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Abstract 
The basic assertion of this thesis is that policy makers' belief systems and economic 
institutions have to change their structures and contents as the nation's economic 
developmental stage is upgraded. Put differently, a state's economic performance or 
achievement of economic objectives will be facilitated if there is no cleavage or 
conflict among economic policy, economic belief systems, and economic institutions. 
This means that the utility of the developmental state is valid until a nation's economy 
is in a take-off position. Persistent developmentalism after this stage will result in 
developmentalism losing its validity and becoming a main obstacle for further 
economic development. At this time, more liberalised economic policies which are 
not only supported by changed belief systems and institutions but also compatible 
with the neo-liberalising international political economy are needed. In other words, 
this thesis does not seek to answer the question `which is the better strategy for 
economic development between developmentalism and neo-liberalism? ' but 
emphasises the importance of the proper timing of transition from developmentalism 
to a liberalised and deregulated economy which is compatible with a mature civil 
society and the neo-liberalising international political economy. 
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction: Conceptualising the post developmental state 
The post developmental state (PDS) 
This thesis starts from the simple observation that in both the Republic of Korea 
(hereafter Korea) and Japan there was a distinctive period after the mid-1980s which 
cannot be explained by the theoretical framework of either developmentalism or neo- 
liberalism. In this period, economic policies oscillated between the free-market 
system and state intervention. This inconsistency and confusion has been neglected 
by the literature of both developmentalism and neo-liberalism. Accordingly, a new 
conceptualisation is necessary. In this thesis, the concept of the `post developmental 
state' (PDS) is used to explain these trends. It refers to the situation in which the 
legacies of the developmental state (DS) or autonomous state were so strongly 
embedded in socio-economic and political institutions that, despite challenges and 
pressures from civil society and the neo-liberalising international political economy 
(e. g. through liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, free trade and investment, 
government downsizing), state intervention in the market system persisted. 
A key difference between the DS and the PDS lies in the extent of congruence among 
three pillars of economic development: economic policies, economic institutions, and 
economic belief systems. More specifically, in the DS period, organic and congruent 
relationships among the three pillars were prevalent. A strong belief in the efficacy of 
state intervention in the market system was shared by crucial policy-makers and 
ordinary people. Thus, economic policies based on developmentalism were faithfully 
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planned and implemented. Also, institutions such as governmental organisations were 
rearranged in order to facilitate and consolidate developmental policies and the 
supporting belief system. By contrast, in the PDS period, there emerged an ever 
increasing cleavage among the three pillars. Economic policies initially embraced the 
free market principle and were continuously liberalised and deregulated 
However, there was a sharp division of economic beliefs within the bureaucracy 
between developmentalsim and neo-liberalism and institutions were deeply 
entrenched in the legacy and inertia of developmentalism-oriented state intervention. 
Thus, the PDS period was unique in its contradictory configuration of liberalised 
economic policies, divided belief systems, and developmentalism-oriented 
institutions. This means that the PDS period cannot be explained or understood 
through the incompatible approaches of developmentalism or neo-liberalism. It also 
means that social constructions such as society, state and the international system are 
not static but dynamic. Thus, the major structures and specific features of the Korean 
and Japanese states and societies have exhibited continuous change and 
transformation. 
The Korean transitionary state (TS) 
Liberalisation in Korea was caused by several factors. First, in the domestic sphere, big 
conglomerates (Chaebol) grew to the extent that they regarded government guidance and regulations 
as constraints on their productivity, competitiveness, and managerial freedom. The Chaebol strongly 
pursued economic liberalisation and tried to induce more liberalised economic policies through 
intensive lobbying of the policy making process. Second, policy-makers in the government were 
under great pressure from the multilateral free trade regime (the GATT and the WTO). Third, more 
high ranking policy-makers accepted the efficacy of a free market economy as they either obtained 
their academic degrees in America, where neo-classical economics is dominanat, or influenced by 
neo-classical economists. Finally, the collapse of the Cold War bipolar system in the late 1980s not 
only weakened Korea's strategic importance to the US but also strengthened the predominance of 
low politics over high politics in the context of the international political economy. Economic 
pressure from the US and the neo-liberalising international political economy forced Korea to 
liberalise its economy. 
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In Korea there emerged new phase after the East Asian economic crisis of 1997. The 
massive impact of the crisis forced Korea to request help from the IMF. Following 
the IMF bailout, Korea faced harsh but unavoidable pressures to adjust its entire 
economic system including economic practices and institutional structure and modify 
its attitude towards the efficacy of the developmental state in propelling its economic 
objectives. In a word, Korea was forced to abandon core parts of developmentalism. 
The neo-liberal structural adjustment was initiated by the economic crisis, but it is 
more correct to say that the need for structural adjustment was deeply embedded in 
developmentalism itself 2. 
First, the bureaucrats' divided belief in the efficacy of developmentalism in the PDS 
period obstructed the effective accomplishment of economic objectives and the 
government's ability to deal with erupting structural problems. Persistent corruption 
among politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen was pervasive throughout the 
Korean PDS period, leading to a distorted and dependent policy making process. In 
other words, whereas, in the DS period, an independent and efficient policy making 
process prevailed, in the PDS system economic policy became a product of coalitional 
give-and-take relations between politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen. As a result, 
a dual economic system, under which the Chaebol dominated the Korean economy 
and small and medium sized companies were suffocated by lack of capital and 
markets, emerged, with the Korean government pursuing a strategy through which 
2 Stanley Fischer, the deputy managing director of the IMF, clearly detects the structural problems of 
the Korean developmental state: "the problems of weak financial institutions, inadequate bank 
regulation and supervision, and the complicated and non-transparent relations among government, 
banks, and corporations were central to the economic crisis" (Fischer 1998: 105). 
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Korea's international competitiveness was based solely on the Chaebol's 
competitiveness. 
However, this strategy led to a dangerous situation when some of the Chaebol began 
to suffer from serious liquidity problems, which were the unavoidable results of 
overinvestment, overcompetition in the small domestic market, and intensified 
competition in the world market. The Korean government failed to deal effectively 
with these ailing Chaebol. This was the inevitable consequence of the bureaucrats' 
divided belief systems, i. e. the Korean government was confused and fragmented in 
terms of its economic ideas between the free-market system and state intervention. 
Thus, the government could neither bankrupt the ailing Chaebol, as neo-liberalism 
proposed, nor channel massive public funds to the Chaebol, as developmentalism 
recommended. Eventually, these lagging and confused governmental efforts to deal 
with the Chaebol led to the start of economic crisis in Korea. This process is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
Second, the Korean PDS's efforts to pursue economic structural reform, which were 
mainly focused on the improvement of the dual economic structure and full-scale 
economic liberalisation, failed and were continuously delayed. This was due to 
several factors. To begin with, the Chaebol, which were regarded by the government 
as the primary means to facilitate economic development, became the main obstacle to 
further structural reform. Because the Chaebol dominated the Korean economy, 
extensive structural adjustment of the Chaebol was considered to be too costly. Also, 
there was strong institutional resistance and inertia which prevented full-scale 
economic reform. The legacy and inertia of institutions which were deeply embedded 
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in developmentalism became an obstacle to pursuing economic liberalisation and 
deregulation. Third, as we have seen above, the belief systems of bureaucrats were 
divided. This obstructed coherent policy making in the pursuit of economic structural 
reform and the determination of major targets of reform. 
Finally, as the international economic system became more closely interdependent and 
as the international political economy became highly politicised, developmentalism in 
one country, entailing domestic market protection and fierce export penetration into 
other countries, tended to result in economic losses in other countries and intensified 
trade friction. As a result, East Asian developmentalism became a highly 
controversial and problematic feature of the international political economy. 
Moreover, with the outbreak of the East Asian economic crisis, the neo-liberal regime, 
led by the JMF, the World Bank, and the US forced crisis-struck countries to adopt 
neo-liberal economic adjustment programmes which aimed to facilitate the eventual 
dismantling of developmentalism in these countries. Thus, accepting the IMF's 
adjustment programmes, Korea entered into a new phase, which called the 
transitionary state (TS) period. In it, foreign economic policies are fully liberalised 
and bureaucrats have embraced the economic belief of neo-liberalism. Thus, in the 
present TS period, economic policies and ideas are based on the efficacy of the free 
market system, but economic institutions are still strongly embedded in 
developmentalism. 
As a result, a concern has grown about whether Korea will transform itself from a 
developmental state to a neo-liberal economy. The answer to this question must await 
the results of various ongoing economic reforms in the labour market, finance, and the 
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Chaebol. However, we can anticipate the answer through the conceptual tools of 
`learning' and `institutions'. In other words, by incorporating the belief systems of the 
bureaucracy and the phenomenon of institutional resistance and inertia into our 
analysis, we can offer some reliable speculation regarding the future direction of the 
Korean political economy. The issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, 
with four possible scenarios. The main assertion of this thesis is that even though the 
original configuration of material interests and political coalitions, which induced a 
consolidated belief system and institutional settings, has changed or disappeared, that 
belief system and those institutional settings have persisted. However, they are 
unlikely to survive as the friction between changed interests and a resilient belief 
system and institutions becomes intensified. The important point here is that the 
sooner ideational and institutional transformations occur, the better economic 
performance becomes and the less economic inefficiency or turmoil. 
In other words, the basic assertion of this dissertation is that the policy- makers' belief 
system and economic institutions have to change their structure and content as the 
nation's economic developmental stage is upgraded. Put another way, a state's 
economic performance and achievement of its economic objectives are facilitated if 
there is no cleavage or conflict among economic policy, economic belief system, and 
economic institutions. This means that the utility of the developmental state is valid 
until a nation's economy is in the take-off position. Persistent developmentalism after 
this stage will result in developmentalism losing its validity and becoming a major 
obstacle to further economic development. At this time, more liberalised economic 
policies which are not only supported by changed belief system and institutions, but 
are also compatible with the neo-liberalising international political economy, are 
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needed. Thus, this dissertation does not seek to answer the question `which is the 
better strategy for economic development: developmentalism or neo-liberalism? ' 
Rather, it emphasises the importance of the proper timing of the transition from 
developmentalism to a liberalised and deregulated economy which is compatible with 
the neo-liberalising international political economy. 
Developmentalism and neo-liberalism as belief systems 
In the literature devoted to explaining the underlying features and background of 
Korea's and Japan's economic development, the unique characteristics of the PDS and 
TS periods are ignored by most researchers. There has been no academic effort to 
build a bridge between developmentalism and neo-liberalism in order to obtain a clear 
understanding of the Korean and Japanese PDS periods and the Korean TS period. 
More importantly, as Bishop points out, "the literature may have underestimated the 
role of the state's developmental ideology" (1997: 3) or "the ideology of 
developmentalism" (1997: 6). And, as Haggard observes, the debate on state 
autonomy "does not answer the nagging question where state interests come from" 
(1990: 46). Thus, the key role of belief systems in determining economic policies and 
the preferences of policy-makers cannot be ignored any more. As the rational model 
suggests, material interests are important in influencing the policy-making process and 
policy outcomes. However, belief systems are just as important. As Higgott points 
out, the East Asian economic crisis was an ideational conflict between East Asian 
developmentalism and Anglo-American neo-liberalism (Higgott 1998). Amsden also 
argues that "neo-classical economics ... is still only a theory. The policies 
associated with it do not automatically generate the outcomes they promise .. 
Between theory and practice lies a mountain of assumptions" (Amsden 1994: 628). 
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This means that developmentalism and neo-liberalism are economic ideas or 
economic grand-theories which have to be chosen by policy-makers in order to 
implement economic policies and to achieve certain policy outcomes. Thus, the 
absence of an ideational approach in the literature of Japanese and Korean studies is a 
major problematic factor. For this research, this thesis seeks to incorporate learning 
theory, which focuses on the belief systems of policy-makers, into the existing 
literature through a critical review. 
Belief systems and the strong state 
The significance of belief systems is also neglected in the debate on the DS or `strong 
state'. The emphasis of this debate has been on autonomy, capacity, and a coherent 
policy-making process (Haggard 1990: 43-44). For example, Wade (1997: 375) 
argues that state effectiveness depends on both policy coherence and the insulation 
(autonomy) of the bureaucracy. The statist approach argues that a strong state can 
emerge only when policy-makers are insulated from societal interest groups (Woo 
1991, Johnson 1987: 145, Leftwich 1996) and international systemic pressures 
(Clapham 1996: 601). Insulation is a prerequisite of state autonomy. A strong state is 
also regarded as one which possesses extensive policy instruments through which 
policy-makers can coerce or persuade various economic actors in order to achieve the 
state's economic objectives. For the statists, a strong state also needs a coherent 
policy-making process, which is possible only when inter-ministerial conflicts are 
absent. 
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However, the critics of these debate on the DS or strong state argue that bureaucrats' 
insulation and a coherent policy making process do not necessarily lead to effective 
policy outcomes. As Doner (1992) argues, state preferences are not independent but 
are reflections of coalitional preferences. Moreover, even in a highly efficient 
developmental state, a decentralised policy making process and inter-ministerial 
conflicts can easily be detected. Also, these debates are not dynamic but static 
because they assume "that once the state initiates and plays a successful role in 
economic development, its hegemony in the economy will continue indefinitely" (Eun 
Mee Kim 1988: 515). 
What all these arguments ignore is the importance of belief systems or ideas. A 
coherent policy making process can be realised only when policy-makers share the 
same economic beliefs or ideas. As Bishop notes: "a key determinant of bureaucratic 
capacity is the value system which holds the bureaucracy together" (Bishop 1997: 
147). Neo-statists like Weiss ignore the significance of belief systems in determining 
the strength of a state. Weiss and Hobson (1995) argue that the state has three 
outstanding capacities: penetrative, extractive, and infrastructural. Infrastructural 
capacity is based on `governed interdependence' between state and civil society. The 
penetrative and extractive capacities are closely interlinked because if a state has a 
high penetrative capacity into civil society, then, it will also have a high extractive 
capacity, as measured by, for example, the amount of taxation. Weiss and Hobson 
emphasise the infrastructural or co-ordinating capacity through which state can 
assume a leadership position while accomplishing a higher form of co-ordination from 
civil society. For Weiss and Hobson, Japan is a representative state with a high co- 
ordinating capacity. This perception is similar to Johnson's structural model of East 
9 
Asia. For Johnson, in addition to bureaucrats' autonomy from societal forces, "co- 
operation between public and private sectors under the overall guidance of a pilot 
planning agency" (1987: 145) is a distinctive characteristic of East Asian economic 
development. Evans (1989) also argues that a strong state has an `embedded 
autonomy' which facilitates continuous negotiations between state and society. 
Young-Myung Kim (1996: 24) also argues that "the strong state exercises its power 
not by coercion but by close interactive relationships between the bureaucracy and 
private companies". 
Weiss and Hobson, Johnson, Kim and Evans all fail to appreciate that continuous co- 
ordination and negotiation between state and society can be realised or strengthened 
only when there is a shared belief system between state and society. By highlighting 
the co-ordinating aspects of the developmental state, this literature overcomes the 
prevalent argument which not only emphasises the state's coercive capacity over 
society (Woo 1991) but also regards state-society relations as a zero sum game. 
However, it fails to identify the basis of co-operation between state and society in 
shared economic beliefs. 
In the cases of Japan and Korea, the shared beliefs in economic mercantilism and 
developmentalism, which are externalised respectively as the `catch up' policy in 
Japan and the `economic growth first policy' in Korea, have enabled the Korean and 
Japanese developmental states to accomplish rapid and high levels of economic 
growth. The key role of belief systems in determining the strength of the state is 
elaborated in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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Intangible institutions and sociological new institutionalism (SNI) 
In the literature on Korean and Japanese studies, institutions are another important but 
neglected variable. Institutions in this literature tend to be restricted to only tangible 
institutions such as governmental organisations, legal systems, and standard operating 
procedures. Even though Haggard calls his approach an institutional approach 
(Haggard and Moon 1990), his approach is interchangeable with statist approach 
(Fields 1995: 23). For him, "the institutional perspective on economic policy 
emphasises the organisational features of the state" (Haggard and Moon 1990: 230). 
Doner (1992) claims that he adopts an `institutional approach' in which not only the 
characteristics of the strong state but also the co-operative aspects between state and 
influential groups are incorporated. However, he also neglects the importance of 
economic belief systems. The shortcomings of these narrowly defined institutional 
perspectives become clear when we endeavour to understand the roles and effects of 
intangible institutions in the foreign economic policy making processes of Korea and 
Japan. People's sentiments, externalised as economic nationalism and xenophobia, 
which can be easily detected in the cases of Korea and Japan, are observable but 
intangible institutions. Without incorporating these intangible institutions into 
analysis, Korea's and Japan's highly protected inward FDI (IFDI) environment cannot 
be clearly understood. Moreover, since institutions are vitally important in the 
learning process, it is necessary to consider institutional settings. In other words, a 
country's learning result is heavily influenced by that country's specific institutional 
settings as exhibited in culture, practices, social norms, and people's sentiments, as 
well as, governmental organisations and legal systems. 
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Thus, in order to overcome the limitations of the existing literature and to take 
account of the role of intangible institutions, this thesis adopts the perspective of 
sociological new institutionalism (SM). The concept of `imbeddedness', which is 
elaborated in SNI, provides useful tool to explain the institutional inertia which causes 
institutional resistance to change, even though the original configuration of interests 
and political coalitions which produced the emergence of particular institutional 
settings has been modified. The term `isomorphism' is also useful: through mimetic, 
normative, and coercive isomorphism, institutions change. Thus, this thesis seeks to 
incorporate SNI into the existing literature, thereby highlighting the influence of 
intangible institutions on policy making processes and policy outcomes. The role of 
ideas and institutions in the foreign policy making process is discussed further in the 
sub-conclusion of Chapter 5. 
A synthetic theoretical framework 
Another major limitation of the existing literature lies in the problematic nature of its 
theoretical frameworks. The literature of Korean and Japanese studies has been 
dominated by the statist and international system approaches. Because the civil 
societies in both Korea and Japan are underdeveloped and not mature, a society- 
centred approach has not appeared to be suitable for explaining Korea's and Japan's 
foreign economic policy (Chu 1989, Johnson 1995: 67). However, as we have seen, 
Korea and Japan entered the PDS phase after the mid-1980s. As a result of steady but 
high economic growth during the two countries' DS period, there emerged a middle 
class and various societal groups which formed a basis for challenging the Korean and 
Japanese states. As Thompson points out, the case of Korea "fit[s] with the 
predictions of modernisation theory" (Thompson 1996: 626). As modernisation 
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theory argues, Korea's civil society has steadily grown as a result of economic 
development. This argument can also be adopted to the case of Japan: Japanese civil 
society has grown and, as a result, a middle class and pluralistic interests groups have 
increased (Pempel 1993, Jang-Kwon Kim 1996, Higashi and Lauter 1990, Zhao 
1995). This means that a society-centred approach cannot be ignored any longer in 
explicating Korea's and Japan's foreign economic policy. 
This thesis elaborates a synthetic approach to Korea's and Japan's foreign economic 
policy. The aim is to synthesise the statist approach, the societal approach, the 
international system approach, the learning approach, and the institutional approach. 
Each of these approaches in isolation produces only a partial analysis. There are 
several researches which have endeavoured to overcome the limitations of a single 
approach. Woo (1991) argues that her approach takes account of the statist, societal 
and international system dimensions of Korea's political economy. However, she 
does not consider the roles of ideas and institutions. In his efforts to elaborate the 
background of the Japanese `reactive state', Calder (1988) considers the Japanese 
state, the international system, and the domestic political structure with equal 
emphasis. However, he excludes the institutional and ideational influences on the 
emergence and consolidation of the Japanese reactive state. Without considering both 
Japanese bureaucrats' belief in the efficacy of developmentalism, and the institutional 
resistance emanating from developmentalism-based institutional settings, a clear 
understanding of the Japanese reactive state is impossible. Criticising the statist 
approach, Koo (1987) argues that he adopts a `comprehensive approach' through 
which the inter-relations among state, society and the international system are closely 
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examined. However, he also overlooks the institutional and ideational aspects of the 
political economy of Korea and Japan. 
Haggard adopts an approach which incorporates statist, societal, international 
systemic, and ideational factors in his book Pathways from the Periphery (1990). 
However, for him, societal and international systemic factors are of less importance 
than statist factors (1990: 42-43). And he also fails to understand the significant role 
of intangible institutions. Moreover, even though he acknowledges the importance of 
ideational factors, he also fails to suggest any concrete explanation of the role of belief 
systems and ideas in his research. Weiss and Hobson (1995: 10) argue that their 
theory of neo-statism does not exclude societal and international system approaches. 
However, their approach remains essentially a statist approach. Goldstein (1993) 
connects ideas and institutions to America's trade policy. Her excellent contribution 
in developing an ideational approach cannot be doubted. However, for her, 
institutions are defined narrowly as laws. Even though she argues that her research 
incorporates intangible institutions such as norms and rules, her research is strongly 
focused on changes in America's trade laws, which are of course closely interlinked 
with economic ideas. Although Goldstein explores the ideational approach, for her 
only economic liberalism and economic protectionism are regarded as economic 
ideas. In this thesis, developmentalism and neo-liberalism are regarded as economic 
belief systems or ideas. 
The neglect of ideational and institutional factors in research produce a partial 
understanding. For example, Gill argues that continuous liberalisation policies under 
Korea's `Segyehwa (globalisation) policy', initiated by the Young-Sam Kim 
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government, "poses the possibility of an abandonment of the developmental state 
model" (1996: 667). Byung-Chun Lee also argues that "developmentalism as a model 
was continuously adjusted to market economy, and as a result, in the Young-Sam Kim 
administration, the fundamental structure and features of developmentalism finally 
collapse" (1998: 1). These assertions are simply wrong. As we will see in Chapter 5, 
liberalised policies in the PDS period were not accompanied by changes in ideas and 
institutions. Liberalisation processes were not an outcome of genuine `learning' 
(changes in belief systems) but merely a tactical `adaptation' (in terms of behavioural 
change) to pressures from both the international system and domestic society. Ideas 
and institutions were strongly entrenched in developmentalism. As a result, far from 
making the abandonment or collapse of developmentalism, the Segyehwa policy was 
an extension of the `economic growth first policy', which was the core part of Korea's 
developmentalist belief system. 
Four types of learning 
The concept of learning has been developed by several disciplines in the social 
sciences. There are basically four types of learning relevant to this thesis: (1) 
technical learning, which refers to the transfer of technology and managerial know- 
how; (2) institutional learning, which refers to the mimetic or coercive isomorphism 
of institutions; (3) learning in foreign policy analysis, which deals with the belief 
systems, ideas and ideologies of policy-makers; and (4) learning and the applicability 
of the East Asian development model (EADM) to other less developed countries. In 
this thesis, learning in foreign policy analysis is the primary analytic framework, but 
the other three varieties of learning will not be excluded. The concept of `technical 
learning' gives us a tool to explain Korea's technological dependency on Japan and 
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the US. It is also necessary for understanding Korea's and Japan's FDI flows, because 
FDI accompanies the transfer of technology and managerial know-how. Mimetic 
isomorphism, which is developed in the theory of sociological new institutionalism, 
can provide a persuasive answer to the question: why are there so many similarities in 
the bureaucratic or semi-governmental structures between Korea and Japan? And the 
concept of coercive isomorphism provides a sophisticated explanation of Korea's 
learning from the international neo-liberal regime, represented by the combination of 
the IMF, the World Bank, and the US. Before the IMF bailout, the view that the 
timing of Korea's neo-liberal structural adjustment would be slower and more costly 
than that of Japan was dominant. This view was supported by the fact that Korea had 
a more dirigiste economy and a more rigidly strong state compared with Japan. 
However, this prediction proved wrong. After the economic crisis, Korea experienced 
rapid reform, including labour market flexibility, financial deregulation, Chaebol 
restructuring, and administrative streamlining. These reforms were the -result of 
coercive isomorphism or coercive learning from the international neo-liberal regime. 
Learning in foreign policy analysis deals with policy-makers' belief systems, ideas 
and ideologies. So far, this approach has focused mainly on strategic studies during 
the Cold-War period, particularly relations between the US and the Soviet Union. In 
this thesis, the concept of learning is employed to analyse foreign economic policy. 
Thus, developmentalism and neo-liberalism are considered not as empirically proven 
prescriptions but as belief systems for economic development. The literature on 
learning and the applicability of the East Asian development model seeks to extract 
core strategies or specific features from East Asian countries' economic development, 
and then to formulate an economic model to be emulated by other less developed 
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countries (Amsden 1994, Broad and Cavanagh 1995). This thesis offers an overview 
of learning theories which are presently scattered in the social sciences, and the 
application of a belief systems approach to the analysis of Korea's and Japan's foreign 
economic policies on FDI. We will discuss the four types of learning in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
FDI and belief systems and institutions 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is taken as a case study in this thesis. Both inward 
and outward FDI are dealt with as a major focus of this research. The role of FDI has 
already surpassed that of trade in international political economy. Research toward 
FDI flows has been centred around two main questions: (1) What are the determining 
factors of FDI flows?; (2) How are host countries, home countries, and MNCs related 
in terms of power? In other words, what are the relationships between the state and 
the market? In the literature of International Business (IB), the main concern has been 
devoted to explain the determining factors of FDI flow, while in the discipline of 
International Political Economy (IPE), the second question has been predominant. 
However, academic communication or mutual understanding between IB and IPE 
have been very rare. As Gilpin (1975: 5) points out, political scientists believe in 
power and economists believe in the market. This thesis tries to overcome this sharp 
division and the basic limitations of research on FDI by incorporating both 1B theories 
on FDI and IPE theories on FDI. FDI theories in both 1B and IPE are critically 
summarised in Chapter 2. This includes both FDI theories of developing countries 
and FDI theories of developed countries. After the 1980s, developing countries 
started their outward FDI (OFDI) in order to maximise their comparative advantage in 
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cheap labour costs or to obtain high technologies through M&As and strategic 
alliances. Korea is one of the outstanding cases of such OFDI development. 
The most important contribution of this thesis lies in its focus on belief systems and 
institutions to explain the inward and outward FDI flows of both Korea and Japan. 
The crucial influence of belief systems and institutions in FDI developments can be 
explained through comparative research. Thus, in this thesis, the historical and 
comparative study of Japanese and Korean FDI development is pursued. This 
approach has not previously been employed. Even though some researchers have 
adopted the comparative or historical research method (Gwang-Chul Lee 1995), they 
have been heavily dependent on an economic approach in terms of the regional, 
industrial and country distribution of FDI flows. And even though some research has 
taken account of state roles in FDI flows, particularly in terms of the supporting 
organisations and regulating systems of both countries (for Japan, Sakurai 1995, 
Tokunaga 1992, Dobson 1993, Machado 1996, and for Korea, Neurath 1984, Clark 
and Chan 1996, Lall 1995, Chung and Branscomb 1996), there has been no research 
focusing on national institutional and ideational settings. 
Characteristic business practices (Keiretsu in Japan, Chaebol in Korea, opposition 
towards hostile take-overs in both countries) and ordinary people's xenophobia and 
economic nationalism (e. g. in the civil movements of `buy Korean or buy Japanese 
goods') are intangible but significant institutional factors which heavily influence both 
countries' IFDI flows. The belief in the efficacy of developmentalism has also 
constrained IFDI flows in both countries. Without considering these ideational and 
intangible institutional factors, both Korea's and Japan's FDI policies and policy 
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outcomes cannot be fully understood. For example, in the Korean and Japanese DS 
period, developmentalism as a belief system prevented IFDI liberalisation and led to 
detailed state regulations and screenings. In the Korean and Japanese PDS period, 
institutions, particularly business practices and business culture, hindered the increase 
of IFDI, although IFDI policies were continuously liberalised and state regulation also 
gradually perished. These factors are ignored in the existing literature on the FDI 
development of Korea and Japan. 
FDI flows are chosen as a case study because, first, FDI is an important index of 
economic globalisation. International investments among states have now surpassed 
international trade among states. However, as we have seen above, there has been 
little comparative research on Korean and Japanese FDI, and it has tended to adopt an 
economic approach. The political aspects of Korean and Japanese FDI development 
have been neglected. Second, as the Korean and Japanese economies have been 
increasingly internationalised, the content of Korea's and Japan's FDI policies and 
policy-makers' belief systems regarding FDI have changed. These changes clearly 
reveal the differences among the DS, PDS and TS periods. The DS was characterised 
by the state's heavy regulations and case by case screenings. The PDS was 
characterised by consecutive liberalisation processes of FDI policy which were not 
accompanied by changes in bureaucrats' belief systems and institutions. The lack of 
congruence and consistency among these three pillars resulted in the general 
ineffectiveness of liberalisation policies. Inward FDI flows were continuously 
regulated and protected in the PDS period. The Korean TS period is characterised by 
fully fledged and comprehensive liberalisation of the Korean FDI regime, caused by 
the impact of the economic crisis. Korean bureaucrats' belief system has changed and 
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became geared to the efficacy of the neo-liberal free market economy in the TS 
period. In sum, Korean and Japanese FDI policy and the associated belief systems in 
FDI clearly reveal the distinctive features of the DS, PDS, and TS periods. 
The expansionist developmental state (EDS) 
As well as using the ideational and institutional approaches, we also need to use the 
political approach. This is because both the massive Japanese OFDI development and 
the smaller Korean OFDI development have been facilitated by political calculations 
and governmental interventions. Thus, this thesis seeks to connect Japanese and 
Korean OFDI development in Southeast Asia with the domestic characteristics of 
developmentalism in the two countries. Without considering Korean and Japanese 
domestic developmentalism's massive influence on OFDI flows, we cannot obtain a 
clear understanding of East Asian economic integration. In order to connect East 
Asian economic integration with Japan's and Korea's domestic developmentalism,, a 
new conceptual framework is required, and for this purpose the concept of the 
`expansionist developmental state (EDS)' is employed in this thesis. 
The EDS refers to the state which propels economic structural adjustment and its 
ultimate political objectives by expanding and re-locating the peculiar characteristics 
of the developmental state into other states or regions in order to overcome the 
challenges from both the domestic and international arenas. The main challenges are 
rising production costs and increasing trade friction caused by the highly politicised 
international political economy. Political objectives include the acceleration of 
economic structural adjustment in the domestic sphere and the improvement of a 
state's political weight in a certain region in order to accomplish `omni-directional 
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diplomacy' (Korea) or regional hegemony (Japan). In this respect, the EDS was a 
policy outcome of Korea's and Japan's post developmental state. The PDS has an 
active aspect in its characteristics: it is a dynamic state which pursues not only the 
internalisation of external pressures coming from the international system but also the 
externalisation of internal pressures coming from domestic society in order to solidify 
and extend its autonomous position emanating from historically determined or 
influenced institutions. The result of this active feature is the emergence of the 
Japanese and Korean EDS in Southeast Asia. 
There are basically two distinctive FDI theories which are used to explain the 
phenomenon of East Asian FDI development: product cycle theory, developed by 
Vernon, and the production networks approach. Product cycle theory is 
interchangeable with the flying geese analogy first introduced by Akamatsu (Bernard 
and Ravenhill 1995: 174). Product cycle theory argues that as a result of transfers of 
standardised technologies and products from developed countries to less developed 
countries, a massive increase of reverse imports to developed countries from the less 
developed countries, led by those transferred products, will be realised. And, as a 
result of the successive processes of these transfers, product cycle theory argues that, 
not only the `catch up' phenomenon but also the homogenisation of industrial 
structures among the countries will occur. Product cycle theory is based on the 
natural changes of comparative advantage among countries. Through the product life 
cycle, Japan transferred standardised and outdated technologies and products to NIEs 
and then to ASEAN countries. Thus, by being incorporated into this product life 
cycle, both NIEs and ASEAN countries achieved a certain level of economic 
development. And, because of differences in comparative advantages among East 
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Asian countries, there emerged a vertical division of labour in which a triple structure 
of regional economic tiers was consolidated: Japan provides expensive and high- 
technology based capital goods: NIEs countries produce low-level capital goods, 
while ASEAN countries are positioned to provide cheap labour costs. This is what is 
representing the flying geese analogy. 
The production networks approach (Bernard and Ravenhill 1996, Hatch and 
Yamamura 1996) refutes the assumptions of product cycle theory. It highlights a 
hierarchical and unequal division of labour in the region. This is different from the 
predictions of product cycle theory, for example, the realisation of catch ups by less 
developed countries, the massive increase of reverse imports, and the homogenisation 
of industrial structures and strategies among regional countries. Thus, the production 
networks approach emphasises the slow increase of reverse imports to Japan in the 
region and more exacerbated technological gaps among regional countries. Moreover, 
by focusing on each country's specific historical, institutional settings, which are the 
outcomes of the country's distinctive state-society relations and unique timing and 
strategy of incorporation into the regional and global structures of the division of 
labour, the production networks approach strongly criticises the concept of the 
homogenisation of industrial structure and strategy assumed by product cycle theory. 
In this thesis, particularly in Chapter 2, it will be argued that the production networks 
approach is a part of product cycle theory. It will be also argued that both approaches 
reveal the same weak point, in the sense that they underestimate the dynamic roles and 
efforts of regional countries in promoting technological capabilities and overcoming 
the structural problems of `dependent development' consolidated in the region. 
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As we will see in Chapter 2, there are several FDI theories in International Business 
(IB) which seek to explain the determining factors of FDI flows: the OLI paradigm 
(ownership, locational, and internalisation advantage), strategic management theory, 
and Investment Development Path (IDP). However, from the early 1990s, a new FDI 
phenomenon (new integration) emerged, different from the old integration (See Table 
2-1). This is alliance or collective capitalism which indicates the importance of 
strategic alliance-seeking FDI flows (Dunning 1995: 58). Alliance capitalism is 
carried out through M&As and strategic alliances. This new phenomenon replaced 
old types of integration (vertical, horizontal integration, and intra-firm, inter-industry 
and intra-industry trades) with new integrations (alliance capitalism and inter-firm 
integrations. ) Of course, the emergence of new integration has been facilitated as the 
costs of technological developments has become so expensive that only. individual 
firms cannot undertake the costs of R&D. Also, the life cycle of new technology has 
become shorter. As competition in technological development has become highly 
intensified and leading MNCs' capacity for innovating new technology has become 
increasingly homogenised, the learning curve has become steeper. As a result, the 
technological gap between developed countries and less developed countries is getting 
wider. Neither the product cycle theory nor the production networks approach can 
produce a complete explanation of these new FDI developments. They can explain 
only the old integrations. 
However, it has to be remembered that in East Asia, new integrations (alliance 
capitalism) are very rare. Japan's and Korea's OFDI development in Southeast Asia 
is still based on the old integration. New integrations occur between the MNCs of 
developed countries. This means that in this thesis, the flying geese analogy, product 
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cycle theory, the production networks approach, the OLI paradigm, strategic 
management theory, and investment development path theory will be dealt with in 
Chapter 6 with a variety of data. However, in Chapter 2, new theories which explain 
new FDI development will be reviewed in order to improve our understanding of FDI 
theories and developments. 
A brief preview of subsequent chapters 
As we have seen, Korea has undergone three distinctive developmental stages: the 
developmental state period; the post developmental state period; and finally the 
transitionary state period under which IMF-forced neo-liberal reforms have been 
undertaken. In these stages, we have witnessed two types of learning: voluntary 
learning from the Japanese developmental state and coercive learning from the 
international neo-liberal regime. The main characteristics of three developmental 
stages and the two types of learning are clearly revealed through the case study of FDI. 
The flows of FDI are determined by both government and private enterprises. 
Therefore, theories of FDI and theories of the policy making process are both re- 
examined in this thesis. Theories of FDI elaborated not only in International Political 
Economy (liberalism, realism or mercantilism, structuralism, the flying geese analogy, 
product cycle theory) but also in International Business (the OLI paradigm, strategic 
management theory, investment development path theory) are reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Theories of the policy making process, which focus on three analytic levels (domestic 
or societal, statist, systemic) are re-examined in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, these 
theories of the policy making process are supplemented by the belief system approach 
and sociological new institutionalism in order to develop a synthetic approach. Any 
analysis which focuses on only one analytic level of the policy making process 
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(international systemic, statist, societal, institutional, or ideational approaches) will 
fail to grasp the whole picture of the complicated reality of Korea and Japan's foreign 
economic policy making processes and outcomes. Also, a theory of FDI which is 
focused on only macro-level analysis, such as mercantilism or structuralism, lacks a 
coherent understanding of the micro-level motives of private enterprises, which are 
developed in International Business. 
In Chapter 4, the Japanese state's socio-economic and political transformation from 
the developmental state to the post developmental state are explained, and in Chapter 
5, the Korean state's transformation from the developmental state through the post 
developmental state to the transitionary state are elaborated. Differences between the 
DS, PDS, and TS period in terms of the relations among civil society, state and the 
international system are elaborated in Figures 1,2, and 3 in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, 
both Korean and Japanese FDI flows are examined on a comparative and historical 
basis. In this Chapter, both inward and outward FDI are researched. 
Japan as an object of comparative study with Korea 
The reason why Japan is chosen here as an object of comparative research is that a 
comparison of Korean and Japanese FDI provides an academic space in which four 
types of learning can be dealt with. Because of their geographical closeness and 
cultural affinity, there has been wide and intensive economic interactions between the 
two countries. After the mid-1960s, Korea learned from Japan in terms of technical 
learning and institutional learning. As a result, Korea is sometimes regarded as the 
next Japan. The proponents of this view believe that for the last 35 years, Korea has 
developed in the same ways as Japan. As a matter of fact, there are similarities 
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between the developmental models of Korea and Japan. These similarities can be 
found in each country's strategic trade and investment policy, industrial policy, and 
well-organised bureaucracy. Consequently, with regard to the role of the state in 
planning and achieving economic national goals, both Korea and Japan are 
categorised as `plan rational' states for scholars like Johnson (Henderson and 
Applebaum 1992). Moreover, Korea's belief in the efficacy of developmentalism in 
achieving economic targets was learned from Japanese developmentalism. Thus, a 
comparative study of Japan and Korea provides us with the chance to deal directly 
with three types of learning. Moreover, because Japan is the original prototype of the 
East Asian developmental model, and also because Korea is another type of EADM, a 
comparative study of Japan and Korea provides us with the opportunity not only to 
investigate the common features of the EADM but also to retrieve some implications 
for the applicability of the EADM to other less developed countries. 
Scope, time span, and method 
In dealing with Korean and Japanese OFDI in this thesis, the host countries are 
confined to the ASEAN 5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Singapore) 
and the time span for FDI development is from 1962 to 1998 for Korea and from 1950 
to 1998 for Japan. This thesis is based on a range of sources including an extensive 
literature review. Secondary sources such as governments' and international 
organisations' official statements and publications were also analysed to supplement 
the literature review. The government sources used in this thesis are: `Economic 
Bulletin' (published by the Korean MOFE), `Monthly Review' (Korea Exchange 
Bank), `White Paper on International Trade' (JETRO), and `Monthly Finance Review' 
(the Japanese MOF). In order to check and confirm information obtained from 
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government sources, private sector publications and opinions are also introduced. The 
private sources are: JAPANECHO (English version), `Japan Economic Almanac' 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun), and various Korean newspapers. 
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Chapter 2. 
Theories on FDI 
Contents 
1. FDI theories 
1-1. FDI theories in IB 
1-2. FDI theories in IPE 
1-3. FDI theories for developing countries 
1-4. FDI theories for East Asia 
2. The state and MNCs 
With the increasing MNCs' horizontal and vertical integration, international 
production caused by FDI has become the chief vehicle of economic interdependence 
and globalisation. Thus, the importance of FDI as a symbol of globalised MNCs 
activities both in the economic and political spheres has been at the centre of the 
disciplines of IPE and International Business (IB) since US MNCs increased their 
activities in Europe from the early 1960s. Since then, in the discipline of IPE, the 
main concerns have been devoted to the relationship between the state and market or 
the state and MNCs. Thus, discussions have centred around several key questions. 
First, whether the state has lost its economic sovereignty over MNCs or globalising 
market forces. Second, whether FDI has negative effects on the home country's 
domestic economy such as the hollowing out of industry and the increase of 
unemployment or on the contrary, whether FDI accompanies domestic structural 
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adjustment by facilitating the shift to a high-technology and high value added 
industrial structure in the home country. Third, whether FDI flows are trade 
diminishing or trade promoting. Fourth, which theory among realism, liberalism, and 
structuralism provides a better interpretation of the relationship between the state and 
market. In relation to the first question, the discourses of `the retreat of the state' 
(Strange 1996), `sovereignty at bay' (Vernon 1971) and `the end of nation state' 
(Ohmae 1995) privileges the predominance of market forces spearheaded by MNCs 
over the state's regulatory, managerial, coordinative and transformative capacity. 
In contrast, the discourse of 'MNCs at bay' and `bringing the state back in' insist on 
the resilience of the state as a main determinant actor in international political 
economy. With respect to the third question, Kojima's FDI theory argues that the type 
of FDI can be divided in terms of macroeconomic and microeconomic underpinnings. 
While the former is based on the changes of comparative advantage between home 
and host countries, the latter is based on the MNCs' search for the host country's local 
market in order to exploit its oligopolistic advantages such as highly sophisticated 
technology. Thus, while "Japanese direct investment is complementary to changes in 
its comparative advantage position" (Kojima 1978: 86) and facilitates Japan's 
industrial adjustment by improving its industrial structure from labour intensive to 
knowledge intensive, American FDI which is mainly developed by innovative, 
oligopolistic MNCs cut-off their comparative advantage by setting up foreign 
subsidiaries. In other words, by transferring labour-intensive industry through FDI to 
developing countries, which then gain their comparative advantage in labour intensive 
industry, Japan's FDI plays a significant role in facilitating both Japan's structural 
adjustment and increases in host country exports in labour-intensive industry. In 
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contrast, American FDI, which is mainly developed by innovative, oligopolistic 
MNCs pursues microeconomic or firm-specific interest at the expense of America's 
comparative and competitive advantage by transferring technology to foreign 
subsidiaries and giving up the chance to increase the amount of exports (Kojima 1978: 
86-9). This specific feature of America's FDI is explained by Vernon's product life 
cycle theory. In sum, Kojima insists that "the main distinction between Japanese and 
American FDI is that Japan's FDI is aimed at increasing international trade and is, 
thus trade-oriented, while American FDI is to serve the recipient country's market: as 
such, it is anti-trade-oriented" (Okposen and Kanbur 1996: 56). 
On the other hand, in the discipline of IB, questions such as why and how MNCs 
invest overseas and where they invest have been the main area of interest. Thus, 
eclectic theory (ownership, internalisation, locational advantages) and strategic 
management theory have been developed in order to explain these questions. It is 
important to acknowledge that there have been some interactions between IPE and IB. 
The incorporation of Vernon's works (product life cycle theory, sovereignty at bay, 
and the obsolescing bargaining model) into lB and the discussion of Dunning's work 
on eclectic theory (OLI : ownership, locational, internalisation advantage) in IPE 
provide clear evidence of the interactions between IPE and IB (Eden 1991: 203). 
However, the main focus of each discipline (the state or firms) remains unchanged 
and resists more intensified interaction between the two disciplines. In other words, 
"economist do not believe in power" and "political scientists ... do not really believe 
in markets. Economists have ignored the political context and the necessary political 
conditions underlying foreign direct investment ... Political scientists, on the other 
hand, have generally neglected economic theories which explain the sufficient 
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economic condition for foreign direct investment" (Gilpin 1975: 5). Thus, while IPE 
treats firms and their collectivity as a black box, IB ignores the inherent conflicts 
between the state and MNCs (Sally 1994). This incompatibility is, without a doubt, 
the main obstacle to obtaining a clearer understanding through a multidisciplinary 
approach of the relations between the state and MNCs as main facilitators of the 
globalising market (Strange 1996: 12). 
The main purpose of this chapter is to overcome this deep division and relatively 
mutual ignorance between IPE and 1B in understanding the changed international 
political economy caused by the increased activities and leverage power of MNCs 
against the state and the various response of the state to MNCs. In order to fulfil this 
purpose, first of all it is necessary to review the theories of FDI developed in both IPE 
and IB and then in the sub-conclusion review the significant debates concerning the 
state versus/and market. 
1. FDI theories 
1-1. FDI theories in IB 
According to Eden, the major analytical focus of IB has changed three times since the 
1960s. At first, a macro approach focusing on the question of the substitutability of 
FDI and international trade was developed. In the mid 1970s, the focus shifted from 
FDI's impact on trade to MNCs' institutional structures. Finally, from the mid 1980s, 
this institutional focus, which produced the OLI paradigm (ownership, locational, 
internalisation advantage) was supplemented by strategic management theory. The 
latter was developed using the core concept of `value chain' in order to explain the 
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new pattern of international production called alliance, relational, and collective 
capitalism' in the 1990s (Eden 1991: 204). 
In the study of IB, there have been five main approaches to international production; 
the cost of capital theory, industrial organisation theory, internalisation theory, eclectic 
theory and strategic management theory. The cost of capital theory is based on 
classical trade theory's main assumption of factor immobility between countries 
(Heckscher-Ohlin model) and this theory argues that interest rate differences are the 
main reason for international capital investment. However, with the emergence of 
international production, this traditional portfolio capital flow theory became obsolete 
"because it contradicts the idea of long-term commitment and managerial control 
inherent aspects of foreign direct investment" (Huang 1997: 8-9). Industrial 
organisation theory (ownership advantage) was developed by Hymer and argues that 
firm specific assets such as economies of scale, superior knowledge competence or 
property rights (technology innovation capacity, patent rights, royalty, managerial 
know-how, brand name rights), well established distribution networks, and efficient 
credit mobilisation capacity are the background of a firm's advantages that overcome 
the extra costs incurred by operating in foreign countries (Huang 1997: 9). 
The internalisation approach (transaction cost approach) was developed by Dunning 
and internalisation advantages are the "advantages a company gains by using its 
ownership factors internally instead of trying to sell them on the market to third 
Dunning defined this term to describe specific feature of international production in the 1990s, 
especially M&A. "The critical feature of strategic-asset-seeking FDI is that the acquiring firm in a 
takeover ... accepts that its internal, or stand-alone, resources and capabilities are 
insufficient to 
sustain its international competitiveness, and that it needs to draw upon resources and capabilities of 
other firms to achieve this goal". See John H. Dunning (1995: 58). 
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parties, e. g. foreign production as opposed to licensing ... and include the ability to 
cross-subsidise products or operations, the ability to avoid transaction and negotiation 
costs, buyer uncertainty about the value of technology being sold, and the ability to 
control supplies of inputs and their conditions of sale" (Taggart and McDermott 
1993: 28). This oligopolistic feature of MNCs' internalisation advantages cannot be 
explained by the neo-classical assumption of perfect markets and its ignorance of the 
concept of transaction costs, because under neo-classical "perfect competition, 
atomistic firms all enjoy equal access to technology and markets, with none large 
enough to influence prices of inputs or output" (Froot 1993: 39-40). 
The eclectic theory (OLI paradigm) was developed by Dunning and is the result of a 
combination of internalisation and ownership advantages with host country locational 
factors which include "trade barriers which restrict imports, most types of labour, 
natural resources, proximity to final markets, condition of transportation and 
communication, degree of government intervention, and cultural distance" (Taggart 
and McDermott 1993: 25-6). Thus, it can be argued that Dunning's eclectic theory 
provides a comprehensive answer to the question of why firms invest abroad and 
where they go. Strategic management theory insists that MNCs engage in a set of 
activities called `value chain' and it: 
consists of primary activities (functions involved in the physical 
creation of the product such as extraction, processing, assembly, 
distribution, sale and service) and support activities (functions that 
provide the infrastructure necessary to support the primary activities 
such as research and development, finance, marketing). Each firm 
must decide the shape and length of its value chain (Eden 1991: 
208). 
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It is the combination of the 011 paradigm and the value chain of MNC strategy which 
provides the key understanding of today's ever increased horizontal and vertical 
integration of MNC activities. As we have seen from the above, the study of IB has 
transformed its main focus three times. The last change in focus from the institutional 
characteristics of MNCs (OLI paradigm) to the production activities and international 
value chains of MNCs reflects the rapidly changing structures of today's international 
production. The outstanding features of today's international production are "an 
enormous increase ... both in crossborder alliance between firms in the same 
industry within the Triad economies ... [and] ... the increasing use by states of 
aggressive industrial policies in high-technology sectors designed to increase national 
competitiveness" (Eden 1991: 204). In other words, the new style of MNCs in the 
1990s was a constellation of several motives: the pursuit of knowledge intensive 
production rather than low cost labour production and the search for new 
Schumpeterian innovations in production and processes from other triad economies' 
MNCs. This new style of MNCs of the 1990s, which can be called alliance 
capitalism, became much more complicated as nation states intervened in this game in 
order to upgrade national competitive advantage and created assets (technological and 
informational capacity, managerial and organisational competence) (Dunning 1993: 6). 
This combination of the market force of MNCs and the state's increased role in 
promoting economic growth needs a combination of both IPE and IB theories on FDI 
which have been focused on politics and economics respectively. 
1-2. FDI theories in IPE 
FDI theories in IPE can be divided into two distinct groups: the first group is based on 
IR theories of realism, liberalism, and structuralism (Gilpin 1975, Clark and Chan 
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1996) while the second group encompasses more economically oriented approaches 
such as the product life cycle theory, the law of uneven development, the obsolescing 
bargaining model, and finally, the changing international division of labour approach 
(Eden 1991: 198). 
The first group was developed by Gilpin's pioneering work on the relations between 
the impact of US hegemony decline and FDI flows. For him, there are three models in 
interpreting FDI flows, that is, the sovereignty at bay model (liberal view), the 
dependencia model (structuralist view) and the mercantilist view (realist view). 
Meanwhile, Clark and Chan suggest a different version of naming each theory, that is, 
modernisation theory (liberalism), dependency theory (structuralism), and statist 
theory (realism) (Clark and Chan 1996: 84). The sovereignty at bay model and 
modernisation theory argue that because of the magnificent advances in technology, 
communication, and transportation and MNCs' indifference to national territories in 
making decisions on investment, trade, production, and distribution, the nation state 
has lost its control over the domestic economic sphere and it is unable to preserve its 
independence and sovereignty in setting macro-economic objectives and policies. 
Proponents of this view insist that MNCs can promote economic growth and 
contribute to improving economic efficacy through both stimulating competition in 
the host country and transferring high technology. In doing so, MNCs also lessen 
income inequality between developed and developing countries. In summary, MNCs 
are "seen by liberals as generally beneficial in their role as promoters of a more 
integrated world order, offsetting the mercantilist tendencies of nation-state" (Eden 
1991: 198). 
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The dependencia model which is Marxist inspired argues that MNCs are aggravating 
the already problematic asymmetrical development between core and periphery 
countries and preventing the realisation of a balanced distribution of wealth. 
Proponents of this view believe that MNCs are frustrating developing countries' 
aspiration to attain indigenous technological capability by providing out-dated or 
obsolete technology and solidifying dependence and exploitation by concentrating 
high-tech, value-added industry and R&D facilities in their home countries while 
confining third world countries' economies to labour-intensive or resource-extraction 
industry. Moreover, by incorporating the third world elite into their transnational 
capitalist class, MNCs also generated the potential for domestic conflicts and social 
division or hostility in developing countries. Structuralists also contend that the 
1 
predominance of MNCs in the host country will result in a further spiral circle by 
undermining indigenous national capital accumulation, indigenous technological 
capability, and native entrepreneurship, which are the underlying foundations of 
autonomous economic development. In summary, structuralists consider MNCs as 
"oligopolistic transnational capitalists that systematically exploit and promote 
underdevelopment in the periphery and semiperiphery creating global income 
inequalities" (Eden 1991: 198) and argue that developing countries' high dependence 
on MNC finance, technology and production systems will ultimately result in 
unavoidable, permanent deeper dependence caused by a distorted domestic economic 
structure. 
The basic proposition of the mercantilist model or statist view is that "strong and 
autonomous states can regulate MNCs and thereby make them contribute to national 
economic performance" (Clark and Chan 1996: 84). This view can be related to the 
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state's managerial capability' of making efficient industrial policy, strategic trade 
policy, and competition policy which are suitable for each state's industrial structure, 
developmental stage and ultimate economic objectives. Moreover, this statist view 
can also be related to the state's transformative capability' which means the ability of 
the state to adjust its economic ideology, institutions and policies in order to overcome 
challenges from the rapidly changing international political economy such as 
economic globalisation and the convergence process towards neo-liberalism and 
multilateral liberalisation of trade, investment and finance. This version of the state's 
transformative capacity is similar to Weiss's definition. For Weiss, the state's 
transformative capacity "refers to the ability of policy-making authorities to pursue 
domestic adjustment strategies that, in cooperation with organised economic groups, 
upgrade or transform the industrial economy. Such strategies encompass both 
structural shifts; from declining to expanding sectors, as well as technological 
diffusion and innovation; and the creation of new industries, products and processes" 
(Weiss 1998: 5). For Weiss, a state's competitiveness is derived form its 
transformative capacity. 
Gilpin's mercantilist model has a slightly different view compared with the statist 
view. The proponents of the mercantilist model believe that "the erosion of national 
self-sufficiency has gone too far and the world has surpassed the limits of beneficial 
interdependence" because "[i]nterdependence accentuates domestic economic 
problems as economic instabilities in one economy spill over into other" and "[i]t 
causes labour dislocations, accentuates inequalities of income distribution, makes 
national planning more difficult, and increases the society's vulnerability to external 
political pressures" (Gilpin 1975: 236). In this mercantilist model, the state 
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participates in a regional economic bloc in order to enter into alliance with like- 
minded countries to deal with trade, investment, and finance related problems in a 
mini-multilateral setting rather than stands alone (Gilpin 1975: 234, Oman 1994: 15). 
This is because regionalism allows the state to obtain the benefits of interdependence 
without losing its autonomy and without causing excessive adjustment costs. In 
summary, the mercantilist model and the statist view believe that MNCs are 
challenging the power of nation states and MNCs "need to be regulated ... to ensure 
that state autonomy and sovereignty are maintained" (Eden 1991: 198). 
These three approaches have their weaknesses and although these shortcomings are 
the result of the pursuit of theoretical parsimony, they also raise serious criticisms 
from opponents. The foremost critique of the sovereignty at bay model can be found 
in its negligence of the political context within a country or between the home and 
host countries. It is clear that the liberalist view asserts MNCs' preponderance and 
leverage advantage over the host state. However, the host country can set a protective 
barrier to IFDI from foreign MNCs in order to provide a stable market for domestic 
corporations or to promote domestic competitive advantage by fostering a domestic 
oligopolistic market structure which will provide economies of scale for domestic 
corporations. Moreover, the host country can alter FDI flows by establishing laws 
which prefer licensing and joint ventures rather than wholly owned subsidiaries. This 
state's managerial capability of "breaking the package of capital, technology, and 
entrepreneurship which foreign direct investment has most frequently entailed" 
(Gilpin 1975: 239) has been the main feature of both Korea and Japan's foreign 
economic policy on FDI. Moreover, in contrast to the liberalist view, the statist view 
contends that the state is not losing its regulatory, managerial, and bargaining power 
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but the state is flexible enough to transform its institutions, policies and economic 
beliefs in order to overcome pressures from both domestic society and the 
international system. 
The structuralist view has lost its persuasive and interpretative power as a theory 
especially with the emergence of East Asian NIEs from the periphery to semi- 
periphery status. Its main assumption is that FDI is basically exploitative. However, 
there are exception such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand which 
have pursued an open door policy to IFDI but managed tremendous economic growth. 
Moreover, the dependencia model regards Third Wworld countries as passive objects 
in the context of the international political economy (Gilpin 1975: 247).. However, 
considering the bargaining power of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and the active regional arrangement of the ASEAN member 
countries, it is obvious that peripheral countries or semi-peripheral countries are not 
necessarily reactive or passive to external pressures and impacts. 
According to Gilpin, there are more controversial debates about the causal 
relationship between MNCs and host countries' subordinated, dependent, and 
underdeveloped economic structure. The first controversy is whether MNCs' 
presence causes a collapse in the domestic industrial base and local entrepreneurship 
or vice versa. The second controversy is whether technology transfer from MNCs is 
good for only the short-term but bad in the long run for economic development. The 
third controversy is whether IFDI will eventually lead to a distorted economic 
structure and increased over-consumption which will dry up domestic financial 
resources and in turn, will inhibit further investment. Gilpin argues that it is difficult 
39 
to distinguish between "what is cause and what is effect" (Gilpin 1975: 250). In a 
word, the direction of causality is not clear. For example, we can not decide which is 
cause and which is effect between MNCs predominance and absence of native 
technological capacity and indigenous entrepreneurship. In relation to the second 
controversy, Gilpin insists that if a state has an aversion to MNCs and worries about 
the disadvantages of technological dependence, the significant questions are whether 
that state has an autonomous capability in technology innovation and whether that 
state can support the enormous costs needed to develop indigenous technology (Gilpin 
1975: 249-52). The third contention of structuralists that increased IFDI will result in 
over-consumption and that this will lead to a shortage of finance for investment can be 
easily rejected by pointing to the cases of Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand 
where high rates of domestic saving and inward FDI flows have co-existed with each 
other 
Gilpin's mercantilist model indicates that with the decline of US hegemony and the 
disappearing of the technological gap between the US, Japan and Germany, 
regionalisation based on each of the three state's mercantilist strategy will replace the 
US hegemony-led multilateral liberalisation regime. Moreover, there are three factors 
which would propell the emergence of regionalism. First, the difficulty of pluralist 
leadership among the three core countries. Second, the state's preference for 
domestic economic autonomy to excessive interdependence, and third, the state's 
resistance to economic structural adjustment (e. g. protection of declining industry in 
order to prevent unemployment) caused by other states' arbitrary comparative 
advantage and strategic intervention into the market (Gilpin 1987: 397-400). In this 
mercantilist model, the market as an efficient allocator of production factors is losing 
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its value as states pursue more interventions into the market by forging `creative 
assets', `arbitrary comparative or competitive advantage' through industrial policy, 
strategic trade policy, competition policy, protectionism and various incentive 
systems. Thus, FDI policy in this model is based on a distorted market and this 
market distortion appears as a set of forms: the selective opening to IFDI by 
implementing a negative list or approval system; protection of certain industries; 
screening; red tape; window guidance; and induction of joint venture or licensing 
rather than FDI. These policies have been practised by Korea and Japan in their 
developmental state period and the post developmental state period. 
The mercantilist model and statist model face ever-intensified pressures from 
globalising market forces and interdependence. Globalists argue that "states were 
once the master of markets, now it is the markets, which, on many crucial issues, are 
the masters over the governments of states" (Strange 1996 : 4). The main facilitators 
of this retreat of the state and sovereignty at bay are MNCs and global finance and 
MNCs' "attraction to host states is its ability to raise finance both for the investment 
itself and ... 
for the development of new technology" (Strange 1996: 9) Thus, 
because of the dramatic growth of MNC activities, "the latitude for autonomous and 
purely domestic oriented actions on the part of the governments of nation states ... 
is being severely curtailed" (Dunning 1993: 2). In summary, while statists argue that 
the state can regulate MNCs and FDI flows and control them by intrusive policy in 
order to realise its economic objectives, globalists criticise the statists' assertion by 
arguing that MNCs are "no longer shaped and conditioned by reasons of the state" and 
"[g]overnment funded subsidies-old fashioned tax breaks for investing in this or that 
location-are becoming irrelevant as a decision criterion" (Ohmae 1995: 3). The 
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relationship between the state and market (MNCs) or the state and economic 
globalisation will be elaborated in the sub-conclusion. 
The second group of FDI theories in IPE is more economics-oriented developed by 
Vernon and Hymer and these are the product life cycle theory, the obsolescing 
bargaining model, the law of uneven development and the international division of 
labour. The product life cycle theory, which was developed by Raymond Vernon, has 
two versions. The first version maintains that "every technology or [manufactured] 
product evolves through three phases in its life history: (a) the introductory of 
innovative phase, (b) the maturing or process-development phase, and (c) the 
standardised or mature phase ... [and] ... The evolution of technology, its 
diffusion from economy to economy, and the corresponding shift in comparative 
advantage among national economies explain both the patterns of trade and the 
location of international production" (Gilpin 1987: 235). The second version was 
modified by Vernon himself and this revised model regarded MNCs as oligopolistic 
firms. Thus, FDI is the result of the oligopolistic MNCs' strategic behaviour "to erect 
barriers to entry in foreign markets in order to maintain market share" and "[o]nce the 
oligopoly becomes mature, the members use economies of scale in production, 
marketing, and research and development as entry barriers to new firms" (Eden 
1991: 199). 
This product life cycle theory faces several critiques. First, the MNC, that is the 
investing firm, "is not necessarily the innovator", and "[s]uch examples are the 
Korean and Japanese conglomerates" (Huang 1997: 13). In other words, this model 
"disregards the increasing proportion of foreign investment that is not trade replacing" 
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(Tolentino 1993: 72). Second, because this theory is focused on manufactured goods, 
service industry and raw material related FDI cannot be explained. Third, this theory 
is limited as it is unable to explain the rapidly changing reality of the 1990s. In other 
words, "with the elimination of the technological gap ... among the triad economies, 
global MNEs now have leading plants and outposts in the major Triad markets .. -ý 
. Thus the parent firm is importing products and technology 
from its foreign affiliate 
abroad in a reversal of the model's prediction. In addition, the product cycle model 
cannot explain where or when particular products are developed in the Triad, or why 
there are mutual cross investments by MNEs in each other's market" (Eden 
1991: 214). 
Put differently, MNCs "have increasingly pursued global strategies that are 
inconsistent with the model. The combined effects of the high costs of R&D, the 
convergence in technological capabilities between firms in the developed countries 
and the rapid rate of technological diffusion in these countries has meant that the 
firms' networks must introduce newly developed products in all sales territories 
simultaneously" (Tolentinol993: 71-2). Fourth, "the model does not address properly 
the question of why MNCs do not license or export, but instead prefer to invest in 
their own foreign production facilities" and "the model does not examine what 
systematic advantages foreign firms have that enable them to overcome their inherent 
disadvantages vis-a-vis local firms" (Taggart and McDermott 1993: 26). In other 
words, while this theory can explain locational factors, it does not analyse 
internalisation factors. Finally and most importantly, recent pattern of FDI in 
developing countries does not conform to the Schumpeterian approach adopted in this 
model. MNCs from developing countries can "engage in foreign direct investment or 
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licensing activities as a form of backward technology transfer in order to gain access 
to complementary foreign technology which ... these firms can combine with their 
indigenous technological innovation" (Tolentino 1993: 73). The product life cycle 
theory will be articulated further in section 3 which deals with theories of FDI in 
developing countries. 
The obsolescing bargaining model was also developed by Vernon and the main 
assumption of this model is that relations between the host country and MNCs are not 
static or fixed but dynamic and changeable over time: 
Prior to the entry of the MNE, the host government is assumed to be 
in a weak bargaining position. Given the uncertainty of investing in 
a new country, and the number of options open to the MNE, the 
state must offer concessions in order to attract entry. However, once 
the investment has been made, bargaining power shifts towards the 
host state. Over time, the uncertainty dissipates; the MNE commits 
more and more immobile resources that can be used as hostages; 
and the host country becomes less dependent on the MNE for 
capital, technology, and access to markets (Eden 1991: 201). 
This obsolescing bargaining model shows the active interaction and continuous tug- 
of-war between the host country and MNCs and implies that any assertion of single 
dominance by one over the other between the host country and MNCs is flawed. 
However, it has to be added into the calculation that "with more MNEs following 
global strategies focused on knowledge-intensive production, the country-specific 
advantages of many developing countries are not high enough to attract global MNEs" 
(Eden 1991: 216). Moreover, as more developing countries adopt open market 
policies to IFDI flows, the competition among them has increased and this position 
can lead to the weakening bargaining power of host countries. 
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The law of uneven development is explored by Hymer and this model shares a 
common understanding with the dependencia model in seeing MNCs as leading 
agents of exploitation and underdevelopment of periphery and semiperiphery 
countries (Eden 1991: 201). In the view of Hymer, MNCs create a hierarchical 
division of labour by international FDI deployment and in this hierarchical integration, 
high-technology and high-value added activities are positioned in the home country 
while labour-intensive, resource-extractive, and low value added activities are located 
in host countries. This uneven development caused by the hierarchical MNC structure 
is further exacerbated by the host country's concessionary incentives such as tax 
breaks, minimal regulations, free land supply and direct subsidies from the central or 
local government. Moreover, "the new-style MNEs of the 1990s ... may play out 
the law of uneven development by widening the income gap between the richest and 
poorest countries. With FDI almost totally occurring within the Triadic economies 
and strategic alliances among Triad MNEs producing most of the new technology, the 
technology gap between the North and the poorest countries of the south ... is to 
widen" (Eden 1991: 217). 
The changing international division of labour model was also developed by Hymer 
based on historical changes in the nature of the division of labour. The nature of the 
international division of labour sought by MNCs activities has been transformed from 
the pursuit of raw material extraction (old division of labour) through the search for 
cheap labour cost (new division of labour) to the seeking of knowledge and 
technology improvement in order to attain strengthened innovative capability (new 
new division of labour) (Eden 1991: 202). In this model, if MNCs search for low 
labour cost was the main reason for the increased FDI from the US and Japan to East 
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Asian and Latin American developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s, then MNCs 
pursuit of more knowledge and technology intensive production methods is the factor 
underpinning the increased inter-firm and intra-industry trade and investment among 
the triad (the US, Japan and the EU). This appears to have been the outstanding 
feature of FDI trends in the 1990s. This changing international division of labour 
model has its benefits in explaining the historically changing trends and main 
characteristics of FDI development. 
However, this model's disadvantage lies in its theoretical inability to explain certain 
FDI flows created by developing countries' MNCs whose main motivation is the 
search for cheap labour cost. In other words, this model's inherent theoretical flaw 
which arises from its insistence on the linear or sequential advancement of FDI trends 
obfuscates the reality of the 1990s where not only developing states' outward FDI 
(both cheap labour and technology acquisition pursuit) but also triad countries' 
mutually penetrating FDI (both cheap labour and strategic assets searching) co-exist. 
Moreover, this reality of the 1990s is getting more complicated by the existence of 
substantial FDI growth which was formed in order to avoid protectionist behaviour 
such as local content requirement in host countries. However, this model's 
contribution is its provision of a theoretical tool which enables us to understand the 
new style FDI development in the 1990s such as alliance capitalism (M&A, strategic 
alliance, and international subcontract) by including the `new new' division of labour 
into IPE perspectives. The specific features of this `new new' division labour have 
been detailed in the section on FDI theories in IB. 
1-3. FDI theories for developing countries 
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In IPE and IB, there are three main FDI theories which have direct or indirect 
implication for the explications of developing countries' FDI development: the 
product life cycle theory developed by Vernon; the theory of localised technological 
change by Lall; and the investment development path by Dunning. As we have seen 
in the section on FDI theories in IPE, the product life cycle theory has a serious flaw 
in explaining increased inter-firm integration among triad MNCs through the 
formation of strategic alliances and M&As. This new form of international 
production, which is called alliance capitalism, is a result of a convergence among 
triad countries in terms of technological capability, income per capita, and 
homogenous consumer taste. However, although this model "is losing its relevance in 
explaining trade and investment among advanced industrial countries, the model 
maintains some relevance with regard to developing countries since some form of 
divergence still exists in their national markets" (Tolentino 1993: 74). 
The ownership advantage of developing countries' MNCs is based on not only their 
capacity for imitation but also their capacity for adaptation of transferred technology. 
This ownership advantage is the result of a response to the unique condition of the 
home market and the creation of new products and production processes. In other 
words, the competitive advantage of developing countries' MNCs "need not be based 
on technological innovation or other oligopolistic advantages but on the development 
of special skills in the maintenance, repair and supply of spare parts for second-hand 
machinery, the use of lower-cost labour intensive production processes and low salary 
payments to managers who are nonetheless adept at organising in developing country 
conditions" (Tolentino 1993: 74). 
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There are two reasons for the strategy of internationalisation through internalisation by 
these firms in FDI development. First, because of advanced countries' protectionism 
and increased transaction costs, these firms go abroad. Second, because most of the 
skills, technology, and their accumulated experience which are the result of learning 
by doing or learning by using are -"not codifiable and therefore cannot be easily 
transferred to other firms" (Tolentino 1993: 85), these firms choose to internalise their 
competitive assets by FDI rather than licensing. In summary, the competitive 
advantages of developing countries' firms "is predicated to derive from their ability to 
imitate and adapt foreign technology in accordance with Third World markets and 
production conditions" (Tolentino 1993: 84). 
In the theory of localised technological change developed by Lall, Third World 
MNCs' firm specific advantages, which are the main reason for Third World MNCs' 
FDI development, are derived from three sources: 
First is the localisation of technical knowledge ... Innovation may 
take form of adaptation of imported technology or specialisation in 
some foreign outdated technology. Second ... Innovation in this 
case may result indigenously through the improvement of local 
products or the adaptation of imported products. Third is innovation 
that results in smaller-scale techniques as opposed to the large-scale 
techniques of developed countries (Tolentino 1993: 78). 
Thus, it can be argued that in understanding Third World MNCs' ownership 
advantages, both the product life cycle theory and the theory of localised technological 
change share common features. However, the difference between these two theories 
lies in Lall's acknowledgement of Third World MNCs' capacity to develop genuine, 
indigenous and independent technological accumulation and his emphasis on 
irreversible, path dependent technological development of each country and the great 
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differences in competitive advantages among developing country MNCs. Thus, it can 
be argued that the product life cycle model is based on a simple generalisation about 
the nature of Third World MNCs and because of this, it "fails to explain marked 
variations in the characteristics of MNEs between developing countries ... [and] ... 
The model excludes other important sources of competitive advantages for developing 
country firms and, specifically, the genuine indigenous technological capability for 
competitive innovation" (Tolentino 1993: 79). In summary, the major shortcomings 
of the product life cycle theory is "in failing to consider the case when firms from the 
more advanced developing countries increasingly generate the capacity for localised 
technological change. The theory of localised technological change formulated by 
Lall shows the capability of indigenous firms in developing countries to generate 
genuinely unique innovations" (Tolentino 1993: 85). 
Dunning's investment development path (IDP) is based on the relationship between 
the state's GNP growth and the state's Net Outward Investment (NOI) and this path 
has five stages. In the first stage, IFDI is very low because the country's locational 
advantage is insufficient to attract foreign investment. The low level locational 
advantages are derived from the undeveloped infrastructure, the small domestic 
market, inappropriate government policy on IFDI, and low quality human resources 
caused by a poor education system in the host country. The government can intervene 
at this stage by improving the quality of education and infrastructure and 
implementing favourable FDI policy. In the second stage, IFDI is rising because the 
country's consumption or purchasing power has increased and the country's OFDI has 
entered into the nascent period. However, the gap between inward and outward FDI is 
widened because the increase of OFDI cannot offset the increase of IFDI. In this 
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stage, the state can provide subsidies for export promotion and technological 
improvement in order to strengthen competitiveness. The state in the third stage will 
experience not only a gradual decrease in the growth rate of IFDI but also a rapid 
growth of outward FDI. "Comparative advantages in labour-intensive activities will 
deteriorate, domestic wages will rise, and outward direct investment will be directed 
more to countries at lower stages in their IDP... [and] ... The original [ownership] 
advantage of foreign firm also begin to be eroded, as domestic firms acquire their own 
competitive advantages and compete with them in the same sector" (Dunning 1996: 
4). As a result of this enhanced domestic firms' competitive advantage, there will be 
increased OFDI to countries at stages 1 and 2. The important point in this stage is that 
in order to realise steady economic development and move up to the next stage of the 
investment development path, industrial structural adjustment has to be implemented. 
In the fourth stage, the state will accomplish net outward FDI. Firms in this stage will 
have competitive advantage both in the domestic and foreign market. "Production 
processes and products will be state of the art, using capital-intensive production 
technique as the cost of capital will be lower than that of labour. In other words, the 
L[ocational] advantage will be based almost completely on created assets" (Dunning 
1996: 6). And because of this, IFDI in the fourth stage will be focused on seeking 
strategic assets from other states located in the same fourth stage or the fifth stage. At 
the same time, in this stage, there will be some IFDI from lower stage countries in 
order to gain access to markets or technological acquisition. At this stage, because of 
the increased competition between countries with similar capabilities in created assets 
and national competitiveness, the role of the state will be strengthened. Thus, 
"[w]hile continuing its supervisory and regulatory function to reduce market 
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imperfections and maintain competition, [the government] will give more attention to 
the structural adjustment of its location-bound assets and technological capabilities" 
(Dunning 1996: 7). The fifth stage is "the scenario towards which advanced industrial 
nations are now approaching" (Dunning 1996: 7). This scenario is similar to the 
globalists' view of a convergence among triad countries. In this stage, "as income 
levels, economic structures and patterns of international production among the Triad 
countries converge, the relative attractions of a particular location will depend less on 
the availability, quality and price of their natural assets and more on those of their 
created assets" (Dunning 1996: 7). Thus, at this stage, there will be true transnational 
corporations and strategic assets seeking investment through strategic alliances and 
M&As will increase and such strategic assets seeking behaviour of firms will 
precipitate the process of convergence among Triad countries. 
It is important to note that Dunning's convergence thesis in the stage 5 scenario is 
different from the argument of `the end of the nation state', `sovereignty at bay' and 
`the retreat of the state' perspectives, because for Dunning, even in the fifth stage, not 
to mention all the previous four stages, the role of government remains significant. 
Dunning argues that even in the fifth stage, "governments will increasingly assume 
the role of strategic oligopolists, taking into account the behaviour of other 
governments in the formation and execution of their own macro-organisational 
strategies" (Dunning 1996: 11). The investment development path suggests a useful 
tool to trace the changes in each state's FDI flows in conjunction with each state's 
developmental stage. 
1-4. FDI theories for East Asia 
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The literature which seeks to explain the major features and environment of FDI 
development in East Asia has focused on either product cycle theory (the flying geese 
analogy) or production networks. Akamatsu's flying geese analogy and Vernon's 
product cycle theory are used interchangeably in the literature (Bernard and Ravenhill 
1995: 174). They are basically neo-classical approaches (Chowdhury and Islam 1993: 
101) and consist of two stages. In the first stage, Japan as a leading goose transfers 
its matured or outdated technologies or manufacturing products to less developed 
countries in the region as Japan's industry moves up in the developmental ladder 
through innovative technological developments. Through these continuous transfers 
of matured technologies and products, less developed countries are sequentially 
incorporated into regional economic integration. In the second and final stage of 
product cycle theory, `catch ups' are realised as reverse imports from less developed 
countries' manufactured goods to Japan greatly increase. 
More specifically, in the first stage, East Asian countries are integrated into a vertical 
division of labour (inter-industry trade) according to changes in comparative 
advantage among countries. As a result, a vertical division of labour among Japan, 
NIEs and ASEAN countries emerges. The second and final stage of product cycle 
theory further argues that through continuous transfers of products and technologies, a 
horizontal division of labour, which leads to increase of intra-industry trades, emerges 
in the region. As a result of the emergence of horizontal integration, reverse imports 
to Japan, catch-up processes, and the regional homogenisation of industrial structures 
and development trajectories are realised in the region. 
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The production networks approach elaborated by Bernard and Ravenhill (1996) and 
later Hatch and Yamamura (1996) argues that in East Asia, through Japanese- 
formulated production networks, highly unequal and hierarchical integration is 
realised. The production networks have increased intra-firm trade, with scattered 
subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs in the region producing standardised and more price- 
competitive intermediary goods in order to improve parent firms' international 
competitiveness. However, deepening technological dependence and the 
consolidating trade deficits of regional countries show that there is a vertical division 
of labour in the region. And, instead of an increase of reverse imports to Japan, as 
predicted by the final stage of product cycle theory, less developed countries' exports 
are greatly dependent on the domestic markets of the US and the EU countries. Thus, 
a triangular relation among Japan as a capital goods provider, East Asian countries as 
both importers of Japanese capital goods and exporters of final goods, and Western 
countries as market providers has emerged. 
Proponents of the production networks approach criticise product cycle theory by 
refuting the assumptions of the final stage. The final stage argues that, first, 
technological catch up, second, massive reverse imports, and finally, the 
homogenisation of industrial structures and developmental trajectories (through 
continuous transfers of products and technologies among the leading country and 
following countries) will be realised in East Asia. However, the current reality of 
production networks in East Asia shows that these three predictions cannot be 
vindicated due to three main reasons (Bernard and Ravenhill 1995: 175-178). First, 
the heavy technological dependence of East Asian countries on Japan shows that in 
the region, the phenomenon of dependent development is being consolidated and this 
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dependency is getting deeper. The rapid changes of innovative technologies by 
Japanese MNCs and Japan's extremely careful protection of its high and core 
technologies can be seen as major reasons for the obstruction of the technological 
development of East Asian countries. Moreover, instead of the process of 
standardisation and the transfer of technologies, as argued by the first stage of product 
cycle theory, continuous innovations in Japan actually frustrate the transfers of 
standardised technologies. 
Second, reverse imports from East Asian countries to Japan are not satisfactorily 
realised. As we will see in Chapter 6, the amount of reverse imports has steadily 
increased (Hook 1996: 182). However, a triangular relationship among Japan, East 
Asian countries, and the US remains. This indicates that the Japanese market is not 
fully open to East Asian countries' exports. As a result of technological dependence 
and the small amounts of reverse imports, East Asian countries have experienced 
chronic trade deficits with Japan. Third, instead of the homogenisation of industrial 
structure and development trajectory, there exist diversified forms of industrial 
structure and different development trajectories in East Asia. Even though, as 
Cumings argues, we cannot neglect the similarities among East Asian countries, (the 
most outstanding similarity is the existence of a shared economic belief system which 
is strongly anchored in the efficacy of developmentalism in East Asia), Japan, the 
NIEs, and ASEAN countries have different economic structures and strategies of 
incorporating into regional and global economic integration. The reasons for these 
variations are, as Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) and Bernard (1996) point out, the 
result of differences between each country's historical and institutional settings, which 
are deeply influenced by each country's society-state relations and the timing and 
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strategy of incorporation into regional economic integration and the international 
division of labour. 
However, the literature on East Asian FDI development overlooks the fact that the 
product cycle theory and production networks approach are not mutually exclusive. 
More correctly speaking, the reality of regional economic integration in East Asia 
contains a complicated structure which can be explained only when we adopt both 
approaches. In other words, a sharp dichotomy between the two approaches cannot 
produce a clear analysis of East Asian EDT development. This means that the two 
approaches are not incompatible in explaining historical FDI development in the 
region. 
First, as we have seen above, product cycle theory has two distinctive stages. In the 
first stage, the differences of technological capability and the changing comparative 
advantage among regional countries lead to successive transfers of standardised and 
matured products and technologies from advanced countries to less developed 
countries. Thus, in this stage, there exists a hierarchical industrial structure among 
countries. It is these uneven relations among countries in terms of technological 
capability that are more clearly and specifically highlighted and emphasised in the 
production networks approach. As we have seen above, the production networks 
approach's great contributions to the understanding of East Asian FDI developments 
can be found in its emphasis on exploitive, unequal, and highly politicised economic 
integration processes in the region. Thus, the approach reveals the problematic 
division of labour in the region by highlighting the small amount of reverse imports to 
Japan from regional countries and the exacerbated technological dependence of 
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regional countries on Japan. A more problematic structure, which is strongly 
consolidated, is the triangular relationship among Japan, the US and regional 
countries. In this triangular form, Japan enjoys massive trade surplus while the US 
undertakes the costs of industrial adjustments in East Asian by absorbing enormous 
exports from regional countries. East Asian countries act as Japan's export platform, 
and suffer from heavy trade deficits and technological dependence with Japan as well 
as political pressure from the US in terms of market opening and liberalisation. 
In summary, production networks theory has an advantage in explaining the 
worsening and intensifying `unequal and dependent integration processes' in the 
region by highlighting such phenomena as technological gaps, the small amount of 
reverse imports, the consolidated trade deficits structure, and the highly politicised 
triangular trade relations in the region. What the literature on production networks 
approach fails to understand is that production networks are a part of product cycle 
theory. The first stage of product cycle theory is basically unequal and dependent 
process in terms of technological capability and economic strength of each country in 
the region. The exacerbated unequal and dependent economic relationships among 
countries can be explained more clearly by the production networks approach. 
However, this does not mean that the first stage of product cycle theory fails to 
explain these problematic features of the regional division of labour. Thus, it can be 
argued that Japanese production networks in Southeast Asia are basically a negatively 
consolidated or extended first stage of product cycle theory. 
Second, having pointed out that production networks are a part of the first stage of 
product cycle theory, it can be argued that the most crucial question is how to 
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accomplish an equal and genuine horizontal division of labour in the region, rather 
than trying to determine which theory is better in explaining East Asian FDI 
development. Put differently, the major concern is the significance of political factors 
for regional economic integration. The final stage of product cycle theory assumes 
that catch ups and massive reverse imports will be realised. However, as the 
proponents of the production networks approach point out, technological gaps are 
increasing and, as a result, "Japan is actually flying further and further ahead of the 
regional flock" (Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 28). The pace of reverse imports to 
Japan is very slow. Moreover, triangular relations among Japan, the US, and East 
Asian countries produce higher economic tension among them. These structural 
problems cannot be overcome through purely economic efforts. Here, the importance 
of political factors in regional economic integration is clear. The crucial weak point 
of product cycle theory is that it cannot explain created or artificial comparative 
advantage, which is an intentional outcome of governmental efforts through industrial 
policy. 
As we have seen above, the flying geese analogy and product cycle theory are based 
on the natural changes in comparative advantages among countries. This means that 
product cycle theory cannot provide a theoretical foundation capable of explaining the 
role of regional states and their industrial policies in purposefully creating artificial 
comparative advantage. With the help of this concept of created comparative 
advantage, we can lay a firm theoretical foundation which can explain Japan's effort 
to protect its core and innovative technologies, and Korea's efforts to raise its 
technological capability through various regulations and supportive systems. As a 
result of each country's industrial policy, there has emerged a complex economic 
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integration process in which not only technological dependence but also competitions 
and complementation among regional economies are formulated. 
Hook argues that "the general increase in technologically sophisticated industries 
being located in other parts of East Asia suggests these economies are not so much 
following Japan as the lead goose in the flying geese model of economic development 
as much as leap frogging into advanced industries, at least in the electronics fields" 
(Hook 1996: 181-182). Awanohara (1989) also argues that we cannot underestimate 
the emergence of a multi-layered competition and chase process in East Asia. In this 
respect, it can be argued that the production networks approach also reveals its weak 
point by underestimating the dynamic roles of regional states and their industrial and 
technological policies. As we have seen, the production networks approach over- 
emphasises deepening technological gaps and unequal economic integration processes 
in the region. To be sure, these structural problems have to be resolved by political 
interactions among regional countries. Because the production networks approach 
underestimates the role of politics and regards NIEs and ASEAN countries as simply 
passive and inactive actors in raising their technological capabilities and overcoming 
structural dependence on Japan, the approach cannot yield a rigorous theory. As we 
will see in Chapter 6, this thesis emphasises these political dimensions of regional 
economic integration. 
Third, from the macro point of view, the flying geese analogy and product cycle 
theory can produce a holistic approach to East Asian economic development and 
integration. By comparing three Northeast Asian countries' (Japan's, Korea's, and 
Taiwan's) historical patterns of industrialisation, Cumings (1987: 46) points out that 
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"it is misleading to assess the industrialisation pattern in any one of these countries: 
such an approach misses ... the fundamental unity and 
integrity of the regional 
effort". In other words, for Cumings, "industrial development ... cannot be 
considered as an individual country phenomenon; instead, it is a regional 
phenomenon" (Cumings 1987: 81). This means that we cannot exclude an approach 
which promotes a holistic understanding of the regional economic developmental 
trajectory. Product cycle theory and the flying geese analogy provide us with a 
holistic insight into the regional characteristics of East Asian countries' economic 
developments. It cannot be denied that in East Asia, Japan has been an explorer and 
transferor of economic development. NIEs and ASEAN countries have achieved their 
economic developments and growth with great help from Japan in terms of 
technology, investment capital, and as a model to emulate. Thus, the analogy of 
flying geese and a generalised theory of product cycle cannot be ignored or 
underestimated, even though they cannot alone produce an adequate explanation of 
the complicated economic integration processes in East Asia. On the other hand, from 
the micro point of view, production networks theory, as we have seen above, can 
provide a detailed and specific tool to promote an understanding of the complex 
economic integration processes and interactions among regional states and MNCs. 
Fourth, product cycle theory was better equipped to illustrate FDI development and 
economic integration processes in East Asia before the mid-1980s. Japanese OFDI 
flows to East Asian countries before the mid-1980s were led by the movements of 
changing comparative advantage in the region. This means that we cannot exclude 
product cycle theory when seeking to explain the historical transformations of 
Japanese FDI development before the mid-1980s. In that period, Japan transferred 
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industries in which it has lost international competitiveness to less developed 
countries in the region. As a result, light industries such as textiles, garments, and 
footwear were transferred to less developed countries. Then, heavy and chemical 
industry followed the same process. Thus, less developed countries started to develop 
their economies by hosting these transferred industries. This means that as product 
cycle theory argues, regional countries' economic development was the result of 
transferred industries from Japan 2. 
However, after 1985, when the Plaza Accord was agreed between Japan and the US, 
Japanese OFDI development changed its structure and specific features. The OFDI 
flows which were basically facilitated by changes in comparative advantage before the 
mid-1980s changed dramatically in their structures and modes. With the massive 
flow of OFDI from Japan to ASEAN countries in the electronics industry, there 
emerged production networks in which intra-firm trade massively increased, not 
according to changing comparative advantage in the region but due to Japan's 
strategy. More specifically, the production networks were the results of both Japanese 
private companies' `global strategy', based on strategic management theory, and the 
Japanese PDS's `political strategy', based on a mercantilistic developmental belief 
system and institutions. From the point of view of Japanese parent companies, their 
subsidiaries in the region play an important role in reducing production costs by 
producing standardised intermediary parts with cheap labour costs. Thus, parent 
2 On the point, Bernard and Ravenhill (1995: 187) criticise product cycle theory by correctly revealing 
that it is basically a state-centric approach which neglects the specific institutional, historical, societal, 
regional, and global contexts of each country's economic trajectory. In other words, by adopting a 
statist approach, product cycle theory not only homogenises a country's economic development with a 
transferred specific product or technology but also fails to consider the important factors such as each 
state's distinctive timing and strategy of the industrialisation process, regional and global environments, 
and the unique feature of state-society relations. 
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companies as assemblers can sustain their international competitiveness. As a result, 
there emerged an argument that a horizontal division of labour is realised in East Asia. 
However, this view is exaggerated when we consider the technological inequality in 
the region. Between Japan and other East Asian countries, deepening technological 
- dependence and the widening gap on technological capacity are major barriers which 
prevent an equal and genuine horizontal division of labour in the region. This reality 
shows that the final stage of product cycle theory is not realised, and the production 
networks approach can produce a more persuasive and specific explanation of 
Japanese OFDI development after the mid-1980s. 
However, in contrast to Japan, OFDI developments from NIEs after the mid-1980s 
still conform to the theory of the product life cycle. Unlike Japanese production 
networks-based OFDI development, NIEs' OFDI developments are based on changes 
in comparative advantage. Thus, Korea transferred labour intensive industries to 
Southeast Asian countries as Japan did before the mid-1980s. In this regard, it can be 
argued that the crucial difference between current Japanese and Korean OFDI 
developments lies in their major motives. In other words, Japan exploits its 
competitive advantage in technology and surplus capital by implementing strategic 
management, while Korea exploits the comparative advantage of Southeast Asian 
countries in cheap labour costs. Korean OFDI develops according to changes in 
comparative advantage, while Japan OFDI develops not according to the division of 
labour, which is determined by changing comparative advantage among regional 
countries, but by strengthening and expanding the production networks in which a 
technologically vertical division of labour is consolidated. In sum, after the mid- 
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1980s, there emerged a complicated and multi-layered economic integration process 
in East Asia led by not only Japanese production networks-based OFDI development 
but also by NIEs' OFDI developments driven by comparative advantage. This means 
that we need both product cycle theory and the production networks approach to 
understanding East Asian EDI development. 
Fifth, the existence of technological gaps among East Asian countries supports the 
argument that as far as technological divergence can be found in the region, the 
product life cycle theory explains the region's OFDI developments. As we have seen 
in section 1-2, OFDI developments among triad countries (Japan, the US, and EU) 
cannot be understood by product cycle theory alone, because there are no significant 
technological gaps among these countries. By contrast, in East Asia, significant 
differences in technological capabilities can be easily found. This is another reason 
why product cycle theory cannot be excluded from this thesis. 
2. The State and MNCs 
The relationship between the state and MNCs is basically ambivalent. Two questions 
are critical: which has more bargaining power and whether an increased FDI presence 
and a neo-liberal open policy to FDI are ultimately beneficial or harmful to the state. 
Before we start the debate about the state and MNCs relationship, it is necessary to 
distinguish between the state in the home and host countries, because MNC activities 
always affect both host and home country's economic and political setting at the same 
time. The host country's purpose is to maximise national wealth without losing 
economic and political independence. In contrast, the MNC's purpose is to maximise 
the firm's interest without sacrificing managerial autonomy and weakening its 
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competitive (ownership) advantages. On the other hand, the home country's purpose 
lies in the dual pursuit of the maximisation of national wealth and the realisation of 
political, and diplomatic objectives through MNC activities in the host country. Thus, 
Japan's OFDI into Southeast Asian countries has to be understood in terms of the 
home country's (Japan) economic and political purposes and not only in terms of the 
economic purpose of firms. It is not only MNC's economic interest but also both host 
and home country's political objectives that have to be incorporated into any 
understanding of FDI development. This proposition leads to the second proposition 
that the study of lB, which shares similar views with the liberalists in IPE has to be 
supplemented by the other two IPE views, namely structuralism and the statist 
approach in order to comprehend the economic and political nature of FDI (See Table 
3-1). 
The strengths and weaknesses of the host country's bargaining power over MNCs are 
based on its locational features such as market size, production factor costs (Labour, 
Land, interest rate, technology, natural resources), infrastructure, incentive system, 
and the cultural and geographical distance (Safarian 1993: 53). Although these factors 
(except the cultural and geographical distance) may be improved by the host country, 
there are two external factors which are likely to reduce the host country's bargaining 
power. First, with the spread of liberalisation and deregulation processes to IFDI, the 
increased competition to induce FDI into their territory among the developed 
countries, not to mention, among the developing countries, has intensified. This high 
demand for IFDI has raised MNCs' bargaining power against the host state. Second, 
as mentioned above, the pressure from the multilateral liberalisation regime also 
facilitates the weakening of the host state's leverage. By implementing liberalisation 
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and deregulation policies, the host country has also weakened the state's regulatory 
capacity as well as reduced the space for strategic intervention into FDI flows that 
stressed joint ventures and licensing over FDI. In addition, once FDI is established, 
the host government's bargaining power and policy autonomy are further diminished 
because of the strengthened MNC's lobby and home country's intervention through 
the application of home country's law and policy to host country (Safarian 1993: 17). 
However, the host country has a set of policy options to regulate or restrict IFDI 
flows. First, the host government can close certain sectors to FDI either wholly or 
partially. Second, the host country can also ban certain types of FDI such as M&As 
and induce certain types of FDI such as joint venture or licensing. Third, the host 
country can discriminate against MNCs in favour of domestic firms through various 
incentives. The host country can also exclude MNCs in certain sectors such as 
government purchasing. Fourth, the host country can provide or abolish various 
incentives such as tax breaks, direct subsidies, and special zones for FDI. Fifth, by 
using strategic trade policy, the host state can request foreign subsidiaries for a certain 
compulsory amount of exports and to restrict imports from parent firms to 
subsidiaries. 
Moreover, through industrial policy, the host country can support domestic firms' 
R&D in order to decrease MNCs competitive advantage against domestic firms. By 
the harsh application of competition policy, the host government can regulate or 
restrict foreign MNC access to domestic markets (Safarian 1993: 6). 
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MNC 
Home 
country 
Host 
country 
Collision 
site 
Co-ordination 
site 
Collision 
site 
Co-ordination 
site 
Old integration 
(vertical, horizontal integration. 
Intra-firm trade. 
Inter-industry trade 
Infra-industry trade). 
Hollowing out. 
Job expört. 
Conflicts between state's 
economic objectives and MNC's 
interest. 
MNC as a tool for foreign 
economic policy. 
Promotion of structural 
adjustment. 
Market protection against foreign 
MNCs to promote home MNC's 
competitiveness. 
Various state supports to home 
MNC to improve its ownership 
Technological dependence. 
Exploitation of low cost labour 
and natural resources. 
Loss of national independence 
(Structuralism). 
Increase of the state' role in 
regulating FDI flows to 
accomplish national economic 
objectives 
(Statist view). 
FDI as a facilitator of national 
development 
(Liberalism). 
Increased state role in improving 
Locational advantage 
(Statist view) 
New integration 
(Alliance, relational, collective 
capitalism. 
Inter-firm integration). 
Transnationalisation of MNC. 
Denationalised TNC. 
(The end of the state). 
Co-operation between home state 
and MNC to improve creative 
assets of state and MNC's 
ownership advantages through 
industrial, trade, and competition 
policy. 
(State as a creative assets 
promoter). 
MNC's oligopolistic behaviour 
conflicts with host state's 
economic wealth. 
The decrease of FDI into 
developing states. 
The increase of inter-Triad FDI. 
Further technological dependence 
of developing countries. 
Increased inequality between 
advanced and developing 
countries. 
Increased role of the Third Word 
host states based on the belief that 
open policy does not necessarily 
mean direct national development 
and does not solve inequality 
problem. 
(Resurrection of the state). 
Fully open market to FDI. 
Liberalisation. 
Deregulation. 
Global, regional, bilateral 
agreement on investment 
(Hyper liberalism or 
Globalisation). 
Table 2-1. Trilateral relationships among home country, host country and MNCs. 
The MNC's leverage is based on its ownership advantages in marketing, organising, 
financing, producing, and technology. However, the MNC's bargaining power can be 
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weakened by two reasons. The first arises from the intensified competition among 
MNCs themselves to obtain a certain investment project. An increased number of 
bidders for one investment project decreases the leverage of MNCs against the host 
country. Moreover, a threat of retreat from an MNC cannot be seriously regarded as a 
real threat, because alternative MNCs are abundant. In short, the MNC's bargaining 
power can be decreased "with the number of effective competitors, whether local 
firms or other foreign-owned firms" (Safarian 1993: 56). And, as we have seen from 
the obsolescing bargaining model, the MNC's leverage is likely to be weakened 
because of the MNC's increased immobile assets in the host country. In other words, 
the MNC's freedom of market exit is so limited that the host government long-term 
bargaining power is improved. 
It is important to remember that these debates on the bargaining power of states and 
MNCs have not been sufficiently incorporated into the debate on the relationship 
between the state and globalising market forces. Globalists and neo-liberal views are 
based on two major concepts, that is, on the convergence of national diversities and 
market efficiency. Apart from a strong belief in the efficiency of the market, another 
major argument of the neo-liberalists and globalists is that as Triad countries converge 
to the same technological capacity and living standards, there will be a convergence 
of national diversities in economic policy, institutions, and production systems. There 
are three notions of convergence: "convergence as the triumph of market forces, 
abetted by passive governments; convergence as the result of diffusion of best practice 
and competition among institutional forms; and convergence as the internationally 
negotiated or coerced choice of one' set of rules and institutions" (Berger and Dore 
66 
1996: 16). However, this convergence theory's weakness lies in its neglect of the 
state's distinctive historical, cultural and institutional solidity. Critics who advocate 
the persistence and resilience of national diversities "see national production systems 
as rather tightly bundled packages of specific national resources, institutions, and 
legacies. The `tightness of fit' makes it extremely unlikely that any one practice or. 
institution, even if dysfunctional, can be easily changed without requiring changes in 
other pieces of the system" (Berger and Dore 1996: 22). "The tightness of fit in this 
perspective reflects the mesh between politics, the polity, and economic institutions 
and the coherence of a system that responds only slowly and unevenly to changing 
markets" (Berger and Dore 1996: 23). This understanding of `tightness of fit' of a 
state's institution, culture, and policy shares the view of `the myth of the global 
corporation' (Doremus et al. 1998). After comparing different and specific 
behaviours among the US, Japanese, and German MNCs in their financing, R&D, and 
investment patterns, Doremus et at. argue that "[d]istinctive national institutions and 
ideologies shape corporate structure and vitally important policy environments in 
home markets. Their external behaviour of firms continues to be marked by their 
idiosyncratic foundations" (Doremus et at 1998: 139). Thus, it can be argued that 
speculation on the convergence of national diversities does not reflect the reality of 
the persistence of national diversities. 
As we have seen from FDI theory, globalists and neo-liberalists argue that the state is 
not a major actor any more in the globalising economic system and they also believe 
that the efforts of state intervention into the market system will deteriorate market 
efficiency and will finally result in the loss of national wealth by causing costly 
isolation from globalising economic integration. Neo-liberal economists maintain that 
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[t]he ultimate objectives of FDI liberalisation is to enhance 
economic growth and welfare in countries ... the efficient 
functioning of markets depends on the contestability of market ... 
Foreign direct investment liberalisation, by removing formal barriers 
to the entry of FDI, can increase the contestability of national 
markets and inject greater competition into them (World Investment 
Review 1997: 25). 
Thus the wide-spread views of globalists and neo-liberalists coupled with pressures 
from the multilateral liberalisation regime have led to "a formidable case for 
wholesale and rapid liberalisation in all developing countries regardless of the level of 
development: not the improvement of government interventions, not the improvement 
of markets and the setting up of new institutions, but the wholesale rejection of the 
state" (Lall 1995: 2). It has to be acknowledged that the globalists view is correct 
until they insist that the state's role has been diminished with increased international 
production and increased bargaining power of MNCs. The globalists view is also 
correct until they criticise the hyper-liberalist view of `a borderless world' (Stopford et 
al. 1991: 7). However, they are incorrect to argue that the state's role is now obsolete 
and their view that any reaction by the state to regulate and restrict the globally 
integrated economic system will result in the unavoidable deterioration of national 
wealth is flawed. For globalists as well as statists, it is important to remember that 
"what is good for firms need not be good for national economies" (Wright 1995: 164), 
and, "if the combination of weak states and strong TNCs is unlikely to sustain 
economic growth under a more integrated international production system, then 
sooner or later measures must be found to strengthen the role of national states" 
(Wright 1995: 166). 
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As we have seen from the section on FDI theory, economic development today does 
not not depend on the prices of production factors but increasingly on created assets 
(e. g., capacity of high technological, managerial, and organisational innovations). The 
need for state intervention in FDI flows lies in this context. "[A] passive reliance on 
TNCs to upgrade and deepen technological capabilities may take a very long time to 
bear results .. . [and]. .. a strong TNC presence 
in an industry, while stimulating 
local competitors to be more efficient in their production, can inhibit them from 
deepening their technological capabilities" (Lall 1995: 6). Moreover, in contrast to 
the assertion by neo-liberal economists of market efficiency, the market cannot 
provide public goods which include education, security, law enforcement and defence 
(Boyer 1996: 104). Minimal state intervention will lead to the sharp decrease in 
public investment and will, in turn, lead to low level locational advantage or low level 
productivity caused by poor educational infrastructure. 
Neo-liberal economists also exclude the state's coordinative capacity. This capacity 
includes the ability of the state in "co-ordinating complementary investment decisions, 
organising the specialisation of smaller firms ... promoting the sharing of 
information as well as technological acquisition, learning, and diffusion" (Weiss 
1998: 6). The state's coordinative capacity in this thesis is expanded to include the 
state's ability to "mobilise consent or to institutionalise co-operation" (Weiss 1998: 
4). Through this capacity, the state can organise consent from its society (the middle 
class and big conglomerates) and participate in regional or global arrangements in 
order to institutionalise co-operation with other countries. The roles of the state are 
many. Through its coordinative, transformative, regulatory and managerial capacity, 
the state can still find much spaces to exert its autonomy. This proposition leads to an 
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important point that the state's isolation from society (policy autonomy and the base 
of policy efficiency) is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for economic 
development. The state's autonomy has to be supplemented by the state's 
coordinative capacity. "Isolation by itself is no guarantee of effectiveness; it needs to 
be matched by embeddedness, by institutionalised bureaucracy-business 
collaboration" (Weiss 1995: 240). Thus, it can be argued that "the message that 
increasingly what governments do and how they do it is much more important than 
how much government involvement should there be! " (Dunning 1993: 28). In other 
words, the "market and the state are not opposed forms of social organisation, but 
symbiotically linked. The point is ... that markets require some form of central co- 
ordinating intelligence in order to effect change and adjustment to the continuously 
changing conditions of competition" (Weiss 1995: 8). 
As we will see in Chapter 6, both Korean and Japanese FDI policy have changed their 
major characteristics as Korea and Japan underwent socio-economic and political 
transformations. In the DS period, both countries' FDI policies were highly 
interventionist. Case by case screenings and detailed regulations were easily detected 
in the period. Thus, in the DS period, the statist view provides the most persuasive 
explanation of the characteristics of and changes in both Korea's and Japan's FDI 
policies. However, in the PDS period, we can witness an extended conflict between 
the liberal view (neo-liberalism) and the statist view (developmentalism). Although 
consecutive processes of liberalisation and deregulation were pursued in relation to 
FDI, state intervention did not disappear due to the unchanged belief systems of 
working level bureaucrats and institutional resistance and inertia which were derived 
from embedded developmentalism in both Korea and Japan's institutional setting. 
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This brief summary of Korean and Japanese FDI policy changes in the DS and the 
PDS period reveals that the grand theories in IPE (such as dependencia, sovereignty at 
bay, and mercantilism) could be regarded not as empirically proven prescriptions but 
as theories or ideas of international political economy. The most serious theoretical 
problem of the structural approach (or dependencia model or the law of uneven 
development) lies in its failure to explain Korea's development from a periphery 
country to a semi-periphery country. So long as this theory cannot provide a proper 
explanation of the economic success of the NICs and ASEAN, this theory's 
applicability to East Asia is greatly limited. 
It has to be acknowledged that the relations between the host country and MNCs are 
so complicated that it could be very reckless to decide the validity of the obsolescing 
bargaining model. Which has more structural power or bargaining power -the host 
country or MNCs? As we have seen throughout this chapter, these relations are 
complicated and still ongoing. This is the reason why we need more time to observe 
before we can provide an answer. The validity of the theory of localised technological 
change can be tested by observing Korea and Japan's processes of technological 
improvement through licensing agreements, joint ventures, and reverse engineering. 
Korea's achievement of a certain level of technology can be submitted as proof for the 
validity of the theory of localised technological change. In this thesis, particularly in 
Chapter 6, we will adopt the theory of product life cycle (and the flying geese model), 
production networks approach, eclectic theory (OLI advantages), and the investment 
development path approach , in order to supplement a political approach to analysing 
Korea and Japan's FDI policy. 
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Chapter 3. 
Approaches to learning and the theoretical framework 
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3-3. The theoretical framework: Towards a synthetic approach 
1. Various conceptions of learning in IPE, DS, IB, and CP 
The concept of learning has been differently defined and interpreted in various 
academic disciplines. Thus, from the literature of International Political Economy 
(IPE), Development Studies (DS), International Business (IB), and Comparative 
Politics (CP), various discussions and theoretical developments towards the concept 
of learning have emerged. However, there have been no co-ordinated efforts to 
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overcome the conceptual diversity in adopting learning theory and applying it towards 
the objects of analysis. In the above disciplines, learning theory tends to be seen in 
terms of either `technical learning', `learning and the applicability of the East Asian 
development model (EADM)', or `institutional learning'. Technical learning means 
that the learning process is related to the transfer of advanced countries' technological 
or managerial know-how which is then adapted to suit the needs of developing 
countries, taking into account their developmental stage, domestic market scale, the 
level of consumer demand, and domestic capacity for absorbing and modifying 
transferred technology or managerial know-how. 
Thus, for Amsden technical learning involves "borrowing, adapting, and improving 
foreign designs" (Amsden 1989: 141). In technical learning, the learning period or 
infant industry period is defined as the "period from the point of entry to the point 
where the firm (or industry) is competitive in the international arena" (Jacobson 1993: 
407). Meanwhile, the measures for technical learning are FDI, joint ventures, Original 
Equipment Manufacture (OEM), strategic alliances, licensing, and informal means 
(such as sending trainees to advanced firms or countries and hiring foreign engineers) 
(Hobday 1995). Technical learning is an important concept in dealing with FDI flows 
among countries. FDI accompanies transfer of technological or managerial know- 
how. Technical learning is also an important index which can be used in measuring a 
country's level of economic development or extent of economic dependency. 
Recipient countries tend to be at a low level of economic development and have a 
high extent of economic dependency. The highly contested issue here is the role of 
the state or market in the process of technical learning. Which measures can produce 
economic development through technical learning? The free market or state 
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intervention? In this thesis, Korea and Japan's technical learning will be dealt with in 
Chapter 6 by adopting FDI as a case study. 
The literature about `learning and the East Asia development model (EADM)' tried to 
elaborate the similar conditions and underpinning features between the Japanese 
model', the NIEs model, and the ASEAN model and then cautiously sought to apply it 
to less developed countries in order to promote economic development (Amsden 
1994, Broad and Cavanagh 1995, Nafziger 1995). However, after long discussion, a 
consensus was made in the literature that there is no single EADM (Ito 1997: 198, Lall 
1996: 14, Hirono 1988: 258, Ungsuh K. Park 1988: 176, Krugman 1994: 78, Lim 
1998: 477, Breslin 1996: 704). Japan, the NIEs, and the ASEAN countries have 
adopted different economic strategies in pursuing their respective economic 
objectives. More specifically, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan adopted the interventionist 
model, Singapore and Hong Kong adopted a laissez faire model, while the other 
Southeast Asian countries adopted the FDI dependency model (Perkins 1994: 655). 
Among these East Asian countries, there were distinctive differences in terms of 
culture, history, institutions, market liberalisation, role of the state, attitude towards 
foreign capital, domestic political configuration, and international systemic influences. 
However, despite these differences, the literature found out some similarities among 
the countries in East Asia and formulated the EADM, which is characterised by state 
interference into the market system with the help of industrial policy, strategic trade 
policy, an export oriented economic structure, state regulations and screening towards 
Chalmers Johnson provides four elements of the Japanese model: the existence of small but elite 
bureaucracy; a political system in which bureaucracy can enjoy autonomy and initiative; market 
conforming state intervention; and finally an existence of pilot governmental organisation like the 
MITI. See Chalmers Johnson (1982: 315-319). 
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foreign capital and technical learning, domestic market protectionism, ' and a domestic 
political configuration centred around an authoritarian regime. The problem is that 
even these criteria are not shared among the countries. The most exceptional case is 
Hong Kong which adopted the free market system. Thus, it can be argued that the 
characteristics of the EADM are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to be 
imitated or learned by other developing countries in other regions. 
What is important is that as Lall says, even though these distinctive features of the 
EADM are not directly applicable to other developing countries, it does not 
necessarily mean that the strategic planning and regulation of these East Asian 
countries cannot be learned by other developing countries (Lall 1996: 24). In this 
thesis, the applicability of the EADM is dealt with in the theory of developmental 
stage. This theory argues that as one country's economy matures, the policy, belief 
systems, and institutions in the country have also to be changed in order to adjust to 
changing internal and external environments. Without adequate changes in policy, 
belief systems, and institutions, pressures from domestic society or the international 
system will increase and as a result, efficient and effective realisation of the state's 
economic objectives will be damaged or delayed. Japan's great transformation from 
the developmental state to the post developmental state and Korea's great 
transformation from the developmental state to the transitionary state reveal the 
significance of changes in policy, belief systems, and institutions which are 
commensurate with both countries' economic position in the international political 
economy. 
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Institutional learning results in changes in a country's tangible institutions 
(particularly governmental or semi-governmental organisations) as a result of learning 
or imitation from other countries' counterparts. This institutional learning is called 
institutional isomorphism in this thesis. In the theory of sociological new 
institutionalism, institutions change as a result of mimetic, coercive, and normative 
isomorphism. There are two conspicuous examples of institutional isomorphism in 
Korea: mimetic and coercive. Korea's mimetic isomorphism derived from learning 
form Japan2. As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6, Korea's governmental and semi- 
governmental organisations are very similar to Japan's with regard to their official 
names, objectives, and operational systems. On the other hand, Korea's coercive 
isomorphism happened in the aftermath of the East Asian economic crisis. The neo- 
liberal global regime led by the IMF, the World Bank, and leading countries in these 
international organisation such as America strongly pushed Korea to adopt neo-liberal 
reforms in the financial, labour, corporate, and administrative sectors in return for 
financial aid to Korea. As a result, Korea implemented a wide range of neo-liberal 
oriented reforms and Korea experienced coercive institutional isomorphism which 
was more or less acceptable to the neo-liberal global regime. 
2. Learning in foreign policy analysis (FPA) 
The previous section provides a brief summary of the three conceptions of learning 
that have been developed in the disciplines of IPE, 113, CP, and Development Studies. 
However, there is another perspective towards learning theory which has been 
2 Taylor argues that China also learned from Japan in terms of mimetic isomorphism: "institutions ... like MITI and the Economic Planning Agency, now find their parallels in the Trade and Economic 
Office 
... and the 
State Planning Commission, while China's newly unveiled industrial plan bears 
resemblance to equivalent Japanese documents in its targeting of specific economic sectors" (Taylor 
1996: 54). 
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developed in the literature of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a sub-field of 
International Relations (IR). It is this concept of learning that this thesis is essentially 
based on in analysing both Korea and Japan's FDI policy. In this literature, the 
learning process is dealt with in terms of the psychological aspects of policy makers. 
Thus, scholars in this discipline have focused on policy makers' belief systems, ideas 
and ideology. This approach emerged as a counter-attack to the strong tendency of 
realists to treat domestic and individual environments in the policy making or decision 
making process as a black box (Kegley 1995: 47). The realist approach is based on 
the assumption that the state is a rational and unitary actor and considers the 
international system in terms of the interaction among rational and unitary states. 
Thus, the international system is conceived as a billiard table on which states act like 
billiard balls. Foreign policy analysis or decision making analysis emerged in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of the realist approach by the pioneering work of Snyder 
in 1954 which focused on the human decision making process (Herman and Peacock 
1987: 22, Powell, et al 1987: 205). With the emergence of foreign policy analysis, 
several approaches were elaborated in order to investigate significant variables in the 
decision or policy making process. The bureaucratic politics approach, the cybernetic 
approach, and the cognitive approach were developed in order to reveal and analyse 
the areas inside the black box neglected by realism. 
In the bureaucratic and cybernetic approaches, the decision or policy making process 
is not the result of utility maximisation led by rational calculations as the realist 
approach argues. Rather, the decision or policy making process is a process of 
reaction from the segmented roles and responsibilities among policy or decision 
makers who possess already prepared standard operating procedures (SOPs) by which 
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they produce routine and simple reactions towards domestic or international inputs or 
stimuli. The most significant weak point of these approaches is that in a crisis 
situation, these approaches cannot explain the actual decision or policy making 
process. These approaches have analytic advantages in investigating stable or normal 
situations. The difference between the cybernetic approach and bureaucratic politics 
approach is that the latter emphasises the conflicting aspects of policy or decision 
making processes among different ministries. Each governmental organisation has 
different supporting groups and interests. And, as these interests are incorporated into 
organisations and become institutionalised, each governmental organisation develops 
different belief systems or institutional features. The bureaucratic politics approach 
has its analytic advantage in the sense that it can explain contending and conflicting 
policy issues among ministries. However, it has its limit in explaining the coherent, 
efficient, and strong government or state in the Korean and Japanese developmental 
state period. Moreover, the bureaucratic politics approach neglects the strong 
leadership role by a supreme decision maker like the Korean president who can 
arbitrate among ministerial conflicts or dictate a certain policy without significant 
resistance from frustrated ministries. 
In contrast to these two approaches, the cognitive or psychological approach focuses 
on an individual policy or decision maker's perception towards the external 
environment. Thus, in this approach, a policy or decision maker's personal 
experience, lessons from history, and analogies from similar issues are major research 
topics in analysing decision or policy making processes (Jong-Wook Jeong and Tae- 
Hyun Kim 1992: 436). This approach also emphasises the cognitive limits of a person 
in processing information. Excessive information cannot be efficiently processed in a 
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person's cognition process and, as a result, rational choice or utility maximisation 
cannot be obtained. Rather, utility satisfaction or psychological choice can be 
produced. In other words, as Peter M. Haas points out, the individual's cognitive 
content and structure can restrain rationality (Haas 1992: 29). 
The shortcomings of this approach are that it is based on description and cannot 
predict future policy direction. Furthermore, in order to testify the assertion of this 
approach, an enormous volume of quantitative research has to be done in order to 
analyse decision or policy maker's cognitive or psychological structure towards a 
selected policy issue (Kegley 1995: 55). For example, Ole R. Holsti analysed 3,584 
statements made by the US secretary of State, John F. Dulles in order to investigate 
Dulles' belief system towards the Soviet Union (Smith 1998: 15). 
The psychological and cognitive approach has its historical background. As Smith 
points out, there was an academic fashion towards behaviouralism which emphasised 
observable and measurable components of behaviour rather than unobservable 
assumptions (Smith 1988: 14). Using behavioural methodology, the following six 
approaches were developed to link the sets of belief systems held by individuals and 
the behaviours of states (Smith 1988: 15) : (1) The `image approach' suggested by 
Kenneth Boulding in 1956. Boulding argued that each individual holds images of the 
world. Thus, events which support the individuals' images of the world can be easily 
accepted, whereas events which contradict the images will be rejected; (2) The `belief 
systems approach' by Ole R. Holsti in 1960. Holsti focused on the empirical 
investigation of the content of a leader's belief systems. His case study was the belief 
system of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Thus, he analysed 3,584 
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statements made by Dulles. He distinguished open belief systems from closed ones; 
(3) The `operational code approach' by Alexander George in 1969. George divided 
the operational code into instrumental beliefs and philosophical beliefs. The former 
are beliefs about the best means to achieve an actor's goals. The latter are beliefs 
which are related to the basic assumptions of an actor's norms and behaviour; (4) The 
`cognitive map approach' by Axelrod in 1976. A cognitive map consists of concepts 
and causal beliefs. To make a cognitive map, Axelrod regarded the concepts as 
variables and causal beliefs as relationships between the variables. Thus, on the 
cognitive map, points replaced concepts and arrows between points replaced causal 
beliefs. The result of this pictorial representation was a cognitive map; (5) The 
`lessons of the past approach' by Ernest May in 1973. May argued that first, decision- 
makers were apt to be influenced by beliefs about the lessons of history, and second, 
policy-makers misused historical lessons to strengthen their political positions or to 
avoid political crises; and (6) `Brecher's research design' approach by Michael 
Brecher in 1969. Brecher argued that policy makers' psychological systems or 
environments determine the individual's ideology. 
Thus it can be argued that, the significant achievement of FPA was to turn the ' 
attention of scholars away from the unobservable generalisation of realism and 
explore neglected areas such as governmental, organisational, and psychological 
domains in the policy or decision making process. However, due to its 
methodological and theoretical limits (such as lack of theoretical prediction and 
complicated, time consuming research based on behaviouralism), the psychological 
approach failed to become an independent model. Moreover, as the Cold War bi- 
polar system became consolidated, the systemic approach which was elaborated by 
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neo-realism became the dominant theory in the discipline of International Relations 
and the psychological approach lost scholars' attention. 
However, as the Cold War order suddenly collapsed and the dominant neo-realism 
failed to explain or predict this historical phenomenon, the psychological approach re- 
emerged as one of the alternatives to the systemic approach (Levy 1994: 280). The 
structural approach adopted by neorealism deduces expectations and preferences only 
from structure and defines structure in terms of the material distribution of power 
(Alder and Haas 1992: 386-89). Thus, neorealism could not detect significant changes 
in a supreme decision maker's belief system. It cannot be denied that the sudden 
change in Gorvachev's belief system towards the survival strategy of the Soviet Union 
against America facilitated or ignited the collapse of the Cold War order. Learning 
theory as a sub-field of the psychological approach was elaborated before the end of 
the Cold War order to deal with images, belief systems, cognition, perception, and 
ideas of decision makers or groups who were in charge of security issues in America 
and the Soviet Union. At this time, learning theory was applied to foreign security 
policy analysis. Accordingly, Breslauer and Tetlock attempted to explain the 
revolutionary changes in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev by applying learning 
theory. 
In this thesis, learning theory is applied to foreign economic policy analysis, 
particularly for both Korea and Japan's FDI development. Different from the 
cognitive or psychological approach, learning theory is not confined to the 
individual's cognitive or psychological structure. It also deals with behavioural 
changes. Moreover, as we will see below, learning theory deals with not only the 
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individual's belief system but also with organisational or governmental belief systems. 
In other words, individuals, groups, and governments can learn and change their belief 
systems or behaviour. Then, what are belief systems and what are ideas? 
Before we start to review contending concepts of learning in FPA, we need to define 
belief systems and ideas. Belief systems and ideas are formulated, maintained, 
consolidated or changed by studies, experiences, and interactions at the level of 
individuals, groups, governmental organisations, and states. Studies, experiences, and 
interactions produce personal, organisational, historical, societal, cultural, economic, 
and political knowledge (perceptions, images, analogies, concepts) or practices. 
These knowledge, practices, and interactions in turn, re-formulate, retain, and 
consolidate or change previous belief systems and ideas. The individual's knowledge 
(cognitive) structure and governmental organisations' cultural or institutional features 
(practices, SOPs) are heavily influenced by these belief systems and ideas. The 
process of studies, experiences, and interactions is the process of learning. The 
learning process can lead to either changes in belief systems and ideas or changes in 
behaviour. The most important assumption of the belief systems approach is that 
"prior beliefs and expectations play a key role in structuring perceptions during the 
stages of the foreign policy decision-making process" (Powell et al. 1987: 206). Thus, 
it can be argued that learning theory brought back the neglected psychological or 
cognitive environment (belief systems, ideas) to the discipline of International 
Relations and connected these with the external environment (realities in domestic, 
state, and international levels). 
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Goldstein defines ideas as shared beliefs (Goldstein 1993: 11). This means that ideas 
and belief systems are interchangeable. Goldstein and Keohane argue that "ideas 
influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps 
that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 3). They also elaborate two conspicuous pathways through which 
ideas play important roles in influencing policy outcomes by ordering the world and 
shaping agendas. The two pathways are ideas as road map, and the institutionalisation 
of ideas. First, ideas as road maps derive from "the need of individuals to determine 
their own preferences or to understand the causal relationship between their goals and 
alternative political strategies by which to reach those goals" (Goldstein and Keohane 
1993: 12). Second, once ideas have influenced the organisational set-up, their 
influence will persist in the organisation through those working in the organisation 
and whose interests are served by it. Thus, although the initial interests which 
promoted institutionalisation fade away, if ideas are institutionalised, the impact of 
ideas may be prolonged (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 23). 
Bearing these in mind, in the first section various distinctive arguments about learning 
theory in FPA will be reviewed in greater detail, and in the second section, a 
theoretical framework will be developed. In developing the theoretical framework, a 
synthetic approach will be elaborated. The synthetic approach includes societal, 
statist, international systemic, ideational, and institutional approaches. The reason 
why the synthetic approach is necessary in analysing Korea's and Japan's socio- 
economic and political changes and transformation will be explained in the second 
section. 
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2-1. Contending concepts of learning in FPA 
So far, the concept of learning has not been clearly defined in the literature on foreign 
policy analysis. Several scholars offer different definitions and interpretations. As we 
have seen above, learning can happen in individuals, groups, governmental 
organisations, and states and the result of learning can be either changes in belief 
systems or changes in behaviour. Hence, there are significant disagreements. First, 
there is the problem of the `analytic unit'. As we will see later in this section, Levy 
suggests that learning is researched at the individual level only. For him, 
organisational or collective learning is difficult to measure. On the other hand, Ernst 
B. Haas emphasises collective learning and insists that learning should be dealt with 
within organisational frames. For him, individual learning cannot be easily translated 
into policy changes or outcomes. 
Secondly, there is the problem of `analytic scope'. As we will see later in this section, 
Nye contends that significant learning must result in changes in actors' `behaviour'. 
For him, measuring changes in actors' belief systems is extremely difficult and it is 
the behavioural changes of actors which are, in the end, the most important research 
objective in foreign policy analysis. By contrast, Ernst B. Haas and Levy emphasise 
that learning leads to vital changes in actors' belief systems. They claim that if we 
focus only on actors' behavioural changes, the actual process of learning which occurs 
in the psychological and cognitive processes of individuals cannot be understood. 
Moreover, they point out that learning processes do not necessarily result in 
behavioural changes in actors. Thirdly, there is the eclectic approach to `analytic 
scope'. Ziegler insists that changes in both belief systems and behaviour can be 
regarded as learning (Ziegler 1993: 10-11). 
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After reviewing these theoretical disagreements, firstly, the `analytic unit' will include 
both collective learning and individual learning in this thesis. Collective learning is 
necessary because the main actors in this thesis are governmental organisations and 
bureaucrats. On the other hand, considering that Korea's presidential system has 
produced a hierarchical and centralised decision making process, the importance of 
individual learning cannot be ignored. Secondly, the concept of learning developed by 
Ernst B. Haas and Levy will be adopted. They conceptualise learning as the process 
which leads to a change in actors' beliefs, not behaviour. Thus, the `analytic scope' of 
learning is not focused on behavioural changes but on belief system changes. As we 
will see throughout the thesis, policy changes (behavioural changes) have to be 
distinguished from belief system changes and institutional changes. Policy changes 
which are not accompanied by changes in the belief systems of state bureaucrats 
represent only a strategic effort to evade pressures from domestic society or the 
international system. For example, liberalisation policy towards IFDI in both Korea 
and Japan could not bring real changes to the protected and highly regulated IFDI 
environment. Unchanged belief systems which were deeply embedded in the efficacy 
of state strategic regulation of IFDI and developmental ism oriented institutions 
actually prevented substantive IFDI liberalisation in both Korea and Japan. Thirdly, 
learning will be distinguished from `adaptation'. As Ernst B. Haas points out, 
adaptation means the emergence of new means by which to achieve fixed ends. In the 
process of adaptation, there are no changes in original belief systems or goals. In 
contrast, learning leads to changes in original belief systems or goals. Thus, under 
learning processes, the causal relations between means and ends will be changed as a 
result of changes in belief systems. Learning brings changes in cognitive 
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environments and adaptation brings behavioural changes in order to adjust to the 
reality of changing external environments. 
In developing learning theory and in seeking to identify the effects of learning on the 
economic policy making process, the systemic approaches based on actors' 
rationalism will be criticised. As we have seen, the recent resurgence of interest in 
learning arguably reflects the widespread disappointment with the neo-realist systemic 
approach. Meanwhile, the epistemic community approach and social constructivism 
will be reviewed to supplement learning theory. The role of an epistemic community 
is important, given that ideas or belief systems need supporting groups. Goldstein 
argues that "for ideas to became politically salient they need to have sponsors, and 
those sponsors must either have political power or influence those who do" (Goldstein 
1993: 15). Without supporting or advocating groups, ideas and belief systems can 
neither be sustained for long or occupy a dominant position in policy or decision . 
making processes. As constructivists argue, interests are not exogenously given, but 
are constructed by intersubjective processes among actors. 
In this thesis, not only the role of belief systems but also material interests will be 
given equal emphasis. Foreign economic policy is not only the result of a state's 
efforts to promote its economic interests but also a reaction towards other states' 
pursuit of economic interests through their foreign economic policies. Thus, a state's 
foreign policy making process is a simultaneous combination of pursuit of its 
economic interest and intersubjective relations with other relevant states' economic 
interests. This means that both belief systems and economic interests are not fixed but 
subject to change, as continuous interaction brings both learning processes and 
,ý 
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different domestic and international environments. For example, Korea's economic 
interests were accomplished by highly regulating and screening IFDI flows in the 
developmental state period and bureaucrats' primary belief systems were based on the 
efficacy of state strategic intervention into the market to realise economic objectives. 
But, in the Korean transitionary state period, economic interests could be realised 
through the massive support and promotion of IFDI and the bureaucrats' belief system 
also changed from a developmentalism oriented one to a free market oriented one. 
These changes in economic interests and belief systems reflected the changed 
international economic system in terms of politicisation among states. We will see 
this in greater detail in Chapters 4,5, and 6. 
In the following sub-sections, contending concepts of learning and the shortcomings 
of using learning theory will be investigated. 
(1) Philip E. Tetlock: A comprehensive approach 
Tetlock summarises three approaches to learning: the neorealist approach; the belief 
systems approach; and the organisational and political cultural approach. In the 
neorealist approach which emphasises the systemic constraints and opportunities 
caused by the international environment, there is no need to be concerned about a 
particular policy-maker's cognitive content or structure. Learning in the neorealist 
approach involves the rational adjustment of policy in response to the shifting rewards 
and punishments of the international environment. "The choice is between learning 
and being selected out of the game in ruthless Darwinian fashion. ... A national 
government that displays little capacity to learn has little chance to survive" (Tetlock 
1991: 24). However, this straightforward reward-punishment model of learning is apt 
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to fail because it does not recognise the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in the 
policy-making process. Moreover, the feedback flows from international events to the 
policy-making process may be delayed or blocked by domestic or individual variables. 
The belief systems approach understands that the international system is 
extraordinarily complicated and in this context, policy-makers are inclined to depend 
on simplified assumptions or views to cope with the complex, uncertain, and difficult 
trade-offs inherent in the foreign policy-making process. Thus, identifying policy- 
makers' simplified images of reality is an essential duty in explaining or predicting 
policy outcomes. The main benefits of the belief systems approach is that by 
providing already prepared answers to basic questions about situations with which 
policy-makers have to deal and guidelines for choosing among several options, they 
facilitate decision-making. However, a main shortcoming is that in "their efforts to 
maintain stable, internally consistent belief systems, policy makers may fashion 
images of the world that are more orderly and regular than reality itself. Belief 
systems may facilitate the learning of lessons consistent with the underlying 
assumptions but impede the learning of anything else" (Tetlock 1991: 28). 
The two concepts of learning which have been considered so far are confined to the 
individual's intra-psychic aspects. However, learning can take place at the 
organisational or politico-cultural levels. In other words, institutions and political 
systems are capable of change in response to events. There are two categories of 
collective learning: (1) institutions can be dismantled or created by policy-makers to 
avoid or repeat past experiences; (2) policy-makers can depend on the specific 
knowledge of an epistemic community in uncertain situations which require 
88 
professional knowledge about certain policy issues and attempt to institutionalise the 
access of that community to the decision-making process (Tetlock 1991: 41). 
(2) Ernst B. Haas: A collective learning approach 
As we have seen, Tetlock's conception of learning is broad and comprehensive. By 
contrast, Ernst B. Haas develops a unique conception of `collective learning' 
connected with the idea of an epistemic community. The distinctive contribution of 
Ernst B. Haas to the theoretical development of learning lies in his distinction between 
`learning' and `adaptation'. For Haas, "learning in and by bureaucracies implies that 
the organisation's members are induced to question earlier ý beliefs about the 
appropriateness of ends of action, and to think about the selection of new ones, to 
revalue themselves" (Haas 1991: 72-73). By adaptation, he means the process of 
changing the way one solves problems without re-evaluating one's beliefs about basic 
causation. Adaptation involves recognising the failure of technical rationality and 
involves the selection of a new set of means (Haas 1991: 73). 
Then, which one is better - adaptation or learning? Ernst B. Haas argues that 
adaptation and learning both coexist and interact (Haas 1991: 95). In summary, for 
Ernst B. Haas, adaptation brings changes in behaviour and means while learning 
brings changes in belief systems and ends. In the adaptation process, both epistemic 
communities3 and consensual knowledge4 remain weak and the degree of 
3 Ernst B. Haas defines an epistemic community as "a group of professors who share a commitment to a 
common causal set of policy values. They are united by a belief in the truth of their model and by a 
commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the conviction that human welfare will be 
enhanced as a result" (Haas 1991: 67). 
4 Ernst B. Haas defines consensual knowledge as "generally accepted understandings about cause-and 
effect linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by society" (Haas 1991: 65). 
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institutionalisation of innovation is gradual and unsystematic. On the other hand, in 
the learning process, epistemic communities and consensual knowledge remain strong 
and the degree of institutionalisation of innovations is sudden and systemic triggered 
by crisis (Haas 1991: 91). 
(3) Jack S. Levy: A minimalist approach 
Levy defines learning as "a change of beliefs at the individual cognitive level" (Levy 
1994: 287). In contrast to Haas's opinion about collective learning, Levy argues that 
collective (organisational or governmental) learning is not analytically viable. For 
him, organisations learn only through individuals who work in those organisations and 
he insists further that individual learning is not a sufficient but a necessary condition 
for collective learning (Levy 1994: 288-289). Thus, Levy argues that individual 
learning, defined as "a change of beliefs, the degree of confidence in one's beliefs, or 
skills as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience" (Levy 1994: 
311), has little impact unless those who learn are able to implement their preferred 
policies or to influence others to do so (Levy 1994: 300). Governmental learning 
"involves more than the aggregation of individual learning or the development of new 
consensual knowledge. Unless new knowledge is institutionalised, it will not endure" 
(Levy 1994: 289). As a result, for Levy, organisational learning is "the 
institutionalisation of individually learned lessons into organisational routines and 
procedures" (Levy 1994: 311). 
Levy has a different view about the neorealist interpretation of learning. Neorealism 
is a structural theory which sees a given structure as having a fairly well defined set of 
consequences. In the neorealist perspective, structure determines or constrains 
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outcomes and intervening perceptual variables are simply ignored. Levy points out 
that in the theory of neorealism, learning is socialisation5. Socialisation means the 
adjustment or assimilation process of states to the norms of the system. The system 
functions as a selector by rewarding some behaviours and punishing others. States 
that fail to learn the causal laws or to socialise to the norms of the international system 
cannot compete and so drop out of the system (Levy 1994: 298). 
Hence, in contrast to Tetlock who regards the neorealist theory of selection by the 
system as one of his three definitions of learning, Levy contends that learning and 
neorealism present different explanations of foreign policy change: "Neorealists 
emphasise the rational and efficient adjustment to changing structural incentives, 
whereas learning theorists emphasise significant variations in cognitive structures, 
beliefs, and processes" (Levy 1994: 298). Levy also argues against Nye's view, of 
learning. According to Levy, Nye views learning as a process of obtaining new 
knowledge or information which results in behavioural change. In other words, Nye 
focuses not on cognition but on behaviour. Thus, Nye contends that if there is no 
change in behaviour after learning, then learning is not useful for elaborating a more 
general theory of foreign policy (Levy 1994: 290). Levy rejects this view by arguing 
that if we focus on learning only when it is followed by policy change, then we cannot 
5lkenberry 
and Kupchan conceptualise socialisation as a "process of learning in which norms and ideas 
are transmitted from one party to another" (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 289) or "a process through 
which the value orientations of leading states are transmitted to elites in other nations, regardless of the 
structural setting" (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 290). This notion is different from that of a neorealist 
like Waltz. For Waltz, socialisation is a "process through which actors come to conform to the 
structural norms of the international system. It is a process that limits and molds the behaviour of states 
in ways that accord with the imperatives and constraints of international structure" (Ikenberry and 
Kupchan 1990: 290). 
91 
understand when individual learning is translated into policy and when learning is 
blocked by institutional or political constraints (Levy 1994: 290). 
(4) Charles E. Ziegler: An eclectic approach 
Ziegler employs an eclectic approach to learning, compared with Tetlock, Haas, and 
Levy who emphasise changes in `belief systems', and Nye who emphasises changes in 
`behaviour'. Ziegler argues that "learning takes place as the subject reassesses the 
appropriateness of earlier beliefs or behaviour, and consequently adjusts toward a 
better fit of means and ends" (Ziegler 1993: 10-11). Ziegler, like Ernst B. Haas, 
distinguishes adaptation from genuine learning. For him, adaptation involves utilising 
new knowledge for adjustments within existing structures to more closely achieve 
regime goals. Adaptation does not challenge the organisations' motivating ideology, 
basic system values, decision-making structures, or central goals. Adaptive behaviour 
seeks to preserve the existing order (Ziegler 1993: 12-13). In contrast, learning 
accompanies changes in ideology, government structure, and basic goals, and it can 
take place only when conditions reach a crisis. Thus, learning in institutions involves 
"a process of building consensus through new knowledge on the seriousness of 
existing problems, on the inadequacy of current problem solving strategies, and on the 
need for fundamental changes to realign methods with goals" (Ziegler 1993: 13). 
According to Ziegler, Rosenau also defines adaptation "as a process of coping with or 
stimulating changes that contribute to keeping the essential structures of a system 
within acceptable limits" (Ziegler 1993: 16). Thus, Ernst B. Haas, Ziegler and 
Rosenau all distinguish adaptation form learning, and all of them share the 
understanding that adaptation does not lead to a fundamental change in the belief 
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systems of an individual or the essential structure of an organisation or in ultimate 
goals of both individuals and organisations. Ziegler insists that the learning process 
tends to be influenced by organisational structure and ideological flexibility. Thus, 
"in closed systems, central decision makers are relatively isolated from lower level 
foreign policy organisations, and from factors in the domestic environment that might 
constrain their behaviour" (Ziegler 1993: 13). By contrast, open systems are highly 
perceptive internally and internationally, and are more receptive to new ideas, 
knowledge and information. In summary, Ziegler develops an eclectic approach to 
learning by suggesting that both beliefs and behaviour are determining variables in 
defining the conception of learning. Ziegler shares the view of Ernst B. Haas and 
Rosenau that distinguishes adaptation from learning. 
(5) Peter M. Haas: An epistemic community approach 
In his development of the epistemic community's role in affecting the foreign policy- 
making process, Peter M. Haas provides a very loose definition of learning. An 
epistemic community is "a network of professionals with recognised expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas 1992: 2). The roles of epistemic 
communities are in "articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex 
problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective 
debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiating" 
(Haas 1992: 2). It is important to know how epistemic communities can be 
distinguished from other groups. An epistemic community is "the combination of 
having a shared set of causal and principled beliefs, a consensual knowledge base and 
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shared (common) interests that the distinguishes epistemic community from various 
groups" (Haas 1992: 18). 
For Peter M. Haas, learning is not only about acquiring new information about the 
environment but also accepting innovative ways of linking causes and effects and 
aligning means and ends (Alder and Haas 1992: 385). Haas suggests two types of 
learning processes: one is the adoption of new instrumental ends (new practices) and 
the other is the adoption of new principled ends (new goals). Thus, it can be inferred 
that he neither distinguishes adaptation from learning nor behaviour from beliefs. As 
a result, even the emergence of a new policy, which is not accompanied by changes in 
policy maker's belief systems, can be accepted as learning. 
Haas further explores the relationship between the epistemic community and ideas and 
beliefs. For him, the usually accepted notion that ideas facilitate policy innovation 
and that prevailing ideas can determine or regulate policy choices leaves a number of 
questions unanswered: How do ideas emerge? How are they disseminated? How do 
they change and evolve? The answers to these questions produce the contention that 
ideas without carriers are useless and sterile. Thus, for Peter M. Haas, one of the most 
significant roles of epistemic communities is that they act as "channels through which 
new ideas circulate from societies to governments as well as from country to country" 
(Haas 1992: 27). 
In summary, Peter M. Haas, compared with other theorists reviewed in this chapter, 
has developed a loose definition of learning. For him, any new policy practices, let 
alone new policy goals, are considered to be the results of learning. For him the most 
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significant questions concerning learning processes are "who learns what; whose 
learning gets translated into policy and why; and whose learning gets a chance to 
affect other countries" (Alder and Haas 1992: 386). These questions need input from 
the theory of the epistemic community. Peter M. Haas's distinctive contribution lies 
in the connection he makes between the epistemic community and learning theory. 
(6) Alexander Wendt: Constructivism and learning 
Wendt argues that both neorealism and neoliberalism have a shared commitment to 
rationalism. Rational choice treats the identities and interests of agents as 
exogenously given and focuses on how the behaviour of agents generates outcomes. 
In contrast, constructivism sees identities and interests as not exogenously given by 
structure but endogenous to `process'. In other words, constructivists pursue a 
cognitive and intersubjective conception of process in which identities and interests 
are endogenously generated by interaction. The fundamental principle of 
constructivism is that `collective meanings', referring to `intersubjective 
understanding and expectation' of self and others, constitute the structure by which 
human actions are regulated or restrained: 
The distribution of power may always affect states' calculation, but 
how it does so depends on the intersubjective understanding and 
expectations, on the distribution of knowledge that constitute their 
conception of self and other ... It is collective meanings that 
constitute the structures which organise our actions. Actors acquire 
identities -relatively stable, role specific understandings and 
expectations about self- by participating in such collective 
meanings. Identities are inherently relational ... Identities are the basis of interests (Wendt 1992: 397-398). 
For Wendt, institutions are a "relatively stable set or structure of identities and 
interests" (Wendt 1992: 399) and are "fundamentally cognitive entities that do not 
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exist apart from actors' ideas" (Wendt 1992: 399). But this does not mean that 
institutions are not objective and are only beliefs (Wendt 1992: 399). Thus, 
institutionalisation is "a process of internalising new identities and interests" (Wendt 
1992: 399). In brief, whereas rationalism posits that structure determines identities 
and interests, social constructivist theory assumes that identities and interests and even 
structure are endogenous to process. 
From the above, it can be inferred that from the social constructivist view, learning in 
neorealism, which refers to a behavioural change conforming to the international 
system's constraints or opportunities, is not genuine learning. Real learning has to be 
accompanied by changes of individuals' or institutions' identities or interests in 
interactive and intersubjective processes. 
2-2. Shortcomings and pitfalls of using Learning theory 
First of all, as we have seen so far, the very definition of learning has been disputed in 
the scholarly literature (Breslauer 1991: 825). Moreover, to demonstrate the structures 
and processes of the psychological environment is an inherently difficult task as is the 
empirical measurement of the psychological environment (Levy 1994: 280, Vogler 
1989: 153). Thus, while Tetlock defines learning very broadly and treats it as a 
generic concept, Levy adopts a very narrow concept of learning and confines it to 
individuals' belief systems. Ernst B. Haas develops a distinctive concept of 
`adaptation' according to which many of Tetlock's learning processes are reduced to 
adaptation. Ziegler is right to point out that the notion of learning "cannot easily be 
developed into an elegantly systemic, rigorous explanatory framework, because 
learning is itself a disjointed, largely trial-and-error process" (Ziegler 1993: 11). 
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In addition, we can identify eight major theoretical or methodological traps in 
adopting learning theory. First, learning theory does not consider policy-makers' 
arbitrary and purposive use of history to justify their ongoing policy implementations. 
This is a serious theoretical flaw. Levy clearly points out this problem: "instead of 
genuinely learning from historical experience, individuals might use history 
instrumentally. They often select from historical experience those cases that provide 
the greater support for their pre-existing policy preferences or they reinterpret a given 
case in a way that reinforces their views" (Levy 1994: 306). 
Second, researchers could use the definition of learning "so loosely that it becomes 
synonymous with any new policy initiative by a government. Learning- at a 
psychological or institutional level of analysis- is by no means the only possible 
explanation for policy change ... for instance, governments often change course in a 
mechanistic or cybernetic fashion, with little or no reassessment of basic beliefs and 
goals" (Tetlock 1991: 23). Third, researchers could take "foreign policy rhetoric too 
seriously as evidence of how policy makers actually think" (Tetlock 1991: 23). 
However, decision makers' rhetoric and belief systems could be different. In 
interpreting rhetoric, we cannot exclude the possibility of decision makers' intentional 
exaggeration, abridgement, or concealment of their original belief systems. 
Fourth, researchers could confuse `learning' with `adaptation'. They could conclude 
that a government learned when it merely adapted to changing stimulus conditions 
without changing its belief systems (Tetlock 1991: 41). Fifth, observers could confuse 
learning with political competition or the random ebb and flow of event streams 
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within groups or organisations. Political competition and event streams can also 
results in policy shifts (Tetlock 1991: 41). Sixth, we have seen above that observers 
have to be careful in interpreting decision makers' rhetoric. But, how can we 
distinguish the decision-maker's rhetoric from real beliefs? Belief systems cannot be 
directly observed. And, because simple observation fails to measure or identify belief 
systems, researchers have to depend on decision makers' rhetoric or statements. This 
means that researchers are heavily dependent on inference in identifying decision 
makers' belief systems (Smith 1988: 32). Goldstein and Keohane clearly summarise 
this problem: "we observe only claims about beliefs and actions presumably based on 
beliefs. Thus our descriptions of beliefs require inferences which need to be tested" 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 27). 
Seventh, the causal relationships between belief systems and foreign policy changes 
are not direct. In other words, changes in belief systems or ideas do not immediately 
lead to changes in foreign policy. Such changes may take place when an existing set 
of belief systems or ideas are discredited by events or "when a new idea is simply so 
compelling that it captures the attention of a wide array of actors" (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 16). Eighth and finally, because ideas and interests cannot be clearly 
distinguished and because purely ideational-based or purely interest-based approaches 
are apt to miss significant aspects of policy changes, it is important for researchers not 
to underestimate the interrelations between ideas and interests. Ideas and interests are 
"not phenomenologically separate and all interests involve beliefs" (Goldstein and 
Keohane 1993: 26). 
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Despite all these limits, Holsti points out that the belief systems approach may be 
useful in certain situations; namely (1) in non-routine situations6 that require more 
than the mere application of standard operating procedures; (2) in decision-making at 
the pinnacle of the government hierarchy by leaders who are relatively free from 
organisational constraints; (3) in long-range planning that involves uncertainty and in 
which normative conceptions are central; (4) in highly ambiguous situations that are 
open to a variety of interpretations; and (5) in situations of information overload 
(Smith 1988: 35). 
3. The theoretical framework 
The main purpose of this section is to develop a synthetic approach to analysing both 
Korea and Japan's foreign economic policy, particularly FDI policy. In order to 
promote a clear understanding of both countries' FDI policy, the role of the state, 
domestic society and the international system will be compared. Thus, this section 
begins with a review of the three contending approaches to foreign economic policy 
analysis (state centred, system centred, society centred). Having done this, the 
literature on sociological new institutionalism will be reviewed in order to supplement 
the three dominant approaches (statist, societal, international systemic) and to 
overcome their limitations. A literature review of sociological new institutionalism 
and its key conceptual terms, including `bounded rationality', `mimetic isomorphism', 
and `embeddedness', suggest a sound explanatory framework for comprehending the 
legacies and irrational existence of core characteristics of Korea and Japan's post 
6A crisis situation is the most urgent non-routine situation. Vogler provides the characteristics and 
conditions of crisis: "A crisis is said to exist when there is a serious threat to high priority goals, when 
the amount of time allowed for decision is sharply limited, and where precipitating events have been 
unanticipated. A range of conditions have been observed in crises. They include a sudden rise in the 
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developmental state. And finally, the theoretical framework of this thesis will be 
elaborated. As we will see, a synthetic approach consists of statist, societal, 
international systemic, institutional, and ideational approaches. 
3-1. Analysing foreign economic policy 
There are three approaches to foreign economic policy analysis: the system centred 
approach; the society centred approach; and the state centred approach. The state 
centred approach can be divided into two groups. One approach sees the state as an 
efficient and autonomous actor and the other approach emphasises the institutional 
settings in a state which is the result of a specific historical context. The system 
centred approach focuses on the international political economy, and it regards 
opportunities or constraints from the system as a necessary first step in any analysis of 
a state's foreign economic policy. In particular, world system theory, international 
regime theory, hegemonic stability theory, transnational relations and economic 
interdependence are approaches based on systemic theories that have pursued a system 
centred approach to foreign economic policy analysis (Ikenberry, Lake, and 
Mastanduno 1988: 4-5). For the proponents of system centred explanations, such as 
the neorealists, a state's domestic politics is not a proper subject of analysis. Thus, 
although a system-centred view can lead to more parsimonious theory by excluding 
the concept of the state, domestic political variables such as the influence of social 
groups in policy making processes and changing coalitions at governmental level are 
simply ignored. This shortcoming regarding domestic politics as a black box causes 
serious theoretical flaws, particularly in explaining both the `post developmental state' 
volume of information ...; resort to informal channels of communication; and the location of 
responsibility for decision at the highest levels of the governmental hierarchy" (Vogler 1989: 151). 
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and the `expansionist developmental state'. Explanations about Korean and Japanese 
PDS and EDS' foreign economic policy require a greater appreciation of the legacies 
of the `developmental state' such as the efficacy of the state and autonomous 
bureaucrats insulated from social group influences and political coalitions. Thus, 
without theories about domestic politics and the state's relative autonomy, neither 
Korean nor Japanese foreign economic policy in the PDS period can be fully 
understood. To be sure, the strength of state autonomy and the extent of its insulation 
from civil society are presently being eroded by strengthened domestic society in the 
form of a growing middle class, a consolidating labour force, and big business 
(Chaebol in Korea and Keiretsu in Japan) as well as by the neo-liberalising 
international political economy. 
Being aware of both the shortcomings and advantages of the system centred approach, 
Milner and Keohane have developed a more elaborate `second image reversed' 
approach by analysing the impact of the globalising economy on domestic politics: 
The clearest effect of internationalisation has been to undermine 
governments' autonomy in the domain of macroeconomic policy, 
and this has resulted largely from rising capital mobility, rather than 
trade ... Internationalisation has also created new policy 
preferences and coalitions ... Hence, there is an ongoing interaction between pressures from internationalisation and 
resistance by entrenched interests and institutions. The blocking and 
freezing effects of domestic institutions are most powerful in the 
short run. However, in the long run they seem unable to persist 
(Keohane and Milner 1996: 256-257). 
Keohane and Milner define internationalisation as "the processes generated by 
underlying shifts in transaction costs that produce observable flows of goods, services, 
and capital" (Keohane and Milner 1996: 4). As can be inferred from above, their 
main arguments are twofold: first, as internationalisation is intensified, it can cause 
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changes in domestic politics by creating new policy preferences and coalitions, by 
triggering domestic economic and political crises, and by weakening government 
control over macroeconomic policy (Keohane and Milner 1996: 243). Secondly, the 
unprecedented increase in international transactions in trade and capital are raising the 
extent to which each economy is exposed to world market pressures and therefore the 
degree of sensitivity of the domestic economy to international price trends and shocks. 
Internationalisation therefore implies that economic shocks from abroad will more 
fully and quickly impact upon the domestic economy (Keohane and Milner 1996: 16). 
The East Asian economic crisis that started in early 1997 confirms the validity of 
these assertions. The chain-reacting financial crisis in the region showed how closely 
each economy is intertwined, how each economy is vulnerably exposed to the 
globalising world economy and how government policies are restrained by the 
international economy and international organisations. The aid and stabilisation funds 
from the IMF meant that the recipient country conceded its economic sovereignty 
particularly in controlling fiscal and monetary policy to the IMP, which insists on neo- 
liberal style economic adjustments in return for assistance. Thus, "pressures from the 
international economy are not the only source of external pressure that matter for 
domestic politics. Political pressures emanating from the international system may 
also play a significant role ... Powerful actors within the international system - 
whether states like the US or institutions like the IMF - can also affect domestic 
politics, and can probably do so even more as internationalisation processes" 
(Keohane and Milner 1996: 255-256). In sum, under the neo-liberalising international 
political economy system, the state's capacity to exercise control over both public and 
foreign economic policies (fiscal policy, monetary policy, strategic trade policy, 
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industrial policy, competition policy) is seriously restrained. This is the reason why 
the systemic view cannot be ruled out in explaining the foreign economic policies of 
both Korea and Japan despite its theoretical flaw in ignoring domestic politics and 
institutions (see Figures 1,2,3, and Tables 1,2). 
The society centred approach views foreign economic policy "as either reflecting the 
preferences of the dominant group or class in society, or as resulting from the struggle 
for influence that takes place among various interest groups or political parties. In 
either case, this approach explains foreign economic policy essentially as a function of 
domestic politics" (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988: 1-2). Opposing the statist 
approach, Gourevitch insists that "there seem to be no characteristics of associations 
or state structure that can stand independently of social factors in explaining policy 
outputs" (Gourevitch 1986: 28, requoted from Kesselman 1992: 651). Moreover, he 
defends his society centred approach against the emphasis on state autonomy by 
arguing that the latter "has a social base: for state autonomy to exist for specific 
purposes, the state must be able to obtain the support of differing kinds from societal 
actors" (Gourevitch 1986: 238, requoted from Kesselman 1992: 651). Halliday also 
argues that "the state is no longer an embodiment of national interest or of judicial 
neutrality, but rather of the interests of a specific society or social formation, defined 
by its socio-economic structure ... Sovereignty equally becomes not a generic legal 
concept but the sovereignty of specific social forces" (Halliday 1994: 60-61, requoted 
from Jacobson 1996: 101-102). 
Thus, in this view, state bureaucrats and institutions are neither autonomous nor 
significant variables in planning or performing foreign economic policy. Moreover, 
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policy constraints or opportunities from the international systemic level cannot be 
explained. And, "the approach tends to lack theoretical rigor and predictive value, 
largely because it lacks an independent measure of group power ... If the outcome 
of group struggle can only be explained after the fact, the predictive value of the 
approach is severely limited" (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988: 8). There are 
more intensive criticisms of the society centred view offered by proponents of state 
centred approaches: 
Lake argues ... that state officials can 
have an important impact by 
shaping the array of interest groups that contend over policy ... 
Goldstein contends that state institutions can shape an interest 
group's ability to gain access to the policy arena ... Ikenberry ... demonstrates that the existing state institutions may influence the 
interests societal actors possess (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 
1988: 8-9). 
Most importantly, the society centred approach to foreign economic policy is not 
suitable to illustrate the peculiar relations between the `developmental state' and its 
weak society. Under the developmental state, social groups and classes were not 
active enough to participate in and influence the policy making process. These weak 
societal forces were the actual output of the purposive state's oppressions, ideological 
manipulation (such as catch up slogan in Japan, national modernisation and growth 
first policy in Korea), and were derived from the under-developed political systems 
and the low level of democratisation. Thus, in explaining the developmental state's 
relations with society and the international system, the persuasive power of the society 
centred view is seriously limited. However, as the `developmental state' transformed 
into the `post developmental state', and as societal forces in the `post developmental 
state' became stronger, an exclusion of society can result in an imperfect explanation 
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of Korea and Japan's foreign economic policy (see Figure 2-1,2-2,2-3 and Table 2-1, 
2-2). 
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Figure 3-1. Inter-relationships and influential flows among society, the international 
system and the DS regarding foreign economic policy. 
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Figure 3-2. Inter-relationships and influential flows among society, the international 
system and the PDS regarding foreign economic policy. 
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Figure 3-3. Inter-relationships and influential flows among society, the international 
system, and the TS regarding foreign economic policy. 
1960s-the mid 1980s The mid 1980s-1997 1997-to present 
-Neo-mercantilistic -Post developmental state -Transitionary state 
capitalism 
-Voluntary learning from -Coercive learning from 
-Communitarian Japan's EDS in East Asia neo-liberal regime 
capitalism? 
-Nascent development of 
-Developmental state the EDS in East Asia 
Table 3-1. Korea's transformations from the DS, through the PDS, to the TS and 
distinctive features in each period. 8 
7 The term `communitarian capitalism' was developed by Lester Thurow (1992) in his book Head to 
Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and America, (New York: William 
Morrow and Company Inc. ). According to Young-Myung Kim (1996: 20-21), Japanese and Korean 
communitarian capitalism has three conspicuous features different from Anglo-American capitalism 
which is based on individualistic and liberal capitalism. First, the primary objective of 
communitarian capitalism lies in the improvement of national wealth. Second, because 
communitarian capitalism's basic unit is the nation-state and because it searches for mercantilistic 
economic policy, communitarian capitalism is likely to be exclusive to other countries. Third and 
finally, communitarian capitalism stresses the interests of the group or nation-state. So it prefers to 
improve national competitiveness rather than to increase individual consumers' quality of life. 
8 Korea's economic development plan started from the early 1960s, and after the late 1980s Korea's 
OFDI increased in the wake of currency appreciation and the first realisation of a trade surplus. Thus, 
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1945-the mid 1980s The mid 1980s-to present 
-Neo-mercantilistic capitalism -Post developmental state 
-Communitarian capitalism -EDS in East Asia 
-Developmental state 
Table 3-2. Japan's transformation from the DS to the PDS and EDS and distinctive 
features in each period. 9 
The state centred approach, as we have seen, is divided into two approaches (the 
institutional approach and the state as rational actor approach). Ikenberry et al. clearly 
explain these two state centred approaches: 
First, what can be termed the institutional approach conceives of the 
state primarily as an organisational structure, or set of laws and 
institutional arrangements shaped by previous events. In this view, 
institutions, once formed, tend to endure. Institutional change ... 
occurs primarily at moments of significant crisis ... The 
persistence of institutions enables them to influence policy even 
after the ideas and coalitions that initially gave rise to them no 
longer dominate. The second approach conceives of the state as an 
actor ... Its primary emphasis is on the goal-oriented behaviour of 
politicians and civil servants as they respond to internal and external 
constraints in an effort to manipulate policy outcomes in accordance 
with their preferences. An underlying presumption is that these 
preferences are partially, if not wholly, distinct from the parochial 
concerns of either societal groups or particular governmental 
institutions (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988: 10). 
it can be argued that Korea's `developmental state' started from the early 1960s and after the late 
1980s, Korea entered into the post developmental state. After the economic crisis, Korea transformed 
into a transitionary state. We will discuss these transformational processes and conspicuous features 
in each period in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
9 Japan's peculiar economic development led by the developmental state started after the end of the 
Second World War and after 1985, as the result of currency appreciation caused by the Plaza Accord, 
Japan's OFDI increased rapidly. Thus, it is reasonable to insist that Japan's `expansionist 
developmental state (EDS)' started from 1985. We will discuss Japan's transformation from the DS 
to the PDS and conspicuous features in each period in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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The second approach considers the state as an efficient and autonomous actor which is 
insulated from pressures emanating from both domestic society and the international 
system. Thus, in this view, states "operate simultaneously at domestic and 
international levels and want to maximise benefits in one domain to enhance their 
positions in the other" (Jacobson 1996: 101). This view clearly explains the 
characteristics of the `developmental state'. In the developmental state period, 
particularly in Korea and Japan, bureaucrats and supreme decision makers exercised a 
great deal of autonomy and pursued policy objectives which were not influenced by 
parochial interests but were compatible with national interests. Korea's `national 
modernisation' slogan and `economic growth first' ideology and Japan's `catch up' 
slogan were undeniably manipulated and became pervasive in domestic society by the 
initiative of autonomous and efficient government officials or supreme decision 
makers in order to improve economic wealth and enhance national pride for the whole 
country, and not just to satisfy parochial interests. 
For instance, ideology manipulation by the state about the necessity and efficacy of 
state autonomy in pursuing economic development was artificially reproduced in the 
form of a social pact or agreement in Korea in the period of the `developmental 
state'. 1° This confirms the fact that in the developmental period, the strength and 
10 Through the 1960s, 1970s, and until the middle of the 1980s, the belief in the efficacy of state 
autonomy and the strong state in pursuing economic development was pervasive in Korea's domestic 
society. There were several underlying factors explaining this socially agreed belief in the 
autonomous state as an efficient way to achieve rapid economic growth. The most important factor 
was the simple fact that the Korean DS achieved unprecedented economic growth in the 1960s and 
1970s. Economic growth in those periods further legitimised and consolidated previous state 
autonomy. However, of great significance was the government's intentional effort to introduce 
Western academic literature on the `East Asian development model', which emphasised the 
successful role of autonomous and intrusive government intervention in the market system, to 
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autonomy of the state over society were strong enough to manipulate and mobilise 
societal forces. Thus, the second view of considering the state as an efficient actor 
emphasises state officials' ability to build and reshape new institutions and mobilise 
inactive societal groups in order to achieve national objectives such as economic 
growth. In sum, in this view, "the state is situated at the intersection of the domestic 
and international economies and is the principal national actor charged with the 
overall conduct of defence and foreign affairs. This unique position of the state gives 
executive officials a special legitimacy in the formation and implementation of foreign 
economic policy" (Jacobson 1996: 13). This view also suggests a valuable 
explanation for the active and autonomous state's position in the internalisation of 
external pressures from the international system and the externalisation of domestic 
society's pressures to the international system. The Japanese and Korean EDS can be 
explained with the help of this approach. Both the Korean and Japanese PDS pursued 
OFDI in Southeast Asia as a result of the simultaneous process of internalisation of 
external pressures and externalisation of internal pressures. More specifically, from 
the internal side, both the Korean and Japanese PDS suffered from shortage of labour, 
high labour costs and competition from other East Asian countries in labour-intensive 
industry. Moreover, from the external side, both countries were under harsh pressures 
to open the domestic market and to evade protectionist measures in foreign markets 
particularly in America and the EU. As a result, OFDI was massively developed in 
Southeast Asia in order to overcome both internal and external pressures at the same 
time. The role of the Korean and Japanese PDS in developing and supporting the 
EDS system in Southeast Asia will be further investigated in Chapters 4,5, and 6. 
ordinary Korean people in order to legitimise and consolidate the autonomous and strong state by 
ideologically manipulating and persuading ordinary people. 
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However, the serious shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot explain the 
weakening position of the state in the Korean and Japanese PDS period caused by 
strengthened societal forces and globalising forces centred on the neo-classical 
economic paradigm and neo-liberal political paradigm. 
The institutional approach emphasises the tendency of state institutions to persist well 
after social coalitions or international conditions that initially led to their creation 
decline (Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno 1988: 11, Ikenberry 1988: 223-224). It 
focuses on "the shaping and constraining role of institutional structures of the state 
and society, and on the historical dynamics of continuity and change that underlie 
these structures" (Ikenberry 1988: 11). Keohane and Milner identify three types of 
domestic institutional resistance to the globalising world economy. First, "domestic 
institutions can block signals from the international environment ... South Korea's 
policies of industrial intervention and capital controls, were also attempts to block, or 
at least reshape, international price signals" (Keohane and Milner 1996: 251). 
Secondly, pre-existing institutions may negate or modify influences from the world 
economy by freezing coalitions and policies in place. "International price signals may 
enter the domestic economy, but politics will remain frozen in time-worn patterns" 
(Keohane and Milner 1996: 253). Thirdly, "pre-existing institutions filter the 
international pressures, and countries make different choice about their responses to 
the world economy" (Keohane and Milner 1996: 255). 
In order to review the institutional approach, it is necessary to define what institutions 
are. Ikenberry suggests three definitions. First, as the narrowest explanation, 
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institutions refer to "the administrative, legislative and regulatory rules that guide the 
adjudication of conflict. Rules and procedures at this level are extensive, and they 
undergird the making of foreign economic policy" (Ikenberry 1988: 226). Secondly, 
institutions refer to "the centralisation and diffusion of power within the state. The 
capacities and resources of the various organisations that comprise the state are of 
concern here ... In relating these institutional structures to 
foreign economic policy, 
scholars have given special attention to the role and efficacy of executive officials 
within the state" (Ikenberry 1988: 227). Finally, as the broadest conception, 
institutions refer to "the norms that govern the relations between state and society ... 
Nations differ in terms of the reigning political beliefs that render legitimate particular 
types of state involvement in the economy and society" (Ikenberry 1988: 228). 
The first and second definitions indicate tangible institutions while the third definition 
indicates intangible institutions. In the third definition, as we can see, political belief 
systems are regarded as institutions. This definition is close to the definition 
developed in sociological new institutionalism. We will discuss sociological new 
institutionalism in the next section. The reason why the new institutionalism is 
incorporated into the theoretical framework of this thesis is also explained in the 
following section. 
3-2. Sociological new institutionalism 
As we have seen, in foreign policy analysis, system, structure, process, agent 
(individual, group, organisation), culture, institutions, and belief systems are 
contending analytical units or levels. Thus, there are the international systemic 
approach, structuralism, constructivism, the cultural approach, rational choice theory 
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and the ideational or belief systems approach in foreign policy analysis. All of these 
have their advantages and shortcomings in analysing and predicting changes in a 
state's foreign policy. The reason why sociological new institutionalism is 
incorporated in this thesis is that it can complement the institutional approach. As we 
have seen, in foreign policy analysis, the definition of institutions is confined to 
observable and tangible institutions such as the administrative and legal system, and 
standard operating procedures. However, it is important to remember that there are 
intangible but very significant institutions such as culture, practice, social norms, and 
people's sentiments (e. g. economic nationalism and xenophobia) that can play a 
greater role in determining or influencing foreign policy making processes or 
outcomes. For example, without considering Korean and Japanese xenophobia and 
economic nationalism which are expressed through the `buy Korean or Japanese 
goods' and `national wealth first' mentality rather than the individuals' quality of life, 
Korea and Japan's institutionally protected domestic market structure, cannot be 
understood. Moreover, without considering the effects of intangible institutions' role 
and influence, the low level of IFDI in both Korea and Japan cannot also be explained 
properly. 
Thus, in this section, first, the background of the emergence of the new 
institutionalism and second, the origins, changes, and definitions of institutions will 
be investigated. In this thesis, the institutional approach is used as a combination of 
the institutional approach developed in foreign policy analysis and sociological new 
institutionalism. In other words, not only tangible but also intangible institutions will 
be analysed with equal emphasis. 
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The old institutionalism flourished between the 1880s and 1920. The old 
institutionalists were "strongly committed to the study of formal state institutions, 
viewing them as tangible entities that evolve in coherent ways" (Ethington and 
McDonagh 1995: 88). The old institutionalism was criticised because it "was 
excessively formalistic in its approach to political institutions; did not have a 
sophisticated awareness of the informal arrangements of society ...; was descriptive 
rather than problem-solving, or analytic in its method" (Rhodes 1995: 48). Academic 
interest in institutions was re-ignited by March and Olsen in the late 1980s after the 
long dominance of behaviouralism and rational choice theory in social science. In 
their co-authored book Rediscovering Institutions published in 1989, March and Olsen 
criticised that "both the behavioural approach of the 1960s and the rational choice 
school eliminated any role for institutions in explaining political outcomes" (Koelble 
1995: 233). For March and Olsen, "human rationality is limited or bounded. Human 
action is an attempt to satisfy and fulfil expectations which are context specific and 
deeply embedded in cultural, socio-economic, and political fields or structures" 
(Koelble 1995: 233). Thus, the new institutionalism "seeks to retrieve the 
significance of both formal state institutions and informal societal pressures, while 
avoiding the extremes of old institutionalism or behaviouralism" (Ethington and 
McDonagh 1995: 90). 
With the help of March and Olsen's stimulating work, there emerged three new 
institutionalism: sociological, historical, and rational choice. For sociological new 
institutionalists, institutions "are not merely rules, procedures, organisational 
standards, and governance structures, but also conventions and customs" (Koelble 
1995: 234). In other words, institutions are "not just formal rules, procedures, or 
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norms, but the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 
frames of meaning guiding human action. Such a definition breaks down the 
conceptual divide between institutions and culture" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). In 
explaining the origins, persistence, and changes of institutions, sociological new 
institutionalists depend on the concepts of `social legitimacy', `embeddedness', and 
`institutional isomorphism'. Sociological new institutionalists insist that 
"organisations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it advances the 
means-ends efficiency of the organisation but because it enhances the social 
legitimacy of the organisation or its participants. In other words, organisations 
embrace specific institutional forms or practices because the latter are widely valued 
within a broader cultural environment" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947). Thus, 
sociological new institutionalists "focus attention on the processes whereby those 
developing new institutions borrow from the existing world of institutional templates. 
This approach usefully emphasises the way in which the existing institutional world 
circumscribes the range of institutional creation" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 953). 
Meanwhile, the term `embeddedness' suggests the reason why old institutions persist: 
Most people are inherently conservative: once they establish a 
routine, they tend to stick with it. Cognitive and cultural 
embeddedness explains why most individuals cannot even conceive 
of alternative institutional arrangements or ways of doing things .. 
. Even more important are ... structural and political 
embeddedness ... Individuals are viewed as embedded in so many 
social, economic, and political relations beyond their control and 
even cognition that it is almost absurd to speak of utility-maximising 
and rational behaviour in a strictly economic sense (Koelble 1995: 
234-235). 
Thus, it can be inferred that sociological new institutionalists have some advantages in 
explaining institutional persistence and inertia, but they cannot clearly explain why 
institutions change despite human actors being strongly embedded in present social 
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and structural institutions. However, Powell and DiMaggio contend that "institutional 
isomorphism explains institutional change. Change occurs as a result of coercive, 
mimetic, or normative isomorphism which lead organisations and institutions to adopt 
surprisingly homogeneous forms" (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 64-74, requoted from 
Koelble 1995: 235). 
This concept of institutional isomorphism suggests a good explanatory tool for 
comprehending the Korean state's mimetic and coercive isomorphism with the 
Japanese state and international organisations such as the IMF or the international 
neo-liberal regime led by America. In both the DS and the PDS periods, the Korean 
government ministries and government-supported organisations (semi-governmental 
organisations) for trade and investment promotion were similar to those of Japan's. 
More correctly, Korea consciously followed or imitated the Japanese model (Singh 
1994: 1821). The Korean government's mimetic isomorphism is well described by 
Vogel: 
The Korean Finance Ministry and Ministry of Trade and Industry 
looked very much like Japan's Ministry of Finance and MITI. To 
promote foreign trade, MITI had established JETRO (the Japan 
External Trade Organisation), and South Korea established KOTRA 
(Vogel 1991: 53). 
The Korean state also accepted Japan as a model in science and technology policy: 
"indeed, Japan has been a reasonably explicit model for Korean science and 
technology policy during the past three decades" (Branscomb 1996: 161). However, it 
has to be remembered that although Korea learned and imitated from Japan, Korea did 
not absolutely duplicate the Japanese state due to cultural, historical, institutional, and 
political differences between the two countries. Although there are great similarities 
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in governmental organisations, economic planning, and the export oriented economic 
system between the two countries, the most conspicuous difference is the extent of 
bureaucrats' autonomy or freedom from politics. Japanese bureaucrats have 
autonomy from politics, while Korean bureaucrats are subordinate to politics (Kang 
1989: 27-36). Moreover, in relation to the corporate system, ownership and 
management is divided in Japan. Thus, "management acts as a mediator between 
shareholders and employees" (Keun Lee 1993: 47). In contrast, management is 
synonymous with ownership in Korea. Thus, there are confrontational relations 
between management and workers. These institutional differences between Japan and 
Korea show that institutions matter in learning processes. Although Korea has learned 
from Japan, there are significant differences between the two countries' institutional 
setting. 
In the TS period after the economic crisis, Korea followed the economic prescriptions 
from the IMF in order to obtain aid for economic stabilisation. This facilitated 
coercive isomorphism in Korea's economic related ministries, which had been the 
symbol of successful government intrusion into the market system, with the IMF as 
the symbolistic keeper of the neo-liberal, free market economy. Thus, the 
characteristics of the Korean PDS, in which the belief system regarding the efficacy of 
the intrusive and developmental state co-existed with the neo-liberal belief system 
regarding the efficacy of the market system, were transferred to the TS which is more 
compatible with the neo-liberalising international political economy. 
However, sociological new institutionalism has two main theoretical flaws. First, it 
seems "so focused on macro-level processes that the actors involved in these 
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processes seem to drop from sight and the result begins to look like action without 
agents" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954). Secondly, "it can miss the extent to which 
processes of institutional creation or reform entail a clash of power among actors" 
with competing interests" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 954). 
Despite these theoretical problems, the reason why sociological new institutionalism 
is incorporated in this theoretical framework is to supplement the institutional 
approach. As we have seen, in the institutional approach, which is a part of the state 
centred approach, the definition of institutions is confined to tangible institutions. 
However, we need to understand the role and influence of intangible institutions in 
order to fully understand Korea and Japan's foreign policy making processes and 
policy changes. In the Korean and Japanese PDS period, the legacies of the 
11 The rational choice institutionalists criticise these theoretical flaws of sociological institutionalism 
and emphasise that the emergence and changes of institutions are closely related to human rationality. 
They argue that cultural norms and social institutions are the product of repeated rational, calculative 
and utility-maximising human actions. In other words, institutions are "designed to stabilise exchange 
relationships, to induce co-operative behaviour among self-interested individuals, and to minimise 
transaction costs between the parties" (Koelble 1995: 239). Thus, "institutions are another kind of 
market and the shape of institutions and their behaviour are the aggregate product of individual 
calculations of instrumental interests" (Ross 1995: 120). They also argue that actors' habitual 
behaviours in institutions are not due to irrationality but due to limited information "since those forming 
institutions had the intention of bringing about a habitual (that is certain and consistent) exchange" 
(Koelble 1995: 240). It can be inferred from the above that for the rational choice institutionalists, an 
institution is intentionally created by relevant and voluntary human actors in order to obtain co- 
operation and to reduce transaction costs. For rational choice institutionalists, the institution persists 
and "survives primarily because it provides more benefits to the relevant actors than alternative 
institutional forms" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 945). And, institutional change takes place "as a result of 
changing prices, which provide an incentive for those within institutions, and sometimes those outside 
of them, to renegotiate terms of participation and to change institutional rules and enforcement 
procedures" (Koelble 1995: 240). 
However, the most significant theoretical flaw is that rational choice institutionalists postulate that "the 
relevant actors have a fixed set of preferences or taste" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 944). Thus, it cannot be 
denied that they fail to explain how preferences are formulated. In other words, "[n]o abstract rational 
actor, whose preferences are simply given, and who acts simply according to interest, has ever existed. 
The concept of rationality is itself a social and historical construct. Preferences are always culturally 
shaped and vary enormously" (Kloppenberg 1995: 126). Moreover, this approach often leaves us 
without an explanation for the many inefficiencies that institutions display" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 
952). 
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developmental state12 were strongly embedded in the socio-economic and political 
contexts although domestic society and the international systems changed and became 
unfavourable or conflicting to developmentalism. And, in the Korean TS period, 
although both Korea and Japan needed a new economic paradigm to adjust to a highly 
politicised and neo-liberalising international political economy, intangible institutions 
such as economic nationalism and xenophobia remain intact and persistent. 
Because of these institutional legacies and the inertia of the developmental state in 
Korea and Japan, both countries failed to quickly adjust to the changing international 
environment. It cannot be denied that as a result of the `economic growth first policy' 
in Korea which has lasted for more than 30 years and the `catch up phase' which has 
lasted for almost a century since the Meiji restoration in Japan, the developmental 
state and mercantilist capitalism were strongly institutionalised not only in intangible 
institutions (culture, practice, social norms, rules and people's sentiment, implicit 
consensus between the and state and society) but also in visible institutions 
(governmental organisations, legal systems, standard operational procedures) in Korea 
and Japan. Moreover, the self-interests of bureaucrats were also strongly engrained in 
both countries' bureaucratic organisations. Sociological new institutionalism provides 
12 The outstanding characteristics of the `developmental state' can be summarised as follows: 
autonomous government insulated from the constraints emanating from both domestic society and the 
international system; government intervention in the market system; strategic trade and investment 
policy; co-operation between government and big business; long-term industrial policy; protectionism 
in the period of import substitution industry; targeting future industry; promoting artificial comparative 
advantage; governmental support for indigenous technology; government subsidies and beneficial 
finances toward targeted industry and technology development; a government-led financial sector; high 
rate of domestic savings; oppression towards labour movement; uni-polar political system (authoritarian 
regime in Korean and long-term Liberal Democratic Party dominance in Japan). The legacies of these 
policies and institutions still remain in Korea and Japan as a form of the post developmental state and 
the transitionary state, although they are contradictory and conflicting to the globalising world economy 
and the neo-liberalising international political economy. 
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useful theoretical tools to explain these rigid institutional legacies and inertia in both 
countries. As a result, the theory of sociological new institutionalism provides a good 
explanatory framework in comprehending the characteristics of the post 
developmental state and the transitionary state. 
3-3. The theoretical framework: Towards a synthetic approach 
So far, we have reviewed five approaches to foreign policy analysis: the ideational 
approach, the statist approach, the societal approach, the international systemic 
approach, and the institutional approach. As we have seen, each approach has its 
advantages and disadvantages in explaining a state's foreign policy making process 
and policy changes. The state as rational actor approach provides the most persuasive 
explanation of the Korean and Japanese DS. In the DS period, the respective Korean 
and Japanese state were efficient and effective in planning and accomplishing their 
economic objectives due to a combination of a set of environments. In the DS period, 
underdeveloped civil society, an unpoliticised international political economy, 
developmentalism oriented governmental organisations and bureaucracy, and the 
autonomous state facilitated the rapid realisation of economic growth. As a result of 
these environments, there were congruent and consistent relations among economic 
policy, economic institutions, and economic belief systems in the DS period and this 
was the underlying background of rapid economic development in both countries. 
However, in the Korean and Japanese PDS period, there emerged cleavages among 
policy, institutions, and belief systems. As the international political economy became 
highly politicised and economic interests became more significant than security 
concerns after the collapse of the Cold War order, both the Korean and Japanese 
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mercantilistic economic behaviour and structure were subject to harsh pressures from 
the international system. Both countries' economic structures which were 
characterised by protected domestic markets and fierce penetration of open foreign 
markets in America and Europe were highly controversial and harshly criticised. As a 
result, both countries started economic liberalisation and deregulation in order to 
evade foreign pressures. However, this change in policy was not accompanied by 
ideational or institutional changes. Changes in belief systems do not directly lead to 
changes in policy. However, the more important point here is that changes in belief 
systems do not easily occur. There is a gap between the external environment and the 
psychological or cognitive environment. Policy makers' or decision makers' belief 
systems persist because of this gap caused by `cognitive consistency'. People have a 
strong tendency to more easily accept events which are close to their present belief 
systems and to more easily reject events which are different from present belief 
systems (Kegley 1995: 53, Vogler 1989: 146). This shows that belief systems are not 
inclined to easily change, despite external environments constantly changing. 
The belief systems of the bureaucrats in the Korean and Japanese PDS were strongly 
embedded in the efficacy of developmentalism. In other words, the bureaucrats 
believed that state intervention in the market through planning, screening, regulations, 
and other supporting measures were still effective in achieving economic 
development, although the international system had become much more politicised 
and unfavourable to this belief system. Thus, right before the economic crisis, Korean 
bureaucrats, particularly medium and low level (working level) bureaucrats were 
strongly rooted to core aspects of developmentalism such as red tape, internal 
guidelines, and administrative guidance. Although the maturing civil society strongly 
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requested the diminution of bureaucratic intervention into the market, and although, 
the side effects of developmentalism such as collusive relations among politicians, 
bureaucrats, and business had been revealed several times through constant corruption 
and bribery scandals in the PDS period, bureaucrats refused to adjust to the changed 
environment in a pluralised domestic society. 
The Korean TS began in the aftermath of the economic crisis. With the intervention 
of the IMF, the Korean TS changed its developmentalism oriented belief systems to 
neo-liberal, free market oriented belief systems. The massive shock and severe 
experience from the economic crisis finally led to a change in belief systems of 
Korean bureaucrats. However, institutions, particularly people's sentiment of 
economic nationalism and xenophobia continue to resist change in the TS period. 
Changes in institutions are more difficult and time consuming than changes in belief 
system. Institutionalised belief systems last far longer, even after the initial 
configuration of material interests and belief systems that had led to the emergence of 
particular institutions change or disappear. Thus, in the Korean and Japanese PDS 
period and in the Korean TS period, we can witness cleavages and contradictory 
relations among policy, institutions, and belief systems. More specifically, in the PDS 
period, institutions and belief systems were strongly engrained in developmentalism, 
which is characterised by state intervention in the market and market protection, while 
foreign economic policy only was liberalised. In the Korean TS period, the resistance 
and inertia of institutions still embedded in developmentalism can be observed, 
although both policy and belief systems were changed and geared to the neo-liberal, 
free market system. 
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These transformations in both Korea and Japan from the DS to the PDS and TS shows 
that we need an approach comprising societal, statist, international systemic, 
ideational and institutional approaches. In other words, understanding both the 
Korean and Japanese states' historical transformation needs these five approaches. 
Neglecting any one approach will result in partial or incomplete analysis. However, 
we can identify a determining approach in each period. For example, the DS can be 
clearly explained by the approach that sees the state as an efficient and autonomous 
actor while the PDS can be explained by the institutional approach. And, the TS can 
be explained by the international systemic approach. However, it is important to 
remember that this does not mean that we can explain the characteristics of the DS 
period only by the approach that sees the state as an efficient and autonomous actor. 
A determining approach can be identified only when we investigate the underlying 
environments which contributed to the establishment of the efficient and autonomous 
state in the DS period. In other words, the autonomous state in the DS was the 
historical result of a combination of weak civil society, an unpoliticised international 
political economy, and the lack of cleavage among policy, institutions, and belief 
systems. This argument shows why we need to investigate the five analytic levels 
(state, society, international system, institutions, and ideas) by adopting a synthetic 
approach. Also, even though the institutional approach can explain the PDS period in 
which the legacies and inertia of developmentalism were pervasive and rigid, we need 
to understand why the institutional legacies and inertia persisted for so long. The 
extended and prolonged institutional legacies of the developmentalism in the PDS 
period can only be fully understood when we adopt the theory of sociological new 
institutionalism and the ideational approach. Sociological new institutionalism 
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provides us with an effective theoretical tool in explicating institutional legacies and 
resistance. The divided belief systems within the bureaucracy in the Korean and 
Japanese PDS period also promoted the institutional resistance of developmentalism. 
Shared belief systems within bureaucrats and between the state and civil society can 
facilitate rapid economic development. Furthermore, shared belief systems can 
shorten the time interval for institutional change, because with these shared belief 
systems, societal and state actors can pursue institutional change and shorten the time 
interval for institutional changes. 
The Korean TS period can be explained by the international systemic approach, 
particularly economic interdependence theory because the Korean TS emerged in the 
aftermath of East Asian economic crisis. The crisis in Southeast Asia spilled over to 
Korea and the contagion effect revealed the fact that in the context of globalising 
world economy and financial globalisation, every economy is closely inter-related and 
interdependent. Thus, the origins of the Korean TS can be explained by the systemic 
approach. However, we need to understand the background of the economic crisis in 
Korea. Thus, we need to investigate other analytic levels such as state, society, ideas, 
and institutions. The crisis was a result of a complex situation. The Korean PDS was 
ideationally divided between high ranking bureaucrats and working level bureaucrats. 
The free market economic idea was supported by high ranking policy makers while 
developmentalism oriented economic ideas were advocated by working level 
bureaucrats. This ideational division resulted in lack of supervision in the newly 
liberalised financial sector. The lack of state supervision led to a massive increase in 
foreign debt by the private sector. The enormous increase in foreign loans was one of 
the important factors which caused the overall economic crisis in Korea. Thus, it can 
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be argued that even though the systemic approach can provide a first step in the 
explanation of the Korean TS, we need to analyse the state level, the ideational level, 
and the societal level as well. 
This shows that we need a synthetic approach which consists of a state centred 
approach, a society centred approach, an international systemic approach, an 
ideational approach, and an institutional approach. This multi theoretical research is 
supported by Rhodes: "You can learn from the critical assessment of one theory; you 
can learn more from a comparative critical assessment of several theories when they 
are brought to bear on a single topic" (Rhodes 1995: 56). 
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Chapter 4. 
From the DS to the PDS: 
Socio-economic and political transformation in Japan 
Contents 
1. The Japanese DS 
1-1. The major characteristics of the Japanese DS 
1-2. Society, state, and international system in the Japanese DS 
2. The Japanese PDS 
2-1. The major characteristics of the Japanese PDS 
2-2. Society, state, and international system in the Japanese PDS 
3. Sub-conclusion: Japan's convergence towards neo-liberal regime? 
The specific nature and characteristics of the Japanese state, society and its economic 
system have been highly contested both in academic and practical fields. Sometimes, 
the differences between the views are so enormous that for some observers, Japan 
could be considered as a multifaceted country. Along the spectrum of interpretation 
and analysis of the Japanese state, society and its economic system, there have been 
four distinctive approaches: (1) a statist approach that focuses on the role of the 
bureaucracy; (2) a market-centred approach that emphasises Japan's market 
conforming state intervention in the economy; (3) an institutional approach that 
investigates specific features of the relationships between political party, bureaucracy 
and business; and finally, (4) a societal state approach. 
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The statist approach mainly developed by Johnson (1995) and Wade (1990) argues 
that Japanese economic success is a result of highly planned and effective 
interventions by the bureaucracy and this approach has been termed as `capitalistic 
developmentalism' or `the governed market theory' in the IPE literature and in 
Development studies. In this approach, "[t]he state is not simply an instrument of 
elite control, responsible for maintaining the status quo. Nor is it merely a neutral 
aggregator of pluralist competition between interest groups. The state has its own set 
of interests and goals, its own repertoire of power resources, including administrative 
authority and an established legal order, and legitimate control over the instruments of 
coercion" (Okimoto 1988: 309). The advantage of this approach is that it provides a 
comprehensive conceptual tool in explicating Japan's high growth period or the catch 
up period. In this period, the state was a powerful locomotive in planning and 
pursuing national economic objectives. 
The major weakness of this approach is that first, it cannot illustrate the close, co- 
operative relationships of the state with business and the co-ordinated trade and 
investment policies emanating from such relations. Second, this approach cannot 
explain inter-ministerial struggles and differences over policy objectives and 
representations of various social groups, which have clearly appeared in the conflicts 
between the MITI and the MOF (Jin 1996: 445). 
The market centred tradition has produced two groups: neo-classical interpretations 
and a concept of `corporate led strategic capitalism' formulated by Calder (1993). 
The neo-classical approach is further divided into two groups: the first group 
faithfully follows the assertion of predominance of the market system over the state 
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and tries to highlight the side-effects of state intervention into markets. This approach 
is an economic expression of the neo-liberal international political economic order 
and lies in sharp contrast to developmentalism. For the proponents of this approach, 
Japan's remarkable economic performance is the result of non-interference of the state 
into the market. Thus, it can be argued that this free market approach has no 
advantages in enhancing a comprehensive picture of Japanese economic development. 
Any approach which ignores the roles of the Japanese state and relies on the free 
market system cannot privide a sufficient explanation in Japanese studies. 
Meanwhile, the second group recognises some state interventions as long as this 
interference is market conforming and not distorting. 
Wade calls these two approaches the free market (FM) theory and the simulated free 
market (SM) theory (Wade 1990: 22-23). In a nutshell, the difference between the 
two versions of the neo-classical approach lies in the acceptance of state intervention. 
Thus, the former highlights the failures of the MITI's planning and interventions in 
the early car industry and the latest bio-technology industry and doubts the efficacy of 
industrial policy, arguing that the role of industrial policy has been, at best, a 
supplement to the market system. Also, this group emphasises the price differences 
between domestic and international markets. Japan's high costs in product factors, 
high prices in goods and services, and poor housing and quality of life are recurring 
items on the menu of this group in criticising Japan's market distortions and their side 
effects. This group can be thought of as a pure neo-classical approach. Meanwhile, 
the second group starts from a recognition that Japan's economic performance cannot 
be understood only by a single logic of the free market system. This group accepts the 
efficacy and usefulness of industrial policies, government-led financial system, and 
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strategic trade and investment policies which led to domestic market protection and 
exports promotion as long as these state policies do not totally violate a market system 
of demand and supply. Thus, this approach is particularly focused on the systematic 
efforts of the Japanese government in developing such areas as human resources and 
social infrastructure which facilitate and support the smooth operations of the market 
system. 
Calder's corporate-led strategic capitalism argues that it is not the state but the 
configuration of private sector actors found in the Keiretsu system and the long-term 
credit bank which have been efficiently allocated financial and material resources. 
Calder's assertion, which argues that the private sector dominates the public sector in 
Japanese capitalism, is different from Johnson's developmental ism. For Calder, 
Japanese capitalism includes such patterns as "(1) fragmented state administrative 
controls over industries and finance, with no strong central executive to integrate 
policy ... (2) powerful and largely self-contained private industrial groups [which 
are] more cohesive, market-oriented, and often more strategic than the public sector" 
(Calder 1993: 263). This contrasting interpretation and understanding of the Japanese 
state, society and economic system are the reason why Japanese studies in IPE and 
Development Studies are unable to reach an agreement on understanding Japan's 
enigmatic state-society relations and economic accomplishment and why Japan is 
regarded as a multifaceted country by some observers. 
Market centred approaches have received fierce criticism from the proponents of the 
statist approach, mainly because of their neglect of state interventions, planning and 
price distortions through industrial policies and strategic trade and investment policies 
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which have been very prevalent throughout Japan's economic trajectory. Criticising 
Johnson's concept of the `capitalist developmental state', Calder argues that Japan's 
economic success does not come from state interventions but from corporate led 
strategic resource allocations. In other words, it is not state intervention and planning 
but the private sector of the Keiretsu system and long-term credit bank nexus that 
plays the most determining role in achieving efficient resources allocation which is a 
prerequisite of economic growth. Calder's approach is peculiar and to some extent, 
has persuasive power in explaining Japan's economic system, considering that Japan's 
specific industrial organisation such as the Keiretsu system has underpinned Japan's 
economic strength in manufacturing sector. 
The Keiretsu system is an informal configuration of corporations and a main bank 
which are closely connected with each other by intercorporate shareholdings and 
personnel exchanges at company' directorate level. The main bank functions as a 
control tower in terms of long-term and excessive lending to the member corporations 
of same Keiretsu system. This Keiretsu system is also widely extended to SMEs by 
close, long-term sub-contracting relationships. Thus, the presence and role of the 
Keiretsu system in Japan has been a focus of scholars studying Japan's remarkable 
economic performance. However, Calder's approach shares a common feature with 
the neo-classical approach by underestimating the persistent roles of the Japanese 
state in achieving economic objectives. 
The third approach which focuses on Japan's institutional characteristics is best 
elaborated by Hatch and Yamamura (1996). In their view, "Japan has neither a 
bureaucratic authoritarian nor a centerless state. It is ruled instead by a government- 
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business network" (1996: 116). Thus, for them, the triad network among the 
bureaucracy, party and business is the key to understanding Japan's remarkable 
economic success. In other words, these well-organised private-public connections 
are the key reason for Japan's effective accomplishment of its economic objectives. 
This network theory has its strength in highlighting the positive results of Japan's 
economic structures and systems, particularly, the active, high growing economic 
period, but it is limited in suggesting an answer to the question of why Japan is in a 
decade-long, deep recession despite the strong presence of this efficient network 
between state and business. Second, it fails "to account for the deep-seated discord, 
clash of interests, and sectoral variations in government-business relations in Japan" 
(Okimoto 1988: 306). Third, this approach cannot coherently explain the dark side of 
this network, that is, chronic, recurrent corruption, bribery and reciprocal special 
treatments. 
The fourth approach is the societal state approach. Okimoto contends that Japan is "a 
societal state in the sense that government power rests on its capacity to work 
effectively with the private sector ... Political power in Japan is thus exercised 
through a complex process of public-private sector interaction, involving subtle give 
and take, not frontal confrontation that results in the forceful imposition of one side's 
will on the other" (Okimoto 1988: 314). This approach provides the most useful 
analytical tool in explicating the current relationships between state and civil society 
in the late 1990s. The emergence of the middle class and various pluralistic interest 
groups in current Japanese civil society (Pempel 1993: 125-127) signalled the end of 
the dominant state over society as we will see in section 2. In this regard, Okimoto's 
societal state theory explains in detail processes of policy making and 
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implementations by highlighting the complex political interactions between state 
bureaucrats, politicians, and civil society members. 
What all these approaches lack is a theory of change and transformation. The 
Japanese state, society and economic system are not fixed and not static. They are 
changing continuously and dynamically transforming. Thus, this thesis' main 
argument is that all these four approaches have a similarity in ignoring or neglecting 
the simple aspects of human history and social constructions, that is, continuous, 
structural change and transformation of state, society and economic system. In other 
words, the Japanese state, society and its economic system have to be understood with 
the concepts of micro changes and great transformations. And, this concept leads to 
the `theory of stage' which is arguing that "countries at different stages of 
development may require different degrees of state intervention" (Friedman 1988: 
208) 
In summary, for Johnson, Japan is a bureaucracy-led capitalist state and for Calder, 
Japan is a corporate-led strategic capitalist state. For Hatch & Yamamura, Japan is a 
network state which is characterised by a close, co-operative relationships among 
business, political parties and the bureaucracy. And for Okimoto, Japan is a societal 
state in which public or foreign policy making and implementing processes are greatly 
influenced by political interactions between civil society members and the state. 
These understandings are perplexing and compete with each other for theoretical 
predominance and so far, the competition among them is still on-going. However, 
these sharply contrasting interpretations are not necessarily contradictory if we adopt 
the view of transformations and changes in socio-economic and political orders. In 
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other words, Japan has been continuously changing the structures and characteristics 
of state, society and economic system as its developmental stage moves up the ladder. 
In this view, both Johnson's developmentalism and Hatch and Yamamura's network 
theories have their advantage in explaining Japan's developmental state period, and 
Calder's corporate-led strategic capitalism and Okimoto's societal state theory have 
their advantage in explaining Japan's post developmental state period. 
It is not difficult to say that everything is subject to changes and transformations but it 
is quite difficult to divide the exact timing and to explain the extent and intensity of 
changes, let alone anticipate future results and direction of these changes and 
transformations. This chapter will investigate the timing and extent and intensity of 
changes and transformations in order to provide a firm base to understand Japan's 
changing foreign economic policies over FDI. Finding a dividing point between the 
DS and the PDS is a more difficult task. In this chapter, the end of the Japanese DS 
period will be the middle of the 1980s. The reasons are several. First, Japanese OFDI 
exploded after the Plaza Accord in 1985 and the high Yen caused by the Plaza Accord 
propelled outstanding changes in Japan's economic system and corporate 
organisational structures. Second, Japanese IFDI policies were nominally liberalised 
in terms of changes to relevant laws, but these have not been accompanied by 
substantial changes in FDI inflows nor in institutions such as the complex domestic 
distribution system that is essentially closed to foreign companies, the populace's 
economic nationalism and the still pervasive government regulations. However, as 
we will see, legal changes are an important indicator of the Japanese state's turning 
point from the DS period into the PDS period. 
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Third, Japan's economic heyday was in the 1980s. This economic boom and 
prosperity in that period also caused changes in Japan's state-society relations. The 
maturing of Japanese civil society, which is an inevitable offspring of economic 
growth, has increased pressures for social and political pluralism against the DS 
period's elite coalition among the bureaucracy, the LDP and business. It has also led 
to fundamental changes in the political terrain by changing the nature of supporting 
groups of the LDP. As we will see in the following sections, the LDP's supporting 
groups in the DS period were the farmers, small and medium size self enterprises and 
big corporations. Meanwhile, the LDP's supporting groups in the PDS period are the 
middle class, financial industries and big corporations. These changes in LDP support 
ultimately resulted in the end of the long period of LDP rule in 1993. Thus, it can be 
argued that the 1980s was a watershed period for the emergence of a strengthened 
Japanese civil society and the starting point for political reconfiguration. And finally, 
as Japan reached its ultimate national goal of `catch up' in the 1980s, the domestic and 
international economic environment also dramatically changed. Among the changes, 
the shift in the role of industrial policy in Japan's economic development were 
remarkable. The bureaucrats role as strategic planners gave way to private companies, 
and strategic trade measures such as protectionism and non tariff barriers ceased to be 
effective measures as internal and international criticism and pressures increased. 
In the next sections, the nature and characteristics of the Japanese DS and PDS will be 
explained and compared. Japanese post developmentalism is competing with the neo- 
liberal global political economic order in order to be not only an economic 
superpower but also to secure a dominant economic paradigm. Thus, Japanese 
evolution is an interesting and important issue both in scholarly and policy (public and 
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private) domains. In the sub-conclusion, Japans' future direction and evolution of the 
PDS period will be discussed with possible scenarios. In this respect, an analysis of 
the impact of the long-term domestic recession and the East Asian crisis is also 
necessary. 
1. The Japanese DS 
1-1. The major characteristics of the Japanese DS period 
The Japanese DS was a mercantilistic state in which policies, institutions, and belief 
systems shared the same principles, norms, and objectives. The bureaucracy's 
persistent belief systems regarding the efficacy of the intrusive state into the market 
system were supplemented by industrial policies which were organised into domestic 
market protection for both imports and IFDI and promotion of both exports and OFDI 
in the DS period. Institutions such as governmental ministries, the collective national 
culture which produced a `rich country mentality', Japanese style corporate 
organisational structures, and trade and investment related laws were adjusted to and 
unified with the persistent belief systems regarding the efficacy of developmental ism. 
In sum, belief systems, institutions and policies were combined into a unified 
mercantilistic developmentalism and there were no contradictions or conflicts among 
these three pillars of economic development. These close, organic relations among 
institutions, belief systems, and policies were the crucial background of Japan's rapid, 
remarkable economic growth in the DS period. 
Japan enjoyed the benefits of an industrial policy in the DS period. Industrial policy is 
the "application of government resources and influence to industrial affairs" 
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(Magaziner and Hout 1080: 1) and is "geared toward the redistribution of capital, 
labour, and production resources among different industries to tailor the entire 
national industry into a desired form" (JETRO (a)1985: 1). In Japan, industrial policy 
has also "served as the main instrument for consensus building, the vehicle for 
information exchange and public-private communication" (Okimoto 1989: 231). In 
the DS period, industrial policy was sustained by the two most influential ministries, 
that is, the MITI and the MOF (Okimoto 1988: 319). MITI's objectives were: 
(1) shaping the structure of industry and adjusting dislocations that 
arise in transition; 
(2) guiding the healthy development of industries and their 
production and distribution activities; 
(3) managing Japan's foreign trade and its commercial relations; 
(4) ensuring adequate raw materials and energy flows to industries 
(Magaziner and Hout 1980: 33). 
As we can see from the above, the MITI's roles and responsibilities in domestic 
industries and international trade and investments were astonishingly comprehensive. 
The relations between state and private sector, particularly between the MITI, the 
Keiretsu system, and industrial associations show how effectively industrial policy 
was organised and worked in the DS period. The MITI could improve the efficiency 
of industrial policy by forging close relations with Keiretsu member enterprises and 
industrial associations. The private sector also enjoyed benefits by closely working 
together with the MITI, as cheap policy loans, direct subsidies and various incentives 
were, in return, provided by the MOF. The MITI orchestrated the strategic industrial 
coalition by incorporating both industrial associations and Keiretsu member 
companies in order to expedite co-ordination and co-operation within a single industry 
and among different industries (Huber 1994: 12). 
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On the other hand, the MOF promoted the efficiency of industrial policy by regulating 
monetary and fiscal policies which were favourable to developmental objectives. The 
Bank of Japan lends money to commercial and regional banks which in turn lend to 
major industries (Huber 1994: 52). Thus, the MOF as a supervisor of the BOJ can 
"exert considerable leverage over the banks, and on occasion will suggest which 
projects to support" (Magaziner and Hout: 1980: 37). To be sure, as we have seen 
above, the close interrelationship between the public and private sectors, and shared 
industrial objectives among them were the major foundation of the efficient 
implementation of industrial policies and remarkable economic growth in the DS 
period. The background of the powerful and influential MITI and the MOF was 
derived from their relative insulation both from social interest groups and politicians. 
For Okimoto, the MITI is a comparatively non-politicised ministry and the MOF is 
somewhat politicised. Heavily politicised ministries are the Ministry of Construction 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (Okimoto 1988: 324). 
As a successful late developer, Japan became a model for late-late developers in East 
Asia and later became a prototype of the East Asian developmental model (Wade 
1990: 326). The Japanese model consists of a set of features: 
an one-party political structure; the ability of technocrats to pursue 
economic policies free from political interference; the use of 
markets as a tool for industrial development while avoiding 
excessive competition; the mobilisation of nationalism on behalf of 
economic development; the emphasis on the collective good rather 
than individual rights; a social bargain that favours producers 
(Mochizuki 1994: 132). 
The East Asian developmental model is a combination of a number of specific 
features of industrial policy. More specifically, policy measures of the developmental 
model are a composition of strategic trade and investment policies, a government led 
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financial sector, administrative guidance, policy loans to selected industries, infant 
industry protection, future industry targeting, exchange rate controls, domestic market 
protection for both imports and IFDI, fiscal and monetary subsidies for the promotion 
of exports, export requirements and local content requirements when admitting and 
screening IFDI, and finally, a preference for licensing and joint ventures over IFDI 
and full foreign ownership in order to promote indigenous technology. As a late- 
developer, Japan was dependent on advanced foreign technologies and the Japanese 
government tried to improve indigenous technological capacity by implementing 
policies which preferred licensing and joint ventures over IFDI. With the help of 
licensing and joint ventures, Japan could upgrade its technological level through 
technical learning. Thus, in the DS period, Japan was not only a pioneer of the East 
Asian developmental model, it was also a technology learner from more advanced 
countries. In practising technical learning, Japan adopted the strategy of reverse 
engineering and wide commercialisation of imported technologies ahead of competing 
countries. 
After a short period of technical learning, Japan's technological capacity became 
equivalent to other advanced countries particularly in manufacturing industries. In 
addition, Japan's exports dramatically increased due to the massive growth of the 
manufacturing sector. The chronic trade surplus coming form this sector caused both 
pressures and protectionist backlash from Japan's major trading partners. In response 
to these pressures and protectionist measures, Japan changed its trade and investment 
related policies although these were not accompanied by changes in belief systems 
and institutions. Thus, the policy changes were superficial and merely for show- 
window display in order to cope with foreign pressures. In other words, liberalised 
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and deregulated trade and investment policies without institutional and belief system 
changes did not result in a substantial increase in imports and IFDI. Such behavioural 
and superficial changes in policies can be termed as `adaptation' rather than 
`learning', which brings changes to belief systems. Unchanged belief systems 
regarding the efficacy of developmentalism was the most crucial factor underpinning 
the preparation of the Expansionist Developmental State (EDS) in the early 1980s. 
These superficial policy changes are the major characteristics of the PDS and this will 
be further elaborated in Section 2. The characteristics of the Japanese DS can be 
summarised in the following Table 5-1. 
The Japanese Developmental State period 
IFDI 1962-1980 
OFDI 1951-1985 
-belief systems = policies = institutions 
-Pioneer of East Asian developmental model and Expansionist 
Developmental State 
-Neo-mercantilistic capitalism 
-State intrusive but efficient industrial policy 
-Before catch up: technical learning from more advanced countries 
-After catch up: adaptation to the neo-liberal regime and globalising 
economy 
-Joint venture, licensing preference over inward FDI 
-Raw material security oriented outward FDI in the 1960s 
-Industrial structural adjustment related outward FDI from the 1960s to the 
early 1980s 
-Kojima's trade promoting FDI by Japan in Southeast Asia in the 1960s 
and 1970s 
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-Preparation of the Expansionist Developmental State (EDS) to 
Southeast Asia in the early 1980s 
Table 4-1. The major characteristics of the Japanese DS period 
1-2. Society, state and international system in the Japanese DS 
The Japanese DS period was sustained by a combination of several pivotal features. 
In the political sphere, co-operative triad relations among the Liberal Democratic 
Party, the bureaucracy, and business formed the core of an elite coalition that 
excluded civil society members, particularly trade unions, blue and white colour 
workers, and the urban middle class. The LDP's lengthy single party rule from 1955 
to 1993 was the sustaining foundation of this triangular relationship and the `catch up' 
slogan was an expression of social consensus which resulted in the tolerance by civil 
society members for state policies which exclusively pursued national wealth at the 
expense of the populace's quality of life and social welfare. 
The background of the sustained triangular elite coalition and inactive civil society in 
the DS period were as follows. First, civil society was not sufficiently mature to the 
point that it could influence policy making processes. Trade unions could not be 
organised into an unified nation-wide organisation as a significant political actor 
because of business' conciliatory measures such as life-long employment, and as a 
result, trade unions turned into company unions. This was the major reason for the 
absence of economic struggle between business and labour, and the stabilisation of the 
labour market in Japan (Okimoto 1989: 233). 
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Second, the social consensus of catch up was exploited by the triad elite coalition in 
order to prevent civil society members from perceiving their rights to fair and equal 
distribution of national wealth and to mobilise the entire nation to realise the goal of a 
rich and strong country. Thus, Wolferen argues that "Japanese civil society is 
extremely weak and politically ineffectual ... Genuine labour unions were crushed 
long ago and have a tradition of serving management. Japan's famous company 
loyalty precludes political activism ... and 
has prevented the emergence of a 
politically significant middle class" (Van Wolferen 1993: 62-3). 
Third, the LDP's long-term rule was a product of long-term patronage relationships 
and clientelistic voting systems associated with electoral constituencies (Okimoto 
1988: 323-330). The LDP's social support groups were in the farmers, SMEs, the 
construction industry, and big conglomerates. Thus, under the clientelistic system, the 
LDP developed and implemented public and foreign economic policies which were 
favourable to these supporting constituencies and in return the LDP was able to secure 
sufficiently safe Diet seats to perpetuate its rule. Thus, among the members of civil 
society, only these LDP supporting groups enjoyed favourable policies while other 
remaining members were excluded and marginalised. This division among civil 
society members prevented the emergence of an organised and unified civil society 
movement in the DS period. On the other hand, under the patronage system, Diet 
members of the LDP influenced the distribution of the government's public spending 
such as public procurements, subsidies, public works, and local infrastructure 
construction by influencing policy making processes in the bureaucracy. Japanese 
fiscal management is centralised. The central bureaucracy administers fiscal 
management in detail, while local government is heavily dependent on central support 
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in fiscal management. This fiscal structure is the reason for the close relationship 
between politicians and the central bureaucracy. Diet members whose electoral 
districts are local or rural have to maintain close relations with the bureaucracy in 
order to attract public spending into their districts. In Japan, bureaucrats are 
substantial law makers. Diet members suffer from a shortage of assistants in the law 
making processes (Zhao 1993: 189) and this shortage of human resources was the 
major reason for the monopoly of law making processes by the bureaucracy. In order 
to have their proposed drafts passed in the Diet without any delay, bureaucrats also 
have to maintain close relations with Diet members. In sum, LDP politicians and 
bureaucrats were closely linked through distribution of public spending and legislation 
of proposed law drafts. 
Fourth, the role of traditional, cultural and historical factors contributed to the 
predominance of the bureaucracy over civil society. Under the influence of 
Confucianism, the state and the bureaucracy were superior to the populace. The 
bureaucracy was revered by the common people and the state was identified with the 
will of heaven. Thus, state legitimacy and bureaucracy's authority could not be 
doubted or challenged. This cultural tradition was supplemented and consolidated by 
the highly competitive bureaucratic examination and the intentional nurturing of the 
bureaucracy by the US Occupational Army after the Second World War. The 
Occupational Army strengthened Japanese bureaucracy in order to fill the political 
vacuum caused by the destruction of the Japanese military regime which had gained 
supreme power during the War. Moreover, it was the bureaucracy that could be re- 
organised into a major base of Japanese economic restoration, which was the most 
important objective of the US Occupational Army, now that Japan was at the front- 
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line of East-West confrontation in terms of the battle of ideology between 
communism and liberal democracy. 
Finally, business became an inevitable coalition partner of the bureaucracy and 
politicians. Politicians needed financial support from business in order to be re- 
elected. Japan adopted a medium size electoral district system before 19941. This 
meant that in an election district, even the same party members had to compete with 
each other to be elected. This electoral system produced a high cost election structure 
in Japan (Calder 1988: 530). Politicians needed funds and the primary source was 
business. Business donated political funds to politicians and in turn, politicians 
exerted influence in the policy making processes of bureaucracy. On the other hand, 
economic ministries developed close relations with business in order to improve the 
efficacy of economic policy implementation. For example, the MITI has maintained 
close relations with manufacturing industries in order to attain more efficient and 
effective policy results in conjunction with export promotion and facilitation of 
industrial structural adjustment. Thus, the MITI advocated manufacturing industries' 
request and resolved predicaments in return for manufacturers' co-operations in policy 
implementation. All these inter-connections mentioned above among business, the 
LDP and the bureaucracy charactered the triangular coalition in the DS period. 
In the economic sphere, the Japanese DS formed a dual economic system: a highly 
productive Keiretsu system and an underdeveloped SMEs sector (Huber 1994: 14-15, 
In Japan, a political reform was accomplished in 1994 as a means to overcome consecutive political 
corruption which started from the `recruit scandal' in 1988. As a result, the medium size electoral 
system was replaced with a small size electoral sytem supplemented by a proportional representative 
system. 
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Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 194). As we have seen above, the Keiretsu system's 
distinctive feature was its inter-firm shareholdings among member companies. 
Member companies do not sell other members' stock even though the stock price may 
be sharply falling or dramatically rising. This persistent and stabilising feature was 
the major driving force of Japanese companies' preference for long-term and market 
share oriented investments over short-term profit-oriented investments, because, 
managers of member companies did not need to worry about hostile take-overs 
through the stock market. Thus, " Japanese managers were able to plan investments 
for long-term profits, relatively free from dividend payment requirements because of 
weaker control exerted by the shareholders" (JETRO 1985: 2). The Japanese bank 
based-financial system is different from the Western capital market-based system. 
This means that Japanese companies can rely heavily on bank loans instead of the 
stock market. Thus, a main bank in a Keiretsu system played an important role in 
supplying stable, long-term credit to member corporations. The Keiretsu's financial 
stability was supplemented by governmental financial aid through industrial policies 
in general and policy loans in particular. These structures of the Keiretsu system 
produced both the life-long employment system and the seniority based promotion 
and wage system which contributed to labour market stabilisation in the Japanese DS 
and PDS period. 
The Keiretsu system is also extended to include the SMEs that are sub-contracted to 
produce parts for their parent companies. What we need to note about these sub- 
contracting relations is that parent companies and sub-contractors are tightly tied to 
each other by long-term, durable commitments. This long-term commitment from big 
parent companies built up the environment in which the sub-contacting companies 
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could devote themselves to developing technologies. One of the reasons for Japanese 
competitiveness in manufacturing industries is the competitive sub-contractors. Also, 
these inseparable relations are one of the reasons why foreign companies could not 
penetrate into the Japanese domestic market (Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 194). A 
structural feature of the Keiretsu system which distinguishes it from the 
underdeveloped economic sectors is the destination of products. Keiretsu member 
companies are geared to export oriented industries while underdeveloped sectors are 
geared to the domestic market. The Japanese DS was a neo-mercantilistic state which 
pursued national wealth by the promotion of exports. Thus, it is not difficult to 
understand why the Japanese government supported and helped high-performing 
export oriented Keiretsu member companies at the expense of domestic market- 
oriented companies. This structural feature of the DS' economic system amplified the 
gap between the Keiretsu system and under-developed SMEs and ultimately 
consolidated the dual economic system in Japan. 
The international system was favourable to the earlier period of the Japanese DS. In 
other words, it cannot be denied that Japan's high growth period of the 1960s and 
1970s was a by-product of the international free trade environment and Cold War 
bipolar confrontation. In this period, there was "relatively favourable access to 
industrial country markets, dramatically increased access to international finance, and 
increasing relocation of production by multinational corporations to low-wage sites" 
(Wade 1990: 346). Thus, the international free trade regime in the 1960s and 1970s 
also provided full benefits to the Japanese DS and its export-oriented economy. 
JETRO points out the major factors of the beneficial international environment: "Free 
trade was strongly maintained under the IMF-GATT regime ... Advanced 
144 
technological innovations were obtained from around the world. The period of 
Japan's economic expansion coincided with a period of world economic growth" 
(JETRO 1985: 1). The US-Japan Security Pact signed in 1951 and renewed in 1960 
provided security for the Japanese DS and produced the environment in which the 
Japanese DS could fully dedicate itself to economic development (Calder 1988: 527). 
However, the Japanese DS period in the later 1980s witnessed the emergence of a 
politicised international economic system which is characterised by increased trade 
disputes, Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs), Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), anti- 
dumping actions, and American Trade Law, particularly the Super 301 provision and 
unilateral or bilateral trade retaliations. 
The sharp difference between the 1970s and the 1980s in terms of the international 
free trade regime derived from several factors. First, the US economy in the 1980s 
experienced a dramatic deterioration. Not only the trade deficit but the fiscal deficit 
also grew like a snowball. The US could not tolerate the ever-increasing twin deficits. 
Thus, trade regulating measures such as the fair trade concept, Super 301 provision, 
local contents requirements, and VERs were introduced. The reason why the US 
could not pursue a policy to reduce the fiscal deficit was that the 1980s was a period 
of intense military competition between the US and the former Soviet Union. 
America's shift to a closed, regulated market was the main reason for the weakening 
of the world free market environment in the 1980s. Second, Japan's economy had 
accomplished its objective of catch up in the 1970s and after that enjoyed 
unprecedentedly high trade surpluses. Without a doubt, the Japanese government's 
industrial policies and the subsequently created comparative advantage of Japanese 
manufacturing goods with the help of policy loans led to a sense of unfairness from 
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the point of view of Western free market-based economies. Moreover, Japan's 
protected domestic market in terms of investment and trade also drew criticism from 
its trading and investment counterparts. Thus, it can be argued that the origin of the 
ideational conflict between developmentalism and neo-liberalism can be found in this 
period. It was in this period of trade disputes that Japan became a reactive state in 
dealing with foreign pressures and criticism. Calder points out two characteristics of 
the reactive state. "(1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign 
economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; 
and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, 
and often incompletely" (Calder 1988: 516). This reactive Japanese state to foreign 
pressures is in sharp contrast with the autonomous and efficient Japanese state in 
pursuing economic objectives by industrial and strategic trade policies. 
So far, we have examined the structural and institutional characteristics of the 
Japanese DS period. As we have seen, the Japanese DS period is a mixed period in 
which Johnson's developmental state and Hatch & Yamamura's network state co- 
existed. This means that answering the question of which theory is better in 
explaining the characteristics of the Japanese DS is very unproductive. As Johnson 
points out, the strength and legitimacy of the Japanese bureaucracy originated from 
the US occupational Army's strategic planning of Japan's economic restoration 
(Johnson 1995: 127-133). Thus, it was the bureaucracy that initially strengthened its 
pre-eminent position of rule at that time compared with business and political parties. 
However, because of their positional limitations in the political and economic spheres, 
they had to promote a co-operative relationship with the LDP and business. In this 
respect, it can be pointed out that Johnson's view which argues that `politicians reign 
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but bureaucrats rule' (Johnson 1995: 68, Fingleton 1995: 85) is suitable for the earlier 
period of the Japanese DS while network state theory is better in understanding the 
later part of the DS period in which the LDP, business and the bureaucracy are closely 
inter-related in a patronage based clientelistic system. Johnson anticipated the 
potential deconstruction of the unique DS system which is embedded or dormant in 
the DS system itself: 
in the long run, greater political instability may result from trying to 
maintain the current political status quo ... The capitalist 
developmental states may soon face ... internal challenges to their 
political and social norms (Johnson 1995: 50). 
In summary, the Japanese DS is strong, efficient, and centralised in terms of 
implementation of industrial policies which give preference to producers. The 
Japanese DS is also strong and efficient in terms of its capacity for regulating and 
controlling civil society. On the other hand, the Japanese DS is weak and reactive in 
terms of managing and coping with foreign pressures and in terms of taking on a 
leadership role in international affairs. 
Domestic Society Developmental State International System 
-Low level configuration -Efficient and autonomous -The US beneficent 
of social groups state in implementation of hegemony until the 
industrial policy collapse of the Bretton 
-No room for social groups Wood system 
in policy making process -Intrusive state into market 
-The Cold War bipolar 
2 Calder's term of the reactive state can be applied to both the Japanese DS and PDS. However, the 
term can be modified and divided into two new concepts: `a domestically institutionalised reactive 
state' and `an internationally structured reactive state'. The former provides a better analytical tool to 
illustrate the domestic impediments preventing active policy initiatives. Time consuming consensus 
building processes, inter-ministries rivalry, overlapping judiciaries among ministries, lack of political 
responsibility and leadership are the distinctive features of `the domestically institutionalised reactive 
state'. On the other hand, as the case of the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) indicates, even though 
Japan initiated and showed dynamic policy action in dealing with the East Asian economic crisis, this 
effort can be frustrated by international systemic power, particularly America's power. In this case, 
Japan is a prototype of `the internationally structured reactive state'. 
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-Docile social groups in 
relation to the state: 
pacified trade unions 
(Pempel 1993: 125-126) 
-Elite coalition among 
bureaucracy, business, and 
LDP 
system favourable to Japan 
by the US-Japan strategic 
alliance 
-Conservative LDP 
supporting groups: 
farmers, SMEs, big 
corporations 
(protectionism and export 
supporting groups) 
-State's manipulation of -Free trade regime until 
catch up mentality in 1970s 
society 
-America's recognition of 
-Growth oriented socio- Japanese style capitalism3 
economic system 
-Effective industrial policy 
-Mixture of Johnson's DS 
and Hatch & Yamamura's 
network state 
-The emergence of 
politicised international 
economic system in the 
1980s 
-'Domestically oriented 
reactive state' to foreign 
Table 4-2. The inter-relationships among society, state and international system in the 
Japanese DS period. 
2. The Japanese PDS 
2-1. The major characteristics of the Japanese PDS 
The Japanese PDS period has to be divided into two sub-periods: before and after the 
burst of the speculative bubble economy. However, despite differences in the extent 
and intensity of conflicts among changed policies and persistent institutional settings 
and belief systems, the Japanese PDS period is distinctive compared with the DS 
period in terms of the cleavage among policies, institutions, and belief systems. In 
other words, departure of policies or their separation from belief systems and 
institutions signals the emergence of the PDS period. The Japanese PDS period is a 
3 Reich argues that "Americans have oscillated in the second half of the Twentieth Century between two 
conflicting positions. The first is an acceptance of the fact that Japan operates a distinctive form of 
capitalist democracy; the second is an insistence that the forms of capitalist democracy practised in 
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period in which bureaucrats' belief systems regarding the efficacy of 
developmentalism remain firmly entrenched, despite the external pressures caused by 
the protected Japanese domestic market and intensified trade disputes as well as the 
internal criticism against the corrupt bureaucracy and its inability in managing the 
economic recession. For Hatch and Yamamura, the reason for the persistent 
characteristics of developmentalism in the PDS period is that "because it is a system 
of policies and practices now deeply ingrained in the Japanese political economy. It 
has become a solid structure of incentives that resists changes, even though it has 
outlived its usefulness" (Hatch and Yamamura 1996: 194). This co-existence of 
bureaucrats' institutional resistance and increasing criticism towards it is clearly 
revealed in this argument: 
The system of bureaucratic leadership actually completed its mission 
at the point when Japan reached the general economic and 
technological level of its Western models ... But a huge institution 
that has lost its raison detre does not automatically disappear. On 
the contrary, it clings all the more tightly to its authority and goes on 
the defensive to maintain its own existence (Taichi 1997: 11). 
The Japanese PDS period is also a period in which zigzag and confused policies 
between developmentalism and the neo-liberal free market system were prevalent and 
structural adjustment was continuously delayed by the rigid belief system of the 
bureaucracy and the populace's hesitation towards abrupt changes. Uriu clearly 
shows the populace's hesitation between its aspiration for domestic economic and 
political reforms and the uncertainty which results as a result of the reforms. 
Certainly, the voters were expressing their frustration at the lack of 
progress in getting the domestic economy growing again ... [however] voters did not seem to be willing to accept the chaos that 
drastic reform such as deregulating the economy would bring (Uriu 
1988: 119). 
the two countries converge ... We are, I contend, currently witnessing a period of American 
evangelical push towards a convergence hypothesis". Simon Reich (1998: 4). 
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This retarded structural reform can also be explained by a cultural factor. Japanese 
society is based on collectivity and communication among the collectivity is based on 
consensus termed `nemawashi'. Delayed reform can be interpreted as the result of the 
need for a long period of consensus building in which the Japanese style economic 
system competes or compromises with global standards and global convergence. 
However, the important thing is that the longer the consensus building period the 
worse Japan's economic performance. Japan's economic recession after 1990 testifies 
to this argument. Under economic recession, the conflicts between changed polices 
and unchanged institutions and belief system were intensified and as a result, the 
Japanese economy suffered from an unprecedented economic contraction. Thus, it 
can be argued that the genesis of the economic recession was the divergence of 
policies from institutions and belief systems and the subsequent ineffectiveness of 
policy implementation caused by the intensified conflicts and contradictions derived 
from the ever increasing cleavage among the three pillars of economic development. 
This also illustrates that the internally contradictory PDS period encompasses 
`adaptation' to pressures from the global neo-liberal order by changing policies only. 
Before the bursting of the speculative bubble, Japan enjoyed its economic heyday in 
the latter part of the 1980s. An astronomical trade surplus was supplemented by 
increasing OFDI. Euphoria over the Japanese style economic system and 
developmentalism was high. This was the period in which the bureaucracy 
implemented expansionist developmentalism (ED) to Southeast Asia. The ED was a 
dynamic policy initiative by which the bureaucracy tried to overcome both internal 
and external pressures through the logic of internalisation of external pressure and 
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externalisation of internal pressure. In other words, Japan was suffering from high 
product costs in the domestic market and market opening pressures from foreign 
countries in the 1980s. In order to improve the international competitiveness of 
Japanese industries, Japan had to transfer its production sites offshore, pursuing cheap 
production costs. Rising land and labour costs were the major obstacles for Japanese 
firms. On the other hand, Japan's astronomical trade surplus and strictly protected 
domestic market in terms of imports and IFDI accessibility were the major reasons for 
trade disputes with other countries, particularly the US. Thus, the Japanese 
bureaucracy carefully planned the Expansionist Developmental State (EDS) system in 
order to solve the problems of trade disputes and rising domestic product costs. By 
implementing and developing the EDS system in Southeast Asia, Japan used both 
internal and external challenges as opportunities to develop further. Establishing 
production networks in Southeast Asia suggested a chance to avoid trade disputes 
with the US and made the domestic industrial structure more advanced by focusing on 
higher technology research and development and higher value added products. 
Moreover, Japan transferred the costs of industrial adjustment to Southeast Asian 
countries by avoiding domestic structural reforms and refusing to change the rigid 
institutional settings and belief systems which were geared towards protectionism and 
mercantilism. Thus, it can be argued that the Japanese EDS system in Southeast Asia 
was an intentional policy of the bureaucracy which not only strongly held to its 
developmental belief systems but also tried to extend its self interest by securing the 
authority and initiative in the implementation of the EDS system in the region. In this 
respect, the EDS system in the region is a result of transplanted Japanese 
developmentalism and an offspring of a combination of bureaucratic institutional 
resistance and adaptation towards the changing environment. 
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As a result, the delayed structural adjustment particularly in the financial sector in this 
period was the most important factor which caused the Japanese financial crisis in the 
late 1990s. Moreover, the Japanese production network in Southeast Asia also caused 
problems for Japan. Japan's development of production sites in the region was not in 
accordance with each nation's comparative advantage. In other words, Japan's 
enormous FDI deployment deteriorated the order of the division of labour in the 
region. This was the reason for increased competition among the Southeast Asian 
states. They have been competing with each other in the same manufacturing 
industries such as electronics and semi-conductors which had been mainly developed 
by Japanese FDI. Overcapacity and overcompetition inevitably resulted in price 
competition. And this was one of the crucial factors which caused the competitive 
currency devaluation in the region which finally resulted in the sudden depreciation of 
the Chinese Yuan in 1994 (Hughes 1999: 35). The devaluation of the Chinese Yuan 
was the prelude to the East Asian crisis. Moreover, the massive Japanese FDI in the 
region also "indirectly promoted an investment environment conducive to speculative 
bubbles" (Hughes 1999: 20). Thus, to some extent, the East Asian crisis was caused 
by Japan's enormous FDI development which ignored the regional order in the 
division of labour and indirectly induced speculative capital by introducing artificially 
created comparative advantage4. 
° Yong-Bok Kim (1998: 109) argues that "a combination of Japan's export of the bubble economy to 
Southeast Asian countries and these countries' collusive relationships between politicians and 
business was a major reason for the burst of the East Asian economic crisis. In other words, the 
exports of Japanese illness to other East Asian countries was a process of internationalisation of 
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The Japanese Post Developmental State 
IFDI 1981-To current 
OFDI 1986-To current 
-belief systems=institutions but only policy changes 
-Intensified friction between developmentalism and neo-liberal regime and 
globalising domestic and world economy 
-Delayed structural reforms because of bureaucrats' rigid belief systems 
regarding the efficacy of developmentalism 
-Adaptation to the neo-liberal regime 
-Competition with the US to be an economic hegemon 
-Zigzag and confused policies between state intervention and free market 
system5 
-Embeddedness of the DS in institutions and belief systems 
-Undergoing financial and administrative reform in the second half of the 
1990s 
-Continuous policy liberalisation and deregulation towards IFDI which were 
not accompanied by institutional and belief systems changes 
-Implementation and deepening of the EDS system to Southeast Asia by the 
combination of FDI and ODA 
-Establishment of production network as an export platform in Southeast Asia 
Table 4-3. The Major characteristics of the Japanese PDS period 
2-2. Society, state and international system in the Japanese PDS 
Japan's domestic economic problem, and finally the East Asian economic crisis was caused due to 
this Japan's strategy". 
s The zigzag and confused policies between the state intervention and free market system was clearly 
revealed in the process of financial reform: "The government has left people in doubt about the 
direction of its liberalisation of financial markets. Even as it talks about its Big Bang program, it has 
intervened in the stock market to prop up prices" (JAPANECHO August 1998), "While 
implementing stopgap measures involving greater government intervention to deal with the crisis at 
hand, they continue to claim they are pursuing the Big Bang goal of free and open competition" 
(JAPANECHO June 1998). 
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During PDS period, Japan experienced a set of challenges from the economic, social 
and political spheres. In the economic sphere, the bargaining power and influence of 
big business on policy making processes was strengthened in several areas. First, for 
business, a closed domestic market was a primary source of friction with major 
trading and investment partners. From the view point of business, opening the 
domestic market was necessary to promote Japan's trade and investments further. 
This understanding was based on the concept of reciprocity. A closed domestic 
market to foreign firms meant intensification of foreign protectionist measures against 
Japanese firms in the politicised international economic system. Moreover, opening 
the domestic market was seen as a means to improve underdeveloped domestic 
market-oriented industries by introducing harsh competition from the outside through 
inward investment. As we have seen in section 1, Japan had a dual economic system 
which had been a major obstacle in achieving balanced and equal development of the 
entire national economy. Thus, business was a powerful advocate of deregulation and 
domestic market opening (Higashi and Lauter 1990: 124). Yoshimatsu points outs 
four crucial reasons for demands by business for deregulation. 
First, Keidanren advocated deregulation in order to promote a 
change in the Japanese economic system away from a bureaucratic, 
centralised system toward a private sector-led, decentralised system . 
.. Second, Keidanren sees 
deregulation as important in raising 
international competitiveness in the nonmanufacturing sector ... 
Third, Keidanren regards deregulation as indispensable for resolving 
trade friction ... Furthermore, deregulation would make Japan's 
economic system more compatible with international norms 
(Yoshimatsu 1998: 337-8). 
Second, business also pursued liberalisation of the financial market. Deregulating the 
financial market could reduce the transaction costs of export-oriented business by 
avoiding commission on foreign currency exchange. The underdeveloped Japanese 
financial sector, which has been incompatible with international financial standards 
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and suffered from the bursting of the bubble economy, has been a crucial factor 
causing the decade long economic recession. Under this financial sector initiated 
economic recession, domestic aggregate demand contracted and did not sensitively 
respond to the government's economic stimulus packages. Contracted domestic 
demand and a struggling financial sector have shackled business for more than a 
decade. Thus, business has been a strong advocate of financial reform. 
In summary, business has matured to the point that the developmental state's 
strategies which were crucial to business growth became a shackle, preventing further 
development of business in terms of international competitiveness and global strategy. 
State protectionism took care of infant or less competitive industries in the early DS 
period. Adolescent business became an important triad coalition partner in the later 
DS period. In the PDS period, business had matured to the point that it regarded the 
state's nurturing strategies as restraints. As a result, the DS period's protected and 
regulated domestic and financial markets came under extreme pressure from Japanese 
big business that competed with other foreign MNCs. 
The so-called Japanese economic system is also under pressure and gaining the 
momentum for change at present. Basically, the conflicts between the DS and the 
PDS in terms of economic system are derived from the dichotomy between catch-up, 
rapid growth, and industrialisation process versus pioneer, slow growth, and 
informationalisation process (Yong-Yeol Kim 1996: 104). It is widely recognised that 
Japan has failed to prepare and identify new industrial growth sectors related to 
information, telecommunications and software. In other words, Japan's industrial 
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structure is highly dependent on a limited set of industries such as cars and 
electronics, while failing to explore new areas of competitiveness in the 
telecommunications and information industries. Drucker points out this problematic 
situation. "Even though quantitatively Japan's export surplus with the United States 
rose ... qualitatively it is deteriorating. Almost three quarters of it is now being 
earned by the products of old industry" (Drucker 1993: 11). As we have seen in 
section 1, the peculiar Japanese economic system was a complex set of distinctive 
features that included a life long employment system, a seniority based promotion 
system, long-term investment rather than pursuit of short-term profits, close and long- 
term relationships between parent and subcontracting companies, a banking based 
financial industry, and absence" of hostile take-overs. However, these characteristics 
of the DS period faced challenges as Japanese firms experienced growing 
internationalisation and globalisation. 
The major challenges were, firstly derived from the economic recession. The 
economic recession aggravated the corporate financial structure and this caused the 
reconsideration of the life long employment and seniority based promotion systems. 
Companies in bad financial condition could not sustain the system of labour market 
stabilisation by their commitment to the life long employment system (Gyohten 1994: 
32, Japan Economic Almanac 1996: 50). Labour flexibility is important to overcome 
the period of economic hardship. Japanese labour costs have continuously risen and 
Japanese firms have managed to cope with increasing labour costs by improving 
market shares and profits. However, more than a decade of economic recession meant 
deteriorating financial conditions for firms and the increased possibility of the 
adoption of labour flexibility by Japanese firms. Under economic recession, firms 
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could not pursue long-term investment because economic hardship requires more 
short term profits in order to prevent potential liquidity problems. The long-term 
investment and market share approach rather than short-term profit seeking cannot be 
sustained in a prolonged economic recession. 
Another factor which facilitates changes in the Japanese economic system is the rising 
Yen. The high Yen, particularly in 1994, was the result of a prolonged trade surplus 
and the emergence of the Clinton administration. This high Yen propelled OFDI, 
global outsourcing, competitive bidding, and strategic alliances with foreign 
companies particularly in high cost areas such as R&D (Jong-Yoon Lee 1994). 
Without a doubt, the DS style Japanese economic system such as the long-term, close 
commitment between big conglomerates and sub-contracting companies is being 
Th 
challenged by these changes. Moreover, foreign pressure, particularly from the US, 
also propelled the collapse of the protective aspect of Japanese economic institutions 
with the conclusion of the agreement on the SH between the US and Japan in 1990. 
The major target of the US in the agreement was to resolve the problem of 
institutionalised protection engrained in specific Keiretsu systems. 
Increased OFDI by export-oriented industries also induced changes in the Japanese 
economic system. Close, long-term relations between parent and subcontracting 
companies faced challenges as parent companies moved out to foreign countries in 
order to develop OFDI. Although some parent companies moved out with their 
subcontracting companies, the numbers were insufficient to maintain the traditionally 
close, long-term relations between them. Moreover, host countries impose contracts 
between their local companies and Japanese investors. In order to reduce production 
157 
ý4° ý' 
factor costs, Japanese parent companies increased the use of outsourcing and bidding 
from other subcontractors, whether Japanese or foreign, rather than depending on 
long-term subcontracting relationships. Thus, long-term, close, vertical relations were 
replaced by short-term, open, horizontal bidding and outsourcing. These changes 
were related to the shift from long-term investment to the pursuit of shot-term profits. 
The banking based financial system also faced challenges and as a result, financial 
reform is now being undertaken. The relationship between the Japanese financial 
system and the financial crisis in the late 1990s is summarised in Figure 4-1. 
Financial shortage period Regulation, protection, 
(1950- mid 1970s) -ý and insulation from 
competition 
1 
Financial surplus period 
(After the middle of the 
1970s) 
Incompentent 
sector and si 
mismangement 
fianacial surplus 
banki 
The emergence of bubble ' Indiscreet enlargement 
economy investment 
Increased non-performing 
The bursting of the debts and the worsening 
bubble financial crisis 
Figure 4-1. The relationship between the Japanese style financial system and the 
financial crisis in the 1990s. Modified from Gang (1996: 94). 
Financial reform combines a stabilisation programme and a structural reform 
programme. Stabilisation targets the resolution of non-performing loans and 
structural reform targets the realisation of a competitive financial system through 
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deregulation and liberalisation. Structural adjustment together with M& As among 
banks and the abolition of the barriers between the banking, security, and insurance 
industries will result in a system which will be competitive and compatible with the 
neo-liberal standard. This means that the Japanese financial system will be similar to 
the Western system and hostile take-overs among competing firms will be easier as 
foreign firms get easier access to the domestic financial market with the help of 
deregulation. These changes in the Japanese style economic system can be 
summarised in the Table 4-4. 
DS period PDS period 
1. Government -bureaucratic leadership -Deregulation 
and 
Corporations -Targeted industry promotion -Reduced government 
intervention 
-Preference for producer 
interests -Domestic market opening 
-Possible change of preference 
towards consumer interests 
2. Corporations -Main banking system -Emergence of shareholders' 
and banking interests 
-Intercorporate share holding 
-Short-term profit pursuing 
-Long-term, market share investment and management 
oriented investment and 
management -Diminished benefits of 
intercorporate shareholding 
because of the collapse of stock 
prices in the 1990s 
3. Parent and -Long-term commitment -Possible collapse of long-term 
sub-contracting commitment because of the 
companies -Protective institutional barrier introduction of competitive 
to foreign companies bidding and global outsourcing 
and increased OFDI 
4. Corporations -Life-long employment -Increased difficulties and costs 
and workers in maintaining DS style labour 
159 
-Seniority based wage and system 
promotion system 
-Introduction of team system 
and performance based wage 
and promotion system 
Table 4-4. The changing characteristics of Japanese style economic system. Modified 
from Yong-Yeol Kim (1996: 124). 
In domestic society, the populace's dissatisfaction had risen because of the poor 
quality of life and weak social welfare system compared with the enormously 
improved national wealth. Increasing economic disparity among the rich and poor 
and poor housing, heavy taxes, and high consumer prices were the major reasons for 
the increasing dissatisfaction. This means that the Japanese populace experienced a 
sense of deprivation and relative poverty, because of the sharp contrast between the 
rich nation and the poor populace. Thus, the DS period's social consensus of `rich 
country first mentality' is being damaged in the PDS period. And, the damaged social 
consensus encroaches on the capacity of the state to pursue developmental policies 
further. The young generation's individualistic tendency is another factor which has 
diluted the Japanese collectivist cultural peculiarity. These changes in the Japanese 
life style from social humans to individualistic humans further amplifies the growing 
indifference towards Japanese politics which has already suffered from the lack of 
political leadership and responsibility (Gang 1996: 101). The DS period was 
characterised by equal distribution of national wealth and economic growth. 
However, in the PDS period, Japan is witnessing a dividing stratification of social 
classes. The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing, further contributing to 
the dissatisfaction of the populace in civil society. Higashi and Lauter clearly point 
out this domestic division: 
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Traditionally, the Japanese have subscribed to the belief that they 
were overwhelmingly (90 percent) middle class. However, this is 
changing as wealth and lifestyle differences are leading to a socio- 
economic stratification that departs from the homogeneous, self- 
described, middle-class society (Higashi and Lauter 1990: 186). 
In the political sphere, the LDP departed from its traditional support groups of the 
farmers and SMEs and tried to incorporate the middle class, financial industry and big 
companies into its support base. Continuous fiscal support towards farmers and small 
enterprises could not be sustained as the costs of the conservative coalition reached 
crisis point. Prime Minister Hashimoto's introduction of the consumption tax in order 
to improve the fiscal balance further deteriorated the already contracted economy. 
Moreover, domestic market openings caused by US pressure symbolised by the 
opening of the rice market and the acceptance of the SH agreement, resulted in harsh 
criticism from the LDP's traditional support groups of the farmers and small 
enterprises in the wholesale and retail distribution industry. Meanwhile, potential new 
coalition partners such as the urban middle class and financial and manufacturing 
industries that had suffered from high prices and heavy taxes also expressed 
dissatisfaction as market liberalisation and administrative deregulation were delayed 
by institutional barriers and bureaucratic resistance. Thus, it can be argued that the 
LDP lost its traditional support groups and failed to include newly emerging social 
groups as coalition partners. This meant a state apparatus dissociated from civil 
society (Jang-Kwon Kim 1996: 350). This also meant that in the PDS period, conflicts 
between these two support groups intensified and the objectives of public and foreign 
policies became confused. This is the reason for the zigzag and confused policy 
implementation in the PDS period. In other words, the support groups of the LDP in 
the DS period pursued protectionist policies, while the support groups of the LDP in 
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the PDS period pursued liberalisation and deregulation. This conflicting and 
contrasting interests and economic ideas are an obvious background to the inefficient 
policy implementation and ineffective policy results in the PDS period. Put 
differently, the co-existence of open market oriented interests and ideas with 
protectionist interests and ideas caused contradictions in the PDS period and this is the 
reason for the decade long recession. Pempel's assertion clearly illustrates the 
relationship between the LDP's changing terrain of support groups and the zigzag 
economic policies in the PDS period: 
The power of many protectionist members of the conservative 
coalition remains strong, although that of organised agriculture is 
undoubtedly on the wane. That of small business seems destined for 
a similar reduction in power. Conversely, forces that have more to 
gain from increased openness and internationalisation, such as big 
business, and finance ... and urban consumers, have been gaining 
their relative power ... But on the specific subissues that make up 
the nation's overall foreign economic policy, many internecine 
battles remain to be fought within the conservative coalition 
(Pempel 1993: 130). 
In the statist sphere, the role of political parties strengthened against the bureaucracy 
in the later PDS period (Calder 1988: 532). In other words, the bureaucracy's 
legitimacy and its leadership role in the DS period confronted serious challenges from 
the increased influence from political parties. The reasons are mainly four-fold. First, 
bureaucracy lost its legitimacy and leadership position by the continuous revelation of 
corruption and scandals. Second, the consolidation of specialised Diet members in a 
certain subject, called `Zoku', weakened the bureaucracy's autonomous position. 
These Diet members have served on the same Diet committee and as they have been 
continuously re-elected, their knowledge of a certain subject has accumulated and as a 
result, they have beoame specialists in that policy area. Moreover, the opportunities 
for becoming ministers from the Zoku has increased. Thus, the autonomous position 
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of the bureaucracy in policy making has decreased in the PDS period (Zhao 1993: 
189,194). Third, during the later period of the Japanese PDS, administrative reform 
was undertaken which led to the weakening of the bureaucracy by reducing the 
number of ministries and by strengthening the prime minister's political power and 
responsibility (Fukui and Fukai 1998, Nakano 1998). Fourth, with the further 
development of globalisation, overlapping jurisdictions among ministries emerged 
and became more complicated (Calder 1988: 529). This undoubtedly led to the 
weakening of bureaucratic leadership as inter-ministerial conflicts over jurisdiction 
intensified, and by constraining rapid, efficient and unified administrative responses 
because more time was needed to build consensus among ministries. It means that 
"[p]olitical pluralism in Japan began to blossom as bureaucratic dominance on 
policymaking began to weaken. Both the ruling party and interest groups have 
gradually increased their influence in the policymaking process" (Zhao 1993: 193). 
This also means that Johnson's concept of bureaucracy-led Japanese capitalism is no 
longer suitable for the PDS period. The reduced legitimacy of the bureaucracy led to 
reduced effectiveness in implementing industrial policy in the PDS period (Jones 
1997: 68). 
The international sphere also dramatically changed in the PDS period. The 
international system has become multilayered by both horizontal and vertical 
integration of globalisation, regionalisation and localisation. This means that the 
interdependence and politicisation of the international system has been extended and 
deepened to an unprecedented degree. Thus, the free trade regime which was 
pervasive during the Japanese DS period can hardly be found in the PDS period. In 
other words, the benign American hegemon towards Japanese developmentalism 
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suddenly changed into a self-interest seeking malign hegemon after the collapse of the 
Cold War bipolar order. Multilateral institutions and agreements such as the WTO 
and the MAI now co-exist with bilateral and unilateral trade and investment measures. 
A free trade neo-liberal regime co-exists with unilateral retaliation. As a result, the 
international system in the Japanese PDS period became so complicated and 
politicised that the issue areas were too diversified to be dealt with within the 
structure of the bureaucracy. This is the major reason why the Japanese bureaucracy 
in the PDS could not efficiently cope with foreign economic and political issues. 
All these changes in the PDS period meant the diminished efficiency of Japanese 
industrial policy. In the period of the PDS, industrial policy was resistant to the 
changing environment even though the extent of co-ordination and efficiency in policy 
making processes and implementation weakened because of both internal and external 
pressures. Okimoto clearly reveals this situation in which industrial policy and 
bureaucratic institutions refuse to adjust to the changing environment. 
industrial policy is not something that can be easily abandoned, even 
though the era of latecomer catch-up is past ... If industrial policy 
once functioned to compensate for market imperfections, the need to 
rely on it as a compensating mechanism is now significantly 
reduced; and if the government once derived its capacity to 
implement industrial policy from the allocation of substantial 
financial resources, that capacity has been significantly diminished. 
Foreign pressures to drop what are perceived abroad as unfair 
industrial policy practices .. . have also been stepped up. Yet even 
in the face of such developments, MITI is unlikely to relinquish 
industrial policy (Okimoto 1989: 232). 
More importantly, it is the economic structure formed by the effects of industrial 
policy that undermines the very existence of Japan's economic system. As a result of 
long-term industrial policy, Japan's economic system has been sustained by the two 
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pillars of domestic protectionism and export penetration of open foreign markets. 
Institutional barriers such as the complicated distribution networks, close and long- 
term commitments between big conglomerates and sub-contracting companies, and 
government regulations were the major features of the protected domestic market. 
This economic structure led to the astronomical trade surplus which, in turn, resulted 
in the high Yen which finally caused a serious blow to Japanese industries through 
price differences and weakened their international competitiveness (Gang 1996: 95-6). 
In sum, in the DS period, Japanese industrial policy was a combination of both theory 
and the effective practice of `one country's prosperity' at the expense of other 
countries and it became a theory and practice of self destruction as Japan could not 
dynamically adjust to domestic and international environmental changes in the PDS 
period. 
Domestic Society Post Developmental State International System 
-Increased leverage power -The end of triad elite -No economic hegemon 
and managerial autonomy coalition (Japan Economic 
of business Almanac 1995: 42) by the -Strengthened neo-liberal 
collapse of LDP long-term regime 
-Increased dissatisfaction rule, financial and 
of populace towards poor administrative reform, and -Weakened security 
life quality and increased OFDI alliance between the US 
stratification of social class and Japan (Drucker 1993: 
(Higashi and Lauter 1990: -Diminished efficiency of 10). 
187). industrial and strategic 
trade policy 
-Conservative LDP -America's pushing of 
supporting groups (Middle -Increased influence of Japan towards global 
class, financial industry, political party against convergence 
and big business) which bureaucracy 
are supporting -Highly politicised and 
liberalisation and market -Disjointed state from competitive international 
opening civil society economic system 
-Potential deconstruction -Increased contradiction -Highly interdependent, 
of life long employment between neo-mercantilism regionalising and 
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and seniority based and globalised Japanese globalising international 
promotion system economy political economic system 
-Increased new middle -Decreased efficacy of the -Controversial position 
mass and emergence of bureaucracy led-industrial between multipolar system 
pluralistic interests groups policy and unipolar system 
(Pempel 1993: 125-127). dominated by the US 
-Internationally structured 
reactive state' 
-Calder's corporate-led 
strategic capitalism and 
Okimoto's societal state 
(Jones 1997: 67). 
-Coexistence and conflicts 
between global free trade 
regime strengthened by the 
WTO and regionalism 
strengthened by regional 
economic integration 
Table 4-5. The inter-relationships among society, state and international system in 
Japanese PDS period. 
3. Sub-conclusion: 
Japan's convergence towards the neo-liberal regime? 
As we have seen in sections 1 and 2, Japan experienced a great transformation from 
the DS to the PDS system. Accumulated socio-economic and political changes in the 
DS period suddenly led to the great transformation. The efficient and remarkable 
accomplishment of economic objectives in the DS period was an inevitable outcome 
of the organic relationships among the belief system, institutions, and policies. All 
these three pillars of economic development in the DS period shared the same 
principle, norms, and objectives and were uniquely organised into a social consensus 
based on the `catch up' slogan and `rich country first' mentality. Thus, it can be 
argued that the absence of contradictions and cleavages among the three pillars of 
economic development was undoubtedly the major factor sustaining the efficient and 
high-performing Japanese DS system. In contrast, the PDS system showed an ever- 
increasing inconsistency between changed policies and resilient institutions and belief 
system resistance. Policies were changed as a strategy of adjustment towards internal 
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and external pressures. The outward appearance of protectionist policies changed and 
became a show window display of deregulation and liberalisation for complaining 
foreign trading and investment partners. However, these changes were not 
accompanied by institutional and belief system changes. The bureaucracy's durable 
and privileged developmental belief systems of the DS period refused to give away to 
adjustment in response to the changed internal and external environment of the PDS 
period. On the contrary, the MITI bureaucracy initiated the EDS system in Southeast 
Asia in order to extend and protect its vested rights and authority. Thus, it can be 
argued that even though bureaucratic self-interest played an important role, the most 
crucial background of the bureaucratic institutional resistance was the ingrained, 
unimpaired developmental belief systems of the bureaucracy. 
The Japanese EDS system has developed a high level of economic integration in the 
region. The economic prosperity of Southeast Asian countries from the second half of 
the 1980s to right before the East Asian crisis was based on the transplanted Japanese 
DS system in the region. Without a doubt, massive Japanese FDI and increased 
exports of these countries were the locomotive of the economic boom. However, with 
the emergence of the crisis, the hidden structural problems of the EDS system have 
emerged, as the impact of the crisis settles and subsequent economic structural 
adjustments are implemented in the affected countries. The structural problems of the 
EDS system in the region are a configuration of an economic system highly dependent 
on exports towards open Western markets, excessive domestic market regulation and 
protection, and underdeveloped financial institutions and the absence of efficient 
financial supervision. The IMF led structural adjustment in the crisis countries are 
geared to neo-liberal prescriptions, and its major target is to dissolve these structural 
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features of the EDS system in the region. This shows that the East Asian crisis has 
been a battle field of not only material interests but also economic belief systems 
(ideas) between the globalising neo-liberal order led by the US and East Asian 
developmentalism championed by Japan (Higgott 1998). Thus, the US and Japan 
have been sharply divided in both understanding and interpreting the origins of and 
reasons for the crisis and recommending policy prescriptions. Japan basically 
contended that the East Asian crisis was not structurally initiated but just a cyclical 
and transitory liquidity problem and advocated the persistent validity and 
effectiveness of developmentalism in the region. Hughes clearly summarises this 
view: "Japanese policy-makers have viewed the developmental ism model as 
fundamentally sound and capable of continuing to deliver solvency and growth" 
(Hughes 1999: 39). On the contrary, the neo-liberal regime asserted that the East 
Asian crisis was the result of structural flaws and contradictions of the developmental 
model, as well as insolvency problems and propelled the dismantling of the model 
through the neo-liberal IMF conditionality (Hughes 1999: 38). 
Considering that Southeast Asia is heavily dependent on present Japanese FDI, capital 
investment and ODA deployment, it can be argued that the future direction and 
development of the EDS system will also heavily rely on whether the developmental 
belief systems of Japanese bureaucracy and businessmen will change or will persist. 
Thus, analysing the domestic debates in Japan on Japan's own economic recession has 
direct and valuable implications for the future development of the EDS system in the 
region. We need to recognise that Japan is not a unitary state but a pluralist state 
particularly in the later PDS period as we have seen in section 2. Japanese views in 
relation to Japan's own economic problems are sharply divided and contend with each 
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other. Reich clearly illuminates these divided Japanese views. First, the optimistic 
view which is pervasive in bureaucrats and politicians sees the recession as a cyclical 
downturn, and not a crisis. Second, the pessimistic view which is prevalent in the 
reformist groups assumes that free market based economic reform is impossible 
because of the absence of strong political leadership. Third, the rejectionist view 
which is easily found in nationalistic groups argues against the need to reform the 
Japanese developmental system (Reich 1998: 43-9). This analysis shows that the 
bureaucracy's developmental belief system is still intact despite the harsh challenges 
of the East Asian crisis and a decade-long domestic economic recession. This means 
that Japan is deeply stuck in the PDS system and will continue to be stuck in the PDS 
system. This also implies that the inefficient and ineffective economic performance 
that derived from the inconsistency among the belief system, institutions, and policies 
will be pervasive in the future economic trajectory of Japan for a long-time unless 
political leadership is strengthened or a real and unbearable economic crisis which 
will lead to a change in the belief system regarding developmentalism takes place. 
Heizo's assertion shows the importance of belief system changes which come after 
sudden, large, and serious crises in reforming Japanese economic problems: "Unless 
they are confronted with an obvious crisis, I fear, the Japanese are not going to really 
move" (Heizo 1997: 25). 
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Chapter 5 
From the DS through the PDS to the TS: 
Socio-economic and political transformation in Korea 
Contents 
1. The Korean DS 
1-1. The major characteristics of the Korean DS 
1-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean DS 
2. The Korean PDS 
2-1. The major characteristics of the Korean PDS 
2-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean PDS 
3. The Korean TS: An intensive challenge to the Korean PDS 
3-1. The major characteristics of the Korean TS 
3-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean TS 
4. Sub-conclusion: A theory of developmental stage? 
Korea's rapid economic growth and turbulent socio-political changes have been 
fascinating topics for the disciplines of comparative politics and international political 
economy. The literature in conjunction with this topic can be divided into two major 
streams: research based on neo-classical economics and research which emphasises 
the specific structure and role of the Korean state (statism) (Burkett and Landsberg 
1998: 435). This shows the conflictual and contending co-existence of the market 
approach and the statist approach. For the proponents of neo-classical economics, 
Korea's market conforming policies, export-oriented economic structure, limited 
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government interventions only in areas such as infrastructure, education, and 
macroeconomic stability and the open economic system towards foreign capital and 
technologies are the primary reasons for Korea's rapid economic growth (Chu 1989: 
655, Hoogvelt 1997: 203, Westphal 1995: 444, Wade 1992: 271). However, what this 
theory neglects is that each country's specific historical and institutional backgrounds 
have more divergent effects on the developmental path of each country. In relation to 
this problem, a set of serious theoretical flaws in this approach can be easily detected. 
First, in this understanding, the Korean state's specific historical and institutional 
settings are simply neglected and became unimportant variables (Mardon 1990: 112). 
Korea's historically and institutionally strong state which is deeply embedded in its 
society needs further explanation. In the discussion about the statist approach, we will 
investigate the historical and institutional background of the strong Korean state in 
more detail. 
Second, the historical development of the Korean market system is also simply 
neglected. The Korean market system under Japanese colonial rule and after the 
Korean War was underdeveloped. It can be argued that before colonial rule in Korea, 
there was no market system equivalent to the Western markets of the 19th century and 
early 20th centuries. The sluggish and underdeveloped market system in the early 
1960s needed the active role of the Korean state. Moreover, Korea's open and export- 
oriented economic system from 1962 was possible because of more than a decade- 
long economic preparation through Import Substituting Industries (ISI) and market 
protections in the 1950s. Third, the neo-liberal approach also does not consider the 
socio-political aspects of economic policies. As Higgott and Phillips correctly point 
out, markets are socio-political constructions and "their domestic functioning depends 
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on their legitimacy and support within civil society" (Higgott and Phillips 1998: 26). 
The neo-liberal approach to Korea's economic success only focuses on the economic 
system of Korea. However, we need to explicate the power relationships and 
changing bargaining positions among the market, the state, and civil society in order 
to produce a more persuasive and comprehensive explanation. This is the reason why 
this thesis adopts a synthetic approach which comprises societal, statist, international 
systemic, institutional and ideational approaches. Finally, advantages or pressures 
from the international system towards Korea's economic developmental trajectory 
have been simply discarded in the neo-classical approach. As we will review in the 
following sections, international factors are indispensable variables in understanding 
the Korean state's economic and socio-political changes and transformations. 
In contrast, proponents of the statist approach try to illuminate the Korean state's 
specific characteristics emanating from its unique historical and institutional 
configuration which gives rise to the emergence and persistence of the strong Korean 
state (Haggard and Moon 1995). This approach insists that Korea's social forces have 
been relatively weak in terms of their influence and incorporation into policy making 
processes and argues that it is the state itself that plays the most significant role in 
economic development as a strategist, planner, entrepreneur, market establisher and 
regulator, and material and financial resource allocator and so on. In a word, from the 
point of view of the statists, it is the presence and efforts of the strong state that 
caused rapid and amazing economic growth. Because of the underdeveloped civil 
society of Korea, the societal approach is unsuitable for analysing Korea's foreign 
economic policy (Suk-Joon Kim 1992: 46, Young-Myung Kim 1996: 63, Chu 1989: 
654). In the statist approach, we have a theoretical anomaly developed by Haggard. 
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Haggard identifies statism with the institutional perspective and in his institutional 
approach, only tangible state organisations are regarded as institutions (Haggard and 
Chen 1987, Haggard 1990). In other words, "Haggard frequently uses the terms 
statism and institutionalism interchangeably" (Fields 1995: 23) and as a result, for 
him, the institutional approach focuses on "the organisational features of the state that 
affect the ability of social groups and political elites to realise their objectives" 
(Haggard and Moon 1990: 230). 
However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, institutions in this thesis have a much wider 
variety of meanings than Haggard employs. Even though the term `institutions' is 
highly ambiguous and difficult to define, we need a refined definition of institutions in 
order to illuminate Korea's foreign economic policies more comprehensively. 
Tangible and intangible institutions are equally emphasised in this thesis. Tangible 
institutions include governmental organisations, legal systems, the dominant Chaebol 
structure and specific economic structures like the persistent collusive relationships 
among the state, business and banking sectors. Meanwhile, intangible institutions 
include, among others, the populace's economic nationalism, window-guidance or 
internal administrative guidelines with no written regulations, the historical or cultural 
background of the strong state and bureaucratic autonomy. Thus, in this thesis, 
institutions "are social constructs ordering human interactions. They may be formal 
or informal, temporary or regularised. Once constructed, they persist in time and 
constrain or otherwise modify the behaviour and actions of groups and the individuals 
associated with those groups" (Fields 1995: 9). Thus, the institutional approach is 
much broader than the statist approach and "statism is not analogous to, but rather a 
component of, an institutionalist approach" (Doner 1992: 401). 
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In the literature on the state-centred approach, the strong state implies three conditions 
(Haggard 1990: 43, Doner 1992: 399, Martinussen 1997: 238). First, bureaucrats 
must be insulated from social forces such as interest groups, trade unions, and the 
middle class in policy making processes. Insulation is a firm base of bureaucrats' 
autonomy. Second, bureaucrats have to possess enough and efficient policy 
instruments in order to systematically pursue their policy objectives. Policy 
instruments basically include incentives and punishment which will eventually bring 
support, as well as persuasion or co-ordination of civil society members. The extent 
of available policy instruments is an index of state capacity. Third, a coherent policy 
making process must exist which can be realised by inter-ministrial co-ordinations. If 
there are conflicts among governmental organisations, policy implementation will lose 
its efficiency. 
However, this definition of a strong state becomes theoretically vague if we consider 
the importance of international systemic factors and ideational factors in analysing 
Korea's foreign economic policy. First, in the theory of dependency and world 
systems, the peripheral or semi-peripheral state is regarded as a weak state compared 
with the strong state of core advanced countries. In this regard, Korea is definitely a 
weak state. However, this argument is controversial and contradictory, given that in 
the literature on developmentalism, Korea is a prototype of a strong state. Moreover, 
in terms of security, Korea is unarguably a weak state which has been vulnerable to 
communist expansion and benefited from the US security umbrella. Without 
considering Korea's strategic position in Northeast Asia, any debate on the strong 
state is in vain. Thus, it cannot be denied that Korea's comfortable relationship with 
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the international economic system in the 1960s and 1970s was possible because of 
American's strategic calculations and because the Cold War order provided open, 
tolerant markets for Korea's penetrative and mercantilistic developmentalism. In 
short, the concept of Korea's strong state becomes blurred and confused if we 
consider international systemic factors (Potter 1992: 222). 
Second, in the ideational approach to economic policy, a strong state means a state 
where shared economic belief systems among politicians, bureaucrats and civil society 
members are persistent and coherent. For example, in the DS period, the Korean state 
was strong in terms of shared beliefs on the efficacy of developmental ism in the 
pursuit of economic objectives among bureaucrats, big business, and the populace. 
On the other hand, the Korean PDS was unarguably a weak state considering that 
bureaucrats' belief system was sharply divided into two opposite ideas: the free 
market initiated beliefs and persistent beliefs regarding developmental ism. What is 
missing and neglected in the strong state debates is this ideational factor. So far, in 
the literature on strong states, only autonomy, capacity, and cohesive policy making 
processes (or internalised co-ordination structure among government organisations) 
have been considered as determining indices of state strength. 
Thus, it can be argued that the concept of the strong state needs to be redefined and 
refined. This means that the discussion of the strong state has to be based on three 
dimensions: first, state autonomy and insulation from not only domestic society but 
also the international system; second, state capacity emanating from sufficient and 
efficient policy instruments; and most importantly, ideational coherence among 
bureaucrats and civil society members. This ideational coherence is the foundation 
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underpinning cohesive policy making processes and the internalisation of inter- 
ministrial coordinations. Shared economic belief systems and economic objectives 
among governmental economic organisations and bureaucrats is the most important 
determining factor of the strong state. Haggard clearly points out the need for the 
ideational approach in the literature on the strong state: "State autonomy may explain 
the capacity to formulate and execute an economic program, but it does not answer the 
nagging question of where state interests come from" (Haggard 1990: 46). 
In this thesis, Korea's developmental stages are divided into three periods: the 
developmental state period; the post developmental state period; and finally the 
transitionary state period. The main argument of this chapter is that the intensity and 
the strength of the Korean state varies according to different policy issues and the 
progress of the developmental stage. The Korean DS is a strong state in terms of 
bureaucrats' autonomy from domestic society and the international system, efficient 
policy instruments, and ideational coherence between the state and civil society 
members. Meanwhile, the Korean PDS is a relatively weak state compared with the 
DS, given that the Korean PDS confronted intensified pressures from not only 
domestic interest groups, particularly big conglomerates, trade unions, student 
movements and the middle class but also from the international trade and investment 
system. More importantly, the Korean PDS revealed ideational conflicts and cleavage 
among the bureaucrats themselves. Thus, it can be argued that diminished 
bureaucratic autonomy and the emergence of ideational conflicts in the PDS period 
resulted in a weak state. In the Korean TS period, we can witness a return of a 
relatively strong state compared with the PDS. The Korean TS faces unprecedentedly 
high pressures from the international neo-liberal regime under the economic crisis. 
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Thus, bureaucratic autonomy relatively lessened as a result of IMF conditionality. 
However, it is important to remember that the externally driven reforms are 
intentionally and purposefully exploited or manipulated by the state itself to drive the 
momentum of domestic reforms including labour reform, financial reform, corporate 
(Chaebol) reform, and public sector reform which can be divided into the privatisation 
of public corporations and the streamlining of administrative systems. Moreover, 
pressures from civil society, particularly from trade unions and the middle class are 
dramatically decreased despite worsened family incomes and poor social safety nets 
caused by the economic crisis and subsequent reforms which led to the 
unprecedentedly high unemployment rate. Thus, it can be argued that the Korean TS 
is a relatively strong state compared with the PDS and a relatively weak state 
compared with the DS. 
In other words, in Korea's socio-economic and political transformations, the DS was 
the strongest state in which autonomy, capacity, and ideas (belief systems) were 
coherently integrated. The PDS was the weakest state in which bureaucratic 
autonomy was reduced and conflicting belief systems emerged among the bureaucrats 
themselves. The TS is a strong state in which ideational conflicts among the 
bureaucrats have disappeared and autonomy is regained with the weakening of civil 
society. These changes in the extent and intensity of the strength of the Korean state 
will be more specifically reviewed in the following sections. 
Before we begin the main sections of this chapter, three things have to be clarified. 
First, a strong state or a weak state does not come into existence in a vacuum. In other 
words, the presence of a strong or a weak state has its own historical, and institutional 
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background. It means that we also need to examine the underlying background of 
Korea's strong or weak state historically and institutionally. Second, the concept of 
the strong state is not an absolute term but a relative term against civil society and the 
international system. As Kim points out "[s]tate power is not constant over time ... 
we need to look into the domestic and international contextual variables" (Eun Mee 
Kim 1995: 515). Thus, an explanation which overemphasises the statist approach and 
entirely ignores both the societal and international systemic approaches represents 
only a partial analysis of Korea's economic and socio-political changes and 
transformations (Woo 1991: 6). In other words, even though the statist approach 
"reveals important dimensions of the East Asian development pattern, it tends to 
overstress the independent role of the developmental state, paying insufficient 
attention to other, equally important socio-political forces such as social classes and 
core-periphery relations in the world economic system" (Koo 1987: 165). As we have 
seen in the theoretical framework of Chapter 3, we need a synthetic approach which 
covers societal, statist, international systemic, institutional, and ideational approaches. 
Third, the term `the strong or weak Korean state' is also not an absolute term but a 
relative term. Put differently, it has to be emphasised that even the weak Korean state 
in the PDS period is stronger than the state in other developing countries in East Asia. 
This means that the Korean state is basically a strong state compared with other states 
in terms of its autonomy, capacity, and ideational coherence. However, we need to 
elaborate and specify the weak and strong periods of the Korean state in order to 
clearly understand Korea's socio-economic and political changes and transformations. 
In this chapter, Korea's transformation from the DS through the PDS to the TS will be 
explicated respectively in each section and in the sub-conclusion, the theory of 
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developmental stage will be maintained as an eclectic approach in order to overcome 
the shortcomings of the two extreme approaches which have been dominant in the 
literature on Korea's political economy, that is, the neo-classical and the statist view. 
1. The Korean DS 
1-1. The major characteristics of the Korean DS 
The most significant feature of the Korean DS was the absence of any cleavage and 
discrepancy among belief systems, institutions and policies. Without a doubt, this 
coherence among the three pillars of economic development was the major reason for 
the rapid and magnificent economic development of Korea from the 1960s to the 
middle of the 1980s. Belief systems on the efficacy of developmental ism was 
pervasive inside civil society as well as among bureaucrats. `National growth first 
mentality' and `national modernisation slogan' were manipulated by the second 
president Chung-Hee Park's government after 1962 when the first five year economic 
development plan was started. Moreover, government manipulation easily penetrated 
into and was accepted by civil society. 
Japanese colonialism and the Korean War devastated the entire economic foundations 
of Korea. First President Singman Rhee's government was corrupt and the entire 
national economy was geared towards to import substituting industry (ISI) and heavily 
dependent on aid from the US. Under the ISI and foreign aid-based economic 
structure, the government lost its autonomy through corruption by being involved in 
the processes of dispensing licenses to importers of capital goods essential to pursue 
ISI and in distributing foreign aid and cheap loans to selected or privileged groups 
(Haggard and Moon 1987: 110-11, Kyong-Dong Kim 1995: 373). Thus, the poverty- 
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ridden populace welcomed the second president Park's initiative to develop the 
national economy by breaking the corruption networks and developing an economic 
structure based on export oriented industry (EOI) (Haggard, Kim and Moon 1995: 
449,456-57). This period was the start of the Korean DS. The Korean DS thus began 
with the onset of EOI. The pursuit of EOI established new entrepreneurial groups 
totally different from the old corporations which had prospered under the ISI based 
economy. Thus, in the DS period, Korea enjoyed an ideational coherence in the 
pursuit of EOI among politicians, bureaucrats, the populace, and newly emerged 
entrepreneurial groups which later became the Chaebol. 
Korea voluntarily learned from Japanese developmental strategies (Johnson 1987: 
138) and as a result, we can find mimetic isomorphism in the administrative structure 
and semi-government institutions between Japan and Korea. As a late-late developer, 
Korea benefited from late developer Japan with the help of mimetic isomorphism by 
reducing the costs of trial and error in relation to establishing efficient governmental 
economic organisations and implementing economic strategies. Under Park's regime, 
Korea established the Economic Planning Board (EPB), the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry (MCI), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as imitations of the Japanese 
Economic Planning Agency (EPA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI), and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). These government organisations are also 
common to other countries whether they are developmental states or free market 
oriented states. What is important in this process of mimetic isomorphism is that 
Korea learned from Japan not only formal and procedural factors but also the core 
aspects of developmentalism. 
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Japanese developmentalism thus transferred into Korea and turned into a more 
dirigiste and nationalist form of developmentalism (Chu 1989: 652,655,662). The 
result of the voluntary learning and mimetic isomorphism from Japan resulted in a 
Korean version of neo-mercantilistic capitalism which in turn, produced intrusive 
industrial and trade policy and a government controlled financial sector. Thus, it can 
be argued that in the DS period, institutions such as government economic 
organisations (the EPB, the MCI, and the MOF), economy related laws, close 
government-business relations, the populace's economic nationalism, and 
bureaucrats' window guidance (or internal guidelines) were systematically geared to 
developmentalism. 
In relation to FDI, government policy preferred joint ventures and licensing instead of 
majority foreign ownership and in conjunction with foreign capital inducement, 
government policy preferred loans rather than inward FDI. These government 
policies revealed the neo-mercantilistic nature of the Korean DS. Put differently, the 
preference for loans, joint ventures, and technology licensing was an expression of 
government intentions to accumulate national wealth by indigenous entrepreneurs. 
Thus, the state was not only a protector of national entrepreneurs from foreign capital 
and MNCs but also a promoter of indigenous entrepreneurs and capitals. These 
policies were complemented by strategic trade policies which protected the domestic 
market while enabling Korean firms to penetrate other open foreign markets by 
providing various incentives for export promotion. Moreover, by nationalising banks, 
the state controlled the financial sector and as a result, the state possessed efficient 
policy instruments, particularly `policy loans' at cheap interest rates. Thus, by 
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controlling the banking sector, the state could directly manage the corporate sector. 
The major characteristics of the Korean DS can be summarised in Table 5-1. 
The Korean developmental state period 
IFDI 1962-1983 
OFDI 1968-1985 
-Belief systems = policies = institutions 
-Voluntary learning from the Japanese developmental model' 
-Mimetic isomorphism from Japanese governmental and semi-governmental 
institutions 
-Neo-mercantilistic capitalism 
-State intrusive but efficient industrial policy 
-Strategic trade policy 
-State controlled banking sector 
-Joint venture and licensing preference in managing inward FDI (Mardon 
1990: 127). 
-Foreign loans preference over inward FDI (Haggard and Cheng 1989: 94, 
Hyug Baeg Im 1987: 247). 
-High regulations on outward FDI because of foreign currency scarcity 
Table 5-1. The major characteristics of the Korean DS period 
1-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean DS 
As we have seen from the above, the Korean developmental state was strong in terms 
of its autonomy, capacity, and ideational coherence. Korean state autonomy was 
Wade suggests the reason for the smooth learning process between Korea and Japan: "Proximity, 
cultural affinity, and historical familiarity all helped to create important neighborhood growth effects, 
not just in terms of trade but also in terms of the plausibility of Japan as a model for emulation" 
(Wade 1992: 312). 
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accomplished because of two remarkable factors before the first five year economic 
plan was implemented in 1962. First, civil society had not developed to the point that 
it could check and balance the state. Land reform which was undertaken under the US 
military government encroached on traditional land owners and produced small and 
medium sized peasantry (Haggard and Cheng 1987: 110, Koo 1987: 170). The 
absence of traditional land owners and the presence of equally distributed 
landownership under more satisfied small and medium sized peasantry who became 
"politically disarticulated" (Moore 1995: 279) ultimately led to a political vacuum in 
rural society. Commercial or industrial capitalists were also underdeveloped under 
Japanese colonial ruling (Koo 1987: 171). Japanese Zaibatsu controlled the entire 
Korean commercial and industrial economy (Cheng 1995: 128) and as a result, it was 
difficult for indigenous capitalists to grow. Thus, after the Korean war, there were no 
dominant civil society members who could challenge the state. Put differently, 
societal actors were "little more than passive, powerless pawns: they existed to serve 
the interests and purpose of a highly repressive developmental state" (Lim 1998: 457). 
Second, if we borrow a term from Alavi (Martinussen 1997: 183), the Korean state 
was basically an `overdeveloped state' from the end of colonial rule. Under Japanese 
colonial rule, Japan needed an efficiently organised bureaucracy in order to facilitate 
colonial exploitation and to manage the colony more systematically (Koo 1987: 170). 
Japan also strengthened the surveillance structure such as the police system in order to 
suppress Korea's independence movements. Moreover, the Korean War contributed 
to a strengthened military force in the newly born South Korean state. Thus, the 
legacies of colonialism and the Korean War eventually resulted in a combination of 
strengthened bureaucracy, police, and military force in Korea. 
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The reason why the bureaucracy and the police who served Japanese imperialism 
survived even after the end of colonial rule needs to be explained. The American 
military government was worried about the expansion of communism into South 
Korea. `The special committee for anti-national behaviour' established by a popular 
central-leftist politician, Woon-Hyung Yeo, could not undertake its primary duties of 
placing them on trial because of implicit objection and hindrance from the US military 
government. The US authority, instead, supported Singman Lee as the first president 
because his political background was anti-communist. After he became president, Lee 
recruited old bureaucrats and policemen who had served during Japanese colonial rule 
in order to stabilise and strengthen his own political position. All these meant that the 
overgrown state was the result of an extraordinarily overdeveloped state apparatus 
compared with its lagged economic developmental stage and the immaturity of civil 
society. These are the historical origins of the overdeveloped and strong Korean state 
and weak civil society at the outset of the DS in 1962. 
After 1962, the Korean state enjoyed an uninterrupted position as a strong state. The 
international system was favourable to Korea's export oriented economy by providing 
open markets. The international system in the 1960s and 1970s was a period of 
economic expansion, helped by the stable Bretton Woods system (Koo 1987: 169). 
Even though, in the 1970s, the fixed exchange rate system collapsed and a double oil 
crisis occurred, the free trade regime undergirded by the GATT system was 
unimpaired (Cheng 1995: 145). Moreover, Korea continuously enjoyed access to an 
open US market and as a result, Korea was able to overcome exchange rate instability 
and the oil crises. Needless to say, this benign international economic system was an 
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offspring of Korea's strategic position in Northeast Asia (Koo 1987: 169, Mardon 
1990: 114). Thus, Korea could avoid the harsh pressures from the international 
economic system and this was the most important background for the Korean state's 
autonomy and insulation from international systemic pressures. The absence of 
dominant foreign investors or foreign capital in Korea also facilitated the autonomy of 
the Korean DS. As we have seen earlier in Table 5-1, the Korean state preferred 
foreign loans over IFDI. Thus, it was hardly possible for foreign investors to have a 
dominant position in the Korean economy in the DS period (Mardon 1990: 114). 
Korea also enjoyed autonomy from domestic society. As we have seen above, Korea 
in the 1950s was a state with no dominant societal groups. However, in the domain of 
civil society, three distinctive groups emerged as potential challengers to the strong 
state from the 1960s to the early 1980s: big business, the labour class, and students. 
First, big business which was geared to export industry steadily grew with the help of 
the government's fiscal and direct incentives (Song 1990: 71). The government used 
various policy instruments to promote exports. After President Park nationalised 
commercial banks in 1961 (Koo 1992: 29) and established special banks such as the 
Korea Development Bank, the Small and Medium Industry Bank, and the Export- 
Import bank, the government could control domestic capital flows (Neurath 1988: 75). 
Moreover, after the Bank of Korea came under the control of the MOF in 1962 (Koo 
1992: 29), government capacity to manage the entire economic system was 
remarkably improved. In other words, by consolidating the state's management of the 
banking sector, "the role of banks, both commercial and specialised, became that of 
credit-rationing outlets for the government as the allocation of credit was tightly 
controlled by the Ministry of Finance" (Lee 1992: 190). One policy instrument which 
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was absolutely useful was policy loans to industrial sectors. By dispensing policy 
loans, the government could handle the industrial sector more easily and as a result, 
the government could drive the economic system as it planned (Johnson 1987: 149, 
159). And in this process of credit rationing, "[b]anks were allowed no voice over 
allocative decisions, and had to passively accommodate the loans irrespective of their 
portfolio strategies" (Woo 1991: 12). 
Differing from the Japanese financial and corporate system characterised by a main 
banking system inside each Keiretsu group, big Korean companies could not become 
involved in the banking sector (Hamilton and Biggart 1995: 195-96). Korea's 
banking industry was basically a state controlled or managed sector. Thus, big 
business was heavily dependent on the government in order to fund their running and 
investment capital (Wade 1995: 304, Mardon 1990: 115). Moreover, the government 
also controlled import licenses in order to promote exports (Neurath 1988: 77). Only 
exporters who satisfied the government's export target could be permitted to import. 
This whole story means that even though big business steadily grew, its relationship 
with government was still highly dependent and subordinate (Koo 1987: 173). Thus, 
it can be argued that, in the period of the DS, the relationship among the bureaucracy, 
business, and the banking sector was basically hierarchical. At the top was the 
bureaucracy, the banking sector was in the middle and at the bottom was business 
(Woo 1991: 15, Chung H. Lee 1992: 189). 
Second, the labour class also steadily grew under the export-oriented economic 
structure. Cheap labour was the basis of Korea's comparative advantage and 
international competitiveness from the 1960s to the early 1980s. The labour 
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environment was seriously unfavourable to workers. In order to sustain cheap labour 
conditions, the government was intolerant and extraordinarily strict with regard to 
strikes and labour movements (Koo 1987: 174, Mardon 1990: 115). Park's 
authoritarian regime was oppressive towards even any fair requests from the labour 
class (Johnson 1987: 150). President Chun also heavily suppressed labour 
movements. However, it is important to remember that different from Japan's docile 
labour class, Korea's labour has been continuously organised and has challenged the 
authoritarian government. Thus, it can be argued that the militant labour movements 
in the late 1980s were unavoidable results of the continuous preparation and the 
growth of labour consciousness in the 1960s and the 1970s even under authoritarian 
and military regimes. 
Third, students have been a crucial actor in determining Korea's socio-political 
transformations. President Lee was expelled from his position because of nation-wide 
protests which had been initially ignited by student protests. The labour movement 
was also organised with the help of students who suspended their study and became 
workers in order to educate workers and to organise labour movements for the 
purpose of ultimately improving the labour environment. Student movements also 
facilitated Korea's democratisation in 1987 by protesting against president Chun's 
regime. As a result, in 1987, civil society members attained a shift to direct 
presidential election in Korea. This period was the PDS period. We will discuss this 
much further in section 2. The specific features of society, state, and international 
system in the Korean DS period can be summarised in Table 5-2. 
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Domestic society The developmental state International system 
-Low level configuration -Overdeveloped state -The Cold War bipolar 
of social groups (Randall (Bureaucracy, police, system 
and Theobald 1998: 211). army) 
-Unpoliticised 
-No room for social groups -Low level of international economic 
in policy making process democratisation system and a period of 
intensive growth of world 
-Subordinate enterprises' -Authoritarian regimes trade and economy 
position in relation to the (Park and Chun regimes) (Haggard 1986: 363). 
state 
-Intrusive state into market -The Bretton Woods 
-State controlled and system system until the early 
governed banking sector 1970s (Stable exchange 
-Strong state in terms of system and free trade 
-No organised labour force autonomy, capacity, and regime) 
ideational coherence 
-No politically awakened -Beneficent American 
middle class -Nationalistic economic hegemony (Hoogvelt 
patriotism2 1997: 211). 
-State controlled banking -Constantly open US 
sector as a means of markets to Korea in the 
industrial policy 1960s and 1970s3 
-The emergence of market 
protection in the US and 
Europe in the early 1980s4 
Johnson explains the effects of economic nationalism in Korea's economic development: "the 
existence of mass nationalism in Korea and a widespread public-private agreement on economic 
goals ... (eclipse) the class or pluralist pressures on governments that are commonly encountered in less mobilised societies" (Johnson 1987: 138). 
3 See Ho-Geun Song (1995: 150-51). Song argues that until the mid 1980s, the international trade 
system was favourable towards developing countries. The GATT system provided developing 
countries with special treatments such as Generalised System of Preference (GSP) and Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) while the US also provided an open market for developing countries, 
because America needed political and strategic partners or suporters in competing with the 
Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union. Johnson also explains the background of the open US 
market in this period: "The Cold War deal the Americans offered to keep these satellites in line was 
unrestricted access to the American market, toleration of their mercantilism and protectionism, and 
technology transfers at often concessionary prices in return for public anti-communism" (Johnson 
1998: 660). 
° Park explains the backgroud of the emergence of protectionism in the period as follows: "as U. S. 
hegemony over the world economy has declined over the years, its leadership role in maintaining the 
liberal economic order in the world economy has diminished. At the same time U. S. foreign policies 
have become increasingly dependent on domestic economic concerns. For example, protectionist 
trade measures proposed and supported by U. S. major industries, labour unions, and members of the 
Congress have increased substantially" (Eul Yong Park 1985: 107). 
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Table 5-2. The inter-relationship among society, state, and international system in the 
Korean DS period. 
2. The Korean PDS 
2-1. The major characteristics of the Korean PDS 
Korea's transformation into the PDS period started from the middle of the 1980s. 
First of all, the developmentalism oriented combination of belief systems, institutions, 
and policies began to break down and policies towards trade and FDI were 
incrementally liberalised as a result of pressures from the international economic 
system. These policy changes from heavy protection to deregulation and liberalisation 
could be regarded as an adaptation, that is, just behavioural change and not ideational 
change. The liberalised policies were just the window display in order to cope with 
external pressures to open the domestic market. Sohn et al. illustrate this limited and 
slow liberalisation process: 
It should be noted that while there was substantial deregulation, the 
process was left incomplete. The government still maintained much 
of its informal control over the financial sector ... Also, while the 
government partially deregulated foreign investment, direct foreign 
investment was still subject to a substantial array of limits ... 
While most government officials and economists recognised the 
need for import liberalisation, they felt that a gradual liberalisation 
was preferable (Sohn et al. 1998: 42-43). 
Belief systems were sharply divided inside the bureaucracy. Firm beliefs regarding 
the efficiency of the intrusive state and developmentalism which was prevalent in the 
DS period began to be challenged by top ranking policy makers who obtained their 
degree in the US where neo-classical policy thinking is prevalent. In contrast, low or 
medium level bureaucrats had a tendency to cling to the status quo and to stick to 
already existing, internally prevailing standard operational procedures which had been 
adjusted to the developmental spirit and objectives. Moreover, there were internal 
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conflicts among economy-related ministries towards policy options. The EPB 
pursued economic liberalisation while the MOF and the MCI tried to hold to 
developmental policies. Thus, in the PDS period, there was a sharp ideational 
cleavage inside the bureaucracy. Jones clearly points out this ideational conflict in the 
PDS period: 
Chun's reforms ... engendered conflict within the bureaucracy 
between economic liberals and conservatives ... after 1985, within 
the government, the EPB encountered growing strategic resistance 
from the MOF and MCI. These tensions continue into the regimes 
of Roh Tae Woo (1987-92) and have been further exacerbated 
during Kim Young Sam's (1992-1997) presidency (Jones 1997: 76) 
This is the very reason for the zigzag and confused policies in the Korean PDS period. 
And this ideational divergence inside the bureaucracy undoubtedly led to intensified 
friction between developmental ism and the neo-liberal free market. In a word, 
"Korea's state became lost between state and market in the process of political and 
economic liberalisation" (Rhee 1994: 232,239). As a result, continuous efforts to 
overcome or dismantle the side effects of developmentalism such as the overgrown 
Chaebol, the collusive government-business relationship, and an underdeveloped 
financial system were frustrated in the PDS period (Sohn 1998: 22-23). More 
specifically, Chun tried to reform the high business concentration of the Chaebol by 
pursuing liberal economic reform and fair market competition after he became 
president. Chun's real intention of pursuing reform was to legitimise his military or 
authoritarian regime by achieving economic justice and equality and showing it to the 
Korean populace. However, this effort failed and collusive government-business 
relation re-emerged as Chun's regime later accepted political funds from the Chaebol 
because Chun "tried to pay the increasing political cost for regime security by 
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exploiting the state-controlled industrial adjustment" (ghee 1994: 233). Chun's 
successor, Roh also attempted to achieve economic liberalisation and Chaebol reform 
in 1988-1989. However, his efforts were also frustrated because the core part of the 
reform such as `real-name financial transaction' and `public land ownership' were 
suspended. The main target of these two measures had been the Chaebol, because the 
legalisation of the former could lead to the complete prevention of illicit political 
funds and the latter could constrain the Chaebol's rent-seeking behaviour by investing 
in real estate (Rhee 1994: 234-35). Young-Sam Kim also tried to sever the collusive 
alliance between the government and the Chaebol by announcing that he would not 
accept political funds from the Chaebol. Moreover, he legalised `real name financial 
transaction', `real-name ownership of real estate', and `declaration of property of high 
ranking bureaucrats'. However, his reform efforts soon went adrift and became 
obsolete because of the unexpected impact of his `Segyehwa policy' such as rapid 
liberalisation of finance without proper supervision and his son's corrupt links with 
the Chaebol. After the emergence of ailing Chaebol such as Hanbo and Kia, Kim's 
efforts to achieve economic reforms were in vain. As a result, the collusive alliance 
among politicians, bureaucrats, and business remained despite Kim's intensive and 
wide ranging reform efforts (Jaymin Lee 1999: 150-51). We will discuss this further 
in the following section. 
Meanwhile, it has to be emphasised that tangible or intangible economic institutions 
such as government economic organisations, window guidances, administrative 
Yeon-ho lee illuminates the powerful practices of window guidance: "Unofficial regulation through 
so-called window guidance also continues to function. Government officials arbitralily apply 
economic, industrial acts with window guidance. Business people even complain that window 
guidance is superior to written laws. Even if a law is aimed at deregulation, officials often render the 
act ineffective" (Yeon-ho Lee 1997: 382). 
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guideline6, unequal and hierarchical state-banks-business relationship and persistent 
economic nationalism remained relatively undamaged compared with the ideational 
divergence. The embeddedness of developmentalism in the Korean state and society 
was persistent and rigid and denied any adjustment despite changed policy and 
divided belief systems in the PDS period. Institutional factors do last longer than 
ideational factors. Institutional changes need more time than policy changes and 
belief system changes and the direction of the changes is difficult to anticipate. The 
MOF and the MCI maintained their developmentalism-oriented organisational 
structure and contents. The EPB never gave up its role of the grand economic 
strategist and planner. The MOF continuously controlled the Bank of Korea and the 
MCI never stopped its role of an industrial policy initiator and an advocator of 
industrial sectors (Peon-Ho Lee 1996: 158-59). The banking sector was 
incrementally liberalised but only in limited scope and at very slow tempo. Lee shows 
the reason for this limited liberalisation: the public officers, "while officially willing 
to admit the need for liberalisation, did not give up regulations of financial institutions 
that were the real source of their perks and privilege. As a result, almost the same 
deregulation issues were being continuously raised for more than a decade without 
being solved in any real sense" (Jaymin Lee 1999: 150). Thus, the state 
uninterruptedly controlled the banking sector in the PDS. This is the obvious reason 
for the underdeveloped banking sector in Korea. Overprotected and guaranteed by the 
government, the banking sector was subject to moral hazard and failed to improve its 
administrative and investment skills. 
s Administrative guideline is "a combination of command and incentive to influence private behaviour 
that requires continuous consultation between Chaebol and public officers". See Paul W. Kuznets 
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As we have seen above, the liberalisation of the domestic market and administrative 
deregulation were a means of avoiding foreign pressures. However, there was another 
reason for liberalisation. The state purposefully pursued liberalisation measures in 
order to improve the international competitiveness of indigenous industrial sectors by 
introducing foreign competition. The primary objective of market protection based on 
the principle of strategic trade policy was to protect domestic companies and 
industries from well developed foreign competitors, especially from the MNCs. 
Under the overarching framework of market protection, infant industry protection was 
practised and oligopolistic competition among indigenous companies in the same 
industry was allowed in order to improve international competitiveness. However, 
from the early 1980s, Korean firms obtained a certain degree of international 
competitiveness as a result of decades long government efforts at artificial oligopoly 
formation and infantry industry protection. Thus, in the 1980s, the government forced 
domestically over-protected industries to compete with foreign competitors by 
incrementally opening the domestic market. This is the other reason for liberalisation 
and deregulation in the 1980s. 
In the PDS period, Korea voluntarily learned from the Japanese Expansionist 
Developmentalism in Southeast Asia. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Japan 
intentionally transplanted its developmental system into Southeast Asia and as a 
result, Japan established a production network in the region. In the latter part of the 
1980s, Korea suffered from rising labour costs and an unstable labour market caused 
by militant labour movements. Thus, Korea's cheap production costs-seeking OFDI 
started to rise in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
(1994: 149). 
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Korea's learning from the Japanese EDS and mimetic isomorphism in the FDI related 
institutional structure and arrangements will be further elaborated in Chapter 6. 
However, it has to be emphasised that the Korean EDS in the region was very nascent 
and only in the process of preparation. Two major reasons for this nascent stage can 
be suggested. First, Korea's OFDI started after the mid 1980s when Korea achieved 
its first trade surplus. Before the period, OFDI was heavily regulated in order to 
manage scarce foreign currency. Second, until the middle of the 1980s, the region of 
Southeast Asia was not crucial for Korea in terms of both strategy and economy. 
Korea's foreign policy was traditionally focused on `oceanic diplomacy' with America 
and Japan. And, from the late 1980s, Korea actively tried to achieve diplomatic 
normalisation with China and the former Soviet Union by pursuing `northern 
diplomacy'. Thus, different from Japan's long-term preparation and aspiration 
towards Southeast Asia, Korea neglected the presence and value of the region in its 
foreign policy in relative term (Jeon 1996: 397). 
However, despite these obstacles and the short-term history of Korean FDI in the 
region, Korea's economic policy towards the region has been steadily strengthened. 
First, as regionalism or regionalisation mushroomed under the globalisation process, 
East Asia and Southeast Asia became an important region for Korea in terms of 
economic integration and as a sort of insurance policy against NAFTA and the EU. 
Second, as internal trade and investment flows in the region continuously grew, for 
Korea, it became inevitable to actively incorporate into the region by maximising its 
comparative or competitive advantages in the regional division of labour. Third, 
Korea's labour costs escalated during the late 1980s because of the intensified labour 
movements. Thus, increased labour costs and labour market unrest led to the rise of 
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low cost-seeking FDI towards the region. Fourth, as Japan established a production 
network in the region, the Korean Chaebols had to explore the region in order to 
procure price-competitiveness against the Japanese production network (Jeon 1996: 
399). As economic integration was facilitated, Korea rearranged its Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and established the new ASEAN Co-operation Fund 
(ACF) in order to actively participate in and take advantage of the process of regional 
economic integration. Korea also established the Economic Development Co- 
operation Fund (EDCF) in 1987 which supplies cheap loans to developing countries 
and the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA) in order to efficiently deal 
with grants and technological assistance towards developing countries (Jeon 1996: 
402-404). 
Furthermore, a pars-governmental research institute such as `Korea Institute for 
Industrial Economic and Trade (KIET)' prepared the policy-report which 
recommended permission for business's financial outsourcing in the region for its 
investment capital and the increase and expansion of `reverse imports' from Southeast 
Asia in order to propel Korean FDI in the region (Jang 1994: 140). KIST also 
recommended the diversification and strengthening of economic diplomacy with the 
ASEAN countries and maintained the organic connection between ODA allocation 
and ASEAN's development projects such as construction of infrastructure (Chun et al. 
1996: 188,193-194). The major characteristics of the Korean PDS can be 
summarised in Table 5-3. 
The Korean post developmental state period 
IFDI 1984-1997 
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OFDI 1986-1997 
-Institutions deeply rooted in developmentalism 
-Divided belief system inside the bureaucracy 
-Liberalised and free market oriented economic policies 
-Emergence of Korea as a development model in developing countries 9 
-Intensified friction between developmentalism and the neo-liberal free 
market in the policy making process 
-Delayed structural reform and limited liberalisation and deregulation 
-Adaptation to foreign and domestic pressures not by changing belief 
systems and institutions deeply ingrained to developmentalism but by 
superficially changing policies 
-Opening of domestic market to improve enterprises' international 
competitiveness 
-Incremental and continuous liberalisation and deregulation in the 1990s 
before the economic crisis 
-Embeddedness of the DS system in the PDS period 
-Preparation and nascent implementation of the EDS 
-Voluntary learning and mimetic isomorphism from Japan in 
implementing the EDS 
The emergence of the side effects of developmentalism such as collusive 
government-business relationship, bureaucrats' authoritarianism, unequal 
regional development, and the overgrown Chaebol (0 1995: 356). 
-Business' needs to access advanced technology and to extend and diversify 
export market led to the rise of OFDI 
7 Neurath reveals the institutional resistance inside the bureaucracy by the persistent administrative 
guideline in foreign investment screening in the PDS period: "Most investment applications, though 
officially handled by the Ministry of Finance as the one stop clearing agency, require the approval of 
various ministries. These in turn base their decisions not merely on the Foreign Capital Investment 
Inducement Law, but also on a number of unpublished internal regulations and guidelines. The latter 
are often more important and more restrictive than the law itself. Moreover, Korean bureaucrats at 
the working level enjoy a considrable degree of administrative freedom with respect to how they 
interprete a given law" (Neurath 1988: 85). 
$O argues that Korea became a model: "the Korean economy of the 1960s and 1970s is now the object 
of study to many economists in the world. It is often said that many former socialist countries and 
developing countries are studying the Korea" (Won-Chol 0 1995: 356). By defining the East Asia 
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Table 5-3. The major characteristics of the Korean PDS 
2-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean PDS 
In the domain of civil society, a set of groups steadily improved their leverage against 
the state. The labour class became a dominant social group (Koo 1987: 177-78, 
Cheng 1995: 147, Pak 1998: 59), particularly after `the declaration of 6.29' from 
president Chun. The day 29th of July in 1987 was a watershed in the process of 
Korea's democratisation (Celoza and Sours 1993: 105). Students' aspiration for 
democratisation widely spread throughout the middle class as well as the labour class. 
The student movements' slogan of `overthrow the military dictatorship and establish a 
democratic government' was widely welcome by civil society members. Korea's 
middle class was politically awakened by supporting the student movement and by 
being involved in the democratisation movement in June 1987 and emerged as a 
crucial political actor for the first time in Korea's history (Koo 1987: 178, Cheng 
1995: 147, Pak 1998: 60). President Chun was endangered because of the intensified 
and nation-wide protests and finally he announced the declaration of 6.29 which 
contained the promise of direct presidential elections in December 1987. After the 6. 
29 declaration, in July and August of 1987, the labour movements spread throughout 
the entire nation (Sunhyuk Kim 1997: 1136). In the open space of promised 
development Model (EADM) as a combination of the Confucian culture, developmental 
authoritarianism, state-led export-oriented economic system, and democratisation after accomplishing 
a certain level of economic development, Goo insists that Korea is a prototype country of the EADM, 
because Korea has experienced the sequence of the emergence of authoritarian regimes, 
concentration on economic development, and then democratisation process and economic 
liberalisation and deregulation process. See Jong-seo Goo (1996: 209). 
9 Sohn et al. shows the backgound of this delayed and slow process of liberalisation like this. "Korean 
had realised from the early 1980s that Korea must ultimately liberalise in order to maintain an 
efficient, productive economy. However, there were substantial differences of opinion concerning 
the speed of liberalisation. Also ... there were some differences in opinion on how quickly and how much the government must withdraw from its involvement in the marketplace. These argument 
began in the 1980s and continue to this day" (Sohn et al. 1998: 53). 
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democracy, the labour class requested their fair share of economic growth. As a 
result, labour costs dramatically increased from late 1987 throughout the 1990s. The 
number of trade unions grew while their membership also expanded. After Young- 
Sam Kim was inaugurated as the sixth president of Korea, they became a politically 
crucial actor by establishing an independent trade union of `the Korean Confederation 
of Democratic Trade Unions (KCDTU)'. 
On the other hand, the Chaebol's position in relation to the state also changed its 
nature (Koo 1987: 176, Pak 1998: 58). Kim clearly illustrates the growing leverage 
position of the Chaebol against the state by revealing the changes in the relationship 
between the state and the Chaebol. The relationship was transformed from `the state- 
coopting or protecting and Chaebol following' to a `symbiotic or bilateral bargaining 
or coexistence of confrontation and collaboration' (Eun Mee Kim 1995: 516). The 
Chaebol became too big to be made bankrupt as their contribution towards the Korean 
economy had dramatically risen. The origins of the Chaebol challenge towards state 
authority could be found in the government's ambitious drive in the heavy and 
chemical industry (HCI) in the early 1970s. At this time, the Korean state faced a 
strategic threat as the US incrementally reduced its military presence and capability in 
Korea as a result of the Nixon doctrine. Korea faced the need to improve its HCI 
sector rapidly in order to fill the vacuum caused by the US military reduction. 
Another reason for the government driven HCI development was the need to improve 
Korea's economic capacity and `the terms of trade' by transferring its labour intensive 
economic system to capital intensity one. Thus, Korean government interfered in the 
market system more intensively than the earlier period of the EOI (Sohn et al. 1998: 
29). Enormous policy loans and preferential loans were built up in order to channel 
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them into the targeted HCI sector. In this process, Chaebol which did not follow the 
government decision were punished and those that rapidly adopted the government 
policy benefited from cheap loans and other incentives such as fiscal or direct 
subsidies. However, the market distortions caused by unequal resource allocation in 
other industrial sectors and overinvestment and overcapacity in the HCI sector 
ultimately resulted in economic instability. Chronic high inflation was persistent in 
the late 1970s. In 1979, after the assassination of president Park, Korea's economy 
revealed clear signs of the side effects of the HCI and stopped developing by showing 
almost minus GDP growth (Sohn et al. 1998: 36-37). 
The important thing to rememeber here is that the Chaebols have been exploiting 
these side effects of the government-led HCI promotion policies as a symbol of 
`government failure' through over-intervention by the state, whenever they try to 
obtain more managerial autonomy from government intervention throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. As the Chaebol grew further in the PDS period, they felt that 
government interventions and guidelines were a shackle preventing their autonomy. 
Thus, the Chaebol pursued more comprehensive administrative deregulation and 
capital market liberalisation. Too many government regulations and rigid capital 
market protection became major constraints in doing business from the view point of 
the Chaebol. Domestic market protection and various incentives provided by the 
government were indispensable factors for the development of the Chaebol in the DS 
period. Thus, the Chaebol steadily grew with the help of government protection, 
support, and guidances. In the PDS period, the mature Chaebol felt the persistent 
government intervention to be an uncomfortable shackle which was preventing them 
from being global MNCs and promoting OFDI. Moreover, the Chaebol continuously 
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exploited the arguments of some economists who insist that the Chaebol's internal 
system or structure had its own advantages1°. Fields briefly summarises the 
justification for the Chaebol: "Korean Chaebol chose an integrated and relational 
structure in a successful effort to reduce transaction costs and achieve superior 
economic performance under imperfect market conditions" (Field 1995: 14). In 
summary, government-driven market protection and various incentives gave the 
Chaebol precious chances by which they could exploit their permitted oligopolistic 
position and ultimately dominate the entire domestic market (Suk-Joon Kim 1996: 
64). As a result, the Chaebol attained a certain level of international competitiveness 
in their targeted industries and in order to grow further, they needed more cheap 
capital from the liberalised financial market and more administrative autonomy from 
the government. Thus, capital market liberalisation and deregulation were pursued by 
Chaebol in the PDS period. 
After the military coup, General Chun was inaugurated as the fourth president of 
Korea in 1980. His urgent task was to stabilise the economy and consolidate his weak 
political foundations. In order to overcome the economic contraction caused by the 
side effects of the HCI promotion policies, financial liberalisation was adopted to 
overcome the excessive government intervention and management of the banking 
sector in the period of the HCI promotion (1974-1979). In other words, the 
underlying foundation of financial liberalisation was the bureaucrats' recognition that 
the underlying cause of the economic hardship was the excessive government 
interference in the financial market and the subsequently distorted capital prices and 
trade (Koo 1992: 31-32). However, it has to be emphasised that the pace and degree 
10 See Chalmers Johnson (1987: 161). And also see Chung H. Lee (1992: 187). 
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of financial liberalisation in the 1980s was limited and slow because of institutional 
resistance and the rigidly entrenched developmentalism-oriented belief systems inside 
the bureaucracy (Sohn et al. 1998: 49). Even though the HCI promotion in the late 
1970s and the financial liberalisation in the 1980s shows the changed degree and 
intensity of state intervention or developmentalism in the market system, the financial 
liberalisation was not market-driven but state-initiated. The limits of financial 
liberalisation is clearly explained by Amsden and Euh: 
The Korean financial system has changed in the 1980s ... Yet it 
would be misleading to characterise such change simply as a move 
towards freer markets ... the financial system continues to operate 
within the context of industrial policy (Amsden and Euh 1993: 379) 
The MOF tenaciously controlled not only the banking sector but also the Bank of 
Korea even under the process of liberalisation. Thus, it can be argued that financial 
liberalisation in the 1980s was not the result of ideational change from learning but 
just an adaptation which accompanies only behavioural changes in policy options and 
implementation. Economic institutions were still deeply entrenched in 
developmentalism and the belief systems of the majority of the bureaucrats were also 
anchored in developmentalism even though there was an ideational divergence inside 
the bureaucracy with the emergence of a minority group of bureaucrats that was the 
advocator of the principles and benefits of a free market economy. In this regard, 
financial liberalisation in the Korean PDS period was the result of adaptation to 
internally or externally driven environmental changes in the Korean economy. 
Developmentalism was undamaged due to its strong embeddedness in economic 
institutions and bureaucrats' belief systems. Thus, as Jones correctly points out, 
"[a]lthough official rhetoric currently adopts a neo-liberal tone, government continues 
to offer big leadership" in the economy (Jones 1997: 77). 
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Korea's sixth president Young-Sam Kim's `Segyehwa' strategy showed the 
persistence of developmentalism in the PDS period. Segyehwa, which means 
globalisation in Korean, became popular in Korea after president Kim implemented 
the Segyehwa policy (Koo 1992: 36-37). The original intention of the policy was to 
improve the Korean economy's international competitiveness by liberalisation and 
deregulation and by actively participating in multilateral and regional economic 
arrangements such as the WTO, APEC, ASEM, and the OECD (Yeon-Ho Lee 1997: 
369). The difference between the liberalisation and deregulation undertaken under 
presidents Chun and Roh and liberalisation and deregulation under president Kim lies 
in the passive versus dynamic nature of the Korean government. The former process 
was slow and involved piecemeal responses towards foreign pressure, especially from 
the US. On the contrary, the latter process was driven by the Kim government as a 
dynamic and positive initiative in order to benefit from or exploit the process of 
economic globalisation. Thus, the Korean government actively tried to be a member 
of the OECD and in order to be a member country, it pursued trade and investment 
liberalisation. As a result, Korea's financial market was rapidly liberalised without 
the commensurate development of financial regulations and supervision. The biggest 
beneficiary of the liberalisation and deregulation process was the Chaebol. In the 
freer and open environment, the Chaebol borrowed increasing amounts of foreign 
capital beyond their capacity because the price of foreign capital was much cheaper 
than domestic capital. 
On the other hand, newly established merchant banks under the capital market 
liberalisation process also borrowed enormous foreign short-term capital in order to 
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exploit the interest rate gap between Korea and foreign countries. Increased foreign 
capital inflows without proper supervision finally led to a currency crisis in 1997. 
This will be further explained in section 3. Besides the financial instability, the 
Segyehwa policy unexpectedly resulted in the further strengthening of the Chaebol's 
leverage against the state. The Chaebol was the only economic sector which had 
enough capacity and international competitiveness to cope with the effects of rapid 
liberalisation and deregulation. Small and medium sized enterprises and service 
industries, particularly financial and distributive industries, were under-developed and 
were not prepared for rapid liberalisation and deregulation. The Chaebol, which is 
based on manufacturing industry, was sufficiently prepared to take advantage of 
economic globalisation. Thus, the Segyehwa policy ultimately became a policy not 
only for the strengthening of the Chaebol's competitiveness but also for an extended 
`growth first policy' of the DS period because the policy lacked an additional package 
for improving social safety nets to cope with the potential dislocations caused by the 
neo-liberalism-oriented liberalisation and deregulation process (Im 1995: 256,261). 
Thus, it can be argued that, the Segyehwa policy as `a Korean version of 
globalisation' was another version of industrial policy and its implementation revealed 
the developmentalism-oriented economic belief systems in the PDS period (Yeon-Ho 
Lee 1997: 369). 
Economic policies under the Segyehwa strategy became rapidly and widely liberalised 
and deregulated. However, the process of liberalisation and deregulation was driven 
by state strategy rather than by the market. The intention of the policy was to improve 
Korea's international competitiveness by strengthening the Chaebol while sacrificing 
other underdeveloped industrial sectors, particularly the agricultural sector. State 
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intervention and the artificial comparative advantage of the DS system persisted and 
did not disappear in the PDS period as the Korean PDS tried to manage, exploit, and 
intervene in the process of globalisation which is widely identified with the process of 
free marketisation and non-governmental intervention. Moreover, the abolition of the 
EPB under the Young Sam Kim regime and the establishment of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (MOFE) led to an unexpected and contrary result. The original 
intention was to streamline government organisation, but the merger of the MOF and 
EPB led to a strengthening of government intervention, because the abolition of the 
EPB meant the total disappearance of a liberal-minded and free market-oriented 
government organisation (Yeon-Ho Lee 1997: 381). Thus, it can be argued that even 
though president Kim tried hard to achieve economic liberalisation and Chaebol 
reform, the efforts only resulted in confirmation of the persistent legacy and influence 
of developmentalism which is deeply ingrained in bureaucrats' belief systems and in 
economic institutions. 
In the international system, crucial changes in the security arena led to fundamental 
changes in the international economic system (Koo 1987: 178). The collapse of the 
Cold War order resulted in a decline in the importance of high politics. The US, 
which suffered from chronic fiscal and trade deficits throughout the 1980s, initiated 
the creation of an environment in which unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral 
trade and investment arrangements mushroomed (Moon 1995: 67, Hoogvelt 1997: 
213, Jones 1997: 79, Chowdhury and Islam 1993: 249-250). Trade and investment 
became much more politicised and as a result, trade retaliations and market openings 
in the name of fair trade and liberalisation became prevalent phenomena in the 1980s 
and 1990s. The US has been a strong advocate of the free market economy and 
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strongly propelled market liberalisation and governmental deregulation in other 
countries by facilitating multilateral agreements in the Uruguay Round such as the 
TRIMs, TRIPs, and agricultural talks. Also, by initiating the establishment of the 
WTO, the US is pursuing liberalisation in service industries, particularly financial 
industries in which it is the most competitive globally. Thus, it can be inferred from 
the above that the US is promoting world-wide liberalisation and deregulation 
particularly in the industries in which it has comparative or competitive advantage 
compared with other countries. 
On the other hand, the US has also adopted unilateral, bilateral and regional 
arrangements in order to complement the multilateral arrangements mentioned above. 
These unilateral or bilateral trade retaliations and initiatives were revealed by the 
strengthened Super 301 provision in US trade law, the structural impediments 
initiative (SII) and the voluntary exports restraints (VERs) talks with Japan, local 
content requirements towards IFDI flows, and trade disputes over the opening of the 
rice market in Japan and Korea. Regional arrangements such as the EU, NAFTA, 
APEC, and ASEAN have been extended and deepened throughout the 1980s and 
1990s. The debates on the nature of regional arrangements have been controversial 
but basically centred on a set of conflicting views: whether regionalism is a bridge 
towards economic globalisation or not (Machado 1996: 40); whether regionalism 
promotes free trade or prevents free trade among regional arrangements; whether 
regional arrangements are economically driven (regionalisation) or politically driven 
(regionalism). The answers towards these questions need more empirical research and 
a longer period of observation. However, what is clear at this juncture is that regional 
economic arrangements are continuously expanding and deepening and this implies 
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increasing politicisation of economic issues in terms of equal market accessibility 
between member and non-member countries of each regional arrangement. 
In this regard, what is significant for Korea and Japan is the US strategy of 
participating in APEC and NAFTA at the same time. America's intention lies in 
consolidating its traditionally strong control of East Asian countries and in 
strengthening its bargaining position against the EU by participating both in NAFTA 
and APEC. The US involvement in APEC shows the complex relationships between 
the US and the nations in the region. From the view point of the East Asian countries, 
an open US market is indispensable in order to sustain their developmentalism- 
oriented economic system which is a combination of export penetration and domestic 
market protection. From the point of view of the US, East Asia, as a fast growing 
economic area, is strategically important in terms of American's economic 
participation in the region and East Asia's value as a potential supporter against the 
EU. We will further discuss the US involvement in the region in section 3. The 
economic crisis and Japan's frustrated plan for the establishment of the Asian 
monetary Fund (AMF) showed the degree and intensity of US control of the East 
Asian political economy system. 
We saw from the above discussion the effects of the collapse of the Cold War on the 
current international economic system. However, it has to be emphasised that in 
Northeast Asia, these effects have their limitations, considering that Korea is still 
divided by the political ideology of communism versus capitalism. In the Korean 
peninsula, the legacy of the Cold War has not totally disappeared. The US army still 
has its military base in Korea and Japan. Strategic calculation are still important for 
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the countries involved in the region. Korea and Japan need the US military presence 
in order to strengthen their military capability and stabilise an uncertain regional 
security situation. Thus, Korea became a leading weapons importer. This strategic 
dependence towards the US definitely limits Korea's leverage against the US in 
economic issues, particularly in processes of market opening and deregulation. 
Korea's dependency and vulnerability towards America in terms of security have been 
amplified by economic vulnerability and dependency caused by high export market 
dependency on the US market. Thus, it can be pointed out that Korea's strategic and 
economic dependence and vulnerability towards the US have been an important 
background of Korea's steady and continuous but slow liberalisation and deregulation 
processes in the 1980s and the 1990s before the economic crisis. The characteristics 
of society, state, and international system in the PDS can be summarised in the 
following Table 5-4. 
Domestic society Post developmental state International system 
-Strengthened civil -Weak state in terms of -Controversial position 
society" ideational division inside between multipolar 
the bureaucracy economic system and 
-Increased influence and unipolar system dominated 
politicisation of middle -Democratisation after by the US 
Cumings argues that Korea has a much more developed civil society than Japan. See Bruce Cumings 
(1998: 12). 
12 Different from the government-led intrusive industrial policy of the 1960s and 1970s, the industrial 
policy in the 1980s changed as foreign pressures and domestic dissatisfaction grew fast. Foreign 
pressure was the result of foreigners' conception that Korea's industrial policy is responsible for 
unfair trade practices. For foreigners, incentives and direct subsidies from the government were the 
major reason for unfair competition. Second, in domestic society, the Korean people who were in the 
process of political democratisation started to feel that the `growth first policy' which underpinned 
industrial policies of the 1960s and 1970s brought about unequal regional development and 
environmental degradation. As a result, from the 1980s, the Korean government changed the nature 
of industrial policy from direct intervention to a market-supporting system. Thus, industrial policy 
from the 1980s (Chun and Roh regimes) became a tool for the promotion of science and technology 
and human resource development. See, Kyung-Tae Lee (1991: 240-42). Under president Young- 
Sam Kim, industrial policy and financial regulations were abolished and Chang et al. argue that the 
sudden abolition of these two government regulation were the most crucial reason for the economic 
crisis, because the absence of sectoral industrial adjustment under industrial policy directly caused 
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class after 1987 (Randall 1987 (Haggard and Moon 
and Theobald 1998: 213) 1990: 236) 
-More chances for social 
groups to criticise or 
influence policy making 
process by organising 
active civil movements 
-Coexistence of the legacy 
of the DS and increasing 
beliefs regarding the 
efficacy of the free market 
system 
-Increased leverage and 
managerial autonomy of 
Chaebol (Too big to be 
made bankrupt) (Hoogvelt 
1997: 215, Woo 1991: 13) 
-Increased leverage of 
organised labour force 
(militant labour 
movements in the late 
1980s and the 
establishment of 
independent `Korean 
Confederation of 
Democratic Trade Unions' 
in the middle of the 1990s 
and the participation in 
`the Tripartite Committee' 
after the economic crisis) 
-Persistent student 
movements (Sunhyuk Kim 
1997: 1142) 
-Intensified friction 
between developmentalism 
and neo-liberal free market 
regime 
-Zigzag policies between 
intrusive state and free 
market 
-Decreasing state 
autonomy caused by 
increasing constraints both 
from domestic society and 
international system 
-Slow and limited 
liberalisation and 
deregulation processes 
-Delayed structural 
adjustment Under Chun, 
Roh and Kim because of 
persistent collusive 
relations between business 
and government (Rhee 
1994, Sohn et al. 1998) 
-Weak state in terms of 
ideational cleavage, 
diminished autonomy, and 
reduced number of policy 
instruments caused by the 
weakening of industrial 
-Highly politicised 
international economic 
system (New 
protectionism and 
reciprocity) (Haggard 
1986: 361) 
-Globalising economy by 
MNCs, FDI and financial 
globalisation (Wade 1992: 
319) 
-Coexistence of free trade 
regime strengthened by the 
WTO and regional 
economic integrations and 
bilateral or unilateral 
measures 
-Strengthened neo-liberal 
regime by the nexus of the 
US Treasury, the IMF, and 
Wall Street (Wade 1992: 
318) 
-Persistent Cold War 
legacy in Northeast Asia 
overinvestment and overcapacity in key industrial sectors and capital market liberalisation without 
supervisory institutes or skills resulted in the currency crisis. In addition, under the Kim regime, the 
symbols of industrial policy such as the EPB and five year economic planning were also abolished. 
Furthermore, under the implementation of the five year financial liberalisation policy, policy loans 
were abandoned. See, Ha-Joon Chang et al. (1998). 
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-Changes in industrial 
policy12 
Table 5-4. The inter-relationship among society, state, and international system in the 
Korean PDS period. 
3. The Korean TS: An intensive challenge to the Korean PDS 
3-1. The major characteristics of the Korean TS 
The Korean TS began with the East Asian crisis. The crisis which started from 
Thailand finally spread to Korea, which suffered from the side effects of rapid 
liberalisation in the financial sector13 in order to be a member of the OECD. As we 
have seen in section 2, Young-Sam Kim's government initiated the Segyehwa policy 
in order to dynamically respond to and benefit from the globalising world economy. 
Liberalisation and deregulation were implemented in order to make the Chaebol more 
competitive by introducing foreign competition into the domestic market, which 
although steadily liberalised in terms of policy remained heavily protected by 
institutional barriers such as the populace's economic nationalism and the `buy 
Korean goods campaign'. However, the effects of the Segyehwa policy resulted in 
enormous inflows of foreign capital borrowed by newly authorised merchant banks 
and the Chaebol (Sohn 1998: 24). Moreover, as Young-Sam Kim's government 
pursued liberalisation and deregulation, industrial policy which had been a locus of 
government planning and co-ordination between the government and private 
economic sectors lost its raison detre. The sudden absence of economic planning and 
co-ordinating mechanisms such as industrial policy directly resulted in economic 
13 An official statement from the MOCIE acknowledged the lack of supervision in the financial 
liberalisation under Segyehwa policy: "Korea's financial liberalisation drive ... had not been 
accompanied by a more transparent financial supervisory system" (Mocie 1998: 8). 
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chaos (Chang et al. 1998: 739-41). As a result, overinvestment in car and steel 
industries re-emerged under the Kim regime and in the period of the Korean PDS. 
Samsung, a Chaebol, became a new participant in the car industry despite criticisms 
and warnings from economists and civil movements. Sambo, also a Chaebol, 
expanded its steel production capacity and later confronted administrative adversity 
and potential bankruptcy. At the same time, Kia, a car manufacturing Chaebol, 
suffered from the side effects of overcapacity in the car industry and also showed 
possible signs of bankruptcy. Sambo and Kia asked the government to provide 
special treatment because they were too big to be bankrupt. They argued that their 
bankruptcies would lead to the total chaos of the Korean banking industry because of 
a massive increase in non-performing loans. 
Korean politicians and businessmen had been enjoying a close relationship by the 
network of informal politics and corruption or crony capitalism. By influencing the 
flow of capital from the banking sector to certain favoured Chaebol, politicians 
received bribes in return. The chairman of the Sambo group built up huge money 
reserves in order to bribe politicians to induce funds from banks. The important thing 
that has to be emphasised here is that at this juncture, the Korean government showed 
the confused and zigzag policy in dealing with the substantially bankrupt Sambo and 
Kia Chaebol. In other words, the government revealed the very characteristics of the 
PDS period, that is, zigzag policies between free market and developmentalism- 
oriented government intervention in the market. The government could neither let the 
Chaebol become bankrupt nor intervene with further preferential or aid funds for the 
suffering Sambo and Kia Chaebol. Foreign investors started to worry about Korea's 
economic situation, observing the government's disorientation and inability in dealing 
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with the ailing Chaebol. At this time, the government also suffered from the lame 
duck president Kim. The Minister of Finance and Economy tried to cover the 
impending economic crisis caused by the ailing Chaebol and excessive foreign capital 
inflows worrying about the bad effects of the economic hardship on the coming 
presidential election (Sohn 1998: 26). The currency crisis in Thailand occurred at this 
time and foreign investors started to worry about the potential insolvency in Korea. 
And finally they started to withdraw their capital from the Korean market. In order to 
defend the Korean currency, the BOK entered into the foreign exchange market and 
just spent foreign exchange reserves without any defensive effects. The Korean 
government inevitably asked for help from the IMF and Korea lost its economic 
sovereignty by letting the IMF make all macroeconomic decisions and by accepting 
the neo-liberalism-based IMF reform package14 for economic stabilisation and 
structural adjustment. More specifically, the Korean government made an agreement 
with the IMF to carry out the following reforms: elimination of trade-related 
subsidies; phasing out the Import Source Diversification Program; elimination or 
change of Special law limiting imports; elimination of ceiling on foreign investment 
and restrictions on mergers and acquisitions (M&A); allowing foreign banks and 
brokerage' subsidiaries; and full liberalisation of the money market. (Sohn et al. 1998: 
56-57). 
14 Randall and Theobald briefly summarise the nature, major contents, and criticism of the IMF 
structural adjustment programmes: "Structural Adjustment Programmes ... were strongly influenced by neo-liberal thinking. Beyond statbilisation they have favoured a reduction in the direct 
role of the state, removal of trade barriers and an emphasis on export-led growth. Thier requirements 
have tended to include (sometimes drastic) devaluation of the currency, reduction of government 
expenditure especially on welfare, removal of price controls, and imposition of wage ceilings ... (and) privatisation of government-run enterprise ... But the prescriptions 
have been doctrinaire and 
insufficiently responsive to the particular circumstances of individual countires" (Randall and 
Theobald 1998: 160). 
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Thus, in the period of Korean TS, we find coercive learning and coercive 
isomorphism from the international neo-liberal regime. Bureaucrats' belief systems 
were changed. The divided belief systems of the bureaucracy between the free market 
and government intervention finally disappeared as Dae-Joong Kim, inaugurated as 
the seventh Korean president, strongly pursued neo-liberal economic reforms. The 
belief systems of the bureaucracy became based on neo-liberal economics and the free 
market system. The economic crisis was not only a material but also an ideational 
battlefield between Anglo-American capitalism and East Asia's developmental 
capitalism (Higgott 1998: 9). Lee suggests the ideational changes of the Korean 
state: "The Korean reform package apparently aims at moving to an Anglo-American 
type of capitalism ... This means of course a complete break-away from the 
developmental state" (Jaymin Lee 1999: 154). 
Thus, it can be argued that learning and ideational changes took place in the TS 
period. On the other hand, financial institutions were forced to adjust towards neo- 
liberal reforms. Thus, operational transparency in deciding investment capital 
distribution and administrative autonomy from the government were pursued and the 
BOK finally became independent after a long struggle to be independent from the 
MOFE. Moreover, under the corporate reforms, the Chaebol were also forced to 
abandon their developmental characteristics such as high debt-equity ratios, inter-firm 
loan guarantees, excessive diversification of businesses and unclear financial 
statements. In sum, in the period of the Korean TS, we can witness coercive learning 
and the coercive isomorphism from the international neo-liberal regime. 
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The nature of economic policies also dramatically changed in this period. As we have 
seen in sections 1 and 2, the earlier liberalisation and deregulation processes were 
either for show-window display in order to evade foreign pressures against the heavily 
protected Korean market or slow, limited changes in which the nature of 
developmentalism, such as the government initiated liberalisation policy, was 
untouched or unimpaired. However, in the TS period, the policy changes towards 
liberalisation and deregulation have been not only rapid and fundamental but also 
comprehensive and massive. Changed belief systems geared to neo-liberalism 
propelled full liberalisation and deregulation. The extent and degree of market 
opening and government deregulation almost reached the level of the OECD 
countries. In particular, regulations towards IFDI have been totally abandoned. We 
will more specifically investigate the liberalisation process of FDI policy in this period 
in Chapter 6. 
In the period of the TS, some scholars anticipate the absolute demise of the legacy of 
developmentalism in Korea's foreign economic policy. However, it can be argued 
that such speculation may have gone too far. We need more time to draw any firm 
conclusion because, even though belief systems have changed, the institutional setting 
which is deeply ingrained in developmentalism cannot disappear in the short term. 
Because of institutional resistance and inertia, institutions last longer than belief 
systems. In the Korean TS, we can detect institutional resistance and inertia by 
observing a set of circumstances: the Korean populace's strong and persistent 
economic nationalism (Neurath 1988: 100-101, Jones 1997: 78); the Chaebol's 
reactive response towards the government and the IMF led structural reform process; 
the persistent and unimpaired `export-driven growth first policy' which is a core part 
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of Korean developmentalism; the possible re-emergence of the selfish egoism of 
bureaucracy which is now dormant under the strong presidency of Dae-Joong Kim. 
First, the Korean populace is deeply worried about economic dependency by 
observing indigenous corporations being cheaply sold to foreign owners because of 
the devalued Korean currency and the corporations' liquidity problems under the IMF- 
led contractionary macro-economic policy. As Randall and Theobald point out, 
"[g]lobalisation may even foster nationalism. This is especially so where national 
economic difficulties can successfully be attributed to the machinations of other 
states" (Randall and Theobald 1998: 262). Second, the Chaebol have tried to buy 
time in order to evade government-led corporate reform. The Chaebol are basically 
following the prescription suggested by the government reform plan. Thus, they have 
reduced their debt to equity ratio and provided consolidated financial statements 
including for all subsidiaries of the group. Moreover, the Chaebol abolished inter- 
firm debt guarantee as instructed by the government and reduced the number of their 
subsidiaries by focusing on specific industries in which they have comparative and 
competitive advantage over foreign competitors. However, they are resisting the so- 
called `big deal' which means inter-Chaebol swaps of industries in which they do not 
have international competitiveness. More specifically, Daewoo was supposed to have 
its electronics industry handed over to Samsung and in return, Samsung was supposed 
to have its car industry handed over to Daewoo. However, the deal fell through as 
Daewoo began suffering from liquidity problems and as a result, Samsung restarted its 
car manufacturing later in 1999. The Chaebol's main argument is that it is absurd for 
the Korean government to intervene in the market system again, because the Korean 
government is pursuing neo-liberal, free market based economic reforms under IMF 
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auspices. Put differently, the Chaebol are arguing that the `big deal' is basically a 
policy which contravenes the free market principle which is pursued by the 
government itself. 
Third, the `growth first slogan' has not perished even though the developmental 
economic system is being dismantled by neo-liberal reform. Even in the seriously 
contracted economy with an unprecedentedly high unemployment rate caused by the 
economic crisis, social welfare or `quality of life' issues have never been a priority of 
government public policy. Only economic development or growth has been the 
primary objective of the Korean government throughout Korean history. The 
persistence of `the growth first mentality' could mean that the core part of 
developmentalism is still rooted in economic institutions and bureaucrats' belief 
systems. Fourth, before the economic crisis, Korean bureaucrats enjoyed autonomy 
and privilege. The use of various discretionary policy instruments and relatively the 
insulated policy making process provided them with a comfortable space where they 
could enjoy privilege and engage in corrupt activities. However, as the economic 
crisis struck and as bureaucrats' inability and negligence in managing and coping with 
the crisis were revelaed, the Korean bureaucracy became dormant and submerged in 
order to evade the harsh criticism directed against them. However, as the economy 
recovers quickly and as Dae-Joong Kim's government enters into its second half 
period, we cannot simply deny the possible re-emergence of the old selfish, corrupt, 
and privilege-seeking bureaucracy. 
Moreover, besides institutional resistance, there are other circumstances that suggest 
that speculation of the demise of Korean developmentalism in the TS period is not 
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persuasive and not feasible. First, foreign belief systems are unchanged and 
accordingly, foreigners still see Korea as a prototype of the developmental state even 
though Korea intensively undertook IMF-led, neo-liberal reforms. In order to attain a 
successful momentum of reform, foreign support of Korean reform efforts are 
necessary. And, of course, the support and recognition of America and neo-liberal 
regime are especially indispensable factors which will ultimately determine the 
performance of Korean reforms. Although Korean bureaucrats' belief systems are 
changed, without ideational changes of foreigners, Korea's transformation from the 
TS to the neo-liberal state (NLS) will be an uneasy process. 
Second, there could be a squeezed and drifting Korean state between civil society 
requesting Keynesian welfare policies and continuous external pressure for more 
market opening and deregulation from the international system. As we have seen, the 
core part of developmentalism, that is, the `growth first policy' has not been removed 
even after neo-liberal reform. And as a result, Korea's social welfare system and a 
national consensus for fair and equal distribution are shamefully underdeveloped. 
High rates of unemployment and underdeveloped social welfare could lead to social 
unrest. Furthermore, an increasingly unequal distribution of wealth under neo-liberal 
reform could also exacerbate the already unstable socio-political foundation of the 
Korean state. Social dissatisfaction and possible social unrest could prevent the IMF 
and state-led neo-liberal reforms in Korea. On the other hand, the neo-liberal regime 
constantly claims more concessions from Korea in terms of market opening and 
deregulation. Thus, Korea is in "a complex game in which the internal and external 
consequences of governments' policies are tightly intermeshed" (Andrews and Willett 
1997: 505) and we cannot exclude the possibility of a squeezed and disoriented 
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Korean state, because the Korean government is located in the middle between 
welfare requesting-domestic social groups and the insatiable neo-liberal regime 
towards Korea's liberalisation and deregulation process. 
Third, as we will see in the following section, the Korean strong state has been 
reinstated after the reform process. The government's strengthened supervisory 
instruments in the financial sector and the populace's wide support for the government 
in pushing Chaebol and financial sector reform led to a paradoxical situation of a 
reinstated strong Korean state. Finally, as Lee points out, we can ask the following 
question: in conjunction with its developmental stage, is it not too early for Korea to 
abolish developmentalism? "Korea in 1995 is approximately at the place of Japan in 
the mid-1960s. Japan was still a strong developmental state in the mid-1960s" 
(Jaymin Lee 1999: 155-56). Having seen the institutional resistance and other 
complicated circumstances, it can be insisted that the assertion of the end of Korean 
developmentalism after the economic crisis is not reasonable. This is the reason why 
the future direction of the Korean TS cannot be simply anticipated. As emphasised 
several times in this Chapter, institutional changes need more time than ideational 
changes and we have no choice but to wait and see whether the Korean TS will return 
to the PDS or transform into the neo-liberal state (NLS). The major characteristics of 
the Korean TS period can be summarised in the following Table 5-5. 
The Korean TS period 
IFDI 
OFDI 
1998-To present 
1998-To present 
-Coercive learning and coercive isomorphism from the neo-liberal regime 
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-Change of bureaucrats' belief systems from developmentalism to neo- 
liberalism 
-Reconvergence of belief systems inside the bureaucracy 
-Contradictory institutional coexistence between facilitated institutional 
changes by changed belief systems and institutional resistance and inertia 
-Rapid, fundamental and comprehensive policy changes which are 
commensurate with changed belief systems 
-Full liberalisation and deregulation process (financial, corporate, labour, and 
public sector reforms) 
-Possible survival of embedded developmentalism (Higgott 1998: 28) 
-Need for new concept of industrial policy" 
-Korean economy's bifurcation from the Japanese model of 
developmentalism 
Table 5-5. The major characteristics of the Korean TS period. 
3-2. Society, state, and international system in the Korean TS 
The aftermath of the economic crisis resulted in a diminished middle class. Before 
the crisis, almost 85 percent of Korean people regarded themselves as middle class, 
but, a survey conducted by Hyundae Institute of Economy in 1998 showed that only 
about 35 percent now saw themselves as middle class (The Korea University Weekly 
15 Linda Weiss argues that "[i]n so far industry itself is constantly changing, industrial policy must of 
necessity be creative. Hence it cannot be defined once and for all in static, snap-shot terms. So many 
commentators have looked 1960s-style Japanese industrial policy in the 1990s ... It must be 
stressed however that the very capacity for industrial policy is one that requires the state to 
constatntly adapt its tools and tasks" (Weiss 1997: 19). In respect to Weiss's argument, it can be 
argued that new concept of Korean industrial policy has to be focused on efficient financial 
supervision and effective management of the exchange system in order to cope with the ever unstable 
international financial system caused by floating exchange rate system and astonomically increased 
speculative capital. Moreover, rather than direct sectoral interventions and price distortions in goods 
and financial markets, the Korean state has to try to achieve advanced human resource development 
particularly for the development of information and telecommunisation industries which will 
determine the winners and losers in the first century of the new millenium. See MOFE (1999d: 
26,28). 
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10.5.1999: 5). Labour reform which laid the foundation for legal lay-offs in the 
name of labour flexibility produced an unprecedentedly high rate of unemployment. 
Corporate reforms also led to a sharp reduction of labour costs by simply reducing the 
number of employees. In addition, the IMF-led contractionary fiscal and monetary 
policy brought about massive bankruptcies of the SMEs (Park 1999: 135). Financial 
reform, which is mainly focused on the improvement of the capital adequacy ratio, 
also led to a credit crunch in the real economy. As a result of the serious credit 
crunch, the SMEs could not obtain even company running costs, needless to say, 
investment capital from the banks, and the bankruptcy ratio in this sector rose 
dramatically. The close to 10 percent unemployment rate coupled with reduced wages 
of remaining employees finally led to a sharp reduction in the size of the middle class 
in the Korean TS period. 
A diminished middle class means a contraction of civil society and the weakening of 
its leverage against the state. The trade unions could not avoid the impact of the 
economic crisis. The Korean Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions (KCDTU) 
which was established under the Young-Sam Kim government steadily improved its 
organisational foundation and it could produce a candidate in the presidential election 
in December 1997. However, the KCDTU failed to attain the expected support from 
the constituency. The newly elected president Dae-Joong Kim revised the labour laws 
and formed the so-called `Tripartite Committee' which consists of representatives 
from the state (politicians), business, and labour in order to overcome the dark and 
heavy shadow of the economic crisis by harmonising the different interests from these 
three major economic actors. However, it was labour that lost more than the state and 
business, because the agreements of the Tripartite Committee allowed the legalisation 
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of lay-offs, while the Committee failed to provide enough social safety nets for those 
just laid-off. Labour requested the reduction of working hours instead of lay-offs. 
However, their request was not accepted by the Committee. Thus, the representatives 
from labour were harshly criticised and an organisational division emerged between 
top leaders and ordinary union members. By initiating the formation of the 
Committee, on the one hand the state was able to control labour and prevent nation- 
wide or militant labour strikes, and on the other hand the state was capable of 
managing business by providing labour market flexibility as a carrot and strongly 
pushing the Chaebol to facilitate corporate reform as a stick in return. 
Meanwhile, student movements under the Dae-Joong Kim regime almost disappeared. 
The sudden tranquilisation of student movements derived mainly from three reasons. 
First, as Dae-Joong Kim who was a symbol of Korea's progress towards 
democratisation and the Korean people's struggle against authoritarianism became 
president, student movements lost their primary objective of pressing for 
democratisation. Second, as Korea's civil movements greatly developed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively, student movements lost their identity and raison detre 
as leader and firm base for social movements. Third, as job opportunities for students 
became seriously reduced due to the economic crisis, students had to focus on 
preparing for employment. Moreover, this sense of danger facilitated the weakening 
of student movements as the core and active members of the movements became more 
distant from ordinary students. 
The Korean TS which began with the inauguration of president Dae-Joong Kim 
showed the return of the strong state as we have seen in section 3-1. The ideational 
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cleavage inside the bureaucracy had been removed by the neo-liberalism-oriented 
structural adjustment driven by the IMF and the Korean TS. The transformation into 
the TS was definitely initiated by the IMF package and its neo-liberalism based 
prescription. Thus, pressure from the international system was a major background 
for the transformation of the Korean PDS into the TS. However, it has to be 
emphasised that the Korean state was not passive in undertaking structural adjustment. 
The Korean state dynamically exploited foreign or external pressures in pursuing 
delayed domestic reforms (Mathews 1998: 748,752) of the PDS period such as labour 
reform. The IMF did not request for labour reform (Park 1998: 3). However, the 
Korean state internalised the external pressure caused by the currency crisis in order to 
propel delayed domestic reforms. An official paper from the MOFE clearly shows 
this situation: 
Some observers argued that the Korean economy was unfortunately 
engulfed by the foreign exchange crisis ... However ... 
President Kim Dae-jung identified long-standing structural problems 
in the financial, corporate, labour and public sectors as the causes of 
the economic crisis rather than a temporary shortage of foreign 
reserves (MOPE 1999d: 8). 
Thus, it can be argued that the state was not reactive and not passive in dealing with 
the aftermath of the currency crisis. On the contrary, the state was active and dynamic 
and manipulated the impact of the currency crisis in order to reinstate its weakened 
position against civil society and the Chaebol and to consolidate its ideational 
coherence inside the bureaucracy. In a word, the Korean TS period is a phenomenal 
space in which the return of the strong state took place. As Randall and Theobald 
insist, "an effective rolling back of the state in itself requires a high level of state 
capacity" (Randall and Theobald 1998: 160). From the same understanding, Hoogvelt 
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clearly illuminates the paradox of globalisation and the background of the return of 
the strong Korean state: 
[N]ational governments adjust their economies to globalisation by 
regulating for deregulation. It is this confusion over regulation and 
deregulation that explains why there is so much controversy ... 
between those who hold so called declinist views of the nation-state, 
and those who claim to observe a strengthening of national authority 
(Hoogvelt 1997: 139). 
Scholte also suggests the same argument more specifically: 
[G]overnments have facilitated global firms' operations and profits 
with suitably constructed property guarantees, investment codes, 
currency regulations, tax regimes, labour laws and police protection. 
States have also provided much of the regulatory architecture for 
global finance ... In short, a great deal of globalisation would not 
unfold ... if states did not sponsor the process (Scholte 1997: 441). 
It has to be emphasised that these roles of the state are what the Korean state is trying 
perform and exercise under neo-liberal reform and it is these new roles that are 
strengthening the Korean TS' autonomy, capacity, and ideational coherence by 
providing the bureaucracy with neo-liberal economic ideas, various policy 
instruments, and new specialities in managing global corporations and finance. 
The Dae-Joong Kim regime has its internal political weakness caused by its 
uncomfortable coalitional partner or the so-called `shared government' with prime 
minister Jong-Pil Kim. Before the presidential election, both Kims agreed to make a 
political pact containing the promise of a coalition between the two political parties 
led by both Kims. Their parties were based on the regional division of South Korea. 
In order to win the election, the coalition was absolutely necessary. And after the 
election, both Kims participated in the regime by assuming the roles of president and 
prime minister. However, the coalition was basically unstable because of the 
differences in each party's political ideology and party members' political 
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background. The National Congress for the New Politics (NCNP) led by president 
Kim is basically a reform-oriented party consisting of former opposition party 
members who worked for the democratisation of Korea. The United Liberal 
Democrats (ULD) led by prime minister Kim, on the other hand is a conservative 
party which is constituted by former ruling party members. Thus, the coalitional 
limitation of Dae-Joong Kim's government have been a major obstacle to quick and 
efficient policy responses towards internal and external pressures, because the shared 
government needs more time to reach an agreement or to compromise over differences 
in policy primacy and interests. 
However, it has to be recognised that this coalitional limitation of the regime did not 
constrain the factors underpinning the strong state, that is, autonomy, capacity, and 
ideational coherence. State autonomy was strengthened by a set of factors: first, the 
retreat and decreased leverage of the middle class driven by massive lay-offs and 
reduced wages; second, the weakened trade unions as they were voluntarily 
incorporated into the Tripartite Committee which is initiated and managed by the 
government; third, the Korean government could be isolated from societal groups by 
manipulating the presence of IMF. The government succeeded in the strategic 
internalisation of external pressures in order to reinstate its autonomy from domestic 
society; fourth, it was the state apparatus that has the capability to deal with the 
unprecedented scale and impacts of the economic crisis. Thus, the state's bureaucratic 
organisations and their members became rejuvenated in the TS period by not only 
initiating the entire economic structural adjustment program but also by showing 
capability in the recovery of the ailing economy. 
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State capacity, which varies according to the degree of availability of policy 
instruments, also strengthened in the TS period. The economic crisis was a blessing 
in disguise (Park 1998: 2-3). The Korean TS actively relied on the presence of the 
IMF and maximised the benefits of the populace's support towards Chaebol and 
financial sector reforms. The massive mental shock and economic pain borne by the 
populace under the contractionary macroeconomic policy and the highest 
unemployment rate thus far played a crucial role in consolidating the leverage of the 
state against the Chaebol and unhealthy financial institutions. Put differently, the 
Korean TS re-gained its economic legitimacy and leadership role in reforming the 
Chaebol and the financial sector by obtaining a national consensus for the reforms and 
the support from trade unions, the middle class, and civil movement groups (Park 
1999: 133). The establishment of `the Financial Supervisory Commission' finally 
gave the state efficient and strong policy instruments such as the order for closures or 
mergers of ailing financial institutions. The Chaebol also received massive pressure 
to undertake intensive and wide ranging reforms. Reduction of the number of their 
subsidiaries, specialisation to a limited number of competitive industries, consolidated 
financial statement which shows the whole group's financial condition, improvement 
of minor stock holders' rights, reduction of its debt ratio to within 200 percent, and 
prohibition of illegal internal trades among the subsidiaries were strongly 
recommended. The Chaebol which fail to follow the government recommendations 
will suffer from liquidity problems as the government will regulate or even constrain 
capital flows from the banking sector to resistant Chaebol. 
The international system in the Korean TS became much more unstable. The reasons 
behind the instability of the global economic system were twofold: an unstable global 
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exchange rate regime (Dieter 1998: 22); and financial globalisation or the enormous 
increase of short-term speculative capital. After the end of the fixed exchange rate 
system sustained by the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, a floating exchange 
rate system was adopted and as short-term capital dramatically increased, developing 
countries which lacked the protective skills and foreign reserves such as in Latin 
America and Eastern and Central Europe constantly suffered from recurrent currency 
crises (Michie 1998: 1,6). And in 1997, the countries in East Asia finally became the 
victims of globalised speculative financial industries. In 1994, the scale of the hedge 
funds reached 20-35 trillion dollars. Considering that America's annual GDP is six 
trillion dollars and the total sum of all the nations' foreign reserves in the world is just 
one trillion dollars, the over-accumulation of speculative capital and its destructive 
impact on the foreign exchange markets can be easily understood (Sohn 1998: 19). 
Despite this destructive effect on the world economy, collective efforts to regulate 
globalised finance or speculative capital have been limited. Cohen suggests two 
major reasons preventing collective control of global finance among countries: first, 
domestic economic groups which benefited from the globalised finance will further 
influence the state's policy making process in dealing with global finance. Second, 
because of the calculation of relative gains from global finance, states are unable to 
easily make a collective decision to manage or controll global finance (Cohen 1996: 
290). All the developing countries which experienced the currency crisis adopted 
IMF led economic structural adjustment programmes which are firmly based on the 
principles of neo-classical economics and neo-liberalism. Moreover, it has to be 
reminded that "[t]he IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO are administrative 
structures, they are regulatory bodies operating within a capitalist system and 
responding to dominant economic and financial interests" (Chossudovsky 1997: 16). 
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Thus, it can be argued that the international system in the Korean TS period is 
witnessing intensified and inexorable pressures from the neo-liberal regime and 
globalised speculative capitals. 
The international economic system became highly politicised even though the WTO 
promoted its dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Under the DSM, small and 
medium sized countries can take disputed issues to the DSM of the WTO and in this 
structure, the possibility of unilateral retaliation and unfair treatment from the big 
countries is diminished. However, it is the unequal economic size and uneven 
structural economic vulnerabilities that make small and medium sized countries 
subordinate to big countries. Haggard and Moon suggest three criteria which make a 
state vulnerable and subordinate: dependency on foreign markets; sensitivity to 
external changes such as oil prices; and reliance on foreign capital and technology 
(Haggard and Moon 1997: 55-56). For example, Korea's dependency ratio towards 
export is more than 70 percent and this economic structure makes Korea vulnerable 
and sensitive to changes in foreign markets and the international economic system. 
Korea is highly sensitive towards changes in production factors in world markets and 
still relies on foreign technology and capital. Thus, in terms of Korea's economic 
structure, the term of economic interdependence is irrelevant. The Korean political 
economy is not only heavily dependent on foreign markets and technologies but also 
sensitive to changes in the price of capital and crucial natural resources. 
The frustrated plan to establish the AMF shows the politicisation of the international 
economic system. The neo-liberal regime led by the US and the IMIF rejected the 
Japanese government's proposal for the AMF (Dieter 1998: 16). The US could not let 
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Japan and other East Asian countries have their own monetary fund which will 
ultimately strengthen Japan's economic position in the region by making the Japanese 
currency the regional currency and will further exclude America's economic 
involvement in the region. In summary, America's political calculation was a major 
barrier in forming the AMF and the reason why East Asian countries conformed to the 
US objection to the AMF lies in their structural economic vulnerability caused by 
heavy dependence on America's domestic market. Thus, it can be argued that the 
international economic system in the Korean TS period can be characterised by an 
unique mixture of the free market oriented trade and investment system led by the 
WTO and the neo-liberal regime and highly mercantilistic unilateralism or regional 
integrations. The inter-relationships among society, state, and international system in 
the Korean TS period can be summarised in the following Table 5-6. 
Domestic society Transitionary state International system 
-Weakened bargaining -Reinstated strong state in -Intensified pressures from 
position of labour and order to manage the the neo-liberal regime and 
Chaebol under the severe economic crisis (Randall globalising world economy 
economic contraction and and Theobald 1998: 264) 
unprecedented national -Unstable and shaky 
crisis caused by the -The state is the only and international exchange 
currency crisis last resort which has regime caused by 
capability to manage the dramatically increased 
-Establishment of the crisis speculative, short-term 
Tripartite Committee capital 
resulted in the weakening -Ironically, globalisation 
of labour and the neo-liberal regime -Financial globalisation 
did not reduce but brought threatens developing 
-Diminished middle class back the strong state by countries which lack 
providing autonomy, defensive skills and 
-Increase in unequal capacity, and ideational foreign reserves 
income distribution coherence (paradox of 
globalisation) -The mixture of free trade 
-Tranquillised student and investment system 
movements -The state regained championed by the WTO 
economic legitimacy by and mercantilistic 
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undertaking Chaebol and unilateralism or regional 
financial sector reforms economic integration 
Table 5-6. The inter-relationships among society, state, and international system in 
the Korean TS period. 
4. Sub-conclusion: A theory of developmental stage? 
Korea's economic and socio-political trajectory from 1962 to 1998 is a dynamic and 
precious history in which various theoretical interpretations and practical prescriptions 
for economic growth and socio-political development have harshly competed with 
each other in order to occupy the dominant position. The entire debate eventually 
divided into two opposite groups: 'neo-liberalism and developmentalism. The 
conflicts between the two have produced continuously alternating winners and losers 
in exact accordance with the economic fortunes of Anglo-American free market 
capitalism and East Asian developmental capitalism. The theory of the economic 
cycle shows that every economy has its economic cycle of ups and downs. Thus, from 
the viewpoint of this economic cycle theory, there is no real winner or loser between 
the two contending approaches. More specifically, in the 1980s, when East Asian 
countries, particularly, Japan and the NIEs enjoyed their economic heyday, the theory 
of developmentalism seemed to be a winner. However, as the Anglo-American model 
based economies of the US and UK recovered and showed their strength and 
prosperity in the 1990s, neo-liberalism seems to be a winner now. Moreover, there is 
an approach which focuses on the ideological pendulum: 
in Dani Rodrik's words, "excessive optimism about what the state 
would be able to accomplish was replaced by excessive pessimism. " 
Rodrik suggests further that, having now surmounted `excessive 
pessimism, " we are "on the threshold of a serious reconsideration of 
the role of the state in development. " (Evans 1997: 83). 
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However, a crucial disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot suggest a micro 
explanation. Thus, questions like how Korea achieved rapid economic development, 
how the Korean economy suddenly turned into crisis and how it recovered from the 
crisis have to be answered by more detailed and rigorous research. Thus, any research 
on Korea has to incorporate international systemic influences, dialectic interactions 
between civil society and the state, and the institutional and ideational effects on the 
Korean economy. In the international system, the Cold War order was a determining 
factor of Korean DS's economic policy. After the collapse of the Cold War structure, 
economic globalisation or free marketisation became a determining systemic 
influence. Without regarding the influence of the bipolar Cold War order and 
economic globalisation, any research on Korea's economic and socio-political 
transformations would be imperfect. Also, without considering the constant changes 
in power relations between the Korean state and civil society, any research will lack 
persuasive power. So far, much research has adopted these three approaches. 
However, it is difficult to find research that has adopted ideational or institutional 
approaches. Even though some researchers like Haggard use the term, `institutional' 
in their approach, they identified it in purely statist terms. Even though some 
researchers have argued that both neo-liberalism and developmentalism are economic 
ideas or belief systems, they did not pursue an approach in their research that focuses 
on the close relationship between ideational cleavages or changes within the 
bureaucracy and Korea's economic changes and transformations. The contribution of 
this thesis, thus, lies in its exploration of ideational and institutional approaches to 
studies of comparative politics and IPE. 
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The unique argument of this chapter is that we need to recognise a theory of 
developmental stage. Developmentalism and the great role of the state have to change 
their contents and adjust to constantly changing environments in society, the state, and 
the international system. Developmentalism played a great part in Korea's economic 
development process, particularly in the DS period, and now, in the TS period, it has 
been forced to be readjusted by the challenges from a globalising economy and the 
neo-liberal regime. As we have seen in section 3, in the PDS period, delayed 
structural reforms and inflexible industrial policies which were deeply rooted in the 
belief systems of developmentalism and failed to adjust to the changing environment 
finally resulted in the economic crisis in 1997. Thus, it can be argued that even 
though the economic crisis was basically exogenously ignited by an unstable 
international financial system comprising an unstable exchange rate system and vastly 
increased speculative capital, such external factors could only have affected the entire 
Korean economy because of endogenously embedded discrepancies within the Korean 
economy. In other words, delayed economic structural adjustments in relation to the 
Chaebol and the financial sector in the PDS period ultimately produced an 
underdeveloped financial sector and the Chaebol' excessive dependency on domestic 
and foreign loans. Overinvestment and overcapacity, funded by the Chaebol's 
enormous borrowings from domestic and foreign financial institutions, finally resulted 
in successive bankruptcies of several Chaebol, and the Chaebol's bankruptcies, in 
turn, exacerbated an already unstable domestic financial market and Korea's 
credibility in the global financial market. As the currency crisis emerged in Thailand 
and Indonesia, foreign investors suddenly and massively withdrew from the Korean 
financial market. This is a brief summary of Korea's path to economic crisis. Thus, it 
can be argued that the economic crisis was an inevitable outcome of a combination of 
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the Korean economy's structural problems which defied adjustment or reform during 
the PDS period and unstable global financial markets. 
Thus, the lesson of the economic crisis for Korea is that the state and economic 
globalisation are equally important. They are not in zero-sum game but have a 
symbiotic relationship. As the country's developmental stage is upgraded, its 
economic policy has to constantly change and readjust in order to overcome pressures 
from both the domestic and international system. Flexible and unified economic 
policy can be obtained only when bureaucrats and politicians are flexible and unified 
in economic objectives. Here, the importance of institutions and belief systems 
emerges. Belief systems' changes and adjustments towards a continuously changing 
environment need more time than policy changes. Institutional changes and 
adjustments towards a changing environment need far more time than ideational 
changes. As we have seen, in the PDS period, belief systems which were deeply 
geared towards developmentalism persisted, despite pressures and criticism of the 
side-effects of developmentalism such as unfair protectionism, bureaucrats' 
authoritarianism, the overgrown Chaebol, the underdeveloped financial sector and 
SMEs. Thus, the ideational resistance of developmental ism in the PDS period 
produced delayed, slow, and limited reforms in the Chaebol and the banking sector. 
More importantly, the ideational persistence of developmentalism in the PDS period 
continuously preserved collusive relations among bureaucrats, politicians and big 
business. 
The rigid economic idea of developmentalism also failed to adjust to changes in the 
international system. As the Cold War order disappeared and economic globalisation 
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and unlimited economic competition among nations intensified, developmentalism 
which heavily protects domestic markets and aggressively penetrates foreign open 
markets cannot be sustained. However, the Korean PDS constantly protected 
domestic markets and preserved a high dependency ratio on exports. Foreign 
pressures and criticisms enormously increased, but Korea dealt with these pressures 
only through superficial and formal liberalisation policies with no substantive effects. 
In a word, Korea unpolitically dealt with a politicised international economic system. 
Thus, in some sense, the inexorable neo-liberal reform processes led by the neo-liberal 
regime after the onset of economic crisis represents an inevitable punishment from the 
US, which mostly suffered from Korea's unfair, developmentalism-oriented trade and 
investment strategy. This shows the importance of flexible changes of policy and 
belief systems in accordance with a state's economic developmental stage. 
The theory of developmental stage shows that a state has to constantly adjust its 
economic policies and ideas as its economy grows. However, this does not mean that 
the role of the state has to be diminished as the economy grows further. So far, 
several scholars argue a theory of developmental stage different from the theory which 
is maintained by this Chapter. The two theories share the understanding that the 
state's role has to be decreased as the economy grows further. However, the crucial 
difference between the two is that the former theory argues for the absolute retreat of 
the state, as its economy passes the take-off period and grows further, while the latter 
theory argues that the excessive role of the state needs to be diminished but the state 
has to be flexible and effective enough to efficiently cope with domestic and 
international challenges and pressures. 
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Johnson argues the former theory: "One of the things a state ... must do is develop 
a market system, and it does this to the extent that its policies reduce the uncertainties 
or risks faced by entrepreneurs, generate and disseminate information about 
investment and sales opportunities ... Once a market system has begun to function, 
the state must then be prepared to be surprised by the opportunities that open up to it, 
ones that it never imagined but that entrepreneurs have discovered" (Johnson 1987: 
141). Also, 0 argues that "the role of government was to help until the corporation 
became an international unit and was able to compete internationally. Afterwards, it 
shifted from a government-oriented approach to a private-oriented approach" (0 
1995: 350-51). However, it has to be emphasised that these arguments are unsuitable 
in an era of accelerated and intensified economic globalisation and the neo-liberal 
regime. Song suggests three contradictions of neo-liberalism oriented economic 
globalisation: contradiction between economic interdependence and harsh economic 
competition among states; contradiction between the government's deregulation 
process and unchecked challenges from free marketisation and global financial 
integration; and finally the contradiction between economic growth and social welfare 
(Song 1995: 150-156). In other words, as Rodrik clearly points out, "[t]he question, 
therefore, is how the tension between globalisation and the pressure to mitigate risks 
can be eased" (Rodrik 1997: 27). 
These discrepancies which accompany economic globalisation and globalising neo- 
liberalism uncover the need for a state role in the globalisation period. Thus, it can be 
argued that the old developmental stage theory which insists on the retreat of the state 
after the domestic market system is developed is irrelevant in the globalisation period. 
The globalisation process needs the state to paly a role. As we have seen in section 3- 
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2, the Korean TS regained its autonomy, capacity, and ideational coherence by 
managing the stabilisation of the currency market and the financial market. Moreover, 
by actively exploiting external pressures, the Korean TS ambitiously undertook 
significant domestic reforms in the corporate, labour, and public sectors. The Korean 
TS's roles during the economic crisis were the pursuit of neo-liberal, global standards 
in the financial and corporate sectors. However, as the underdeveloped social welfare 
system and the possible dependency of the Korean economy on foreign capital 
emerged in the TS period, the Korean state could be squeezed and disoriented 
between domestic requests for the improvement of social welfare and external 
pressure to rapidly open domestic markets much further. As Hirst points out, "[t]he 
danger of recklessly pursued internationalisation without sufficient regard to its social 
effects is that there will be revolts against an open international economy" (Hirst 
1997: 425). This circumstance shows that "[t]he real choice for government is not 
how best to fight globalisation but how to manage it, which will require creative 
policies both at home and abroad. It is ironic: the age of globalisation may well be 
defined in part by challenges to the nation-state, but it is still states and governments . 
.. that will determine whether we exploit or squander the potential of this era" (Haass 
and Litan 1998: 6). 
Thus, the new theory of developmental stage argues that the state's role is not to be 
excessive but to be flexible and in order to be flexible, bureaucrats and politicians' 
pivotal roles in economic governance, financial supervision, and policy making and 
decision making have to be preserved, because it is only the state which can 
effectively cope with various challenges and side-effects of economic globalisation 
towards domestic society and the state itself. This means that the economic 
234 
globalisation process and the role of the state is compatible. At the moment, it is 
hardly possible to anticipate whether the Korean TS will ultimately lead to the neo- 
liberal state (NLS) or go back to the PDS. However, one thing that is clear is that 
Korea's liberalisation and deregulation processes will continue in order to make the 
Korean economy more compatible with neo-liberal standards and also, the Korean 
state's role will persist in order to flexibly cope with or dynamically take advantage of 
the challenges and benefits of economic globalisation. 
In summary, state and market relations in the globalisation period do not have to be 
incompatible (Martinussen 1997: 265-66). On the contrary, their relations have to be 
symbiotic. The lesson of the Korean TS period shows that on the one hand, strong 
and turbulent pressures from the neo-liberal regime and economic globalisation have 
to be buffered and checked by the strong state, and, on the other hand, excessive and 
discretionary government intervention into the market system and the prolonged 
legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism have to be balanced by the free marketisation 
and the neo-liberal regime. Stiglitz clearly points out this complementary 
relationship: "[t]he pragmatic framework ... entails a balancing of the strengths and 
limitations of markets and government, and the determination of how they can best 
complement each other" (Stiglitz 1996: 17). 
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In this chapter, Korea and Japan's historical changes and transformations of FDI 
policies will be elaborated. So far, the literature on Korea and Japan's FDI policies 
reveals an inconsistency arising from two distinctive and contrasting observations, 
that is, developmental characteristics of FDI policies versus continuous deregulation 
or liberalisation processes of FDI policies. This chapter aims to explain why these 
contrasting interpretations and observations exist and to show why we need the 
concept of `the post developmental state period' in order to get a clear picture of 
historical changes and transformations in Korea and Japan's FDI policies. As we 
have seen in Chapter 4 and 5, both Japan and Korea have experienced socio-economic 
and political transformations from the DS to the PDS (Japan) or to the TS (Korea). In 
this chapter, Korea and Japan's FDI policies are used as a case study to explain why 
the concept of `developmentalism' gives only a partial understanding of Japan and 
Korea's historical, socio-economic, and political trajectories and to suggest why the 
conceptual tool of `post developmentalism' is needed to understand both countries' 
outstanding transformations in FDI policies. Thus, this chapter will be divided into 
the developmental state period, the post developmental period, and the transitionary 
state period. 
In the DS period section, the distinctive characteristics of developmentalism-oriented 
FDI policies such as the preference for licensing over inward FDI (IFDI) in the 
process of technology transfer, the preference for joint ventures over wholly owned 
IFDI in the ownership structure, and strategic or prohibitive outward FDI (OFDI) 
development will first be explained. This will followed by a discussion of the role of 
the state in controlling, regulating and planning FDI deployment. In contrast with this 
mercantilistic DS period, the IFDI policies in the PDS are basically in line with 
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continuous liberalisation and deregulation processes. As we have seen in Chapter 4 
and 5, in the 1980s, both the Korean and Japanese state tried to cope with the 
increasing pressures from not only domestic society but also the international system. 
In response to these pressures, liberalisation and deregulation policies were adopted 
and pursued in relation to IFDI. However, the pace and extent of the liberalisation 
processes were so piecemeal and incremental that the real effects of liberalisation 
policies were greatly limited. As emphasised several times in this thesis, the PDS 
period is characterised by the contradictory co-existence of liberalised IFDI policies 
and unchanged belief systems and institutions which are strongly embedded in 
mercantilistic developmentalism. Thus, in the section which deals with the post 
developmental state period, the research will be centred on the ever-increasing 
conflicts between consecutive liberalisation processes on the one hand and persistent 
belief systems and institutions that are deeply entrenched in developmentalism on the 
other. In other words, in the PDS period, we will concentrate on the persistent and 
recurrent clashes between state intervention (developmentalism) and the free market 
system (neo-liberalism) by investigating the increased rupture between deregulated 
FDI policies and rigid belief systems and institutions. This historical period can be 
regarded as a continuously frustrated domestic structural adjustment period. This 
extended and postponed structural adjustment finally led to a crisis stage in which 
previously incremental and piecemeal liberalisation and deregulation processes 
suddenly turned into rapid and fundamental ones caused by economic recession in the 
Japanese later PDS period and economic crisis before Korea's TS period. Even 
though, Japan is still in the PDS period, as we will see in this chapter, prolonged 
economic recession after the burst of the bubble economy also caused 
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unprecedentedly comprehensive liberalisation and deregulation policies with regard to 
IFDI. 
In the PDS period, the conceptual tool of the expansionist developmental state (EDS) 
will be adopted in order to explain the specific features of the Japanese OFDI 
development in Southeast Asia. The Japanese EDS in the region is not a recent 
phenomenon. There have been three waves of Japanese OFDI increases from the 
1960s to the 1990s towards the region. However, the Japanese EDS refers to the 
upsurge of OFDI after the Plaza Accord which was agreed in 1985. Only with the 
development of the EDS, the Japanese state and private companies started to 
implement regional production networks in Southeast Asia as not only an export 
platform towards third countries but also a strategic production site of Japanese 
manufacturing goods. Moreover, the Japanese EDS was accompanied by increased 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan to the countries in the region. 
Thus, in order to investigate the development of the Japanese EDS in Southeast Asia, 
we also need to illustrate Japanese ODA development in the region. Various 
governmental and quasi-governmental organisations that were established in order to 
facilitate Japanese OFDI in the region will be also illustrated. 
The Korean state learned from its Japanese counterpart in developing OFDI 
development in Southeast Asia. Even though the Korean government's support of 
and co-operation with private corporations in conjunction with OFDI development is 
relatively insignificant compared with that of Japan, the Korean state's efforts in 
developing economic co-operation with the countries in the region were undeniably 
influenced by the Japanese system. Mimetic isormophism in institutional settings can 
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be easily found in Korea's ODA related government organisations. Thus, in the 
Korean EDS period, learning from Japan will be discussed in more detail. After 
Japanese and Korean FDI policies and FDI development are respectively discussed, a 
comparative analysis will be undertaken in order to identify differences and 
similarities in the two countries' FDI policies and development. 
In the transitionary state period, Korea's full-scale liberalisation processes after the 
economic crisis will be investigated. The Korean state's desperate efforts to induce 
more IFDI led to a neo-liberal system of IFDI policies. This sudden change from 
incremental deregulation to rapid, full-fledged liberalisation shows the importance of 
the crisis impact in learning theory. As we have seen in Chapter 2, changes in belief 
systems do not easily occur in normal periods. Changes of belief systems are 
followed by the emergence of huge ruptures or divisions between previously believed 
cause and effect or ends and means relations. When Korea was in the DS period, in 
the structure of Korean bureaucrats' belief system, developmentalism and state 
intervention in the market were treated equally as a precondition of economic growth 
and development. When Korea was in the PDS period, as we have seen in Chapter 5, 
the Korean state's belief systems were divided between the top-level bureaucrats 
whose belief systems were in accordance with the neo-liberal free market system and 
medium and low-level bureaucrats whose belief systems were still in line with 
developmentalism. Thus, although the IFDI policies were consecutively liberalised by 
the initiatives of the top ranking policy makers including the president, in the actual 
processes of approval or notification, various bureaucratic practices of red tape 
exercised by the medium and low level bureaucrats effectively prevented liberalisation 
of FDI flows. This continuous screening and filtering effects of the medium and low 
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level bureaucrats finally caused foreign investors' complaints and dissatisfaction and 
after the economic crisis, the belief systems of the medium and low level bureaucrats 
also changed towards full liberalisation of IFDI policies. The massive criticism 
against the bureaucrats and the intensity and extent of the shock from the 
unprecedented economic hardship finally led to a full and comprehensive change in 
the belief system of the medium and low level bureaucrats. We will discuss this in 
greater detail in later section. In terms of OFDI flows, Korea OFDI was not reduced 
even after the economic crisis. Because of the credit crunch in the home country 
(Korea) and deteriorating credit ratings of Korean subsidiaries in host countries, it was 
widely inferred that Korean OFDI might be greatly reduced. However, surprisingly, 
OFDI flows from Korea increased. Even though the number of investment 
withdrawals from host countries increased after the economic crisis, Korean parent 
companies had to finance their subsidiaries that were strategically important. 
Before we start the first section, several things have to be mentioned. In investigating 
Korea and Japan's historical FDI development, a political approach will be 
emphasised. In other words, economic analysis of the FDI will be supplementary to 
political interpretations. Even though, economic theories about FDI which are 
elaborated in Chapter 3 are adopted to explain the historical, industrial, and regional 
changes of the FDI flows, the major task of this chapter will lie in the political 
approach towards FDI. A political approach includes analysing the state's roles in 
regulating, prohibiting, planning, promoting and supporting FDI flows. More 
specifically, the historical changes of FDI and technology policies will be discussed 
first, before going on to examine the government's screening mechanism and 
supporting organisations for FDI. In the third part of this chapter, the deployment of 
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ODA towards Southeast Asia will be analysed while the fourth section will review the 
ideational changes towards FDI in each period of the DS, PDS and TS. The final part 
of the chapter will discuss the domestic and international political pulling and pushing 
effects of FDI. Economic theories of FDI will also be adopted in analysing FDI data 
in order to explicate regional, industrial distribution of FDI flows. 
1. Inward FDI 
1-1. The developmental state period 
The most distinctive feature of the Korean and Japanese DS' IFDI regime is their 
highly calculated regulative aspects of policies. IFDI flows were screened case by 
case and approved on the basis of a long-term evaluation. Although liberalisation was 
implemented, it was very slow and in a piecemeal fashion. Thus, liberalisation and 
deregulation were implemented only in the industrial sectors in which domestic 
companies had already accomplished international comparative or competitive 
advantage. The firm belief held by bureaucrats that they can control, manage, and 
regulate IFDI flows in order to improve national wealth and to achieve national 
economic targets were legitimised to the extent that both Korea and Japan succeeded 
in effectively dealing with IFDI flows in the DS period. Both countries not only 
strictly restricted IFDI flows in such sectors as labour intensive ones but also were 
eager to attract more IFDI flows in high technology industrial sectors in order to 
improve their technological level. This dual standard policy towards IFDI will be 
elaborated in the following sections. The time span of Korean and Japanese DS is 
based on the changes in FDI laws. The fundamentally different IFDI principle was 
adopted in 1984 in Korea and 1980 in Japan. The years 1984 and 1980 represented 
the turning point in Korea and Japan respectively in dealing with IFDI flows in both 
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countries. `Prohibition in principle, approval in exception policy' changed into 
`approval in principle, prohibition in exception policy' after 1984 and 1980 in Korea 
and Japan. Thus, time span for the Korean DS in dealing with IFDI is from 1962 to 
1983 and that for the Japanese DS is from 1950 to 1980. 
1-1-1. The Korean DS period (1962-1983) 
(Of IR millinnl 
Calendar year Total acceptance Arrival Calendar Year Total Acceptance Arrival 
1962-66 47.4 24.3 1979 191.3 195.3 
1967-71 218.6 117.2 1980 143.1 130.9 
1972-1976 878.5 535.8 1981 153.2 150.2 
1977 83.6 142.9 1982 189.0 128.6 
1978 149.4 181.0 1983 269.4 122.5 
Table 6-1. Total IFDI flows into Korea in the Korean DS period. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Quoted from Won-Young Lee (1987). 
The Korean DS period was characterised by its preference for foreign loans and 
technological licensing over IFDI and comprehensive and detailed regulations on IFDI 
flows. Thus, as Lall clearly points out, the Korean DS' IFDI regime was based on the 
strategy of `restriction and exploitation' (Lall 1995: 23). Korea's efforts to induce 
foreign direct investment started with the introduction of the Foreign Capital 
Inducement Promotion Act (FCIPA). In the Act, there were two contrasting contents. 
One was for the promotion of IFDI and the other was for the tough regulations on 
IFDI. The promotive aspect of the Act reflected Korea's need for foreign capital in 
order to supplement the shortage of domestic savings and investment capital and the 
regulatory aspects of the Act revealed the Korean state's concern about the possible 
dependency of the whole economic system by more competitive foreign investors or 
MNCs. More specifically, the promotive aspects included allowing the remittance of 
principal and earnings, strict protection of intellectual property rights, widening 
bilateral negotiations such as the Investment Guarantee Agreement and the Double 
243 
Taxation Avoidance Agreement, tax reduction and exemption, and provision of the 
Export Free Zones. On the other hand, the regulatory aspects contained red tapes, 
performance requirements, entry regulations, ownership regulations, and remittance 
regulations. Thus, these conflicting ideas and practices on IFDI determined the 
historical development path of Korean IFDI flows as policy-makers' ideas and 
practices pendulated between regulations and promotions of IFDI. In this context, as 
we will see from the following sections, the Korean DS period is characterised by case 
by case regulations and screening processes towards IFDI and the Korean PDS is 
characterised by the consecutive, piecemeal but limited deregulation processes. 
Tables 3,4, and 5 show the comprehensive regulative aspects of the Korean DS 
towards IFDI flows. The Korean state preferred foreign loans over IFDI and even the 
small amount of the IFDI was strongly regulated in order to prevent foreign 
domination in the domestic economy. Foreign ownership was managed by detailed 
screening and strict approval processes and the result was that the majority and wholly 
owned IFDI were minimal in the Korean DS period. Compared with Singapore and 
Hong Kong, the share of wholly foreign owned investment in Korea was far lower. 
According to Chowdhury and Islam, in 1981, the share of wholly owned investment in 
Korea and Singapore was 14.6 and 42.0 percent respectively and the share of Hong 
Kong in 1984 was 52.0 percent (Chowdhury and Islam 1993: 112). This figure 
reveals the Korean DS' nationalistic regulations on IFDI flows. Accordingly, as Clark 
and Chan argued, the Korean DS " stands out in its practice of `sovereign en garde' in 
that it has imposed the most stringent conditions on MNC access" among Asian 
countries (Clark and Chan 1996: 94). The small amount of IFDI can also be attributed 
to the high ratio of technological licensing. The major rationale of screening in 
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technology transfer was that only high-tech industries and investments towards the 
free export zones could have majority or wholly owned IFDI. This dual policy in the 
ownership regulation of IFDI was stipulated in `the 1981 adoption of dual policy'. 
More specifically, in the labour intensive and domestic market seeking industries, 
only less than 50 percent of foreign ownership was allowed and in the industries 
which are devoted to import substitution or export promotion, foreign ownership over 
50 percent was allowed. Only in high-tech industries and in the export free zones, 
was wholly owned foreign investment permitted (Seung-Jin Kim 1996: 14). 
The preference for technological licensing over IFDI was the result of cautious 
planning of `the science and technology policy' which contained the Korean state's 
eagerness to raise its technological level'. In order to improve Korea's capacity and 
competitive advantage in technology, the Korean government manipulated IFDI flows 
into minority or co-owned investments and preferred technological licensing rather 
than IFDI, because the technological spill-over effects from these measures were 
much better than wholly owned IFDI or II{DI itself. However, in the high-tech 
industries, IFDI was recommended and the industries enjoyed a relatively unregulated 
environment. The reason for this was that foreign investors prefer not to transfer their 
high technologies through licensing agreements in order to preserve their ownership 
advantages in technological capacity. Thus, by adopting a dual policy in technological 
transfer, the Korean DS forced licensing arrangements in medium-level technology 
Chung and Branscomb (1996: 215) argued that "acquisition of advanced technology from foreign 
sources has been one of the main concern of Korea's science and technology policy ... The 
industrialisation of Korea has been a process of learning how to absorb and improve upon borrowed 
foreign technologies for industrial development". 
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industries while heavily relied on IFDI in high-technology industries as an effective 
way to acquire advanced foreign technologies. 
Detailed criteria in the technology licensing process imposed by the Korean DS also 
uncovered the interventionist and mercantilistic essence of the Korean DS. After 
1978, the automatic approval system was adopted in technology licensing agreements. 
However, sophisticated criteria were introduced in order to maximise the spill-over 
effects of technology transfer and to tightly control foreign currency. Three criteria 
were adopted. "First, the life span of the project must be less than 10 years; second, 
the running royalty payments must be less than 10 percent of the total sales value: and 
third, the front-end payment must be less than one million US dollar" (Won-Young 
Lee 1988: 192). 
Year Changes in FDI related laws 
1960 Introduction of the Foreign Capital Inducement Promotion Act (FCIPA) 
1965 Korea's diplomatic normalisation with Japan 
1966 Change of the FCIPA into the Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FCIA) 
1969 Introduction of `the Policies for the promotion of foreign investment and foreign 
companies' 
1970 Introduction of the Export Free Zone Establishment Law 
1973 Introduction of `the Principle for the proper share of foreign investment' and 'the 
General guideline for foreign investment' 
1981 Adoption of dual policy in ownership regulation 
1984 Amendment of the FCIA (Introduction of the negative system, introduction of the 
automatic approval system, abolition of the ownership regulation) 
1989 Abolition of the performance requirements (such as export requirement and local 
contents use) 
1991 Introduction of the prior notification by replacing automatic approval system 
1993 Introduction of the Foreign Investment 5 year Liberalisation Plan 
Introduction of 'the system of notification in principle and approval in exception' 
1994 Introduction of the substantial notification system by changing recipient organisations 
from the MOFE and BOK to foreign exchange banks. 
1996 Korea became a member of the OECD 
Introduction of the Foreign Investment and Foreign Capital Inducement Act (FI & 
FCIA) by replacing the FCIA 
1998 Introduction of the New Foreign Investment Promotion Act (NFIPA) by replacing the 
FI & FCIA 
Table 6-2. Changes of IFDI related laws in Korea. 
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These regulative aspects of the IFDI policies could be also found in the internal 
guidelines circulated inside the FDI related ministries. `The Principle for the proper 
share of foreign investment' and `the General guideline for foreign investment' 
contained the joint venture recommendation and detailed regulations on the amount of 
investment according to industrial sectors (Hong-Goo Lee 1994: 188). In `the General 
Guideline for Foreign Direct Investment', restricted businesses and exceptional 
businesses from 50 percent foreign ownership regulation were stipulated. The 
restricted businesses were the investments that could compete with domestic firms in 
foreign markets and the projects that aim to pursue rent seeking through land 
acquisition. The exceptional businesses which were not obliged to have 50 percent 
ownership regulation were categorised into four areas. First, the projects that were 
purely export-oriented investments which would not compete with domestic firms. 
( Amount nerrrntaorl 
Total loans FDI Total foreign capital 
1962-65 86.0 14.0 100.0 
1966-70 96.0 4.0 100.0 
1971-75 90.0 10.0 100.0 
1976-1980 96.0 4.0 100.0 
Table 6-3. Ratio of IFDI and loan flows in the total foreign capital inflows into the Korean DS. 
Source. The EPB data and based on the arrival. Quoted from Castley (1996). 
(Nnmher of cases nercentaeel 
Year Minority owned Co-owned Majority owned Wholly owned Total 
1962-66 35.9 20.5 28.2 15.4 100.0 
1967-71 42.7 23.8 16.9 16.6 100.0 
1972-76 45.0 30.0 10.2 14.8 100.0 
1962-86 46.9 26.8 12.8 13.5 100.0 
Table 6-4. Ownership structure of IFDI in the Korean DS. 
Source. The MOF data and quoted from Won-Young Lee (1988). 
(Number of cases) 
1962-1971 1972-1976 1977-1981 1982-1986 Total 
TL IFDI TL IFDI TL IFDI TL IFDI TL IFI)I 
Manufacturing 285 336 391 734 1095 191 1878 450 3649 1711 
Total 318 388 434 851 1225 244 2078 565 4055 2088 
Table 6-5. Distribution of technological licensing and IFDI flows into the Korean DS. 
Source. The MOF data and quoted from Won-Young Lee (1988). 
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of 
US Japan Germany Others Total 
1962-1975 122 397 19 43 581 
Table 6-6. Korean DS' technological licensing agreements by countries. 
Source. The EPB data and quoted from Sung-Hwan Jo (1980). 
Second, technology-intensive investments which could improve Korea's technological 
level, third, the projects that could bring about domestic structural adjustment, and 
finally investments that were realised in the export free zones (Won-Young Lee 1987: 
20). Moreover, the Korean DS' FDI regime had another distinctive feature of 
regulating IFDI, namely the performance requirements. The performance 
requirements required certain amount of export or the usage of local contents. 
Meanwhile, contrary to these restrictive and regulatory aspects of IFDI regime, the 
Korean DS also tried to induce more IFDI by establishing export free zone in which 
various incentives were provided and regulations on technological licensing and 
ownership structure were not strictly but flexibly applied. Moreover, in order to 
maintain labour market stability in the foreign firms, the Korean DS adopted a labour 
law under which strikes in foreign firms were totally prohibited (Bishop 1997: 33). 
In sum, the Korean DS' IFDI regime was a combination of regulation and promotion. 
However, as we have seen through Tables 3,4, and 5, the regulatory aspects of the 
IFDI policies overshadowed the promotive aspects. Moreover, in the Korean DS 
period, "there indeed exists a gap between the law on paper and the law in practice" 
(Neurath 1984: 21). As we have seen earlier in the section, the FCIPA contained not 
only regulative but also promotive and supportive aspects. However, the promotive 
side of the act was heavily overshadowed by mainly three factors: internal guidelines 
circulated only within concerned ministries; discretionary interpretations of laws by 
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working level bureaucrats; and finally, disagreement and competition among different 
ministries such as the EPB, the MOF, and the MOCI. Thus, as Neurath argued, "the 
rule of men not law is a concept deeply embedded in Korea's bureaucratic tradition" 
(Neurath 1984: 21). 
Inter-ministerial conflicts over IFDI flows were the result of the unique screening 
structure of the Korean DS. As Wint pointed out, the Korean DS "allowed screening 
decisions to be made in a diffused manner by various units of government with each 
unit independently making its own decision" (Wint 1992: 1520). Because there was 
no dominant or single ministry which could centralise the policy-making processes 
towards IFDI, the Korean DS witnessed inter-ministerial rivalry and competition. The 
result was time-consuming approval procedures and contradictory policies among 
different ministries. The EPB had authority over IFDI from 1962 to 1981, which was 
transferred to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 1981. When the EPB had single 
dominant authority over IFDI, consistent policies based on developmental beliefs 
could be implemented. However, after the MOF undertook the authority from the 
EPB, policy disorientation and zigzag policies emerged. The major background of the 
emergence of policy disorientation was the liberalisation era after the early 1980s. 
Under this liberalised era, inter-ministerial rivalry emerged as the EPB lost its 
developmentalism oriented control on IFDI. We will discuss more about this negative 
effect of divided ministries in relation to IFDI in the Korean PDS section. All these 
three factors revealed that although the Korean DS had law which contained the 
promotive and supportive side of IFDI, it can be argued that the Korean DS' IFDI 
regime was basically a regulation and prohibition dominated one. 
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A distinctive structural problem of the Korean DS in regulating IFDI flows was the 
structural dependence of technology on Japan and increased trade deficit with Japan. 
Table 6 shows the Korean DS' technological dependence on Japan by illustrating the 
serious inequality among provider countries and the sole dominance of Japan in the 
numbers of licensing agreements. The dependent structure of Korean economic 
relations with Japan was sustained for a long time and caused `import diversification 
policy' throughout the Korean DS and PDS periods. However, in terms of amount, 
America was the dominant technology exporter. According to Steven, Korea's 
cumulative technological imports from Japan and the US for the period of 1962 to 
1983 were 270 million US dollars and 329 million US dollars respectively (Steven 
1990: 149). This shows that Japan provided Korea with medium level and relatively 
cheap technologies while America supplied Korea with relatively high level and 
expensive technologies. However, what is important here is the quality of the 
transferred technologies to Korea. According to the survey conducted by the Korea 
Innovation Research Institute, almost 90 percent of technologies were in the mature 
stage in the product life cycle. Meanwhile, only 2.3 percent of technologies were at 
the innovative stage (Requoted from Won-Young Lee 1988: 196). This structural 
dependence of Korea's technological imports from the two countries has lasted to the 
present time and brought about Korea's efforts to not only ameliorate structural 
dependency by improving economic relations with European countries in the later 
PDS period but also to improve Korea's indigenous innovative capacity by increasing 
its R&D expenditure. 
1-1-2. The Japanese DS period (1950-1980) 
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Al IR mi11innl 
Fiscal Year2 FDI Fiscal Year FD! 
1950-1955 29 1968 76 
1956 16 1969 72 
1957 32 1970 94 
1958 12 1971 210 
1959 18 1972 169 
1960 6 1973 -42 
1961 44 1974 202 
1962 45 1975 167 
1963 88 1976 196 
1964 83 1977 224 
1965 47 1978 236 
1966 30 1979 524 
1967 45 1980 300 
Table 6-7. IFDI flows into the Japanese DS. 
Sources: Data from 1955 to 1974 is based on the balance of payments statistics made by the Bank of 
Japan and quoted from Komiya (1972) and Safarian (1993). Data from 1975 to 1980 is based on the 
MOF data and quoted from Safarian (1993). 
Year Changes in IFDI related laws 
1949 Introduction of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (FE & FTCL) 
1950 Introduction of the Foreign Capital Control Law (FCCL) 
1950-1960 Total approval period 
1964 Japan became a member of the OECD 
1967 Introduction of the positive list system 
Establishment of the Foreign Investment Council (FIC) under the MITI 
1971 Introduction of the negative list system 
1973 Introduction of the automatic approval system 
1976 Introduction of the notification system 
1980 Amendment of the FE & FTCL 
Abolition of the FCCL and incorporation of the FCCL into the FE & FTCL 
Change of the FIC into the Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transaction 
(CFEOT) under the MOF 
1990 The amendment of the Security Transaction Law 
1992 Change of the prior notification system into the ex post reporting system 
1998 Amendment of the FE & FTTCL into the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law 
(FE &FTL) 
Table 6-8. Changes of FDI related laws in Japan. 
The Japanese DS' IFDI regime experienced two distinctive periods. The earlier part 
of the Japanese DS (from 1950 to 1964) was a period of total approval or regulation. 
For example, the FE & FTCL required strict approval for all transfers of Yen or 
foreign currency between residents or non-residents (Safarian 1993: 242). After 
becoming a member of the OECD in 1964 and registering its first balance of payments 
2 From 1 April to 31 March 
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surplus in 1967, Japan started consecutive but very slow and strategically calculated 
liberalisation processes. The reason why Japan liberalised its IFDI policies after 
joining the OECD was that IlVIF Article 8 prohibited any restriction on current account 
transactions for balance of payments reasons (Sekiguchi 1979: 11). Thus, in line with 
liberalisation, the positive list system was introduced in 1967 and this system changed 
to a more open negative list system in 1971. In order to simplify the investment 
procedure, Japan adopted the automatic approval system in 1973, the prior 
notification system in 1776, and finally in 1980, Japan amended the FE & FF FCL. 
Under the amended FE &FI CL, the IFDI policy transformed into a system of 
`approval in principle, prohibition in exception'. In 1990, by the amendment of the 
Security Transaction Law, Japan allowed hostile takeovers and in 1992, the prior 
notification system was replaced by an ex post reporting system. 
As can be seen from Table 7 and 8, IFDI flows into Japan sharply increased after 
Japan adopted the negative list system. However, as can be seen from Table 9, before 
the introduction of the notification system, comprehensive and detailed standards in 
regulating IFDI flows remained. In green field investment (establishing new firms), 
industrial sectors were divided into three categories (not liberalised, permission until 
50 percent of foreign ownership and permission until 100 percent of foreign 
ownership) and in purchasing shares of domestic firms, foreign investors' share was 
strictly limited. For example, in the restricted area, foreign investors could obtain 
only 5 percent of existing firms' stock in 1952. This ceiling was increased to 15 
percent in 1971 and after 1973, one hundred percent of stock purchasing was allowed 
after obtaining consent from the Japanese domestic company involved and with 
3 Cumulated total for the period 
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notice given to the Japanese government. It was in 1980 when one hundred percent 
stock purchasing was allowed without the consent and notice procedures. This means 
that hostile takeovers were possible after 1980 revision of the FE & FTCL. 
What is important but cannot be seen from Table 9 is that the Japanese DS liberalised 
IFDI flows only in the sectors in which Japanese firms had already attained 
comparative advantage in the international market (Komiya 1972: 153, Safarian 1993: 
243). What is more important is that in the DS period, the reality of IFDI 
environment was not consistent with the liberalised IFDI related law. In other words, 
although IFDI policies were gradually liberalised, IFDI into Japan did not increas 
proportionally. Thus, even though Japan liberalised its IFDI regime after becoming a 
member of the OECD, the entire Japanese DS period can be characterised by 
regulation and restriction. 
Establishing new firms 
(Number base) 
Purchasing Shares in existing firms 
(percentage base) 
Not Foreign Foreign Maximum not restricted 
liberalised ownership ownership per single restricted sector 
50% 100% investor sector 
Yen based companies 1956-63 All 
1952 All 8 5 
1960 All 5 15 10 
1967 Rest 33 17 7 20 15 
1969 Rest 160 44 7 20 15 
1970 Rest 447 77 7 25 15 
1971 7° All but 17 228 10 25 15 
1973 55 17 22 1006 
1976 5 Notification 1007 
1980 4 Notification 100, 
Table 6-9. Japanese DS' policy changes on IFDI. 
Source. Safarian (1993). 
4 This 7 prohibited sectors include oil refining, electronic computer, data processing, leather, retail, 
agriculture-fishery-forestry, and real estate. 
s This 5 sectors indicates above 7 sectors minus electronics and data processing but include mining. 
6 Consent of the company was required. Also notice to the government was required. 
7 Still consent of the company and notice to the government were required. 
8 Just notice to the government was required. This means that hostile takeovers were possible after 
1980. 
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More specifically, the first half of the DS period (1950-1964) was a formal law-based 
regulative period and the second half of the DS period (1965-1980) was an informal 
practice-based regulative period. The informal practice-led regulation was 
characterised by internal guidelines and bureaucrats' discretionary interpretation of the 
law. This lack of transparency in IFDI regime gave rise to complaints from foreign 
investors and Japan's major trading or investment partners: 
Foreigners often complain that the criteria or standards according to 
which the Japanese government approves, requests changes - to, or 
turns down applications have never been made clear in an official 
document (Komiya 1972: 154). 
The underlying belief system of this regulation and restriction towards IFDI flows is 
also clearly pointed out by Komiya (1972: 158): 
Many government officials, particularly those in the MITI, 
businessmen, and journalist consider liberalisation of inward direct 
investment as a sacrifice which Japan must pay for international co- 
operation or for her membership in the community of advanced 
industrialised nations, rather than a benefit to Japan itself. 
The criteria for approval by the MITI unveiled the mercantilist and regulative aspects 
of the Japanese DS' IFDI regime: The projects should "(a) make a clear contribution 
to technological development of Japanese industry, (b) make a contribution to exports 
or a saving on imports, (c) involve no significant competition with Japanese industry, 
and (d) involve a percentage of equity less than 50 percent" (The Economist 14 
August 1965: 626-7, requoted from Safarian 1993: 243). The informal guideline 
prepared by the MOF in 1967 also disclosed the informal practice which discouraged 
IFDI flows into the Japanese DS. The guidelines prepared to minimise the adverse 
effects of IFDI liberalisation included the following interesting points: 
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Seek coexistence and prosperity with Japanese enterprises through 
joint ventures on an equal partnership basis ... Avoid suppressing 
small enterprises when entering into industries characterised by 
small firms ... Take positive steps towards developing Japanese 
technology, and do not hamper the efforts of Japanese industries to 
develop their own technology ... Appoint Japanese to the board of 
directors and top management positions ... Conform to the 
government's economic policy (Safarian 1993: 247-248). 
Thus, it can be summarised that the Japanese DS was regulative and prohibitive in 
terms of IFDI. Dunning (1996: 43-46) summarised four government roles in keeping 
the IFDI flows very low. First, the government's discriminatory policy encouraged 
either total closure or limits to foreign investment in majority service sectors and 
some primary or manufacturing industries. More importantly, the foreign firm's M&A 
was strictly disallowed in the DS period. Second, the Japanese DS induced 
technology licensing rather than IFDI. Third, Japanese consumer's `buy Japanese' 
attitude9 was implicitly manipulated by Japanese government. Fourth, by applying 
interventionist industrial policy and liberal competition policy on the IFDI flows, the 
Japanese government discouraged IFDI flows. As we have seen in Chapter 4, with the 
combination of interventionist industrial policy and liberal interpretation of 
competition policy, the Japanese government supported indigenous R&D and tacitly 
admitted oligopolistic competition among domestic companies in order to improve 
Japan's international competitiveness. As a result, foreign investment was 
discouraged because of Japanese firms' improved comparative or competitive 
advantages through massive R&D expenditures and oligopolistic domestic industrial 
structure. 
9 It has to be emphasised that this attitude of `buy Japanese' is viewed as a cultural or institutional 
characteristic in this thesis. As we have seen in Chapter 2, without considering the influence of this 
patriotic and mercantilist belief systems of not only Japanese and Korean bureaucrats but also 
ordinary people, it is hard to understand the rigidity and persistence of developmentalism-oriented 
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This meant that foreign investors could not exploit their ownership advantages against 
their Japanese counterparts. Even though foreign investors could get access to the 
Japanese market, the market was carefully liberalised in areas in which Japanese firms 
could compete with foreign investors in defending their domestic market share. 
Moreover, even though foreign investors had ownership advantages in certain 
industrial sectors, they could not get access to the Japanese market because those 
sectors were highly protected or regulated by case-by-case screening processes. As 
Dunning pointed out above, the Japanese DS preferred technological licensing instead 
of IFDI and managed IFDI flows into joint ventures rather than majority or wholly 
owned IFDI (Yoshitomi 1990: 124). This reflected the Japanese need to import 
foreign technologies in the DS period. Japan was behind foreign competitors in terms 
of technological level (Sekiguchi 1979: 11) in the DS period. 
1-2. The post developmental state period 
1-2-1. The Korean PDS period (1984-1997) 
(CI1. C millinn\ 
Calendar Year Total acceptance Arrival Calendar Year Total acceptance Arrival 
1984 422 193 1992 894 803 
1985 532 236 1993 1044 728 
1986 355 477 1994 1317 991 
1987 1063 626 1995 1941 1357 
1988 1283 894 1996 3203 2308 
1989 1090 812 1997 6970 3086 
1990 803 895 1998 8852 4235 
1991 1396 1177 
Table 6-10. Total IFDI flows into Korea in the Korean PDS and TS period. 
Source. Based on the MOPE data and quoted from the National Statistics Office (1998). 
(state interventionist) economic system in the PDS in which market-oriented liberalsation measures 
were continuously implemented. 
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(Amnnnt nercentavel 
1962-86 1987-90 1991-1995 1962-97 1997 1998 
Manufacturing 63.9 66.7 53.4 52.6 33.7 64.8 
Non- 36.1 33.3 46.6 47.4 66.3 35.2 
manufacturing 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6-11. Industrial trends of IFDI flows into Korea 
Source. Based on the MOFE data and total acceptance. Data except for 1998 is quoted from Joon- 
Dong Kim (1997). Data for 1998 is quoted from the MOFE (1999a). 
The Korean PDS is a period when consecutive, incremental but basically limited 
deregulation and liberalisation of IFDI policies were implemented. As we will see 
later in this section, the Korean PDS was a period when zigzag policies between free 
market and state intervention persisted due to the conflicts between unchanged 
developmentalism-oriented belief systems towards IFDI and consecutively liberalised 
laws and policies towards IFDI. As can be seen from Table 8, in 1984, Korea 
amended the FCIA and adopted a negative list system and removed ownership 
regulations. Moreover, performance requirements were abolished in 1989 and a prior 
notification system was introduced in 1991. In 1992, eight businesses that were 
previously closed to foreign investors became open to IFDI and the number of 
businesses which required joint ventures were reduced (Monthly Review 1992 
November). 
l. P11C miI1inn) 
1962-86 1987-90 1962-1997 1998 
Industry Amount Industry Amount Industry Amount Industry Amount 
Manufacturing 
I Electrical 21.0 Chemicals 195.4 Chemicals 2763.1 Pulp/Lum. 1644.0 
2 Chemicals 18.2 Electrical 169.9 Electrical 2457.3 Electrical 1377.0 
3 Transport 13.5 Transport 95.1 Transport 1656.3 Chemicals 756.0 
4 TextJGar. 805 Machinery 83.1 Food 1607.9 Food 719.0 
5 Machinery 6.9 Food 59.9 Machinery 1154.3 Machinery 588.0 
Non- 
manufacturing 
1 Hotel 36.5 Hotel 198.9 Hotel 5206.1 Finance 506.0 
2 Finance 6.8 Finance 84.6 Finance 1869.7 Distri. 474.0 
3 Construe. 2.2 Insurance 25.6 Distri. 1477.7 Elec. /Gas 344.0 
4 Tans. /Sto. 1.4 Trade 24.5 Trade 910.4 Hotel 303.0 
5 Distri. 0.7 Distri. 10.0 Insurance 289.4 Trade 284.0 
Table 6-12. Five leading sectors of manufacturing and non-manufacturing industry in IFDI flows into 
Korea. 
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Source. Based on the MOFE data and total acceptance. Data except for 1998 is modified from Joon- 
Dong Kim (1997). Data for 1998 is modified from the MOFE (2000). 
MIR millinnl 
1962-86 1987-90 1962-97 1998 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
U. S. A 42.9 29.5 292.6 27.6 8280.7 33.6 2974.0 33.6 
North America total 46.6 32.1 303.0 28.6 8798.9 35.7 3776.0 42.7 
Japan 76.1 52.3 474.0 44.7 5832.6 23.7 504.0 5.7 
Malaysia 0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1617.9 6.6 262.0 3.0 
Asia total 81.9 56.3 516.4 48.7 8637.3 35.1 2015.0 22.8 
Netherlands 2.1 1.5 37.7 3.6 2251.1 9.1 0322.0 15.0 
Germany 2.6 1.8 58.2 5.5 1118.8 4.5 785.0 8.9 
UK 2.6 1.8 40.3 3.8 789.0 3.2 61.0 0.7 
Europe total 13.9 9.5 220.8 20.8 6993.4 28.4 2884.0 32.6 
Table 6-13. IFDI flows into Korea by country and region. 
Source. Same as the Table 6-12. 
Korea T Indonesia I Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
1.3 8.5 13.2 1 7.3 1 27.5 3.2 
Table 6-14. The percentage contribution of IFDI to domestic fixed capital formation in East Asian 
countries. 
Source. Average percent date is based on the UN, World Investment Report 1993. Requoted from 
Guan-Ho Kim (1993). Data for 1996 is quoted from the UNCTAD (1998). 
Korea 1993 Korea 1987 Taiwan 1986 Singapore 1989 Hong Kong 1989 
100% 18.6 13.3 30.5 51.2 59.4 
50-99.9% 33.4 38.5 40.3 21.4 - 
Under 50 % 48.0 48.2 29.2 27.4 
Table 6-15. Ownership structure of IFDI in the Asian NIEs. 
Source. Based on the UN (1992), World Investment Directory vol. ]. Requoted from modified data of 
Guan-Ho Kim (1993). 
And in 1993, under the policy of `Segyehwa' (globalisation policy), Korea 
implemented `the 5 year Foreign Investment Liberalisation Plan' initiated by the 
International Investment Bureau in the MOFE in order to facilitate IFDI development 
by simplifying investment procedures and providing more incentives to foreign 
investors. Under the 5 year plan, among 224 restricted businesses, 132 businesses 
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were liberalised. Moreover, the number of businesses which had been strongly 
regulated in order to request Joint venture instead of full or majority foreign 
ownership was reduced from 50 to 7 (Economic Bulletin August 1993, Monthly 
Review First quarter 1995). The 5 year plan was amended three times after 1993 and 
in 1994,57 previously prohibited businesses were further liberalised and in order to 
induce more IFDI, the clauses concerning the protection of intellectual property rights, 
financial sector liberalisation, labour market stabilisation, deregulation of foreign 
acquisition of land, and administrative deregulation were incorporated in the plan. 
Thus, in order to facilitate administrative deregulation, `the Special Law on Business 
Deregulation' was enacted in 1993 and to propel financial liberalisation, the ceiling on 
foreign share in portfolio investment in each domestic company's total share was 
increased from 10 percent to 12 percent in 1994 and to 15 percent in 1995. Moreover, 
in order to ease the restriction on foreign acquisition of land, `the Alien Land Law' 
was abolished and replaced by `the Law on Alien Land Acquisition and Management' 
in 1993 (Economic Bulletin November 1994, Monthly Review First quarter 1995). 
With the help of these consecutive liberalisation processes, Korea's liberalisation ratio 
became 90.3 percent in 1996 (More specifically, in manufacturing industry 99.8 
percent, in service industry 91.7 percent, and in primary industry 79.4 percent) 
(Seung-Jin Kim 1996: 14). In 1996, Korea took further steps towards liberalisation. 
Under the FI & FCIA, friendly M&As were allowed and various incentives were also 
provided to foreign investors (Economic Bulletin September 1996). In science and 
technology policies, gradual liberalisation processes were also introduced in the PDS 
period. Thus, a reporting system replaced the former approval system in 1984 (Won- 
Young Lee 1988: 192). Besides these liberalisation processes, the Korean PDS also 
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endeavoured to remove administrative red tape by establishing `the Committee for the 
administrative deregulation' under the `New 5 year Economic development Plan 
(1993-1997)' implemented by president Young-Sam Kim (Economic Bulletin 1993 
April). 
However, the extent of liberalisation was basically limited and liberalisation 
continued to be accompanied by specified regulations due to the rigidity of working 
level bureaucrats' belief systems which were strongly embedded in the efficacy of 
developmentalism (Bishop 1997: 90-91). The belief that the state could control and 
manage the flow of IFDI in desired or planned direction was rigidly engrained in the 
bureaucrats' minds. Another important reason which brought about limited 
liberalisation was inter-ministerial conflicts on IFDI policies10. As we have seen in 
the the section on Korean DS, inter-ministerial conflicts over IFDI policies emerged 
after the authority over IFDI was transferred from the EPB to the MOF. In the Korean 
PDS, the MOFE and Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) struggled to 
represent their respective interests (Bishop 1997: 142). The International Investment 
Bureau of the MOFE actively endeavoured to liberalise the IFDI regime while the 
MOTIE represented the protectionist attitudes. The MOFE's belief systems for the 
promotion of liberalisation was strongly supported by top policy makers, the MOFE's 
subsidiary research institute, namely `the Korea Development Institute (KDI)' and 
foreign business representatives especially from the American Chamber of Commerce 
(AMCHAM) and the European Chamber of Commerce. Meanwhile, the view of the 
10 Michael S. Brown, the president of the American Chamber of Commerce clearly pointed out this 
inter-ministerial conflicts and working level bureaucrats' unchanged belief in the efficacy of 
developmentalism in dealing with IFDI: "We are often caught between different ministries on various 
business problems. Each ministry has an agenda which is not easily influenced by other ministries. 
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MOTIE was advocated by Chaebol, SMEs, labour unions, and the MOTIE's 
subsidiary research institute, `the Korea Institute of Industrial Economy and Trade 
(KEET)' 
Because of these two regulative and conflicting background (working level 
bureaucrats' developmentalism oriented belief systems and inter-ministerial conflicts), 
the Korean PDS had regulative and prohibitive aspects in its IFDI regime. Thus, after 
the amendment of FCIA in 1984, the clause which contained the protection of 
strategic or infant industry remained in the changed Act. According to the act, 
restriction was imposed on projects "which are being supported by the government on 
a special basis ... [and] projects 
in infant industries which are being given protection 
at the present time" (Monthly Review 1984 September). Although the negative 
system was introduced, there were 297 industries prohibited on the list out of a total of 
999 industries. This meant that almost 30 percent of businesses were prohibited under 
the negative list system. Although the automatic approval system was adopted, the 
criteria were strict. Only projects that "are not on the negative list, that have a foreign 
equity share of less than 50 percent, that involve foreign investment amounting to no 
more than one million US dollars, and that do not require tax exemption" were 
automatically approved (Won-Young Lee 1988: 191). And although a reporting 
system was adopted in technology transfer in 1984, "Korean firms which wish to pay 
more than US $ 100 thousand or 2 percent of their net sales from the product in 
question in return for using foreign technology for more than 3 years" had to attain 
approval as of 1992 (Economic Bulletin 1992: 33). Despite consecutive liberalisation 
Lower level officials are generally not empowered, recognised or rewarded for heloping foreign 
companies operate in Korea" (The Korea Herald 6 February 1988). 
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efforts of the Korean PDS, as of June 1995 there remained 150 restricted projects (107 
totally restricted and 43 partially restricted) out of 1148 businesses listed in the 
Korean Standard Industrial Classification. And as of May 1996, IFDI was still 
restricted in 120 businesses. Thus, even the state acknowledged the limits of slow and 
incremental liberalisation processes in 1996: "the government recognised that its 
current liberalisation plan falls short of the level of liberalisation achieved by the 
advanced countries" (Economic Bulletin 1996 June). 
The result of a conflict between slow liberalisation processes and unchanged belief 
systems of bureaucrats was a breakdown of the congruence among the policies, ideas, 
and institutions which had underpinned the rapid and efficient economic development 
of the Korean DS period. This breakdown of the congruence led to inefficient 
economic policy making and implementation processes and finally contributed to an 
economic recession throughout the 1990s and an economic crisis in 1997. In an 
earlier section, we examined thoroughly the increased gap between liberalised IFDI 
policies pursued by top policy makers and developmentalism-oriented regulative and 
restrictive belief systems of medium and low level bureaucrats throughout the PDS 
period. This uncovered the fact that without the change of belief systems of policy 
implementors (medium and low level officials), liberalised IFDI policies had no 
substantially positive effects on flows of IFDI. 
Moreover, liberalised IFDI policies in the Korean PDS period could be regarded as 
only for `show-window display' in order to evade foreign pressures to open the 
Korean market. For example, in 1989, Korea made an agreement to remove 
performance requirements, to abolish screenings and to open service industries further 
262 
after America intensified its pressures towards Korea after 1986 (Bishop 1997: 109). 
However, as we have seen above, the extent of liberalisation in the Korean IFDI 
regime was not necessarily satisfactory throughout 1990s. Although performance 
requirements were abolished in 1989, the screening system through joint venture 
recommendation in technology transfer remained and the restriction of IFDI into 
certain businesses was only very slowly and carefully liberalised. Moreover, the 
clause which contained the protection of infant industry and the exclusion of foreign 
investors in such industries still remained in the FCIA (Joon-Dong Kim 1996: 70). 
The unchanged belief system was of course a major source of persistent red tape and 
internal guidelines that substantially regulated and prohibited IFDI flows even though 
the laws and polices related to IFDI were continuously liberalised throughout the 
Korean PDS period. 
IFDI flows into the Korean PDS increased after Korea amended the FCIA in 1984 as 
part of its process of economic liberalisation. As we have seen in Chapter 5, the 
Korean state implemented economic liberalisation after 1980 in order to overcome an 
economic slowdown and recession caused by the side-effects of excessive state 
intervention in heavy and chemical industries (HCI) in the late 1970s. In order to 
channel the massive capital into HCI, the Korean state depended too much on foreign 
loans and as a result, Korea's foreign loans dramatically increased in this period. 
After witnessing the Latin American debt crisis in the early 1980s, the Korean state 
started to worry about the snowballing foreign loans and to acknowledge the necessity 
of IFDI as a way to countervail the tremendously swollen foreign loans (Won-Young 
Lee 1987: 25). Thus, both reflection on excessive state intervention in the HCI and 
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the anxiety about the massive foreign loans resulted in the liberalisation of the IFDI 
regime in the earlier Korean PDS period (Economic Bulletin 1993 February). 
Under this liberalisation era, as we have seen earlier, by amending the FCIA, Korea 
introduced the negative list system and the automatic approval system and abolished 
the ownership regulation. And after the accomplishment of the first trade surplus in 
1986, the foreign exchange law was liberalised and as a result, IFDI into Korea again 
witnessed a dramatic increase. However, as we can see from Table 14, the 
contribution of IFDI to domestic fixed capital formation in Korea was insignificant 
compared with the ASEAN member countries. This small percentage of IFDI 
contribution to domestic fixed capital formation showed that Korea was not dependent 
on IFDI flows in channelling investment capital, because Korea still depended heavily 
on foreign loans instead of IFDI even in the PDS period. Another domestic factor 
which prevented I>DI development in the Korean PDS period was excessive 
administrative regulation. Even though the Korean state endeavoured to promote 
administrative deregulation in the PDS period, foreign investors indicated excessive 
regulation as the most crucial obstacle in operating their firms in Korea (Joongangilbo 
16,7,1996, requoted from Joon-Dong Kim 1996: 63). 
However, the most interesting domestic factor which hindered further IFDI flows into 
the Korean PDS was the Chaebol system. Different from the above two preventive 
factors (high dependence on foreign loans and excessive administrative regulation) 
which were caused by state regulations, the Chaebol system also prevented the 
penetration of foreign firms into the Korean market due to the Chaebols' extensive 
and oligopolistic dominance of the Korean economy. In other words, the Chaebols' 
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dominant or pervasive presence in the Korean economic structure actually 
discouraged foreign firms from entering the Korean economy. According to Guan-Ho 
Kim, among 308 manufacturing subsidiaries of 30 Korean Chaebols, 106 subsidiaries 
made joint ventures with foreign firms (more than a third) and among 30 Chaebols, 23 
Chaebol possessed joint venture subsidiaries with foreign firms. A more interesting 
phenomenon was that in the ownership structure of 106 joint ventured subsidiaries, 
only 8 percent (9 subsidiaries) had more than 50 percent foreign ownership (Guan-Ho 
Kim 1993: 32-33). This showed that like the Keiretsu system in Japan (we will see 
the Keiretsu system and its negative effects on IFDI in the section on the Japanese 
PDS), Korea's Chaebol system discouraged IFDI flows into Korea and also 
contributed to the increase in the ratio of joint venture IFDI in the Korean PDS period 
(Guan-Ho Kim 1993: 52). 
The small amount of IFDI in Korea was also caused by external factors. From the 
1980s to before the East Asian economic crisis, the ASEAN countries liberalised IFDI 
policies much further than Asian NIEs (except Singapore and Hong Kong) in order to 
promote economic development and exports. And, because of this liberalised IFDI 
environment, foreign investors preferred the ASEAN countries instead of Korea 
which still had a regulated market and unfavourable accessibility in terms of the costs 
of production factors. The reason why the Korean state preferred foreign loans 
instead of IFDI was that while investment made by foreign loans could be in Korean 
possession after the repayment of the loans to creditors, investment made by IFDI 
could not be in Korean possession forever. In a word, Korean attitudes towards IFDI 
were based on nationalistic and mercantilistic belief systems. Moreover, as we have 
seen in Chapter 5, the Korean state strongly regulated financial sectors in order to 
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facilitate state-initiated industrial policy. Thus, the Korean financial sector was useful 
means of accomplishing the targets of industrial policies. Korean bureaucrats were 
worried about the possible loss of regulation on IFDI because too much dependence 
on IFDI meant the loss of tight control on monetary policy by the government. 
The Korean state was also worried about the potential exacerbation of foreign 
currency conditions in Korea caused by sudden withdrawal of IFDI capital. Thus, 
even though Korean top policy makers tried to induce more IFDI instead of foreign 
loans after 1980 by pursuing comprehensive economic liberalisation measures, there 
was no significant change in Korea's IFDI environment. Table 15 shows the 
unchanged IFDI environment in Korea. This points to the rigid ownership regulation 
even in the PDS period. Thus, similar to the Korean DS period, the ownership 
structure was dominated by joint ventures in the Korean PDS, different from other 
NIEs. In Singapore, thanks to the liberalised and promotive environment for FDI 
policies, wholly owned IFDI was over 50 percent and in Hong Kong the share of 
wholly owned IFDI was nearly 60 percent. This table reveals the dirigiste and 
nationalist nature of the Korean IFDI regime even in the PDS period in which various 
liberalisation measures were continuously pursued. The reasons for the persistently 
prohibitive and regulative environment of Korean IFDI regime could be attributed to 
unchanged belief systems of policy implementators and the Korean populace's 
economic nationalism" which prevented wide and influential presence of foreign 
companies in Korea. 
A survey conducted by the Economist (Korean version) and the POSCO Management Research 
Institute in 1996 revealed the Korean populace's nationalistic double standard towards foreign firms 
and investors (Joongangilbo 16,7,1996, requoted from Joon-Dong Kim 1996: 67). The result was 
that 54.5 percent of respondents considered the role of foreign investors in the Korean economy as 
positive. The reason were the transfer of advanced technology (29%), the supply of satisfiable goods 
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Table 11 shows that the Korean state, like the Japanese counterpart, liberalised 
manufacturing sectors earlier than non-manufacturing sectors. Because the service 
and primary industrial sectors were strictly regulated and prohibited, only 
manufacturing sectors enjoyed the effects of liberalisation. Table 12 shows the 
leading sectors of IFDI flows into Korea. In manufacturing industry, electrical and 
general machinery, and chemicals were the major sectors and in non-manufacturing 
industry, hotel, finance, trade and distribution were the major destinations of IFDI 
flows. An interesting phenomenon is that the leading sectors of IFDI flows are also 
the leading sectors of Korean OFDI into ASEAN countries. This reveals that by 
carefully regulating IFDI flows into the leading sectors of IFDI, Korea improved its 
technological level to a more advanced level than that of the ASEAN countries and by 
this manipulated technological edge, Korea developed OFDI flows into the ASEAN 
region. Another interesting situation is that in non-manufacturing industry, finance 
and distribution became top leading sectors in inducing foreign direct investment. 
This reflects the fact that after the economic crisis in late 1997, Korea's service 
sectors, particularly the financial sector, were liberalised in order to facilitate financial 
structural adjustment. We will discuss this in the section on the Korean transitionary 
state in greater detail. 
Table 13 indicates the country and regional distribution of Korean IFDI. Japan was 
the most important investor country until 1990. But its share in Korean IFDI 
(24.95), the transfer of advanced management know-how (20.1 %), the creation of jobs (20.1 %), and 
making Korean firms more competative by introducing competitions (4.1%). However, 50.6 percent 
of respondents answered that they do not have favourable feelings towards foreign firms. Moreover 
12.9 percent responded that they disliked foreign firms. This survey uncovered the Korean 
populace's nationalistic but pragmatic approach to foreign investment. 
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dramatically decreased in the 1990s and in 1997, the Japanese share was 3.8 percent 
and in 1998, the share was 5.7 percent. This phenomenon indicates the fact that 
Japanese OFDI flows preferred the ASEAN region rather than the Asian NIEs in 
establishing its overseas production plants in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, the 
share of Europe sharply grew from 9.5 percent for 1962-1986 to 28.4 percent for 
1962-1997. The share in 1997 was 35 percent and in 1998 was 33 percent. This 
sharply increased share of Europe in Korean IFDI flows indicates the importance of 
the Korean domestic market which cannot be neglected by European investors any 
longer. The enlargement of the Korean domestic market caused by increased 
consumption power of Koreans is the major reason for the sharp increase of European 
OFDI presence in Korea. A survey conducted jointly by `the Economist' (Korean 
version) and the POSCO Management Research Centre in 1996 showed that the most 
important investment motive for foreign investors in Korea was the Korean domestic 
market (82.4 %). And the most important reason for constant investment in Korea 
was the purchasing power of the Korean domestic market (71.3%) (Joongangilbo 16, 
7,1996, requoted from Joon-Dong Kim 1996: 63). This survey showed that in the 
PDS period, Korea became a much more developed economy considering that in the 
DS period, the most crucial investment motive for foreign investors was the cheap 
and abundant but relatively well-educated labour force. 
1-2-2. The Japanese PDS period (1981-To present) 
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MIR tnillinn until 1001 IPY million after 1QQi121 
Fiscal Year 1FDI Fiscal Year IFDI 
1981 432 1990 2779 
1982 747 1991 4339 
1983 813 1992 4084 
1984 493 1993 3078 
1985 930 1994 4155 
1986 941 1995 369700 
1987 2212 1996 770700 
1988 3244 1997 678200 
1989 2860 1998 1340400 
Table 6-16. Total IFDI flows into Japanese PDS period. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. 1981 data is quoted from Safarian (1993). Data from 1982-1996 is 
quoted from the OECD (1993b and 1998a). 
As can be seen from Table 17, IFDI into Japan was concentrated in the chemicals and 
machinery sectors in manufacturing industry and commerce and trade and financial 
sectors in non-manufacturing industry. Like Korea, Japan also channelled IFDI flows 
into the manufacturing sectors in which Japan had its majority OFDI amounts. This 
indicates that sectors which experienced massive IFDI flows into Japan also led the 
massive OFDI flows from Japan. Thus, it can be inferred that Japanese chemicals and 
machinery sectors improved their technological levels by inducing IFDI from more 
technologically advanced foreign companies and with this improved technological 
edge, Japan developed its OFDI deployment in order to exploit the ownership 
advantage. Another distinctive feature is that Japan experienced a transition in IFDI 
flows. In other words, IFDI flows into the service industry surpassed the flows into 
manufacturing industry. In the service industry, IFDI flows have been traditionally 
concentrated in the commerce and trade sector. This indicates that in service industry, 
foreign competitors have continuously tried to penetrate the Japanese domestic 
market. However, as can be see from Table 17, in 1997 and 1998, the financial sector 
became a leading sector. This change reflects the Japanese government's efforts to 
12 In order to facilitate the internalisation or regionalisation of Japanese Yen, the MOF has been using 
the JPY in dealing with FDI flows since 1995. 
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liberalise and reform the domestic financial sector which suffered from massive non- 
performing loans after the bursting of the bubble economy. 
America is the top investor in Japan. This is not a surprising fact, considering that 
America has experienced chronic trade deficit with Japan and America is one of the 
countries which has a competitive edge against Japan in high-tech and knowledge 
intensive industry. In other words, in order to compensate for its trade deficit, the US 
tried to enter into the protected Japanese domestic market and in order to exploit US 
companies' ownership advantages in technologies and management know-hows 
against their Japanese counterparts, the US also endeavoured to localise its 
entrepreneurial presence in Japan. A survey conducted by the MITI showed that the 
most significant motive for foreign firms' investment in Japan is access to the 
Japanese domestic market (JETRO 1997: 55). However, as it can be inferred from the 
SH talks between the Japanese and American governments, the institutionally 
protected Japanese domestic market has continuously prevented American companies 
from fully taking advantage of their ownership advantages in the Japanese market. 
Schoppa (1993) clearly summarised the result of the SH talks. According to him, 
America gained substantial concessions from Japan in the distribution sector by 
making an agreement that would shorten the delay for notification to the MITI and for 
adjustment processes between big retailers and small and medium sized retailers. 
Before the SH talks, the adjustment processes between big and small and medium 
sized retailers to consider the interests of consumers and small retailers were 
compulsorily imposed by the law and these processes were intentionally used to delay 
the granting of permission to the application of big retailers. However, in the talks 
about exclusive business practices and the Keiretsu system towards new foreign 
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investors, America failed to gain any concessions from Japan. In order to improve 
market accessibility, America requested the abolition of cross-share holdings inside 
Keiretsu member companies and the strengthening of shareholders' rights. However, 
virtually no concessions were made by Japan. 
Against the harsh pressure towards the closed Japanese domestic market, `the White 
Paper on International Trade' justified the low levels of IFDI flows into Japan by 
insisting that the extent of IFDI flows is not determined by the market openness but by 
the competitiveness of private firms (JETRO 1993: 32). Put differently, the Japanese 
PDS argued that the protected Japanese market was not the crucial factor causing the 
low levels of IFDI flows into Japan. Instead, it was weak competitiveness or the weak 
ownership advantage of foreign firms against Japanese firms that contributed to the 
low level of IFDI flows into Japan compared with other advanced countries. 
However, this argument cannot be supported by the reality of the discouraging IFDI 
environment in Japan and the sluggish increase of IFDI. Table 19 shows the unequal 
market accessibility between Japan and other investor countries. Japanese firms could 
have easy M&As while foreign firms' M&As of Japanese counterparts were strictly 
constrained. For example, in 1990, Japanese firms took 440 M&As in foreign 
countries while foreign firms took only 18 M&As in Japan. This massive inequality 
in market accessibility is caused by several specific features of Japanese corporate 
structures and institutional and political barriers. The Japanese corporate structure 
which constraints M&A is the Keiretsu system (Lawrence 1993: 93-94). As we have 
seen in Chapter 4, this Keiretsu system encompasses unique relationships among 
member companies. Cross-share holding and long-term relationships between 
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member companies and banks hindered foreign firms' M&As and long-term 
relationships between big companies as assemblers and SMEs as parts providers also 
prevented foreign firms' penetration into the domestic industrial structure. Moreover, 
the preponderance of the interest of employees and managers rather than shareholders 
effectively discouraged foreign takeovers of Japanese firms. The specific and 
complicated Japanese distribution system also contributed to low level foreign 
acquisitions in this sector (Balassa and Noland 1988: 61). "Excessive regulation by 
the Japanese government and collusive practices among distributors limited the ability 
of newcomers (especially foreign producers) to get their products to the market" 
(Schoppa: 1993: 360) Thus, it can be argued that, one of the primary obstacles of 
low level IFDI flows was the closed domestic market caused by the Keiretsu system 
(Yoshitomi 1990: 141). 
Safarian (1993: 253) summarised the Keiretsu related background of the Japanese 
government's and firms' aversion to or dislike of foreign M&As in Japan. First, 
foreign acquisitions could threaten the life long employment system which is a 
distinctive feature of Japanese style capitalism. Second, foreign acquisitions could 
disturb Japanese firms' embedded business practices such as long-term relationships 
with parts suppliers and banks. Third, increased foreign takeovers could be an 
obstacle for the government in implementing administrative guidance. Fourth, 
because of the high debt to equity ratio of Japanese firms, foreign firms' purchasing of 
certain amount of stock could be a crucial threat to management control. 
Another factor which frustrated foreign M&A is the cultural institution of Japanese 
corporate system which are deeply embedded in business practices and businessmen's 
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belief system. Hamada clearly explained a cultural restrictive factor towards M&As: 
"there is an established social norm against hostile takeovers. This norm has a lot to 
do with the Japanese concept of the company as a community of people based on 
long-term relationships, and the primary responsibility of the management to serve the 
welfare of the company community" (Hamada 1989: 192). Japanese people's 
xenophobia and `buy Japanese goods attitude' are also cultural institutions which 
discourage foreign investment (GATT 1995: 35, Graham 1996: 69,71). 
The rapid development of Japanese firms' comparative or competitive advantage 
against competing foreign firms is also as significant as the institutional barriers in 
discouraging IFDI flows into Japan. Dunning's eclectic FDI theory of OLI 
(Ownership advantage, Locational advantage, Internalisation advantage) undergirds 
this argument. The low level IFDI development in Japan can be attributed to these 
three factors: first, foreign firms lack ownership advantages such as technological or 
managerial superiority over indigenous Japanese firms; second, Japan as a location for 
IFDI is not attractive compared with other foreign markets in terms of government 
incentives, production costs, people's hospitality; third, even though foreign firms are 
competitive with Japanese firms, they preferred not to internalise their ownership 
advantage by engaging in direct investment but to sell their ownership advantage 
through licensing agreements (Dunning 1996: 14,22). The superior Japanese 
ownership advantage in manufacturing industry over foreign firms is reflected in 
Japan's astronomical and consolidated trade surplus. However, it has to be pointed 
out that in the service industry, particularly in the banking and distribution sectors, 
Japanese firms' ownership advantage is far behind foreign competitors. Thus, the 
increase of IFDI in the service industry can be anticipated as Japan implemented neo- 
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liberal style financial reform which accompanied total liberalisation and deregulation 
measures in the financial sector. The locational disadvantage of Japan can be proved 
by a survey conducted by the JETRO in 1998. The survey showed that the most 
important problem in business development in Japan was the high business cost 
(almost 80 percent of respondents) and the order of business costs from the most 
expensive was personnel expenses, land price or rent, distribution cost, and tax 
(JETRO 1998: 32). 
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that in the Japanese PDS period, the low level of IFDI 
flows is not due to government policy of regulations or restrictions but due to a 
combination of institutional factors and unfavourable OLI advantages towards foreign 
firms. This argument is supported by Graham's statement: "FDI simply does not 
occur in a country where official policies prohibit or discourage it, and for much of 
modern Japanese history, such policies have been in effect. But FDI has continued to 
be low in Japan even after all such policies were removed: to understand why this is 
so, the theory of FDI -or, at least, the OLI paradigm- is of some utility, but only when 
merged with some understanding of traits and characteristics of Japan" (Graham 1996: 
88). Thus, the announcement from the JETRO in 1989 that "government regulations 
are no longer an obstacle to foreign investment in Japan" (requoted from Lawrence 
1993: 86) is not an exaggerated statement. Hamada supported this argument: "Studies 
that the legal and regulatory barriers that once kept foreign investors out of Japan no 
longer have any pervasive impacts on direct investment decisions" (Hamada 1989: 
191). A survey carried out by the MITI in 1994 also supported this argument. 
According to the survey, the most significant problem faced by foreign affiliates in 
Japan was the harsh competition with Japanese companies and the second most 
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important problem was difficulties in recruitment, and the third was particular 
customer preference. The fourth problem was the difference in business practices and 
the fifth was the high corporate tax. Regulation and administrative guidance was 
ranked next in eighth place. This survey clearly reflected the reality of Japanese PDS' 
IFDI regime. Harsh competition with Japanese firms' means that Japanese firms' 
ownership advantage is either as competitive as foreign companies or more 
competitive. The particular consumer preference means Japanese people's preference 
of Japanese goods over foreign goods and the difference in business practices means 
institutional difference of Japanese corporate or banking sectors. In sum, the survey 
results support the argument that in the PDS period, the low level of IFDI into Japan 
is not due to government regulation but due to a combination of institutional 
characteristics of Japanese firms and the OLI disadvantages towards foreign firms. 
Due to these institutional (Keiretsu system and business practices) barriers and 
unfavourable OLI advantages of foreign firms, IFDI flows into Japan remained very 
low and this gave rise to tough criticism and pressures from foreign countries. The SH 
talk between Japan and America was a result of this unequal accessibility to each 
country's market. While Japanese firms actively used the M&As in developing its 
OFDI in foreign countries, foreign countries could not equally participate in M&As in 
Japan. As a result of the pressure from the US, in 1990, the Japanese government 
amended the Security Transaction Law which effectively restricted hostile takeovers 
from foreign firms (Wakasugi 1996: 124). Accordingly, there is no legal regulation 
on hostile takeovers in Japan after 1990. However, the level of IFDI into Japan 
remains very low compared with other developed countries. Thus, the foreign 
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pressure to change even the culture surged: "Japan needs to undergo a culture change 
in the way it deals with its economy" (Jordan 1996: 201). 
1950-1989 
Cumulative 
$US million 
1950-1995 
Cumulative 
$US million 
1997 
JPY 100 million 
1998 
JPY 100 million 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
Manufacturing 
Food 283 1.8 606 1.6 22 0.3 258 1.9 
Rubber & Leather 76 0.5 312 0.8 188 2.8 48 0.4 
Chemicals 2722 17.4 6583 17.4 740 10.9 397 3.0 
Petroleum 692 4.4 1158 3.1 58 0.8 84 0.6 
Glass & Ceramics 141 0.9 174 0.5 7 0.1 - - 
Metals 497 3.2 1101 2.9 3 0.0 20 0.2 
Machinery 5370 34.3 9411 24.8 1452 21.4 2129 15.9 
Others 421 2.7 994 2.4 185 2.7 153 1.1 
Subtotal 10202 65.2 20268 53.4 2674 39.4 3126 23.3 
Non-manufacturing 
Construction 82 0.5 119 0.3 87 0.1 14 0.1 
Real Estate 794 5.1 1255 3.3 482 7.1 416 3.1 
Commerce & Trade 2213 14.1 7593 20.0 996 14.7 1759 13.1 
Services 798 5.1 3497 9.2 888 13.1 3181 23.7 
Transportation 127 0.8 248 0.7 4 0.1 61 0.5 
Communication 127 0.8 408 1.1 33 0.5 168 1.3 
Banking & Insurance 572 3.7 3467 9.1 1616 23.8 4569 34.1 
Others 739 4.7 1069 2.8 87 1.3 111 0.8 
Subtotal 5452 34.8 17656 46.6 4108 60.6 10278 76.7 
Total 15654 100.0 37925 100.0 6782 100.0 13404 100.0 
Table 6-17. IFDI flows into Japan by Industry. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Cumulative data for 1950-1989 is quoted from Yoshiyomi (1990). 
Cumulative data for 1950-1995 is quoted from the MITI (1996a) and data for 1997,1998 is quoted 
from Monthly Finance Review July 1999. 
In response to this harsh criticism, the Japanese PDS implemented various supportive 
systems and incentive to raise IFDI flows. Thus, in 1992 Japan announced a 
promotional package for IFDI (GATT 1995: 26-27), and as a result, the prior 
notification system changed into an ex post reporting system, while preferential tax 
treatment, low interest rate loans from the Japan Development Bank (JDB) and loan 
guarantees from the JEXIM bank were introduced. Furthermore, in 1993, `the 
Foreign Investment in Japan Development Corporation (FIND)' was established in 
order to provide technical support to foreign investors such as expert consultation, 
recruitment services and training. In 1994, `the Japan Investment Council (JIC)' 
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headed by the prime minister was established as an advisory body in order to improve 
IFDI environment (OECD 1995: 79). In 1995, the Japanese PDS took further steps to 
improve the IFDI regime by removing unnecessary administrative regulations, 
extending tax incentives and loan guarantees, and strengthening share holders' right in 
order to facilitate foreign M&As (OECD 1995: 79). 
1950-1988 
Cumulative 
$US million 
1950-1995 
Cumulative 
$US million 
1997 
JPY 100 million 
1998 
JPY 100 million 
Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share Amount Share 
U. S. A 6268 49.0 15613 41.2 1518 22.4 8078 60.3 
Canada 152 21.2 1663 4.4 2 0.0 17 0.1 
North America total 6420 50.2 17276 45.6 1521 22.4 8095 60.4 
UK 518 4.0 1643 4.3 446 6.6 370 2.8 
Germany 546 4.3 2062 5.3 552 8.1 335 2.5 
France 202 1.6 777 2.1 93 1.4 168 1.3 
Switzerland 928 7.3 2250 5.9 191 2.8 288 2.1 
Netherlands 482 3.8 3361 8.9 1463 21.6 1280 9.5 
Europe total 3013 23.6 11653 30.7 3078 45.4 3023 22.6 
Japan13 1663 12.9 3951 10.4 843 12.4 1729 12.9 
Total 12794 100.0 37925 100.0 6782 100.0 13404 100.0 
Table 6-18. IFDI flows into Japan by country and region. 
Source. Same as the Table 6-17. 
Japanese Firms 
acquire Japanese firms 
Japanese firms 
acquire foreign firms 
Foreign firms 
acquire Japanese firms 
Total 
1980 122 48 6 176 
1985 163 100 26 289 
1986 226 204 21 451 
1987 219 228 22 469 
1988 223 315 17 555 
1989 240 405 15 660 
1990 293 440 18 751 
Table 6-19. Number of M&As involving Japanese firms. 
Source. Lawrence (1993). 
As we have seen from the above, the Japanese state endeavoured to liberalise and 
deregulate the IFDI regime in the PDS period. As we have seen in the earlier section 
for the Japanese DS, the Japanese IFDI regime was fully liberalised in terms of 
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regulations and screenings. The deregulation and liberalisation can be dated back to 
1980 when Japan abolished `the Foreign Investment Council (FIC)' which was under 
the authorisation of the MITI and established a new organisation named `the 
Committee on Foreign Exchange and Other Transaction (CFEOT)' under the MOF. 
The important thing here was that bureaucrats participation in the FIC was abolished 
when the CFEOT was founded. The CFEOT was organised by non-bureaucrat, 
civilian members. 
However, in the PDS period, administrative regulations became a primary obstacle 
which constrained IFDI flows into the Japanese domestic market. In other words, 
instead of direct regulation or restriction measures, indirect barriers caused by 
complicated and time consuming administrative processes became the most important 
factor preventing IFDI development in Japan. Thus, deregulation became a national 
slogan in the Japanese PDS period. Deregulation was intended to "limit government's 
interference in the economy to improve the quality of life, by expanding the range of 
consumer choice and reducing price differentials between Japan and other countries, 
and to facilitate imports, thereby easing friction with the trading partners" (OECD 
1996: 67). Thus, it can be inferred from the above that the deregulation processes 
pursued in the Japanese PDS were a comprehensive plan to facilitate domestic 
structural adjustment by opening service sectors to foreign competitors in order to 
improve the Japanese underdeveloped service industry and to increase market access 
to foreign trader and investor. Moreover, deregulation was also pursued in order to 
improve the Japanese quality of life. 
13 IFDI by Japan indicates the amount of investment by affiliates of foreign business in Japan 
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Governmental efforts to deregulate the Japanese economy started from 1988 when 
`the Provisional Council for the Promotion of Administrative Reform (PCPAR)' was 
founded and eight areas14 were targeted to be deregulated. In 1993, the `Hiraiwa 
Report' by the Advisory Group of for Economic Structural Reform was published. In 
the report, easing regulations to improve market access by simplifying inspection and 
custom procedures and reporting requirements were emphasised. `The Outline of 
External Economic Reform Measures' announced in March 1994 called for faster 
deregulation in the distribution system and the financial sector. `The Japan-United 
States Framework for a New Economic Partnership' which was agreed in September 
1994 propelled the deregulation process further by promising increased market access 
to the Japanese service industry for American companies. However, the problem of 
these deregulation processes was that: 
Although numerous measures have been implemented, most 
represent only partial steps towards complete liberalisation ... 
there are few industries where entry barriers have been abolished .. 
. The 1988 and 1994 packages, 
for example, covered some of the 
same issues, such as the distribution system and telecommunications 
(OECD 1994: 71) 
Aware of this criticism, the Japanese PDS continued to propel deregulation processes. 
In March 1995, `the Deregulation Action Programme' was introduced and in March 
1997, `the Final Revision of the Three Year Deregulation Plan' was announced. As a 
result of these deregulation efforts, as of March 1997,1531 deregulation measures 
were implemented with 402 unfinished items (OECD 1997: 84). In May 1998, `the 
Three Year (1998-2000) Programme for the Promotion of Deregulation' was adopted 
14 The eight areas were distribution system, telecommunications, finance, inspection, testing and 
qualification system, transportation, energy, agricultural products, car leasing. 
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by a cabinet decision. In the Programme, the removal of entry barriers affecting 
foreign companies and foreign products in the Japanese markets, further relaxation of 
approval or notification systems and the conformity of standards, inspection with 
international standards were again emphasised (Monthly Finance Review May 1998: 
45-46). What is important here is that these deregulation processes are mutually 
repetitive. The OECD Economic Survey, although it was published in 1995, clearly 
pointed out the limit of the Japanese PDS' deregulation processes: "many of measures 
included in the new plan are aimed at the same sectors as previous deregulation plans, 
suggesting a degree of repetition and overlap and a continuation of a strategy based on 
incremental change" (OECD 1995: 79). Thus, although the Japanese PDS 
continuously deregulated service sectors, because of this cautious and very slow pace, 
Japan's international competitiveness in the service industry is still behind compared 
with other advanced countries (JETRO 1998: 14). 
In sum, the low level of IFDI in the Japanese PDS can be attributed to three major 
factors. First, slow, cautious, and very incremental deregulation measures in the 
service industry. Second, the institutional barriers caused by Keiretsu system. And 
finally, cultural practices of Japanese businessmen and Japanese people's culturally 
rooted aversion towards foreigners. Government regulation or screening is no longer 
a determining factor which frustrates foreign investors in progressing their investment 
in the Japanese PDS. 
1-3. The Korean transitionary state period (1998-To present) 
The Korean TS period witnessed a fundamental change and transformation of the 
IFDI regime. Incremental and piecemeal liberalisation processes under the PDS 
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abruptly turned into full-fledged, comprehensive, and substantial liberalisation after 
Korea experienced the East Asian economic crisis. Excessive dependence on foreign 
loans occurred because of rapid but poorly prepared financial and foreign exchange 
liberalisation under the Young-Sam Kim government. As we have seen in Chapter 5, 
the Korean state was not passive but very active in coping with challenges from the 
globalising world economy. In order to actively deal with challenges, the Korean state 
prepared `the Segyehwa (globalisation) policy' in which further and more 
comprehensive liberalisation and deregulation policies were implemented. However, 
liberalisation in financial sectors was not accompanied by a strengthened supervisory 
system and as a result, merchant banks borrowed excessive foreign loans in order to 
exploit the interest rate gap between Korea and creditor countries. The Korean 
interest rate was much higher than that of developed countries. Moreover, in the 
liberalised space, big Korean companies (Chaebols) and their subsidiaries also 
excessively borrowed from local financial institutions. The most important thing was 
that the Korean government did not reserve sufficient foreign currency to protect the 
Korean currency, the Won and to stabilise the foreign exchange market. Thus, as the 
domino effect of the economic crisis spilled over to Korea from Southeast Asian 
countries, the Korean state had no policy means to escape from the domino effect. 
Snowballed foreign loans caused by excessive and unregulated borrowings of 
merchant banks and Korean subsidiaries and the shortage of a foreign currency 
reserve finally led to an unprecedented economic and social crisis in Korea. 
With the help of the IMF, the World Bank, and the ADB, Korea recovered fast and the 
Korean state changed its fundamental belief systems towards the value and 
contributions of IFDI to the Korean economy. The changed belief system from 
281 
developmentalism to a free market-oriented one was revealed by president Dae-Joong 
Kim's official addresses which firstly criticised excessive government intervention in 
the market, secondly strongly committed Korea's embrace of the free market system 
and thirdly emphasised Korean people's changed attitude towards foreign investment: 
The root cause of the crisis ... was the continuing undemocratic 
practice of the government meddling in the private economic sector. 
Collusion between politicians and businessmen, government- 
controlled financing and corruption were widespread and, as a 
result, the function of the market economy was distorted and the 
country lost its competitive strength (Economic Bulletin 1999 
April) 5. 
From now on, government intervention will be de-emphasised in 
favour of private initiative and creativity. Korean will soon adhere 
fully to the principles of a free market economy (Economic Bulletin 
1998 November) 16. 
Since the crisis, Koreans, who had not generally welcomed foreign 
capital, have changed their attitudes. For example, a recent poll 
showed 87 percent of Koreans now believe foreign investment is 
beneficial to our national economy (Economic Bulletin June 
1998)'7. 
Moreover, a statement from the MOFE also reflected the changed belief systems of 
the Korean TS: 
Measures taken by the Korean government to liberalise the capital 
market and promote FDI since the outbreak of the crisis reflect not 
just the changes in policy matrix, but more fundamentally the 
change in the government's philosophy (Economic Bulletin May 
1999). 
Thus, Korea fully liberalised its IFDI regime in the TS period and Korea enjoyed a 
dramatic surge up of IFDI flows in the TS period. With this changed belief systems, 
is This adress was delivered at the Pensions 2000 Annual Meeting held in Seoul on 12 April 1999. 
16 This address was delivered at the annual APEC Business Summit meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia on 16 November 1998. 
17 This address was devlivered at the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington D. C. on 10 June 1998. 
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the IFDI regime in the Korean TS underwent dramatic changes. In his speech 
delivered to the AMCHAM in Korea, the vice minister of the MOFE promised to 
remove government red tape which had been the most restraining factor to IFDI flows 
(Economic Bulletin February 1999). As of April 1998, among remaining 52 restricted 
businesses, a further 10 businesses were opened to IFDI and only 42 businesses out of 
1148 business category remained restricted. This brought Korea's investment 
liberalisation ratio up to 98.4 percent (Economic Bulletin April 1998). In May 1998, 
the Korean government accelerated the opening of domestic businesses to IFDI by 
announcing a further liberalising plan in which 20 businesses would be liberalised 
after 1998 (Economic Bulletin May 1998). Moreover, in May 1998, hostile takeovers 
by foreign investors were fully allowed and "the ceiling on foreign acquisition of real 
estate, as well as the ceiling on equity ownership by foreigners of private Korean 
enterprises, was eliminated in June" (Economic Bulletin May 1999). All these efforts 
show that, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the Korean TS undertook full- 
fledged liberalisation in the areas of M&A and land acquisition and opening the 
domestic market by reducing the number of businesses closed to IFDI. Thanks to the 
deregulation on hostile M&As, in 1998, more than 50 percent of IFDI was attracted by 
M&As (MOCIE 1999b: 1). 
The most important change in the Korean TS period was the introduction of the New 
Foreign Investment Promotion Act in November 1998. In the new Act, various 
incentives were stipulated. First, tax reduction and exemption were widened. For 
example, high tech and service IFDI which could improve Korean firms' international 
competitiveness could benefit from an initial 7 years tax exemption and a half per cent 
reduction thereafter for 3 years. Second, governmental land or properties could be 
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provided to foreign investors free of charge for up to 50 years and finally, direct 
government subsidies could be provided. For example, expenses from job training 
will be covered by the subsidies (Seong-Bong Lee and Hyong-Keun Lee. 1998: 1-2). 
After the enactment of the Act, the Korea Investment Service Centre (KISC) under the 
KOTRA started its service as an one-stop service centre (MOCIE 1999a: 1) and the 
MOCIE also established `the Trade and Investment Facilitation Office for Foreign 
Companies (TIFO)' in order to expedite IFDI and resolve difficulties foreign investors 
encounter (MOCIE 1999: 1). In order to improve Korea's negative image caused by 
consistent protective features in imports, the Korean TS also abolished the Import 
Diversification Program in December 1998 which had lasted for more than 30 years in 
order to reduce the trade deficit with Japan and technological dependence on Japan 
and America (The Korea Herald 25 August 1999). 
The underlying belief systems of these fundamental and radical liberalisation 
processes in the Korean TS period is that IFDI flows are now regarded as a sole way 
to decrease the high dependency on foreign loans. With this changed belief system, 
IFDI is regarded as positive and beneficial to the Korean economy as long as the flows 
develop more jobs and promote more technological transfers in high-tech and 
knowledge intensive industries. Moreover, foreign direct investment could help to 
facilitate Korea's financial and corporate reforms by improving firms' liquidity 
condition and by realising transparency due to newly introduced international 
accounting standards (Joon-Dong Kim 1998: 1). It was revealed that foreign firms 
which are operating in Korea were better than indigenous Korean counterparts in 
productivity by introducing more efficient managerial know-how and by staying away 
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from inefficient corporate behaviour such as cross-debt guarantee and excessive debt 
to equity ratio. 
The official statements from the MOFE again unveils the fundamental changes of 
belief systems towards IFDI and the fact that the MOFE endeavours to justify the 
benefits of IFDI by challenging the criticism and scepticism which amplifies the side- 
effects of rapid and fundamental liberalisation. This statement shows that the MOFE 
become a strong proponent of IFDI promotion and full liberalisation: 
First, there are those who insist that FDI is no longer useful or 
necessary since the nation has fully recovered from the liquidity 
crisis. However, the still weak financial structures suggest that the 
economy may not be entirely immune to another economic crisis . 
. Second, some believe that, 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
domestic companies were sold to foreign investors at lower prices 
than their real values. In reality, however, these domestic firms 
were sold at market prices (the MOFE 1999b: 2-3). 
This statement also reveals that, for the Korean TS, IFDI flows were considered as a 
kind of panacea in curing the chronic Korean foreign debt problems and inefficient 
corporate and banking systems. In 1998, Korea introduced the New Foreign 
Investment Promotion Act (NFIPA) in order to improve the IFDI environment and to 
increase IFDI flows into Korea. By adopting the new Act, the Korean state introduced 
various incentives and supporting systems. With the help of these supportive and 
promotive government policies, IFDI flows into Korea surged up dramatically after 
1998 and Korea become a net FDI recipient country after 10 years of having a net 
investor country (UN 1999: 57). This success for Korea in attracting IFDI is 
remarkable considering that after the East Asian economic crisis, Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Taiwan experienced a down turn of IFDI from 
foreign investors (UNCTAD 1999: 2). 
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2. Outward FDI 
2-1. The developmental state period 
Japan's and Korea's OFDI development in Southeast Asia has to be explained with a 
political calculation. In the discipline of international business (IB), Japanese 
manufacturing industry's heavy presence in the region has been explicated with only 
an economic approach. This economic approach argues that even though the Japanese 
government carefully planned and implemented OFDI development in the region, it 
was the economic calculations of private firms that actually pursued and accomplished 
production plant in the region. For the proponents of this approach, economic pull 
factors from host countries and economic push factors from Japan were the primary 
and most important driving forces of OFDI deployment in the region. Accordingly, 
differences in ownership advantage, locational advantage, and internalisation 
advantage determine the extent and content of global inward and outward FDI flows. 
However, what this economically oriented approach neglects is the fact that Japan is a 
state in which co-operation and co-ordination between government and private firms 
are systematically realised in the name of national interest. Moreover, this economic 
calculation also underestimates the social embeddedness of Japanese 
developmentalism even in the post developmental period. As has been emphasised 
several times in this thesis, both tangible and intangible institutions last longer than 
ideas (belief systems) and material interests. This means that even though the 
institutional legacies of the developmental state became a primary obstacle of further 
economic development in the more politicised global political economy system, 
institutionalised developmentalism itself needs much more time to be changed and 
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adjusted to a greatly transformed domestic or international political economy system. 
In the Japanese EDS period, we can examine this institutionalised developmental ism 
in the constructing processes of Japanese production sites in Southeast Asia. In order 
to add a political approach to the economic approach, we need to closely examine the 
relationship between Japanese ODA and OFDI development in the region. 
Korea also tried to learn from Japan in developing its economic and political ties with 
the ASEAN countries. In the PDS period, the Korean state's supports towards private 
firms' OFDI flows was insignificant. Different from the traditional and strong 
interventionist state in economic affairs, the Korean state's role in OFDI development 
in Southeast Asia was almost insignificant. However, although actual state policies 
did not show any supportive or restrictive aspects, in the policy-making processes we 
find Korea's learning from the Japanese EDS in arranging and preparing the Korean 
ODA system. In the following sections related to Japan and Korea's OFDI 
development, the industrial and regional distribution of OFDI will be firstly explained 
and then the political aspects of Japanese EDS into Southeast Asia and the Korean 
state's institutional learning (mimetic isormophism) from its Japanese counterpart will 
be examined. The time span for Korean DS is 1962-1985 and for Japan is 1951-1985. 
The Plaza Accord which caused the appreciation of the Japanese Yen was a watershed 
in Japanese OFDI development path. For Korea, the Plaza Accord was also an 
important watershed. The rise of JPY and the relative drop of the Korean Won 
against JPY facilitated Korea's trade surplus. As Korea achieved its first trade surplus 
in 1986, the Korean PDS initiated OFDI and foreign exchange liberalisation. And, 
due to increased trade surplus with America in the second half of the 1980s, pressures 
from America also increased and the Korean Won appreciated. With the currency 
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appreciation, Korean OFDI into Southeast Asia surged. Thus, the Plaza Accord was 
also a significant turning point for Korean OFDI. 
2-1-1. The Korean DS period (1968-1985) 
Korea's OFDI dramatically increased after the middle of the 1980s. The background 
of the increase could be divided into internal push factors and external pull factors. 
The first balance of payments surplus achieved in 1987, strategic globalisation of 
private Korean firms particularly the Chaebol, the appreciation of the Korean Won, 
dramatically rising labour costs, labour market unrest, the shortage of labour force in 
`3 D' (difficult, dangerous, dirty) industries and dual economic system led by 
dominant Chaebol and underdeveloped SMEs were the major features of the domestic 
push factors behind the promotion of Korean OFDI in the PDS period (Yoon-Hwan 
Shin and You-Il Lee 1995: 179, Economic Bulletin August 1992). The improved 
balance of payments brought about Korea's liberalisation of the Foreign Exchange 
Management Law in 1987. 
C (TT 
Calendar Year Total Acceptance Total investment Net investment 
1968-71 20178 14314 13364 
1972 2739 5115 4767 
1973 16609 3907 3717 
1974 15278 18149 18045 
1975 12027 14171 9701 
1976 17800 8220 6943 
1977 17484 17795 12331 
1978 46522 43418 38761 
1979 102412 22772 18820 
1980 22816 21095 15456 
1981 108530 28212 21925 
1982 121396 100837 97578 
1983 82969 108917 102591 
1984 67448 50186 48184 
1985 219190 112774 63752 
18 `Net investment' means `total investment' minus `liquidation'. `Total acceptance' minus 
'cancellation' is `remaining acceptance'. Thus, there are four standards in dealing with Korean OFDI 
flows. Total acceptance - cancellation = remaining acceptance, total investment - liquidation = net 
investment. 
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Table 6-20. Korean OFDI flows in the DS period. 
Source. Data from 1968 to 1980 is based on the Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various 
issues and requoted from Sakong (1993). Data from 1981 to 1985 is quoted from the MOFE (1999c). 
(Percenta¢e) 
CY US Europe Asia ASEAN 5 Latin America China'9 
1968-80 22.4 3.6 36.5 30.7 3.6 
1985 11.1 34.4 15.8 14.3 2.5 - 
1868-86 23.6 9.7 18.9 13.4 - - 
1987 40.9 1.7 32.2 30.9 - - 
1988 51.5 8.6 20.2 13.0 - - 
1989 29.6 3.5 22.8 15.9 - - 
1990 35.7 9.9 31.3 23.9 - 1.7 
1991 35.0 8.1 38.4 29.2 3.7 3.8 
1992 28.4 11.8 42.7 20.4 3.0 11.6 
1994 22.8 18.6 47.0 7.2 2.1 27.5 
1995 17.4 21.0 53.8 13.5 3.9 26.8 
1997 22.6 14.3 46.6 13.1 8.0 19.6 
1998 22.5 26.2 39.8 9.8 5.3 16.2 
Table 6-21. Korean DS' and PDS' OFDI flows by region (Percentage). 
Source. Based on the total investment. Data for cumulative 1968-80,1985, and 1991 to 1998 is 
modified from the MOFE (1999c). Data for cumulative 1968-86 and 1987 to 1990 is quoted from Si- 
Joong Kim et. al. (1992). Data for China is modified from the MOFE (1999c). 
Also, as we have seen in the Chapter 5, Korea experienced rapid rising labour costs 
and labour market unrest caused by nation-wide, militant labour movements in the 
late 1980s under the democratisation process of Korea's political economy. 
Moreover, as Korea's GDP grew rapidly, labour shortages emerged, particularly in 
labour intensive industries. With these labour market disadvantages and an 
unfavourable business environment caused by the dominant Chaebol structure, SMEs 
which were then focused on labour intensive industries started to move their 
production sites to Southeast Asia. 
As we have seen in Chapter 5, the Korean state underwent a democratisation process 
in the mid-1980s. Particularly after 1987 when `the 6.29 declaration' from the ruling 
party was announced, labour movements became militant and nation-wide labour 
market unrest facilitated OFDI flows from Korea to Southeast Asian countries. Under 
the democratisation processes, the Trade Union Law was amended in 1987. Before 
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the amendment, the law "legitimised state intervention in strikes, work contracts and 
decentralised the union movement to the company level and gave the state rights to 
change the existing union structure at any time" (Yoon-Hwan Shin and You-Il Lee 
1995: 183). However, after the amendment, the new law "guaranteed three rights of 
labour (union organisation, collective bargaining, and collective acting) and lifted 
restraints on unionisation, union activities and leadership selection controlled by deep 
state intervention" (Yoon-Hwan Shin and You-Il Lee 1995: 184). Thus, under this 
democratised labour environment, labour movements were intensified. Increased 
production costs which were accompanied by militant labour movements were the 
major push factors for Korean OFDI. In other words, Korea's cheap and abundant 
labour force ceased to exist from the mid 1980s and as Korean manufacturing industry 
lost its comparative advantage, OFDI from the industry began to increase in order to 
'find cheap production sites in Southeast Asia. 
External pull factors for Korean OFDI included Korea's loss of its Generalised 
System of Preference (GSP) in 1989, the ASEAN countries' liberalised and 
favourable policies towards FDI throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the trade and 
technological protectionist trends starting from the mid 1980s in the US and Western 
Europe, and Korea's economic boom in 1986-1988 which was indebted to the three 
lows of international interest rates, international oil prices, and Korean Won against 
the Japanese Yen and finally, rapid changes of comparative advantage in Asia due to 
massive increase of FDI flows (Sakong 1993: 150, Economic Bulletin August 1992, 
Ku-Hyun Jung and Moxon 1996: 158-159). As Korea lost its GSP privilege, Korea 
sought to find a production base for detour exports and the ASEAN countries were the 
19 Korea made diplomatic normalisation with China in 1989. OFDI started from 1990. 
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perfect places which welcomed foreign investment with liberalised policies and 
incentives and still enjoyed GSP status and supplied abundant cheap labour. 
Moreover, as developed countries strengthened their protectionist measures in trade 
and technology, Korea had to find alternatives in attracting high technology and in 
overcoming protectionist barriers and blocs. The OFDI provided Korea with not only 
technology accessibility to advanced countries by takeovers but also stable exports 
into advanced countries' markets by establishing overseas production sites which 
were not affected by protectionist measures. 
Before the middle of the 1980s (60s, 70s, and the first half of 80s), the Korean 
government strongly restricted and regulated OFDI in order to take control of the 
shortage of foreign exchange and snowballed foreign debt. Thus, OFDI was 
concentrated in natural resources development in order to secure a stable supply of 
raw materials for exports. The most distinctive symbol of regulatory state 
intervention in OFDI flows was the establishment of the Overseas Investment 
Deliberation Committee (OIDC) in 1981. After witnessing specified and detailed 
screenings by the OIDC after 1981, Korea suddenly turned to OFDI liberalisation in 
1987 when a notification system was introduced for investment under one million US 
dollars and the amount of investment which needed the approval of the OIDC was 
increased from three million to five million US dollars. Moreover, the amount of 
investments which needed approval by relevant ministries was raised from one 
million to three million dollars. As we have seen above, the first liberalisation 
measure in 1987 was possible because of Korea's first balance of payment surplus 
realised in 1986. These liberalisation measures were stipulated in `the Formal 
Proposal' to improve OFDI in 1987. 
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In the Proposal, declining industries such as labour intensive and light industries were 
recommended to pursue OFDI and in order to evade protective barriers in the 
international political economy system in the 1980s, the barrier circumventing OFDI 
was also strongly recommended and as a result, regulations towards these OFDI were 
liberalised and various financial and tax incentives were provided in 1987 (Monthly 
Review September 1987). What is important here is that by observing these 
promotive OFDI policies for both declining industries and trade barrier circumventing 
investment, we could find the Korean PDS' intention to promote the Expansionist 
Developmental State. Under the Japanese DS, as the MITI strongly promoted 
Japanese OFDI into Korea in the 1970s in order to adjust and upgrade Japanese 
economic structure by exporting declining industries (Castley 1996: 73), the Korean 
PDS pursued the same strategy to upgrade its economic structure by exporting 
declining industries to Southeast Asia. 
Thus, Korean OFDI started from labour-intensive, cheap labour seeking sectors such 
as textile and garments, footwear, and standardised electrical home appliances. The 
destination of these OFDI was the ASEAN 5 countries, Vietnam, and later China. As 
Table 21 indicates, Asia has continuously been a most important destination of 
Korean OFDI. The share of the ASEAN 5 in Asia was dominant position until the 
early 1990s. However, as China normalised diplomatic relations with Korea, Korean 
OFDI into China dramatically increased and in 1994, China surpassed the ASEAN 5 
as a destination for Korean OFDI flows. The reasons for the rapid emergence of 
China as a massive absorber of Korean OFDI can be summarised as follows. First, 
China's labour cost is much cheaper than the ASEAN countries. Thanks to rapid 
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economic growth, the ASEAN countries experienced a continuous rise in labour costs. 
Second, China is much closer than the ASEAN countries to Korea. Moreover, 
historical and cultural affinities between the two countries also contributed to rapid 
expansion of trade and investments between the two countries. Third, as Japan had 
already established systematically organised production networks in Southeast Asia, 
Korean firms as latecomers in the region experienced difficulty in finding local 
partners and in penetrating Japanese production and supply networks. Thus, Korean 
firms chose China as an alternative destination for their OFDI. 
2-1-2. The Japanese DS period (1951-1985) 
AT TIZ _; 11-1 
Fiscal Year OFDI Fiscal Year OFDI 
1951-1956 45 1971 858 
1957 34 1972 2338 
1958 65 1973 3494 
1959 54 1974 2396 
1960 94 1975 3280 
1961 164 1976 3462 
1962 99 1977 2806 
1963 126 1978 4598 
1964 119 1979 4995 
1965 159 1980 4693 
1966 227 1981 8932 
1967 275 1982 7703 
1968 557 1983 8145 
1969 665 1984 10155 
1970 904 1985 12217 
Table 6-22. Japanese total OFDI flows in the DS period. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Data from 1951 to 1962 is quoted from Hamada (1972). Data from 
1963 to 1985 is quoted from Steven (1990). 
/Perront2on\ 
FY 1951-74, Cumulative FY 1951-81, Cumulative FY 1985 
US 23.6 27.1 45.0 
Europe 19.1 11.6 15.8 
Asia 23.0 29.0 11.6 
Latin America 17.6 16.2 21.4 
Table 6-23. Japanese DS' OFDI flows by region (Percentage). 
Source. Data for 1951-1974 is quoted from Steven (1990) and data for 1951-1981 is quoted from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (1983). Data for 1985 is modified from the OECD (1993b). 
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The Japanese DS' OFDI policy underwent a distinctive change in the second half of 
1960s when Japan achieved its first surplus in the balance of payments. Before the 
surplus, OFDI was strongly regulated. For example, projects over 300 thousand US 
dollars had to obtain permissions from the BOJ and projects only under 200 thousand 
dollars were subject to the automatic approval system. The background of the 
regulation was firstly, concern about the possible deterioration of the balance of 
payments due to excessive capital outflows, secondly, the concern about the possible 
ineffective control of monetary policy when OFDI involved large amounts of capital, 
and finally, the concern about the adversarial effects of OFDI towards domestic 
industry when OFDI hinders Japanese exports and when there is excessive 
competition among Japanese firms in host countries (Hamada 1972: 188). However, 
as Hamada clearly pointed out, the regulation was not substantial but formal and the 
belief systems of the majority of the Japanese people towards OFDI was positive: "the 
general attitude of Japanese people towards outward direct investment is commonly 
favourable. It seems that government, businessmen, most academics agree that Japan 
should liberalise outward direct investment. This is in great contrast to attitudes 
towards foreign investment in Japan" (Hamada 1972: 189). 
Thus, the OFDI policy was continuously liberalised throughout the Japanese DS 
period. Firstly, in 1964, liberalisation started by the introduction of the automatic 
approval system. Investments under 40 thousand dollars were eligible for Automatic 
Approval. Investment which was automatically approved did not need to contact the 
MOR The authority for Automatic Approval was transferred to the BOJ from the 
MOF. The amount of investments which were eligible for Automatic Approval was 
extended to 100 thousand dollars in 1969. In 1970, the amount was again raised to 
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200 thousand dollars and in 1978, the prior notification system to the BOJ replaced 
the old approval system. In 1980, the Japanese DS took further steps towards 
liberalisation by reducing the number of restricted businesses and by announcing the 
system of `approval in principle, regulation in exception'. From 1984, investment 
projects under 10 million JPY could proceed without prior notification to BOJ and the 
amount was raised again in 1987 to 30 million JPY. In 1998, the Japanese PDS 
abolished the prior notification system by amending the FE & FTCL. 
The MITI announced the reasons why Japan had to promote OFDI in its White Paper 
`The Long Term View on Industrial Structure' published in 1975: "the need to secure 
stable natural resources, the need to upgrade Japanese industrial structure by moving 
declining industry and focusing on more value added industry, the need to overcome 
the protectionist barrier against Japanese exports" (Requoted from the EIU 1983: 12). 
The intention of economic structural upgrade was written in the official statement 
prepared by `the Industrial Structure Council' under the MITI: "industrial branches 
such as textiles which include a low degree of processing and generate low added 
value should be moved to developing countries. .. so that Japan can concentrate on 
high technology and knowledge intensive industries" (Requoted from Suzuki 1991: 
146). 
Japanese DS' OFDI flows experienced four distinctive stages of development from 
1951. In the first stage, Japanese DS' OFDI was concentrated in labour intensive 
industries and natural resource development. As the Japanese economy developed 
further, Japan witnessed rising production costs. And as a result of this rise, Japanese 
SMEs developed labour-intensive OFDI in Asian NTEs countries from the 1960s to 
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1970s (Ozawa 1996: 159). For example, Korea, after normalising diplomatic relations 
with Japan in 1965, tried to induce more Japanese FDI by establishing the Export Free 
Zone. Thus, light industry such as textile, garments, and footwear led to the sudden 
growth of Japanese DS' OFDI in Asian NIEs. The Japanese DS was constantly eager 
to secure stability in the supply of raw materials. Because Japan lacks natural 
resources and Japan is heavily dependent on exports of manufactured goods, securing 
a stable supply of raw materials was a significant condition for Japan's economic 
development. Second, the Japanese DS' OFDI also developed through heavy and 
chemical industries (HCI) (Chng and Hirono 1984: 48). HCI industries facilitated 
Japanese OFDI in two ways. One was Japan's suffering from pollution caused by 
rapid development in HCI industry. Thus, the Japanese DS was eager to move 
pollution industries to foreign countries from the mid 1970s (Steven 1990: 80-81, 
Suzuki 1991: 143). This was the so-called house cleaning OFDI (Ozawa 1996: 161). 
And the other was that as ASEAN countries implemented import substitution 
industries, demands for Japanese exports in HCI industries were massively increased. 
This is the period when the Japanese DS' OFDI qualitatively transformed its contents 
from labour intensive to capital intensive ones. 
Third, OFDI was also pursued in order to circumvent protective barriers in America 
and Western Europe (EN 1983: 5). This type of investment was led by the 
automobiles and consumer electronics industries from the mid 1980s. Moreover, this 
was the period when Japan actively invested in the real estate sector in America with 
the help of the appreciated JPY and surplus capital which emanated from its enormous 
trade surplus. Thus, after the mid 1980s, Japanese OFDI in the two regions increased 
rapidly and the amount of investment towards Asia decreased. Fourth, however, from 
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the first half of the 1990s, Japanese OFDI in East Asia surged dramatically. This is 
the period when Japan started its project of establishing production networks or export 
platforms in the region (Ozawa 1996: 163). More specifically, Japanese OFDI 
dramatically surged from 1985 to 1989. At this time, investment was concentrated in 
developed countries and the share of ASEAN and NIEs fell. However, the share of 
Southeast Asia started to increase after 1990 led by massive manufacturing OFDI. 
The political background of the expansion of Japanese OFDI in the region could be 
summarised into two major factors: "this FDI shift can be viewed as part of a gradual 
strategic re-orientation that will lessen Japan's dependence on the US, while 
expanding its opportunities with developing economies in Asia" (Jun et al. 1993: 28). 
(Percentane) 
FY Asia NIES ASEAN 4 FY Asia NIEs ASEAN 4 
1951-1970 21.2 5.1 12.9 1978 29.1 12.9 16.2 
1971 27.6 11.2 16.1 1979 19.5 12.3 6.8 
1972 17.2 9.7 7.4 1980 25.3 8.1 16.7 
1973 28.6 12.9 15.6 1981 37.4 8.1 28.8 
1974 30.6 8.9 21.4 1982 18.0 9.6 8.1 
1975 33.6 8.4 24.5 1983 22.7 13.7 8.0 
1976 36.0 6.5 29.4 1984 16.0 8.0 6.7 
1977 30.8 10.3 20.3 1985 11.6 5.9 4.9 
Table 6-24. Japanese DS' OFDI into Asia, NIEs, and ASEAN 420 (Percentage). 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Quoted from You-Soo Hong (1993). 
FY 1973 
Cumulative 
$US million 
FY 1980 
cumulative 
$US million 
1987 
Cumulative 
$US 
million 
FY 1996 
JPY 
100 million 
FY 1997 
JPY 
100 million 
FY 1998 
JPY 
100 million 
Manufacturing 1211 3847 10000 7466 8978 4732 
Food 47 139 425 314 215 161 
Textile 483 870 1231 403 520 285 
Wood/Pulp 71 132 212 258 162 171 
Chemical 76 528 1585 1004 1619 759 
Metals 99 732 2064 1068 965 704 
Machinery 49 242 778 625 647 363 
Electrical 183 473 1562 2059 2226 852 
Transport 77 238 1028 897 1047 1021 
Others 126 492 1115 839 1577 415 
Non-manufacturing 1148 4695 16286 4755 5640 3484 
AgJFoJFt? ' 103 259 391 102 223 9 
Mining 605 2815 6677 522 1270 375 
Construction 11 65 254 174 267 170 
20 ASEAN 4 refers to Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
21 AgJFoJFi. means Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery. 
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ComfFrade 74 331 1482 894 957 1452 
Fi. /lnsurance23 128 237 1447 891 706 548 
Service - - 3173 862 676 487 
Transportation - 393 302 486 267 
Real Estate - - 846 1007 1089 169 
Others 228 988 1622 - 65 9 
Branch equipment - 25 336 862 330 141 
Real estate - 77 37 - - - 
Total 2359 8643 26.658 13.083 14948 8357 
Table 6-25. Japanese DS and PDS' OFDI flows into Asia24 by Industry (Amount). 
Source. Cumulative data until 1973,1980 and 1987 is quoted from Steven (1990) and yearly data for 
1996,1997, and 1998 is quoted from the MOF (1999a). 
(Pereen to nel 
FY 1951-76 FY 1977-86 FY 1986 
Food 1.9 1.0 1.2 
Textile 13.9 3.0 1.0 
Lumber/Pulp 2.3 0.5 0.3 
Chemicals 5.7 6.3 2.0 
Metals 4.4 9.2 2.7 
Machinery 1.8 3.5 4.1 
Electrical 5.6 4.8 11.4 
Transport 2.6 4.0 5.6 
Others 5.1 4.2 6.6 
Manufacturing Total 43.4 36.7 34.9 
AgJFo. 3.0 1.1 0.0 
Mining 36.6 27.5 10.6 
Construction 0.5 1.4 1.0 
Commerce and Trade 3.1 6.7 8.7 
Banking and Insurance 3.2 5.3 12.5 
Others 10.4 21.1 31.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6-26. Japanese DS' OFDI into Asia by industry (Percentage). 
Source. Suzuki (1991). 
Tables 25 and 26 clearly point out the transitions in Japanese OFDI in Asia. In the 
manufacturing industry, until 1976, the textile industry occupied a dominant position 
and from 1977 to 1986, chemicals and metals became leading industries. And finally 
in 1986, electrical machinery and electronics occupied almost a third of Japanese 
OFDI in manufacturing industry. In non-manufacturing industry, Japanese OFDI 
flows also revealed a transition from mining to commerce and trade and the financial 
sector. These tables also reflect the ASEAN countries' historical trajectory of 
22 ComJTrade means Commerce and Trade. 
23 FiAnsurance means Finance and Insurance. 
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economic development from natural resource exporting countries to electrical 
machinery exporting countries. 
The increase of Japanese OFDI in the financial sector in the ASEAN countries started 
with the appreciation of the Japanese Yen after the Plaza Accord. With the expensive 
Japanese Yen, Japanese financial institutions found their way into the ASEAN 
countries in order to support Japanese firms' subsidiaries in the region. Moreover, 
Japanese financial institutions also increased their commercial loans to ASEAN 
countries. As of 30 September 1998,18 major Japanese banks had loans worth 16 
trillion Yen to Asian companies (Japan Economic Almanac 1999: 24). More 
specifically, at the end of 1996, Japanese banks' exposure to Asian countries were 
Thailand (37.5 billion dollars), Korea (24.3 billion dollars), Indonesia (22.0 billion), 
Malaysia (8.2 billion), and Philippines (1.6 billion) (Japan Economic Almanac 1998: 
57). The rise of Japanese investment flows to the financial industry in ASEAN also 
reflected ASEAN countries' economic structural transformation from a manufacturing 
industry-centred economic structure to a more advanced service-industry centred one. 
The easy access for ASEAN countries to Japanese commercial loans propelled an 
asset bubble in the region, particularly, in Thailand. Thus, to some extent, the 
Japanese EDS exported its asset bubble to the ASEAN countries (Whittaker and 
Kurosawa 1998: 761). Besides this side-effect of financial development, Japanese 
OFDI also caused other negative side effect of development. The deeply structured 
technological gap and increasing trade and investment inequality between Japan and 
24 Asia includes Newly Industrising Economies (Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) and ASEAN countries. 
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the Asian countries reflect a hierarchical and unequal economic relationship (Suzuki 
1991: 149). 
The destinations of Japanese DS' OFDI are illustrated in Tables 23 and 24. For the 
period 1951-1981, both Asia and the US shared almost the same amount of the 
Japanese DS' OFDI. This indicates that traditionally Asia and the US were the major 
destinations of the Japanese DS' OFDI. However, in 1985, OFDI into the US was 45 
percent and into Asia, it was a mere 11.6 percent. This indicates that because of the 
upsurge of protectionist mood in the 1980s, Japan needed to overcome protective 
barriers and the best way was through OFDI into protected markets. Thus, in the 
1980s, massive inflows of Japanese OFDI into the US were evident. The other way to 
evade protectionist barriers in America was to exploit Latin America as a base for 
detour export. Thus, Japanese DS' OFDI into Latin America also gradually grew 
throughout 1980s. 
2-2. The post developmental state period 
2-2-1. The Korean PDS period (1986-1997) 
In 1988, `the proper self capital requirement' which was imposed to Korea investors 
by government was abolished. The original intention of `the proper self capital 
requirement' was to prevent excessive OFDI development beyond the capacity of 
investor firms and to restrain excessive financial outsourcing from foreign institutions. 
In 1988, the availability of the notification system was increased to 2 million dollars. 
Al IS thousand' 
CY Total acceptance Total investment Net investment 
1986 363786 182649 158286 
1987 367360 409708 320096 
1988 474752 215861 156194 
1989 943660 569589 392384 
1990 1610549 958935 812713 
1991 1524105 1115413 1026902 
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1992 1343928 1219430 1098254 
1993 1875989 1261612 1016396 
1994 3581581 2299555 2029824 
1995 4949096 3071779 2760705 
1996 6286983 4248485 3595095 
1997 5819497 3229527 2993614 
1998 5134182 3892863 3471512 
Total cumulative 1968-1998 35125701 23221468 20293000 
Table 6-27. Korean OFDI flows in the PDS and the TS period. 
Source. The MOFE (1999c). 
However, after Korea returned to a balance of payments deficit in 1990, regulative 
measures were reintroduced in order to reduce the side-effects of rapid OFDI 
development. Thus, such regulative measures as the re-intensification of approval 
procedures were introduced. By strictly applying the approval procedure, the Korean 
PDS tried to regulate not only over-competition among Korean affiliates in host 
countries but also excessive projects in which the invested capital in affiliates was 
larger than the self capital of parent companies. 
In contrast with this return of regulative measures, in 1991, the most fundamental 
liberalisation measures towards OFDI were carried out by the amendment of the 
Foreign Exchange Management Act. The objective of the amendment was to improve 
Korean OFDI and promote outfinancing of Korean investors. First, the old system 
`regulation in principle and liberalisation in exception' was transformed to 
`liberalisation in principle and regulation in exception'. Second, the amounts of 
investment which required notification, approval, and deliberation were extended in 
order to facilitate liberalisation processes. More specifically, the notification system 
was applied to investment under two million dollars, and investment between two to 
five million dollars was subject to the approval system and investment over five 
million US dollars was forced to be deliberated by the OIDC. Third, OFDI was 
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classified into three categories: encouraged, restricted, and general. The announced 
intention of the classification was that investments "that bring high technology into 
Korea are encouraged and provided with financial support, while investments which 
speed up the outflow of Korea's technology and ultimately weaken its international 
competitive edge are restricted. Those not falling under the encouraged or restricted 
categories are approved in principle, but financial support is provided on a selected 
basis" (Quarterly Review November 1992: 10-11). In 1992, the notification system 
was extended to under five million dollars and the approval system was applied to the 
projects over 5 million dollars and only the investments over 10 million was forced to 
receive the approval of the OIDC. 
Furthermore, in 1993, the number of businesses restricted from OFDI was reduced 
from 30 to 17 and the authority organisations for the investment procedure were 
diversified to include all banks which are permitted to do foreign exchange business. 
Before the change, only the BOK and the KEXIM were available for notification and 
approval procedures. In 1994, the restricted businesses were again reduced to 14 and 
projects under 300 thousand dollars became subject to a simple validation system 
instead of the notification system. In the liberalisation of 1994, the notification 
system was extended to investments under 10 million dollars and the approval system 
was applied to projects over 10 million dollars. The principle underlying these 
liberalisation processes throughout Young-Sam Kim's regime (1993-1998) was the 
Segyehwa (globalisation) idea. In January 1994, the Korean PDS identified the 12 
most necessary tasks for the globalisation of the Korean economy. Among the 12 
tasks, `formulation of strategies for firms' overseas expansion', `globalisation of 
domestic financial industries and capital trade, and the enlargement of foreign direct 
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investment', `effectively forestalling the movement toward regionalism' and 
`formulation of a basic strategy for Korea's internationalisation' were closely related 
to Korea's OFDI development. 
What is important here is that the task of `formulation of strategies of firms' overseas 
expansion' and `forestalling the movement toward regionalism' could be regarded as 
the Korean PDS' preparation of the expansionist developmental state (Economic 
Bulletin July 1994). More specifically, the official statement below from the EPB 
uncovered the governmental intention of globalisation: 
Globalisation should be pursued with two major objectives in mind: 
To make Korea the world's best location for foreign investment, and 
conversely, to allow Korean firms to make use of the optimal 
combination of production factors around the world (Economic 
Bulletin July 1994). 
The Korean PDS speeded up further OFDI liberalisation by introducing outstanding 
measures in 1995 such as the reduction of restricted areas to only three real estate 
related sectors. Moreover, the extent of validation was raised up to 10 million dollars 
and notification was required for projects over 10 million dollars to less than 50 
million dollars. The Approval from the BOK and OIDC was necessary only for 
investments which exceeded 50 million dollars. The liberalisation measures of 1995 
were comprehensive and substantial considering that almost 95 percent of Korean 
OFDI was carried out by projects under 10 million dollars which only required 
validation by foreign exchange banks. However, the changes of 1995 also 
accompanied regulative aspects in order to improve the financial structure of Korean 
subsidiaries and to minimise the side-effects of the rapid increase of financial 
outsourcing from Korean subsidiaries by re-adopting the proper share of parent 
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companies' self capital in subsidiaries and by regulating debt-guarantees of parent 
companies for their subsidiaries. 
This re-introduction of regulative policies in 1995 revealed that although the Korean 
PDS consecutively and gradually liberalised and deregulated OFDI flows, the state 
never fully disengaged from its interventionist and regulative belief systems. What is 
worth mentioning here is that if these regulative policies were for the proper 
supervision of OFDI and foreign debt control, the economic crisis that occurred at the 
end of 1997 would not have happened. This showed that the regulative aspects of the 
liberalisation measures of 1995 were not instituted to strengthen the supervision of 
OFDI flows and foreign loans borrowed by Korean investors. Instead, they were the 
result of prolonged and deeply engrained developmentalism-oriented belief systems of 
bureaucrats in the PDS period. In 1996, the Korean PDS finally opened the remaining 
three restricted businesses and by doing that, Korea fully deregulated all businesses 
for the promotion of OFDI. Moreover, in July 1997, just before the economic crisis, 
the Korean PDS abolished the approval system by the BOK and simplified investment 
procedures by unifying the notification system to foreign exchange banks. However, 
the OIDC was sustained in order to induce sound OFDI development. The criteria for 
OIDC deliberationa were investments over 50 million dollars and projects carried out 
by heavily debted firms (Economic Bulletin July 1997). 
Besides these consecutive liberalisation processes regarding investment procedures, 
the Korean PDS also provided various incentives and a supporting system in order to 
promote OFDI development. `Overseas investment credit' available from the KEXIM 
bank; `foreign exchange loans' from foreign exchange banks; the EDCF by the 
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KEXIM bank; tax incentives; `overseas investment insurance' provided by the Korea 
Export Insurance Corporation; provision of investment information by the KEXIM 
bank, the KOTRA, Regional information centre of the KIEP and KDI; and finally 
national agreements in order to prevent double taxation and protection of investment 
were the major incentives and supporting system provided by the Korean PDS (OECD 
1993: 128-129, Si- Joong Kim 1996: 33-36, Seung-Jin Kim 1997: 118-122). 
Korea's OFDI can be variously classified according to the motives of OFDI: natural 
resource seeking investment, cheap labour costs seeking investment, capital intensive 
investment, Chaebol's own ownership advantage exploiting investment, and trade- 
barrier circumventing investment. Korea's OFDI development into the ASEAN 
countries was basically based on natural resource seeking, production cost saving, 
trade-barrier circumventing investment. Thus, the majority of the investments were 
carried out by SMEs. Differing from the Chaebols which have abundant capital and 
technological edge, the Korean SMEs pursued small and medium sized investment in 
terms of investment amount in order to take advantage of the host countries' low 
labour cost. Due to this technological and financial difference between the Chaebol 
and the SMEs, the Korean PDS' OFDI had a dual structure. First, world-wide, large 
investments led by Chaebol and second, small and medium sized investments 
concentrated in Asia led by SMEs (Dent and Randerson 1996: 538, Keun Lee 1993: 
167). The most important motives for the large investments conducted by the 
Chaebol were first, the need to induce more advanced technology by participating 
actively in M&As and strategic alliances, second, the need to circumvent protectionist 
barriers in America and Western Europe, third, the need to not only cope with 
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pressures from the globalising world economy but also take advantage of it, and, 
finally, the need to explore the domestic markets of the developed countries. 
Meanwhile, the motives for the investments by SMEs were first, the need to move out 
abroad in order to overcome the adversarial business environment in Korea caused by 
increased labour costs, the labour shortage, and a dominant Chaebol structure in the 
domestic economy under which SMEs could not compete with. Secondly, OFDI by 
SMEs was also motivated by the need to take advantage of the rapidly changing 
regional comparative advantage in labour intensive and capital intensive industries. 
Thus, the Korean PDS' OFDI into ASEAN was basically `pro-trade' or `development 
spreading'25 and had close affinity to the earlier Japanese DS' OFDI development in 
ANIEs and ASEAN (Keun Lee 1992: 11). Two surveys conducted by the KIEP in 
1992 and 1996 revealed the same result in indicating the most important motives for 
Korean OFDI into America and Asia (Si-Joong Kim 1996: 71, Si-Joong Kim et. al. 
1992: 97). The motives for investing in America was the massive market size (most 
important motive), easy access to parts and resources (second important motive) and 
acquisition of local technology (third important motive). In sharp contrast with the 
above, the most important motive for investing in ASEAN and China was their 
abundant, cheap but relatively skilled labour forces. 
The economic relationship between Korea and ASEAN underwent a fundamental 
change in the middle of the 1980s. Before the middle of the 1980s, ASEAN was a 
25 Kasai classified OFDI into development spreading, development obsobing, and finally development 
promoting. The first refers to the OFDI which is carried out for the exploitation of cheap labour and 
the second refers to the OFDI for the technology acquisition. The last definition refers to the OFDI 
which are carried out in order to secure markets and to circumvent trade barrier. (Requoted from 
Keun Lee 1992: 11-12). 
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major exporter of natural resources to Korea and Korea exported labour intensive 
manufacturing goods to ASEAN. However, after the middle of the 1980s, due to the 
appreciation of the Korean Won, Korea's labour shortage, increased labour costs, and 
the liberalised FDI environment in the ASEAN countries, economic relations between 
Korea and the ASEAN countries dramatically increased (Sang-Chul Yoon et al. 1991: 
99). Besides this development of their economic relationship, Korea and ASEAN also 
expanded political and diplomatic ties after the middle of the 1980s. In 1987, Korea 
became a partial dialogue partner of ASEAN and in 1991, became a full dialogue 
partner. After this, the Korean government established `the Special Co-operative 
Fund for ASEAN' and later businessmen from both sides established the `ASEAN 
and Korea Private Economic Co-operation Committee (AKBC)'(Sang-Duk Chun et 
al. 1996: 145). 
Korea's OFDI continuously grew throughout the 1980s and 1990s and total 
cumulative OFDI reached 35 billion US dollars in 1998. An interesting phenomenon 
is that even after the economic crisis in late 1997, Korea actually increased its OFDI 
in terms of net investment. The 1990s witnessed the rapid growth of Korean OFDI, 
thanks to investment booms in China and Vietnam. Thus, as Table 28 shows, 45 
percent of Korean cumulative total OFDI went to Asia. In terms of industrial 
distribution, manufacturing industry as a whole represented more than 50 percent of 
cumulative total OFDI. In the service industry, commerce and trade led the OFDI by 
sharing 20 percent of cumulative total OFDI. 
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($US million) 
By industry By region 
Cumulative 1968-98 Cumulative 1968-98 
Amount (Share) Amount (Share) 
manufacturing 18261 (52.0) Asia 15684 (44.7) 
Commerce/ Trade 7006 (20.0) North America 8901 (25.4) 
Construction 925 (2.6) Europe 5622 (16.0) 
Others 8934 (25.4) Latin America 2162 (6.2) 
Others 2757 (7.8) 
Total 35126 100.0 Total 35126 100.0 
Table 6-28. Korea's cumulative OFDI flows for 1968-98 by industry and region. 
Source. Based on total acceptance. The MOFE (1999c). 
($US thousand) 
CY Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
1968-85 122802 27068 2110 8149 1811 
1986 - 2918 - 232 
45 
1987 173571 240 1582 - 1567 
1988 28809 4255 4840 698 17346 
1989 117379 30724 9195 628 14163 
1990 270813 63899 69820 2411 33951 
1991 198562 32444 39168 14626 32632 
1992 67309 33062 21217 6052 33920 
1993 63554 10243 34802 3822 12206 
1994 66309 170036 91934 3593 25993 
1995 362099 79579 32113 28562 37778 
1996 219255 67002 88586 75512 71591 
1997 376638 85640 82336 57911 227958 
1998 82371 23912 95622 291014 105106 
Total 2248180 642434 576084 495400 623386 
Share in ASEAN 5 49.0 14.0 12.6 10.8 13.6 
(Percentage) 
Table 6-29. Korean OFDI flows into ASEAN 5 countries. 
Source. Data for 1968-1990 is based on remaining acceptance and quoted from Guang-Chul Lee 
(1995). Data from 1991 to 1998 and total figures are based on the total acceptance and quoted from the 
MOF (1999c). 
(1968-1990 cumulative, $US thousand) 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ASEAN5 
(a) 
Total 
(b) 
alb 
% 
Manufacturing 369437 126294 87097 5703 63460 651991 1766116 36.9 
(51.3 %) (99.4%) (99.5%) (47.1%) (92.1%) (64.4%) 
Mining 242707 - - - 3702 246409 653963 37.7 
FoJFi. 44060 380 - 500 - 44940 192157 23.4 
Construction 140 456 - - 441 1042 67911 1.5 
TransJStorage - - - 78 - 78 13438 0.6 
ComiTrade - 1097 274 5605 280 7256 603661 1.2 
Others 58030 877 75 232 1000 60214 352903 17.1 
Real Estate - - 101 - - 101 48326 0.2 
Total 714374 127104 87547 12118 68883 1012031 3698835 27.4 
Table 6-30. Korea's OFDI flows into ASEAN 5 countries by industry. 
Source. Data is based on the remaining acceptance. Guang-Chul Lee (1995). 
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(1968-1990 cumulative- SI1S thnncandl 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Total Percentage 
Food/Beverages 82535 - - 500 3763 84708 13.0 
Textile/Garment 143806 - 10254 - 2001 156061 23.9 
Footwear/Leather 31187 704 3309 - 3977 39177 6.0 
Wood 18634 13942 134 - 32710 5.0 
products/furniture 
Paper/Printing 1700 1944 - - - 3644 0.6 
Petrochemicals 27890 15392 32671 924 5094 82018 12.6 
metals 12328 32067 1240 3724 5880 55239 8.5 
Machinery 24383 56836 37481 - 29797 148407 22.8 
Others 28974 5409 2041 555 12988 49977 7.7 
Total 369437 126291 87177 5703 63510 652121 100.0 
Percentage 56.7 19.4 13.4 0.9 9.7 100.0 
Table 6-31. Korea's OFDI flows in manufacturing industry into ASEAN 5 countries. 
Source. Data is based on the remaining acceptance. Guang-Chul Lee (1995). 
(Total TFDI stock in nercentavel 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Japan 20.0 32.0 25.0 30.0 
NIEs 28.0 34.0. 16.0 30.0 
US 7.0 14.0 30.0 17.0 
Europe 28.0 13.0 23.0 12.0 
Others 17.0 7.0 6.0 11.0 
Table 6-32. IFDI flows in ASEAN 4 countries by investor countries. 
Source. Thomsen (1999). 
In terms of country distribution, Indonesia attracted almost half of Korea's cumulative 
total OFDI into the ASEAN 5 countries (Table 29) and in terms of industrial 
distribution, Korean OFDI into these countries was concentrated in manufacturing 
industry (Table 30). As can be seen from Table 30, the share of manufacturing 
industry in the ASEAN 5 countries was 64.4 percent. In Malaysia, Philippines, and 
Thailand, the share was over 90 percent. However, Indonesia also attracted Korean 
OFDI in the mining industry with a 34 percent share while Singapore induced over 46 
percent of Korean OFDI in the commerce and trade sectors. This reveals the fact that 
Singapore is used as a base for trade promotion in the region by Korea and Korea is 
heavily dependent on Indonesia in terms of the energy industry. Table 31 shows 
Korean OFDI distribution in the manufacturing industry. It reveals that Indonesia is a 
key destination for labour intensive, cheap labour cost seeking Korean investment 
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while Malaysia, Thailand, and Philippines are the destinations for capital intensive 
Korean investment. This table also shows that Indonesia is the most favoured 
destination for Korea's manufacturing investment among the 5 countries. The reason 
is that, as can be seen from Table 31, Korea's manufacturing investment is 
concentrated in labour cost saving sectors such as textile and garment and electrical 
machinery. Indonesia has a comparative advantage in labour intensive industry thanks 
to its abundant and relatively cheap labour force. The more interesting phenomenon 
is that the leading sectors in Korea's OFDI such as machinery and chemicals are the 
leading industries in inducing IFDI into Korea (Keun Lee 1993: 160). This shows that 
by attracting IFDI flows into strategically targeted industries, Korea could raise its 
technological level and with this technological edge, Korea developed OFDI into 
Asia. 
In the 1990s, economic interdependence in Asia deepened as the comparative 
advantages in the region rapidly changed and not only Japan but the NIEs increased 
their share in the flow of investments in Asia (OECD 1993: 40). For example, 
Korea's economic relationship with Asia clearly indicated the deepening 
interdependence between the two economic actors. In 1996, more than 51 percent of 
Korean exports and 44 percent of OFDI were carried out with Asian countries (H. J. 
Kim et al. 1997: 1). As can be seen from Table 32, the share of the NIEs surpassed 
that of Japan and the US in the ASEAN countries except Philippines which has a 
traditionally strong relationship with the US. However, the table also indicates that 
Japan is the top single investor country in the region. What is important here but 
cannot be seen from the table is the structuralised economic disparity or unequal, 
dependent economic relationship between Korea and Japan. As we have seen in the 
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Korean DS section, Korea has been constantly and heavily dependent on Japan in 
terms of technology transfers and trade deficit. This structural weakness was 
sustained in the Korean PDS. The result was a vicious cycle. The more Korea 
exported, the more Korea experienced trade deficits with Japan due to increased 
capital goods imports from Japan. And, the more Korea exports to America, the more 
intensified become trade and investment related protectionism and pressures from 
America. Muraoka clearly pointed out this structural contradiction of Korea: "1. 
Japan has played a mediatory role as a source of capital goods; 2. The US market has 
provided the role of absorber of ANIEs' manufacturing exports; 3. The ANIEs have 
been placed in a peripheral position as a recipient of capital goods from Japan and as a 
supplier of exports to the US" (Muraoka 1991: 165). 
The Southeast Asian countries are also in the same position as the ANIEs. In other 
words, the Asian countries (NIEs and ASEAN countries) are heavily dependent on 
Japan's technology and capital in their economic development path. This hierarchical 
and unequal economic interrelationship in Asia needs to be improved in order to 
obtain sustainable, long-term economic prosperity in the region and bring about 
mutual benefits (Sang-Chul Yoon et al. 1991: 101). An equal and reciprocal 
economic relationship requires first, more reverse imports from host countries to 
home countries and second, more purchases of local supplies and parts by investor 
companies. Korea's ratio of reverse imports from the ASEAN countries is very low 
and the ratio of using local parts and intermediary goods is also very low compared 
with direct imports from parent companies located in Korea. 
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According to a survey conducted by the KIET in 1995 (Sang-Duck Chun et at. 1996: 
247,250), the destinations of products produced by Korean subsidiaries operating in 
the ASEAN were the host countries' domestic market (38.4 percent), the advanced 
countries (detour export 30.6 percent), Korea (reverse import 17.4 percent) and finally 
other Asian countries (13.5 percent). The structure of Korean subsidiaries' supply 
market uncovered a more serious structural inequality. The same survey showed that 
Korean subsidiaries operating in ASEAN imported 51.4 percent of parts and 
intermediate goods from Korea. Meanwhile, 33.9 percent of parts and intermediate 
goods were supplied by host countries' firms. These two survey results revealed that 
Korean OFDI has unequal and hierarchical structure. In order to achieve desirable 
and sustainable economic co-operation in the region, Korea needs to improve its 
OFDI structure by not only increasing reverse imports from its subsidiaries but also 
raising the purchase ratio of parts and intermediate goods from host countries. 
CC IS mi11inn) 
Year ODA ODA/GNP Year ODA ODA/GNP 
1981 20.9 0.03 1990 61.16 0.02 
1982 126.4 0.17 1991 57.48 0.02 
1983 233.7 0.28 1992 76.80 0.03 
1984 28.0 0.03 1993 111.56 0.03 
1985 48.3 0.05 1994 140.22 0.04 
1986 109.5 0.10 1995 115.99 0.03 
1987 73.0 0.06 1996 159.15 0.03 
1988 34.0 0.02 1997 185.61 0.04 
1989 33.80 0.02 1998 182.71 0.06 
Table 6-33. Korea's ODA flows and percentage to GNP. 
Source. Data from 1981-1987 is quoted from Hak-Soo Kim (1991). Data from 1988 to 1998 is quoted 
from the MOFAT (1999). 
(SUIS million) 
1981 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bilateral aid 5.3 14.9 12.25 71.46 123.31 111.34 124.69 
Grant aid 5.3 14.9 3.26 50.11 53.41 54.77 67.21 
EDCF loan - 8.99 21.35 69.90 56.57 87.48 
Multilateral aid 15.6 33.4 48.91 44.53 35.84 74.27 58.01 
TotalODA 20.9 48.3 61.16 115.99 159.15 185.61 182.71 
Table 6-34. Korea's ODA disbursement. 
Source. Same as the Table 6-33. 
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(PPrrrntaorl 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
Asia 35.7 36.4 41.6 49.7 
Africa 30.4 31.0 25.4 17.3 
Middle East 6.3 9.0 8.2 15.1 
Latin America 22.5 17.0 17.9 11.2 
Eastern Europe/ CIS 5.1 6.6 6.9 6.7 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6-35. Korea's grant aid expense by region. 
Source. Yul-Kwon (1995). 
1963-1981 1982-1986 1991-98 
[Invitation of trainees] 
Asia, (Southeast Asia) 79.8 (59.6) 61.9 (35.9) 50.1 (-) 
Middle East 9.3 8.5 20.8 
Africa 5.5 15.5 2.8 
Latin America 4.2 11.0 22.1 
Others 1.1 3.2 4.2 
Sub-total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
[Dispatch of exports] 
Asia, (Southeast Asia) 24.5 (18.4) 54.2 (26.0) 23.2 (-) 
Middle East 15.3 1.7 13.9 
Africa 30.6 11.9 37.3 
Latin America 16.3 23.2 7.4 
Others 12.2 8.5 18.2 
Sub-total 100.0 1000 100.0 
Table 6-36. Korea's technical co-operation by region (Percentage base) 
Source. Data for the cumulative 1963-1981 and 1982-1986 is quoted from Won-Chan Ra (1991). Data 
for the cumulative 1991-1998 is quoted from KOICA (1999). 
Korea's Official Development Assistance (ODA) development has a relatively short 
history. Technical co-operation started from the mid 1960s and grant aid started from 
the later 1970s (Yul Kwon 1995: 59). As a result, as the ODA ratio to total GNP 
shows in Table 33, Korea's ODA amount is insignificant. The Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) recommended 0.7 percent of ODA ratio to GNP to the 
member countries and 0.15 percent of ODA ratio to GNP to the least developed 
countries. However, the reality of ODA contribution from the DAC member 
countries is far from satisfactory. The average percentage of ODA of DAC member 
countries is just 0.22 percent to GNP (Yul Kwon 1999: 1). Given Korea's poor ODA 
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to GNP ratio, although Korea is not a member country of the DAC, Korea is not 
exceptional in this disappointing ODA performance. Besides the short history of 
Korean ODA, another reason for the small amounts of ODA is that Korea became a 
member of the OECD in late 1996 while it is yet to be a member of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC). Korea as a developing country before entry to the 
OECD had no great concern for assisting other developing countries. Moreover, the 
institutional setting for ODA operation was finished when the Economic 
Development Co-operation Fund (EDCF) and the Korea International Co-operation 
Agency (KOICA) were established in 1987 and 1991 respectively. However, 
although the amount of ODA between Japan and Korea is hardly comparable, it is 
worth comparing the operational systems and responsible governmental organisations. 
The similarities and differences between the two country's ODA system will reveal 
Korea's institutional learning from Japan in arranging responsible organisations. 
As we will see later in this section, the Korean ODA system has similar structures and 
organisation compared with those of Japan's. Ra acknowledged Korea's institutional 
isomorphism (imitation) from Japan in developing an ODA operational system and 
governmental authorities: "Recently Korea established the EDCF and the KOICA 
which have almost similar characteristics compared with Japan's OECF and the JICA. 
The great similarities in the motives for establishing ODA and in the associated 
operational tasks and in the names suggested raised worries in Korea that Korea just 
imitated the Japanese system of economic co-operation" (Ra 1991: 64-65). 
The Korean ODA system is divided into bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid is 
divided into grant aid and loans. Grant aid is again divided into cash grants and 
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technical co-operation. Grant aid is operated by the KOICA while loans are managed 
by the EDCF. The Ministry of Foreign Affair and Trade (MOFAT) takes charge of 
grant aid and the MOFE and KEXIM bank have authority in managing the EDCF. 
As can be seen from Table 34, Korean ODA was concentrated in multilateral aid until 
the 1990. Multilateral aid was associated with both contributions and subscriptions to 
international organisations and international financial institutions. After the 1990, the 
share of bilateral aid increased and surpassed the share of multilateral aid. And in 
bilateral aid, the EDCF loan provides more than grant aid. This reveals that the 
Korean ODA system needs to be reformed considering that the amounts which are 
channelled into the grant aid activities such as cash grant and technical co-operation 
are less than the amount channelled into the EDCF loan. A more problematic 
phenomenon is that the EDCF loans are almost tied loans (Yul Kwon 1995: 60). The 
tied loan means that loans are available only when Korean firms are involved in the 
usage of the loans. Moreover, the terms and conditions of the loans are not favourable 
to recipient countries (Yul Kwon 1995: 69). The regional distribution of ODA also 
reveals a problematic structure. As can be seen from Table 35, Korean ODA's grant 
aid is concentrated in Asia. The combined share of Africa, Eastern Europe and CIS 
countries was smaller than that of Asia in 1994. To some extent, the concentration of 
grant aid in Asia can be justified by Korea's geographical closeness and deepening 
economic horizontal and hierarchical interdependence in East Asia. However, the 
share of Africa which needs foreign aid the most fell continuously throughout the 
1990s. Table 36 shows the regional distribution of Korea's technical co-operation. A 
distinctive feature is that Korea's technical co-operation in Asia experienced a 
continuous drop. An almost 80 percent of share in 1963-1981 dropped to 50 percent 
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in 1991-1998. This feature reveals that the Asian countries, including the ASEAN 
countries, accomplished their technological and governmental administrative 
development throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Instead of Asian countries, trainees 
from Africa and Latin America countries were increased in the 1990s. 
The DAC and OECD member countries announced their collective views on the 
objectives of ODA development in 1996: "(1) humanitarian consideration, which is 
considered most fundamental; (2) enlightened self-interest, which means that 
development benefits people not only in poor countries, but also in the industrialised 
donor countries; (3) solidarity for all people, which enables people from all nations to 
work together to address common problems and pursue common aspiration" (KOICA 
1999: 2). What is important here is that by inserting the second sentence, the 
developed countries actually tried to justify their usage of ODA development in close 
line with their economic expansion or development. In this sense, it can be argued 
that there is no free international grant aid and the grant aid is only for the countries 
with economic potential which can benefit donor countries. Korea is not exceptional 
in this respect. KOICA announced its major objectives of ODA development. Three 
objectives are (1) contribution to international peace and prosperity, (2) advancement 
of Korea's economic interests, (3) humanitarian concern (KOICA 1999: 2). Korea's 
intention of relating ODA with its economic expansion and development can be easily 
found in official government announcements: "Korea intends to concentrate future aid 
efforts towards the developing countries which should improve economic relations 
between Korea and these countries" (Economic Bulletin August 1991). Moreover, the 
strong recommendation for usage of ODA in close relation to Korea's OFDI 
development can be found in government-funded, semi-governmental research 
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institutes: "co-operation between government and private firms could be realised 
when private firms' entrance into a targeted areas is supported and accompanied by 
the EDCF projects such as the provision of infra-structure or by supporting the needed 
capital of private firms' projects by the EDCF' (Hak-Soo Kim 1991: 96). 
In line with this emphasis on economic development, Korea selected target countries 
in distributing its ODA funds. The list of targeted countries is managed by the 
KOICA and the KEXIM bank. For example, the targeted countries of the EDCF loan 
in 1995 were China, Vietnam, Indonesia, India, Philippines and the targeted countries 
for grant aid were Vietnam, China, Indonesia (Yul Kwon 1995: 77-78). This revealed 
that the Korean PDS tried to develop the EDS in Southeast Asia by connecting ODA 
development with OFDI expansion. 
2-2-2. The Japanese PDS period (1986-To current) 
( 11. Q million until 1QQd 1PY millinn26 iuftnr 10001 
Fiscal Year OFDI Fiscal Year OFDI 
1986 22320 1993 36025 
1987 33364 1994 41051 
1988 47023 1995 4956800 
1989 67542 1996 5409400 
1990 56915 1997 6622900 
1991 41586 1998 5216900 
1992 34138 
Table 6-37. Japanese total OFDI flows in the PDS period. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Data from 1986 to 1996 is quoted from the OECD (1998a). Data 
from 1997 to 1998 is quoted from the MOF (1999b). 
(Pn. rnntono\ 
1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 
US 46.1 47.7 43.3 40.5 42.1 44.1 38.5 25.3 
Europe 19.4 21.9 23.0 18.8 15.2 16.7 20.8 34.4 
Asia 11.8 12.2 14.2 20.8 23.6 24.0 22.6 16.0 
ASEAN 5 5.8 6.9 8.9 11.3 12.0 10.4 13.9 9.8 
China 0.6 0.6 1.4 3.1 6.2 8.7 3.7 2.6 
Latin 11.5 7.8 8.0 7.8 12.8 7.5 11.7 15.9 
America 
26 MOF has been using the JPY instead of $US in indicating Japanese inward and outward FDI flows in 
order to facilitate internationalisation or regionalisation of the JPY. 
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Table 6-38. Japanese PDS' OFDI flows by region. 
Source. Data from 1988 to 1995 is modified from OECD (1993b and 1998a). Data from 1997 and 
1998 is quoted from the MOF(1999b). 
The Japanese PDS in OFDI development is basically an Expansionist Developmental 
State (EDS). In transplanting its domestic developmental state system into Southeast 
Asia, Japanese private firms played a leading role. However, it is important to 
remember that supportive and promotive governmental efforts also played a 
significant role (Machado 1996: 61). In the International Business literature, 
academic interest has focused on the economic calculations of investors (MNCs or 
home countries) and host countries. In the 1B literature, political and diplomatic 
variables have been treated as of secondary importance. However, without 
considering the political and diplomatic calculations and systemic co-ordination 
between the government and private firms in Japan, it is difficult to explain the 
historical and phenomenal development of Japanese OFDI in East Asia. As has been 
emphasised several times in this thesis, the research focus of this thesis is the political 
and diplomatic aspects of OFDI in explaining the Japanese EDS system. The MITI's 
official statement of `The Vision for the economy of the Asia-Pacific region in the 
year 2000' published in 1993 reveals the Japanese state's intention of transplanting 
the developmental state system in the region. Sheridan summarised the essential parts 
of the report: 
[Japan] wishes to establish a production base in the region on the 
basis of Japan's developed production and management 
technologies which should be supported by her know-how in 
industry policy and government business relation (Sheridan 1995: 
488). 
the government intends to allocate large amount of public funds .. 
. for adequate production and social infrastructure facilities in the 
region. Public funds would also provide education and training 
facilities ... This will establish a mixed form of capitalism in Asia 
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which will become an alternative to Western market capitalism 
(Sheridan 1995: 489). 
The first sentence indicates the Japanese government's intention of transplanting the 
core part of the Japanese developmental state system such as the strong presence of 
industrial policy in which the government could intervene in market and 
systematically organise co-ordination between government and private firms in 
accomplishing economic objectives. The second sentence reveals the Japanese 
government's intention of using the ODA system in order to' promote OFDI 
development in the region. The more important point is that Japan actually 
endeavoured to challenge America and Western Europe by formulating a conspicuous 
Asian style capitalism led by Japanese OFDI development in the region. 
What is missed here is that the Japanese EDS propelled OFDI into East Asia in order 
to facilitate domestic economic structural adjustment or the upgrading of the domestic 
economic structure. In this regard, Japanese OFDI policy can be identified with an 
economic restructuring policy (Machado 1996: 45). Machado's argument undergirds 
this point: "From the mid-1980, the economic ministries and agencies began to 
formulate plans for promoting regional economic integration, primarily as a vehicle 
for domestic industrial restructuring. In this connection ... Japan agreed to yen 
revaluation in accordance with its own industrial policy for phasing out sunset 
industries at home and for the purpose of accelerating its FDI" (Machado 1996: 61). 
The plan for the implementation of the EDS in East Asia could be dated back to 1987 
when the MITI announced `the New Asian Industrial Development Plan (New AID 
Plan)'. In the plan, the MITI revealed its intention to connect ODA development 
closely with OFDI development and to actively participate in the policy making 
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processes of Asian countries' industrial policy or economic development plan 
(Machado 1996: 61). 
In order to support and facilitate private firms' OFDI development, the Japanese state 
not only deregulated OFDI policies but also organised various supporting institutions 
and incentives. In 1998, by introducing the FE & FTL, Japan abolished the prior 
notification system in OFDI. And, in financial assistance, there are `Overseas 
Investment Credit' and `Overseas Investment Insurance' available from the JEXIM 
bank. The main duty of the JEXIM was changed from an export promoter to a FDI 
promoter in 1996 (Huang 1997: 178). The coverage of the Overseas Investment 
Insurance was enlarged from only political risks such as war or revolution to 
commercial risks such as firms' bankruptcies (Tokunaga 1992: 23). This amendment 
was realised when Japan changed its `Export Insurance Act' to the `Trade Insurance 
Act' in 1987 (Sakurai 1995: 81). There are also quasi-governmental organisations for 
the promotion of OFDI such as the Japan International Development Organisation 
(JAIDO) established in 1989 and the Japan ASEAN Investment Company (JAIC) 
established in 1981. The Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) has its 
equity share in these two hybrid organisations. More specifically, in the JAIDO, 
OECF has a one third share while the remaining two thirds are held by private firms. 
The JAIDO's major purpose is to promote OFDI by actively participating in ODA 
related projects. The JAIC, which also has the equity share of the OECF, intends to 
promote OFDI by investing its funds to venture companies in the ASEAN countries 
(Tokunaga 1992: 24, Huang 1997: 180). Besides these financial assistance 
programmes, the Japanese state provided information services and endeavoured to 
extend bilateral or multilateral governmental agreements on investment. The JETRO 
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and the JEXIM bank are the major windows for investment information. The MM 
has semi-governmental organisations such as the Japan Small Business Co-operation 
(JSBC) and the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) in order to provide available 
information for potential Japanese investors (Sakurai 1995: 82). The Japanese 
government also extended the number of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) for the 
purpose of protecting investment. The BITs include detailed agreements such as the 
protection of invested assets, the avoidance of double taxation, the guarantee of 
repatriation of original funds and profits, the promise of national or most favoured 
nation treatment, and the submission of disputes to international authority (Sakurai 
1995: 79). 
Thanks to these governmental supporting systems, which were systematically 
accompanied by pressures from internal and external economic environments such as 
a strong JPY, the need to recycle trade surplus, protectionist mood in the developed 
countries, rising costs of domestic production factors, inflated domestic real estate 
prices, and finally, big business's globalisation strategy, Japan's OFDI dramatically 
increased from the mid-1980s (Eiger and Smith 1994: 20). The expansion of 
Japanese OFDI in Southeast Asia throughout the 1990s was possible due to low 
labour costs, constant economic growth, liberalisation and a pro-FDI environment27 in 
the ASEAN countries (Kawai and Urata 1996: 63, Soo-Hee Lee 1995: 155). This 
massive OFDI flows resulted in the emergence of Japanese production networks in 
East Asia and as a result, Japanese private firms regard East Asia as a kind of 
27 Even though, the ASEAN member countries sustained open and pro-FDI policies before the crisis, it 
did not necessarily mean that there was no government intervention in FDI flows. On the contrary, 
the ASEAN countries liberalised FDI flows which were closely related to export promotion. Market 
seeking FDI was strongly restricted and various regulations on the aqusition of lands, and ownership 
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domestic market (Dobson 1993: 41). It is important to note that the Japanese OFDI 
development experienced a conspicuous change in its motives and operational system 
in the 1990s. The major motives of the Japanese OFDI in the 1980s were the need to 
resolve trade friction with America and Western Europe by exploiting the ASEAN 
countries' GSP status and to take advantage of cheap labour costs in the region. 
However, the most important motives in the 1990s were the strengthening of the 
already existing export platform or the production networks in the region (JETRO 
1995: 23). 
The background of the deepening productions networks are mainly two-fold. First, in 
order to reduce production costs in Japan, the production plants in the region could act 
as a supply base for cheap, standardised intermediary parts to be imported back to 
Japan (Tejima 1995: 95). Second, the production networks in the region could also 
reduce production costs due to the advantage of internalisation. This internalisation 
advantage gives a competitive edge to Japanese subsidiaries in the export markets of 
advanced countries. Thus, cheap labour costs in East Asia and the benefits of 
internalisation are the key factors which underpin Japan's international 
competitiveness in the world market. Moreover, thanks to economic development, 
the ASEAN countries' domestic markets also emerged as a major motive for Japanese 
OFDI in the 1990s. As a result, in East Asia, the amount of reinvestment undertaken 
by the subsidiaries already surpassed that of their original investment done by 
Japanese parent companies (JETRO 1996: 25). This indicates that East Asia, 
particularly the ASEAN 5 countries became `fixed production sites' for Japan. 
structure were excersied by the ASEAN member countries. Also, in order to promote exports, 
performance requirements were imposed on foreign investors. See Steven (1999: 5). 
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Moreover, the procurement structure of Japanese affiliates in the region also shows 
the intensified consolidation of Japanese production networks. According to a survey 
conducted by the MITI named `Survey of Overseas Business Activities of Japanese 
Companies', Japanese affiliates procured 38 percent of parts from local companies 
and imported exactly the same 38 percent of parts from Japan (JETRO 1997: 9). This 
sharp increase of local procurement can be regarded as an index of the consolidation 
of Japanese production networks in the region. The increase of reverse imports of not 
only cheap manufacturing goods but also capital goods from East Asian countries in 
the second half of 1990s (JETRO 1996: 15, JETRO 1998: 28) also supports the above 
argument regarding the consolidation of Japanese production networks in the region. 
The profitability of Japanese affiliates in the region is also the highest compared with 
that of other affiliates operating in North and South America and Western Europe due 
to the consolidated and deepened production networks in East Asia (Steven 1996: 76, 
MITI 1997: 2). 
However, even though Japanese OFDI contributed to economic structural upgrade 
from labour intensive to capital intensive industry in the ASEAN countries with the 
help of massive OFDI flows, the most important investment motive in the region is 
still the cheap production costs rather than its domestic markets. Given that the most 
important motives for OFDI to Europe and America are to evade protectionism and to 
penetrate the domestic market respectively (JETRO 1998: 30), the ASEAN countries 
are still being exploited by Japanese PDS and private firms as the most suitable place 
for export platforms and production plants with stable, cheap production costs. Thus, 
it can be argued that the most problematic feature of Japanese OFDI is its OFDI 
system which promotes more intensively Japan's capital and high-tech based exports 
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to the ASEAN countries than imports from these countries. This means that, from the 
viewpoint of Japanese private firms, Japanese OFDI is basically export-inducing or 
promoting rather than export-substituting or import-stimulating28. This situation 
resulted in the East Asian countries' experiencing structurally consolidated and 
chronic increase of technology imports, trade deficits and the repatriation of profits 
emanating from Japanese subsidiaries (JAPANECHO December 1997: 9-10). 
In order to ameliorate this structural inequality between Japan and other East Asian 
countries, Japan has to boost its domestic consumption and to increase imports from 
these countries as well as reverse imports from its overseas subsidiaries (Machado 
1996: 41, JAPANECHO December 1997: 11)29. The more significant structural 
problem is the amplified conflicts between Japan and America. Japan improved its 
international competitiveness by establishing and consolidating production networks 
in East Asia and using the networks as an export platform to the advanced countries. 
Even though, intra-regional trade sharply increased in East Asia, the value of the 
American market to East Asian economies has not declined. The American market is 
still an important destination for the manufactured goods of the East Asian countries. 
Thus, in this triangular relationship, between America as a market provider and Japan 
as a high-tech or capital parts provider, the NIEs and the ASEAN countries became 
intermediary actors. The problematic phenomenon is increasing trade deficits or 
unequal economic relationships of both America and East Asian countries with Japan. 
28 The terms of export-inducing, export-substituting, and import-stimulating are quoted from the GATT 
(1995: 33). 
29 Fred Bergsten emphasised this view in the US Congress' hearing on the East Asian economic crisis. 
As a chairman of Institute of International Economics in Washington, he argued that "the 
fundamental resolution of the East Asian crisis is heavily dependent on Japan's increase of domestic 
consumption and imports because Japan occupies two thirds of Asian economy" (Joongangilbo 6 
February 1998). 
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Without ambitious efforts to improve this structural inequality, Japan's pervasive 
economic presence in East Asia is basically unstable and subject to continuous 
criticism. Yoon succinctly pointed out this situation: 
There thus arose an imbalance between the rigidity of Japanese 
institutions and a rapidly changing ... world political economy. 
The Japanese have not been ready and willing to adjust ... to the 
new situation. Rather, they have clung to the mercantilist way of 
life ... Unfortunately, 
in an interdependent world, the imbalance 
could not remain as a purely Japanese problem (Young-Kwan Yoon 
1991: 16). 
What the Japanese EDS pursued in the region was a hierarchical economic structure 
based on each country's development level. In other words, Japan is at the top of the 
structure by devoting itself to knowledge and high technology industry, and the NIEs 
are in the middle by specialising in capital intensive industry, and finally at the 
bottom, the ASEAN countries pursue labour intensive industry. This is basically a 
hierarchical division of labour and the problem of this structure is that chronic trade 
and investment inequality cannot be easily overcome. Meanwhile, on the positive 
side, this hierarchical division of labour can promote economic development of 
developing countries by providing chances for them to participate in economic 
integration processes occurring in East Asia. In a word, the Japanese EDS' core 
economic strategy is based on the flying geese model or the product life cycle. By 
actively participating in this flying geese-like economic integration or interdependence 
processes in East Asia, the NIEs and the ASEAN countries could attain a certain level 
of economic development through both increased exports and continuous 
restructuring of the division of labour as argued by Kojima and Ozawa (Anderson and 
Linder 1993: 136, You-I1 Lee 1999: 467). However, as we have seen in the section on 
Korea, the East Asian countries' technological dependence and chronic trade deficit 
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with Japan is the most destructive factor which needs to be ameliorated in order to 
realise further economic interdependence and co-prosperity in the region. 
Thus, it can be argued that current economic relations between Japan and the other 
Asian countries are based not on interdependence but on dominance, dependence or 
exploitation (EIU 1983: 73). The side-effects of the dominant Japanese economic 
position in the region were anticipated by Japanese bureaucrats and the Industrial 
Structure Council under the MITI suggested guidelines in order to minimise 
unnecessary friction or tension between Japanese subsidiaries and host countries: 
"promote industrial co-operation including joint ownership; localise organisation and 
management; localise parts production; localise research and development; harmonise 
with the local community; and devote greater efforts to public relations" (Sakurai 
1995: 83). 
The problematic or destructive aspects of the rapid increase of Japanese OFDI is not 
confined to host countries. They could also be found in the domestic Japanese 
economy. The most significant problem was the possibility of hollowing out of 
Japanese domestic industry. The loss of domestic jobs and the sharp drop of domestic 
investment caused by massive OFDI flows were the major concerns of policy-makers 
(Minshall 1998: 42-43). The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency of the MITI 
prepared its policy measures to prevent rapid increase of unemployment in 1988 and 
announced a guideline. The guideline contained two measures, "any parent company 
planning overseas business expansion should notify subcontracting firms at the earlier 
stage and ... parent company should introduce other clients so that the 
subcontractors' business will not drop dramatically" (Japan Economic Almanac 1988: 
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78). Moreover, due to massive outflow of domestic capital and decreased 
reinvestment in the domestic economy, Japan's domestic manufacturing facilities 
became more and more outdated (JETRO 1998: 13). The separation of R&D from 
production also gave rise to adverse effects to Japanese innovative capacity in 
technology development (JETRO 1996: 21). Japanese R&D facilities are 
concentrated in Japan while production sites are transplanted to East Asian countries. 
The Japanese PDS' OFDI dramatically rose after 1985 when the Plaza Accord which 
raised JPY's value against US dollar was agreed between Japan and America 
(Takenaka 1991: 92). The dramatic surge of Japanese OFDI was also caused by 
intensified trade friction from the mid 1980s. Another important factor which 
promoted OFDI was the dramatic increase of Japan's trade surplus in the 1980s. 
Thus, the appreciated JPY, abundant capital emanating from the trade surplus, and 
protectionist mood in the advanced countries were three major factors which 
accelerated Japanese OFDI in the PDS period (OECD 1993: 55). Another factor is the 
continuous benefit from the GSP by engaging in OFDI development in Southeast Asia 
(Lim 1990: 175). Throughout the PDS period, Japanese OFDI fluctuated according to 
changes in the Japanese Yen's value. More specifically, as can be from Table 37, 
Japanese OFDI responded quickly to the two episodes of high JPY which occurred 
from 1985 to 1989 and from 1992 to 1993. The rebound of OFDI in 1994 was due to 
the emergence of a strong JPY in the period. The retreat of OFDI from 1990 to 1992 
was due to the bursting of the bubble economy. After the economic crisis in East 
Asia, the Japanese PDS' total OFDI dramatically fell. As Table 38 illustrates, the 
Japanese PDS' FDI into Asia witnessed a rise until the East Asian crisis occurred. 
The more interesting phenomenon is that China does attract much less Japanese OFDI 
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than the ASEAN 5 countries as a whole. This Table points out that Japan still prefers 
the ASEAN 5 countries rather than China as a production site for its low cost seeking 
manufacturing investment. However, in contrast to this table, a survey conducted by 
JEXIM bank in 1997 showed that Japanese firms actually preferred Vietnam and 
China instead of the ASEAN 5 countries (Requoted from Thomsen 1999: 13). This 
contrasting data actually indicates that in the ASEAN 5 countries, Japan has already 
established a firm and consolidated production network and because of this deepened 
economic integration, it is difficult for Japan to move to Vietnam or China by quickly 
responding to changing regional comparative advantage. 
In the aftermath of the East Asian economic crisis, Japanese firms are experiencing 
hard times and Japan's investment into the region dramatically decreased, particularly 
due to the economic recession at home and low profitability of subsidiaries abroad 
(OECD 1999: 112). According to a MITI survey conducted in 1999, the adverse 
impacts on Japanese affiliates are reduced profits (first), exchange loss through 
foreign currency denominated debt (second), reduced domestic demand-oriented sales 
(third), higher prices for imported parts (fourth), higher price of domestic procurement 
(fifth), and reduced exports to foreign countries (sixth) (JETRO 1999: 21). However, 
the affiliates anticipate that after some adjustment period, economic conditions in the 
region will improve and they have revealed their intention to sustain the existing 
economic integration in the region (JETRO 1998: 30, JETRO 1999: 25). The 
statement from the JETRO reveals the background of Japan's massive aid and support 
(the New Miyazawa Initiative) towards crisis struck countries: "The Japanese 
economy and the Asian economies are now inseparably related to each other as the 
division of labour takes root. This makes it important to help them surmount their 
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fragilities and achieve further growth" (JETRO 1998: 31). However, from the long- 
term point of view, it can be anticipated that due to the weakened JPY since 1997, 
Japanese OFDI in the ASEAN 5 countries will be diminished (Thomsen 1999: 13). 
Moreover, given the changing comparative advantage in labour costs in East Asia, the 
rise of Japanese OFDI in Vietnam and China can be also anticipated. The OECD 
supported this view by indicating that investment flows to East Asia underwent two 
distinctive changes. The first change happened around 1986, when investment fled 
from the NIEs to the ASEAN countries. The second change happened after 1990, 
when investment turned its way from ASEAN to China and Vietnam (OECD 1998: 
9). The MITI's `White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises' also supported the 
changing destination of Japanese OFDI from ASEAN to China. As of 1993, in terms 
of the number of cases, China30 accounted for 53.3 percent of Japanese OFDI pursued 
by SMEs (Requoted from Itoh and Ohashi 1995: 93). Meanwhile, ASEAN accounted 
for only 10.7 percent. Anticipating this changes in FDI flows in the region, the 
ASEAN member countries endeavoured to sustain stable FDI inflows into their 
countries by facilitating the eastablishment of the `ASEAN Investment Area (AIA)' 
and by implementing further liberalisation measures through the AFTA (Thomsen 
1999: 5). 
30 Harwit (1996: 983) pointed out the historical background of the Japanese OFDI increase in China. In 
1986, China welcomed both export facilitating FDI and high technology inducive FDI. In order to 
promote IFDI flows, China provided greater incentives and limited bureaucratic interference. In 
1988, China promised free remittance of earning back to Japan and started to provide cheap loans to 
foreign investors at interest rates equal to that applied to domestic firms. 
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(Fiscal Year, $US million until 92, $US billion since 1993) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
NIEs 
Manu. 573 878 775 1347 805 640 439 0.7 0.8 
Non-Man 946 1672 2341 3469 2501 1507 1376 1.6 1.9 
Total 1519 2250 3116 4816 3306 2147 1815 2.3 2.7 
ASEAN4 
Manu. 193 704 1360 1553 2028 1945 1808 1.5 2.2 
Non-Man 358 311 545 1212 1181 1122 1382 0.9 1.5 
Total 551 1015 1905 2765 3209 3067 3190 2.4 3.7 
CHINA 
Manu. 23 70 203 206 161 309 650 1.4 1.9 
Non-Man 151 1156 93 231 185 230 361 0.3 0.6 
Total 174 1226 296 437 346 539 1011 1.7 2.5 
Table 6-39. Japanese PDS' OFDI flows into Asian NIES, ASEAN 4, and China. 
Source. Data is based on the MOF statistics. Data for 1986-1992 is quoted from Poong-Mo An 
(1994). Data for 1993 and 1994 is quoted from Sugitani (1996). 
(1951-1994 $US million, 1995-1998 JPY million) 
Fiscal Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand 
1951-69 148 35 45 24 78 
1971 112 12 5 15 9 
1972 119 13 10 42 30 
1973 341 126 43 81 34 
1974 375 48 59 51 31 
1975 589 52 149 52 14 
1976 931 52 15 27 19 
1977 425 69 27 66 49 
1978 610 48 53 174 32 
1979 150 33 102 255 55 
1980 529 196 78 140 33 
1981 2434 31 72 266 31 
1982 410 83 34 180 94 
1983 374 140 65 322 72 
1984 374 142 46 225 119 
1985 408 79 61 339 48 
1986 250 158 21 302 124 
1987 545 163 72 494 250 
1988 586 387 134 747 859 
1989 631 673 202 1902 1276 
1990 1105 725 258 840 1154 
1991 1193 880 203 613 807 
1992 1676 704 160 670 657 
1993 813 800 207 644 578 
1994 1759 742 668 1054 719 
Cumulative total 
1951-94 16887 6391 2789 9525 7172 
(Share) (39.5) (15.0) (0.7) (22.3) (16.8) 
1995 154800 55500 69200 114300 119600 
1996 272000 64400 63000 125600 158100 
1997 308500 97100 64200 223800 229100 
1998 137800 65800 48500 81500 175500 
Cumulative total 
1995-98 873100 282800 244900 545200 682300 
(Share) (33.2) 00.8 (0.9 (20.7) 26.0 
Table 6- 40. Japanese OFDI flows into ASEAN 5 countries. 
Source. Based on the MOF data. Data for the cumulation of 1951-1969 is quoted from Chew et al. 
(1992). Data from 1971 to 1981 is quoted from Chng and Hirono (1984). Data from 1982 to 1996 is 
quoted from the OECD (1993b and 1998a). Data from 1997 to 1998 is quoted from the MOF (1999b). 
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(FY 1951-FYR9 cumulative. SUS thnusand) 
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand ASEANS 
a) 
Total-31 
(b) 
a/b 
% 
Manufacturing 3120981 1820571 637094 2667646 2245035 10491327 66127 15.9 
Food 69211 37820 57347 478380 137412 780170 - - 
Textile 571463 144459 27555 17442 259035 1021954 - - 
Lumber/Pulp 273837 67613 8856 19709 34915 404930 - - 
Chemical 211120 263696 99624 723057 137793 1435290 - - 
Metals 1428596 232930 94613 103649 315994 2175782 - - 
Machinery 34044 77926 12478 385514 418427 828389 - - 
Electrical 87908 654757 110084 490889 513939 1857577 - - 
Transport 189184 186744 148918 127396 96771 749013 - - 
Others 255614 154822 77614 319607 250745 1058402 - - 
Non- 
manufacturing 7305361 675695 673311 2969485 922397 12546252 182517 6.9 
Ag1Fo. /Fi. 226807 35908 43228 3722 48123 357788 1883 19.0 
Mining 6398533 173199 418601 3334 6869 7000536 15211 46.0 
Construction 33749 99471 16528 167952 106760 424460 2089 20.3 
Com. /Trade 56316 152414 18013 318500 212035 757278 25159 3.0 
F. /lnsurance 313086 90351 58623 890097 52108 1404265 57271 2.5 
Service 195266 55394 62415 308376 226773 848224 23375 3.6 
Transportation 3440 7617 3318 617864 43446 675685 15269 4.4 
Real Estate 13838 38060 33682 552571 211630 849781 34742 2.4 
Others 64320 23276 18896 107064 14650 228206 7515 3.0 
Branches 521 7348 10463 72095 99884 190311 4659 4.1 
Real Estate 8068 2999 837 5489 710 18103 595 3.0 
Total 10434931 2506613 1321705 5714715 3268026 23245993 253896 9.2 
Table 6-41. Japan's OFDI flows into ASEAN 5 countries by industry. 
Source. Data is modified from Sang-Chul Yoon et al. (1991). 
Table 39 shows the regional and industrial distribution of the Japanese PDS' OFDI in 
Asia. While the NIEs induced more non-manufacturing investment than 
manufacturing investment, the ASEAN 4 countries attracted more manufacturing 
investment while China also received more manufacturing investment after 1991. 
From this table, it can be inferred that Asia has a vertical industrial structure. Even 
though the ASEAN countries, thanks to massive Japanese OFDI presence, improved 
their economic structure from a labour intensive to a capital intensive one, the NIEs 
still have a competitive advantage in capital intensive industry compared to the 
ASEAN countries. This fact was also reflected in Table 32 which illustrates that the 
NIEs' total OFDI share in the ASEAN 4 countries surpassed that of Japan's. 
31 World total unit is $US million. 
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Table 40 shows that Indonesia is the top recipient country of Japanese OFDI, with 
Singapore and Thailand competing for second position in attracting Japanese 
investment. The ASEAN 5 countries have different economic and industrial 
structures while their level of economic development also differs. As can be seen 
from Table 40, Indonesia's non-manufacturing industry attracted twice more Japanese 
investment than manufacturing industry thanks to the massive inflow of investment 
into the mining sector. The Philippines and Singapore also induced more Japanese 
investment in their non-manufacturing industry. 
However, while the mining industry led investment in the Philippines, the financial 
sectors were the top recipients of Japanese investment in Singapore. On the other 
hand, Malaysia and Thailand attracted more Japanese FDI in their manufacturing 
sectors. In both countries, Japanese OFDI's primary destination is the electrical 
machinery sector. This indicates that Japan has established a production base for the 
electrical and electronics industry in both countries. All these phenomena reveal that 
the ASEAN 5 countries have different economic development levels and industrial 
structures. While Singapore is utilised as a financial and distribution base for 
Japanese investment, Malaysia and Thailand have become the core centre of 
manufacturing for Japan. Indonesia is not only a stable provider of natural resources 
for Japan but also a destination for labour intensive Japanese investment. 
(PITS millinnl 
Year ODA ODA/GNP Year ODA ODA/GNP 
1977 1424 0.21 1988 9134 0.32 
1978 2215 0.23 1989 8965 0.32 
1979 2638 0.26 1990 9070 0.31 
1980 3304 0.31 1991 10950 0.32 
1981 3171 0.27 1992 11150 0.30 
1982 3023 0.28 1993 11259 0.27 
1983 3761 0.32 1994 13239 0.29 
1984 4319 0.34 1995 14489 0.28 
1985 3797 0.29 1996 9439 0.20 
1986 5634 0.29 1997 9358 0.22 
1987 7454 0.31 
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Table 6-42. Japan's ODA flows and percentage to GNP. 
Source. Data from 1977 to 1989 is quoted from the MOFA (1991). Data from 1990 to 1992 is quoted 
from Steven (1996) and data from 1993 to 1997 is quoted from the OECD (1998b). 
$US million Percentage of GNP 
1981-82 1986-87 1993 1997 1981-82 1986-87 1993 1997 
Average Average Average Average 
Japan 3097 6488 11259 9358 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.22 
US 6992 9340 10123 6878 0.23 0.21 0.15 0.09 
UK 1996 1804 2920 3433 0.40 0.29 0.31 0.26 
France 3007 4646 7915 6307 0.54 0.58 0.63 0.45 
Germany 3166 4111 6954 5857 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.28 
Table 6-43. Net ODA flows and percentage of GNP from selected DAC countries. 
Source. OECD (1998b). 
($US million) 
Rank Year 
1985-1989 total 1995-1996 averse 1996-1997 avers e 
Country Amount Country Amount Country Amount 
1 Indonesia 315964 Indonesia 1444 Indonesia 1208 
2 China 294384 China 1353 China 963 
3 Philippines 199582 Thailand 884 Thailand 760 
4 Thailand 167642 Philippines 798 India 741 
5 Bangladesh 141671 India 756 Philippines 714 
6 India 96734 Pakistan 409 Malaysia 363 
7 Pakistan 81519 Bangladesh 366 Pakistan 327 
8 Myanmar 82973 Korea, Rep. 297 Bangladesh 297 
9 SriLanka 59573 Sri Lanka 276 SriLanka 211 
10 Malaysia 40198 Mexico 273 Viet Nam 186 
Table 6-44. Top ten recipients countries of Japanese bilateral ODA. 
Source. Data for the 1985-1989 total is quoted from the MOFA (1991) and data for 1995-96 average is 
quoted from the OECD (1997) and data from 1996-1997 average is quoted from the OECD (1998b). 
(Percentage) 
1970 1980 1986 1987 1988 1994 1995 1996 
Asia total 98.2 70.5 64.8 65.1 62.8 57.3 54.4 49.6 
Northeast Asia 4.2 12.7 11.0 11.3 
Southeast Asia 44.0 30.4 35.6 34.2 
ASEAN 35.9 23.8 32.0 29.9 
Southwest Asia 22.2 21.6 18.5 17.3 
Unspecified 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Middle East 10.4 8.8 10.1 9.1 7.8 6.8 6.7 
Africa 11.4 10/9 9.8 13.8 11.8 12.6 12.8 
Latin America 6.0 8.2 8.0 6.2 8.6 10.8 11.8 
Oceania 0.6 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.4 
Europe - 0.1 0.0 0.1 - 1.5 - 
Other regions 1.2 5.7 5.8 6.6 14.6 12.3 16.7 
Table 6-45. Geographical distribution of bilateral ODA (Percentage distribution). 
Source. Data for 1970,1994,1995 is quoted from the MOFA (1995 and 1996) and data from 1980 to 
1989 is quoted from the MOFA (1992). Data for 1996 is quoted from the JICA (1999a). 
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(Perrentnnal 
1954-1980 1954-1987 1954-96 1996 
Asia 52.4 49.6 45.7 41.9 
ASEAN 5 34.5 33.9 29.4 23.7 
Middle East 10.4 8.8 8.9 9.4 
Africa 13.2 12.9 13.5 14.4 
Latin America 17.5 22.0 21.7 21.0 
Oceania 1.6 2.3 - 
Others 4.9 4.4 10.2 13.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6-46. Japan's technical co-operation expenses by region (Percentage) 
Source. Data from the cumulative 1954-80 and 1954-87 is based on the Japan International Co- 
operation Agency Annual Report, 1981 and 1988 and requoted from Chew et. al. (1992). Data for the 
cumulative 1954-1996 and 1996 is quoted from the JICA (1999b). 
l41 1. C rnillinnl 
1970 1975 1980 1987 1992 1994 1996 
Bilateral aid 372 850 2010 5135 8482 9558 9606 
Grant aid 122 202 702 2108 3862 5299 5574 
Cash grants 100 115 375 1154 1733 2314 2395 
Technical aid 22 87 327 954 2130 2985 3179 
Yen loan 250 649 1308 3027 4620 4259 2780 
Multilateral aid 87 297 1343 2207 2848 3681 1252 
Table 6-47. Japan's ODA disbursement. 
Source. Data 1970-92 is quoted from Steven (1996). Data for 1994 is quoted from the MOFA (1995) 
and data for 1996 is quoted from the JICA (1999a). 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1990 1991 
Grant aid as percent of total ODA 
DAC average 79.7 76.8 80.8 84.3 78.5 - 
Japan 55.2 48.2 47.4 60.7 39.3 38.1 
Table 6-48. Japan's grant aid disbursement compared with DAC average. 
Source. Steven (1996). 
Japan has a long ODA history. The ODA programme started when the `Asia 
Association' was established in 1954 as an initiative of the MOFA. The association 
took charge of technical co-operation such as inviting trainees and sending experts to 
developing countries. In 1958, Japan took a further step by providing loans to 
developing countries by establishing the `Southeast Asia Development Fund' under 
the authority of JEXIM bank. This fund was incorporated into the Overseas 
Economic Co-operation Fund (OECF) which came into existence in 1961. And in 
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1958, the Yen loan was introduced for the first time. By becoming a member of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961, Japan started to feel the need to 
systematically organise its ODA system. In line with this need, Japan established the 
OECF in 1961 and the Overseas Technical Co-operation Agency (OTCA) in 1962. 
With the establishment of the OTCA, the duties of the Asia Association were 
transferred to the OTCA. Thus, in 1962, Japan accomplished a systematic operational 
system of ODA by arranging the ODA system into technical co-operation led by the 
OTCA and financial assistance led by the OECF. The OTCA was incorporated into 
the Japan International Co-operation Agency (JICA) in 197432. 
The Japanese ODA system consists of bilateral and multilateral aid. Bilateral aid 
consists of grant aid and Yen loans (OECF loans) with grant aid divided into cash 
grant and technical co-operation. Technical co-operation is divided into invitation of 
trainees and dispatch of exports. Grant aid is under the authority of the MOFA and 
the Yen loan is under the MOF. Technical co-operation is operated by the JICA and 
the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS) while the Yen loan is run 
by JEXIM bank. The share of ODA in total GNP in Japan is around 0.3 percent and 
this share is under the recommendation of the DAC (Table 42). However, the amount 
of Japanese ODA surpassed that of the US in 1990 and after that Japan has been the 
top donor country among DAC member countries for 7 years until 1997 (the Table 43) 
(MOFA 1998b: 1). However, after the Japanese government announced `the Fiscal 
Structural Reform Act' in November 1997, the amount of ODA was contracted as a 
means to improve Japan's serious fiscal deficit (MOFA 1998a: 1). 
32 The history of Japanese ODA system is referred from Won-Chan Ra and Ha-Yoon Song (1989: 122- 
130). 
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Table 44 shows the top ten recipients of Japanese bilateral ODA. This table reveals 
that all the recipient countries are Asian countries except Mexico and all the ASEAN 
4 countries were in the lists except Malaysia in 1995-1996. What is significant but 
cannot be seen from the tables is the fact that historically, Japanese OFDI flows have 
been accompanied by Japanese ODA flows (EN 1983: 67, Steven 1996: 40). This 
indicates that Japan has used ODA development as a propeller of OFDI development. 
Table 45 shows the geographical distribution of Japanese bilateral ODA. As can be 
seen from the table, the share of Asia as a whole gradually decreased from the 1970s 
to the 1990s. For example, in 1970, the Asian share was amazingly over 98 percent. 
But the share was reduced to around 60 percent in the 1980s and it became around 50 
percent in the 1990s. In Asian countries, the highest shares of Japanese bilateral ODA 
was in the ASEAN countries. Japanese technical co-operation expenditure is also 
concentrated in Asia and the ASEAN 5 countries (Table 46). Thus, it cannot be 
denied that Japanese ODA distribution is characterised by unequal regional 
distribution and this regional inequality has been a result of Japan's intentional ODA 
policy to improve its economic integration with the Southeast Asian countries. In 
other words, Japan's ODA system is a facilitator of Japanese trade and investment in 
targeted areas and the interests of Japan comes first rather than those of the recipient 
countries (EN 1983: 67-68). This argument can be supported by the Keidanren's 
intention of using the ODA system as a trade and investment promoter: "As the recent 
involvement of the Keidanren in advising on the use of the ODA budget shows, ODA 
is increasingly being used to oil the wheels for Japanese FDI in these countries" 
(Grosser and Bridges 1990: 11). The background of Keidanren's involvement in the 
ODA development is that ODA activities can reduce the costs of private firms in 
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developing their OFDI by providing essential infrastructure in recipient countries 
(Dobson 1993: 67). 
The regional concentration of Japanese ODA in Asia is a not unique feature, 
considering that other DAC member countries also concentrate their ODA in the 
regions which are closest to these countries and also try to connect the ODA system 
with FDI development (Grosser and Bridges 1990: 11). What is important here is that 
ODA is not an instrument to facilitate and improve donor countries' economic 
presence and penetration into recipient countries. The more important thing is that 
developed countries like the US, the UK, France, and Germany have no concern or 
enthusiasm to meet the DAC recommendation of ODA share to GNP of 0.7 percent. 
The problem is that the DAC has no authority to impose any preferred level of ODA 
from its member countries. The DAC could only recommend the preferred ODA share 
to GNP. Thus, it can be argued that in reality, the ODA system is being exploited by 
the advanced countries as a weapon to expand their economic dominance in the 
recipient countries (Steven 1996: 239). Detailed figures for Japanese ODA 
disbursements are illustrated in Table 47. This table shows that bilateral aid has 
always exceeded multilateral aid and it was after 1992 that the amount of grant aid 
surpassed that of Yen loans. However, although Japan provided more grant aid than 
Yen loans after 1992, the share of Japanese grant aid in total ODA is far lower than 
the DAC member countries' average (Table 48). This low level of grant aid share in 
ODA together with the regional concentration of ODA in Asia represent the 
problematic structures of Japanese ODA operation. However, it has to be emphasised 
that the ratio of untied loans in the operation of Yen loans is very high. In other 
words, the degree to which the Yen loan is untied to Japanese goods or Japanese 
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private firms' participation in the projects is higher than that of other DAC member 
countries. For example, in 1990, it was 82.1 percent for Japan while the average for 
the DAC was 60.9 percent (Steven 1996: 236). 
Thus, the positive aspects of Japanese ODA operations are Japan's highest ODA level 
among the DAC member countries and the higher degree of untied loan in the 
disbursement of Yen loans compared with the other countries. In line with these 
positive aspects of the Japanese ODA system, Japan implemented massive aid to the 
Asian countries that underwent adverse impacts of the economic crisis. `The New 
Miyazawa Initiative' includes various assistances and aid to countries like Korea, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The political or diplomatic background of the 
plan can be found in the statement from the MOFA: "Extending a helping hand to 
those countries 'will be beneficial to Japan itself, given the strong ties of economic 
interdependence it has cultivated with the rest of Asia at large. Additionally, such 
help can be expected to earn Japan's recognition as a true friend in a time of need" 
(MOFA 1998: 1). 
Under the Miyazawa Initiative, the Japanese government is ready to provide 30 billion 
US dollars to Asian countries. The initiative to help the countries is divided into three 
categories: first, direct provision of financial assistance; second, the use of a guarantee 
mechanism in order to support the Asian countries efforts to raise foreign funds by 
issuing sovereign bonds or increasing foreign loans; and third, technical assistance. 
Direct financial assistance is being carried out by extending JEXIM bank's loans to 
the countries and by the acquisition of sovereign bonds issued by the countries. 
Moreover, the Yen loan under the ODA system was also extended. By utilising the 
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guarantee mechanism, the Japanese government extended the JEXIM bank's credit 
guarantees of bank loans to Asian countries and sovereign bonds issued by the 
countries. By extending technical co-operation, the Japanese government is ready to 
assist the Asian countries in their efforts to address financial system restoration or 
corporate debt restructuring (Monthly Finance Review December 1998: 10-11). 
Besides this Miyazawa Initiative, Japan spent 19 billion US dollars in order to 
contribute to the IMF assistance package towards Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand 
(JETRO 1999: 28). Moreover, as a part of the `Comprehensive Economic Measure' 
which was announced in February 1998 in order to boost the Japanese domestic 
economy, various assistance measures for Asian countries were introduced. Thus, in 
total, Japan has extended 43 billion US dollars (the largest contribution as a single 
donor country) to help Asian countries (MOFA 1998c: 1). 
2-3. The Korean transitionary state period (1998-To present) 
After the economic crisis, the Korean state actively implemented corporate reform 
together with financial and labour reforms. The Korean state's official statement 
indicates the importance of free market-oriented reform in curing the ailing Korean 
economy in the aftermath of the economic crisis: 
Although the current crisis was triggered by an immediate shortage 
of foreign exchange reserves, structural impediments deeply 
embedded in the Korean economy constitute a fundamental, long- 
term factor precipitating the crisis ... The lagging development of 
a democratic, free market economy gave rise to collusive links 
between politicians and businessmen, as well as a strong tendency 
on part of government to interfere in the market, particularly the 
financial sector ... The failure to address these structural 
deficiencies and to make adjustments in line with global standards 
resulted in a significant deterioration in the overall competitiveness 
of the Korean economy. Given the far-reaching implications of the 
structural imbalance, short-term measures or a simple Band-Aid fix 
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will prove ineffective, or perhaps even counter-effective (Economic 
Bulletin May 1998). 
Thus, big conglomerates such as Chaebols were under harsh pressure to adopt neo- 
liberal reforms actively pursued by the Korean TS and the IMF. The Chaebols' heavy 
dependence on external debt and excessive cross-debt guarantees among subsidiaries 
were criticised as the most important causes which gave rise to the economic crisis. 
Wang points out the problematic over-borrowing of the Chaebol's overseas 
subsidiaries: "overseas companies recorded higher debt to equity ratios than domestic 
companies on the average. In particular, large companies preferred to borrow from 
international or local financial markets because financial costs were cheaper there than 
in domestic financial markets" (Yun-Jong Wang 1998: 1). Thus, under the corporate 
reform strongly pursued by the Korean TS, Chaebol had to cut down its debt ratio to 
within 200 percent of their assets and cross shareholding was restricted. 
Moreover, the Chabols were forced to adopt a transparent accounting system which is 
equivalent to Western standards. As a result, from April 1999, the Chaebol was 
forced to have consolidated financial statement covering all their subsidiaries. All 
these reform measures became discouraging factors which prevented Korea's capacity 
in developing its OFDI flows. Thus, the sudden contraction of Korean OFDI was 
anticipated. However, the result was on the contrary. Korea's OFDI after the crisis 
increased in 1998. As can be seen from Table 27, Korea's OFDI dropped in terms of 
total acceptance but rose in terms of net investment. The reason for the increase 
despite so many discouraging factors mentioned above is that because Korean 
subsidiaries' credit rating weakened after the crisis, Korean subsidiaries could not 
borrow from local financial markets, so Korean parent companies had to send capital 
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to their subsidiaries (UNCTAD 1999: 1). Thus, it can be argued that the increase of 
Korean OFDI in its TS period is not a positive development but a negative one. This 
can be proved by the increased number of withdrawals of Korean OFDI after the 
economic crisis. 
In terms of regulation, the Korean TS abolished the deliberation by the OIDC on 
investment which is over 10 million dollars. An interesting phenomenon here is that, 
as we have seen in the section on the Korean PDS, the Korean PDS took further 
liberalisation steps by increasing the amount of investment which needed approval 
from the BOK and the OIDC to over 50 million dollars in 1997 just before the 
economic crisis. This reveals that although the Korean state liberalised constantly 
throughout the PDS period, the liberalisation package was repetitive in their contents 
and was not checked by any governmental authority or private organisations regarding 
the actual consequence of each liberalisation package. This again proves the 
foreigner's argument that in Korea the reality is not in accordance with the law. Thus, 
regarding the Korean TS' OFDI regime, it remains to be seen whether these limits on 
liberalisation processes are being actually removed with the help of the unprecedented 
social and economic crisis. 
3. Sub-conclusion: The changing role of the state: From restriction and 
regulation to promotion and support 
Korea and Japan's historical trajectory of changes and transformation in FDI policy 
has been in continuous conflict between free markets and state intervention. 
However, as we have seen throughout this Chapter, there has been a trend towards the 
free market. The DS period was a period dominated by regulation and restriction, and 
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the PDS period was a period of intense conflict between developmentalism style state 
intervention and neo-liberalism style free markets. Even though consecutive 
liberalisation and administrative deregulation measures were implemented, there has 
always been the heavy shadow of developmentalism in the PDS period. The uni- 
dimensional regulation and restriction policy toward FDI in the DS was a combined 
result of an unpoliticised, favourable international political economy and a persistent 
bureaucratic belief system. In other words, under the unpoliticised international 
political economy, the mercantilistic FDI policies of Japan and Korea were not 
significantly problematic to their trade and investment partners and the bureaucrats' 
belief system that they could control and manage FDI flows in order to improve 
national wealth or to realise economic targets was not seriously doubted or 
challenged either externally or internally. On the contrary, the bureaucrats' belief 
system was strengthened or even legitimised as Japan and Korea achieved great 
growth in the DS period and both countries' technological level was also highly 
upgraded through strict screening and regulation procedures. 
However, as Japan's and Korea's respective economies became crucial members of 
the international political economy, the mercantilistic and protective FDI policy could 
not be sustained any longer. Trading and investment partners started to complain 
about unequal market accessibility. Thus, in the PDS period, Japan and Korea started 
to liberalise their respective FDI policies in order to pacify foreign pressures and to 
raise the competitiveness of domestic firms by inducing harsh competition from 
foreign competitors. Moreover, inside the state, there emerged various interest groups 
which represented different interests. For example, the Keidanren in Japan and the 
Jeonkyungryeon (Federation of Korean Industries (FKI)) in Korea represented the 
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interest of big business and they enthusiastically pursued liberalisation of OFDI 
policy. State regulation became an obstacle of business operations or expansion in the 
PDS period. On the other hand, labour groups were opposed to a free market FDI 
regime because of the threat of job losses from massive overseas investment or hostile 
takeovers from foreign firms. More importantly, the old, unified bureaucratic 
organisations in the DS period also could not escape from internal division regarding 
FDI policy. The MITI in Japan and the MOCIE in Korea were strongly opposed 
towards the rapid opening of the domestic market to foreign investors in order to 
protect underdeveloped SMEs in both countries. On the other hand, the views 
towards overseas investment by domestic firms were divided inside the two 
ministries. For example, in the case of Japan, in order to facilitate domestic economic 
structural adjustment, OFDI was recommended with delicate supporting systems such 
as connecting the OFDI with ODA. However, in order to minimise adverse effects on 
domestic employment, the MITI also prepared a plan to support SMEs which were 
deeply impacted by massive transfers of production base of their parent companies. 
Thus, in the PDS period, the Japanese and Korean state became fragmented in relation 
to FDI policy. The loss of unified policy making and policy implementing process in 
the PDS period in conjunction with FDI was one of the reason for the piecemeal and 
very slow liberalisation and deregulation processes. The fragmented or divided PDS 
state in its policy towards FDI was the result of a divided belief system among 
bureaucrats and businessmen. The limited and piecemeal liberalisation of FDI policy 
in the PDS was characterised by repetitive and overlapping contents of announced 
government plans. As we have seen in this Chapter, we could locate the repetition of 
liberalisation plans in both Japan and Korea's PDS period with relative ease. This 
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limited liberalisation gave rise to increased criticism and complaints from foreign 
competitors. The Korean TS, thus, compulsorily and actively undertook fundamental 
reforms to promote IFDI in order to induce foreign capital necessary for overcoming 
economic hardship. The term `compulsorily' is used to describe the realised foreign 
countries' demands to fully open the Korean financial and IFDI market in exchange 
for their financial help to crisis struck Korea. The term `actively' is used to explain 
the Korean TS' voluntary efforts to fully open the Korean market and to ardently 
pursue comprehensive reforms in the labour market, the Chaebol structure, and the 
financial system. As we have seen in Chapter 5, this fundamental and comprehensive 
reform in the Korea TS was possible due to not only a changed belief system of 
Korean top policy makers including the president but also the disappearance of 
ideational divisions among bureaucrats. Compared with Korea, Japan is still in the 
PDS period. As we have seen in section 2-2-2, the Japanese PDS' deregulation 
measures were characterised by repetition and slowness. As we have argued in 
Chapter 4, without a massive shock or crisis, the Japanese PDS will persist for a long 
time. This argument can be supported by learning theory. As we have -seen in 
Chapter 2, fundamental changes in belief systems could occur when there is a crisis or 
a massive shock which cause total destruction of old causes and effects or means and 
ends relations. 
In the debate on the roles and effects of IFDI towards host countries, there has been a 
serious division between the proponents and opponents of state intervention. State 
interventionists argued that in order to prevent economic and technological dominance 
of foreign firms and induce IFDI into desired sectors, the state needs to not only 
regulate the flows of IFDI but also provide various incentives. In contrast, the neo- 
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liberal approach argues that state intervention will lead to market distortions in 
resource allocation and the protection of certain business sectors will result in an 
underdeveloped and inefficient domestic economy in those sectors (Bishop 1997: 29). 
The problem with this debate is that it lacks an understanding that the two approaches 
are not mutually exclusive. They are compatible with each other. As we have seen in 
this Chapter, even though the DS period was characterised by state regulation and 
restriction, there were efforts to liberalise and deregulate IFDI flows in both countries. 
Also, in the PDS period, we could easily show the constantly planned and 
implemented liberalisation policies. However, we could also witness the tenacious 
shadow of state intervention in IFDI flows. 
Thus, it is reasonable to argue that there is no state which adopts a solely free market 
approach or a statist approach. The two approaches coexist with each other in the 
reality of the economy. The problem is that according to structural changes in society, 
the state, and the international system, policies towards FDI are also changed. Put 
differently, we need to understand the changes and transformation of society, the state, 
and the international system in order to understand FDI policy changes in a country. 
From this point of view, we can explain the sluggish development of liberalisation 
and deregulation processes in both countries' PDS period. The market is not given 
exogenously but it develops in a certain historical context. Both countries' markets 
were strongly and systematically regulated in the DS period. This historical and 
institutionalised protective market could not change swiftly towards a free market 
system in the PDS period, even though both countries' society grew and became 
polarised as various interest groups emerged while the international political economy 
system also became highly politicised in the period. The state also experienced a 
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process of fragmentation as once unified bureaucrats in the DS period became divided 
in the PDS period in terms of their belief system. As a result, the PDS period in both 
countries was characterised by zigzag economic policies pendulating between the free 
market and a managed market. This disorientation and confusion of state policy in the 
PDS period is one of the major reason for the economic difficulties and long-term 
recession in Japan, and the economic crisis in Korea. 
In the PDS period, we witnessed the emergence of the Japanese EDS into Southeast 
Asia and could find the nascent planning of Korea's EDS into the region. The Korean 
OFDI in the region was dominated by labour-intensive, cost-cutting investments led 
by SMEs similar to the earlier Japanese OFDI development in the 1960s and 1970s 
towards the region. The Japanese EDS is distinctive compared with other NIEs given 
that Japan developed production networks based on capital intensive industry in the 
region (Steven 1996: 98). The NIEs, including Korea, lack this kind of networks. 
This is the conspicuous difference between Japanese and Korean OFDI development 
in the region. 
In the operation of ODA, the use of ODA as a supporting system for the expansion of 
OFDI could be found in both countries' operational trends. However, there were 
more differences than similarities revealed in the comparision of Japan and Korea. 
The long history of Japanese ODA and its highest ODA level cannot be compared 
with the short period of the Korean ODA system and its insignificant amounts. 
Moreover, while Japan has a high ratio of untied loans, Korean loans are mostly tied. 
In the aftermath of the economic crisis, Japan extended its ODA and various support 
in order to help the East Asian countries. As we have seen, Japan is the top donor 
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country in the world. The important thing here is that these massive Japanese efforts 
are deeply rooted in the intentional need to sustain and protect the Japanese 
production networks in the region (Hook 1996: 175). However, it has also to be 
emphasised that Japanese efforts to help ailing neighbour countries is not necessarily 
only for Japan's interest. Deepened economic integration and interdependence led 
Japan to increase its aid to the East Asian countries. Here, we are witnessing the 
importance of the changes in belief system of not only subjects but also objects. The 
recipient countries' image or belief system about Japan is as important as changes in 
the Japanese policy maker's belief system. In other words, despite Japan's massive 
aid to the countries, "a broad suspicion of Japan's ultimate intentions remains among 
its neighbours who retain memories of Japanese aggression in the 1930s and 1940s" 
(Brown 1993: 549). This situation can also be adopted to explain the ever-increasing 
economic pressures from America towards Japan and Korea even though both 
countries continuously opened their domestic market and deregulated various 
regulations. Put differently, although the Korean TS suddenly changed its 
developmentalism oriented state intervention policy into a free market based neo- 
liberal policy, as far as America's belief system and image of Korea based on DS 
period's protective and highly regulated market remains fixed and does not change, 
pressures and complaints from America will continue. 
Japan and Korea's historical FDI development showed that the argument of the 
Investment Development Path (IDP) elaborated by Dunning is not suitable in 
explaining the cases of the two countries. According to IDP, one country's FDI 
development follows the following cycles. First, the IFDI from advanced foreign 
firms dominates in the country and secondly, small amounts of OFDI from the country 
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begin as its firms' ownership advantage improves due to transferred technologies and 
managerial know-how from highly competitive foreign firms. And then thirdly, the 
amount of OFDI surpasses the amount of IFDI and in the fourth and final stage, the 
country becomes a pure exporter of OFDI to other less developed or still developing 
countries. As we have seen, both Korea and Japan highly regulated IFDI flows in the 
DS period. As a result, both countries skipped the first and second stages of the IDP. 
Thus, it can be argued that the IDP theory is an idealistic hypothesis that cannot be 
adjusted to Korea and Japan's FDI case study. However, given the fact that both 
Korea and Japan upgraded their technological level in manufacturing industry by 
inducing IFDI with highly strategic and calculated regulations and screenings, the role 
of IFDI as an efficient way to improve technological levels cannot be denied. In this 
regard, the underdeveloped service industry, particularly financial sector, in both 
countries can be attributed to strict protection and slow liberalisation processes. 
Korea's IFDI will continuously grow as the Korean TS fully liberalises and 
deregulates IFDI related policies. Moreover, Korean firms' need to induce more 
advanced technology will also result in the increase of IFDI, while IFDI into the 
service industry, particularly finance and distribution sectors, will also grow as the 
Korean government fully opens these sectors in order to improve their 
competitiveness. Korean OFDI into East Asia as well as Southeast Asia will also 
continuously increase in order to actively participate in the rapid change in the 
regional division of labour and to facilitate domestic structural adjustment. Japan's 
OFDI will also sustain its trend and increase in East Asia, given the fact that FDI is 
not as mobile as portfolio investment (Howell 1998: 7). Moreover, in order to protect 
already existing production networks, constant OFDI from Japan is also necessary. 
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However, as we have seen in section 2-2-2, the amount of OFDI into the ASEAN 5 
countries will not increase over the medium or long-term, given that Japanese OFDI 
has moved its direction according to changes not only in the regional division of 
labour but also of each country's comparative advantage. Thus, increase in Japanese 
OFDI and ODA in China, Vietnam and later in India can be anticipated. However, 
Japanese IFDI will not experience any crucial changes so long as the Japanese PDS 
manages the economic recession as it has done for the last decade and as far as the 
high-costs Japanese economic structure remains. The more important factor which 
will significantly determine the future IFDI regime in Japan is the political factor: "the 
question remains ... whether Japan has the political clout to push through these 
reforms without sinking into a quagmire of political paralysis" (Howell 1998: 8). The 
future trends and changes of Japanese IFDI are also heavily dependent on the results 
of ongoing structural changes and transformation inside the Keiretsu system and the 
financial system. As we have seen in Chapter 4, each part of the Japanese Keiretsu 
system is so systematically and efficiently organised or combined, a collapse of any 
part of the Keiretsu system could result in total collapse of the system. We have 
witnessed the collapse of the life-long employment system, and the shake out in long- 
term business relations between SMEs and big companies due to the massive increase 
of OFDI from Japan. Moreover, as the Japanese government is pursuing financial 
reform (so-called financial big bang), cross-share holdings among Keiretsu member 
companies will decrease. In other words, as the Japanese banking-based financial 
system is being transformed into an Anglo-American style, capital market based 
financial system, not only will cross-shareholdings, which have been a core part of the 
Keiretsu system, but also Japanese firms' long-term based strategic investments, 
which have been a most important base of Japanese international competitiveness, 
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will be replaced by short-term, high risk but high returns pursuing investments. It can 
be anticipated that both the weakening or collapse of the Keiretsu system and the 
changing financial system from a stable, long-term capital supplier to industries to 
short-term assets managers to investors will widen the Japanese road to induce further 
IFDI by facilitating foreign M&As. 
The major characteristics of each period in both countries can be summarised as 
follows: 
Korea Japan 
IFDI The -Strong and strategic regulation period -Strong and strategic regulations period 
DS -No transparency in investment -No transparency in investment 
procedure procedure 
-Discretionary law interpretation by -Discretionary low interpretation by 
bureaucrats bureaucrats 
-Unified belief system among ministries -Emergence of ministerial conflicts over 
and bureaucrats towards IFDI IFDI policy33 
-Mercantilistic and negative belief -Finished liberalisation measures in 
systems towards IFDI terms of formal law in 1980 
-Mercantilistic and negative belief 
systems towards IFDI (Komiya 1972: 
158) 
The -Consecutive but basically limited -Consecutive but basically limited and 
PDS liberalisation and deregulation period piecemeal deregulation period 
-Repetitive and overlapped -Repetitive and overlapped deregulation 
liberalisation and deregulation measures measures 
-Restrained IFDI caused by high-costs -Restrained IFDI caused by high-costs 
domestic economic system domestic economic system 
-Tenacious shadow of developmentalism -Restrained IFDI caused by institutional 
oriented state intervention into IFDI barriers emanating from Keiretsu system 
flows in the midst of continuous -Persistent shadow of developmentalism 
liberalised IFDI laws oriented administrative regulations 
-divided belief system among ministries which are so complicated and time 
and bureaucrats towards IFDI consuming 
-Majority Korean people's negative -Majority Japanese people's negative 
belief systems towards IFDI belief systems towards IFDI 
-Still rigid, fixed foreign countries' 
belief systems deeply rooted in the 
Japanese DS' protected and regulated 
market, although Japanese PDS 
endeavoured to improve IFDI regime by 
33 Safarian (1993: 248) explained that the MOFA and the Keidanren were the suppotive groups of the 
liberalstion of IFDI, while the MITI and the MOF were divided internally. The SMEs and the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries were oppsed to liberalisation. 
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consecutive administrative deregulation 
measures 
The -Sudden changes of belief systems from 
TS developmentalism to neo-liberal free 
market system 
-Total liberalisation period 
-Reconvergence of belief system among 
bureaucrats 
-Still rigid, fixed foreign countries' 
belief systems deeply rooted in the 
Korean DS' protected and regulated 
market, although the Korean TS changed 
its belief system and fully opened the 
market 
-Korean people's weakening negative 
belief systems towards IFDI 
OFDI The -Strong regulation -Before the balance of payment surplus: 
DS not substantial but formal regulation 
period due to positive and favourable 
belief system of Japanese towards OFDI 
-After the surplus (after 1967): 
Liberalised period 
-No production networks 
-Labour intensive OFDI led by SMEs to 
NIEs countries first and then to ASEAN 
countries 
-Majority Japanese people's positive 
belief systems towards OFDI 
The -Nascent planning of the EDS into East -Fully Liberalised period 
PDS Asia -Transplantation of the EDS into 
-Nascent planning of connecting ODA Southeast Asia 
system with OFDI development -Close connection of ODA development 
-No systematic state support for the with OFDI expansion 
promotion of OFDI compared with -Formulation and consolidation of 
Japan34 regional production networks 
-Consecutive but limited liberalisation -Close co-ordination between 
and deregulation processes in 1990s government and private firms 
-No production network -Rigid and fixed foreign countries' belief 
-No close co-operation between systems towards Japanese intention of 
government and private firms in aids and helps for them by ODA and the 
developing OFDI Miyazawa Initiative 
-Labour intensive OFDI led by SMEs -majority Japanese people's positive 
-Majority Korean people's positive belief systems towards OFDI 
belief systems towards OFDI 
The -Negative increase period in order to 
TS directly finance overseas subsidiaries 
which suffering from capital shortage 
-Temporary re-strengthening of 
government regulation in order to 
control scare capital35 
34 See, Ku-Hyun Jung and Moxon (1996: 170). 
35 As have seen in the Korean TS section, the Korean TS temporarily strengthened regulation by 
reducing the amount of investment needed to be deliberated by the OIDC. However, that measure 
was to control the scarce capital in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Given the full and 
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Table 6-49. The major characteristics of Japan and Korea's DS, PDS, and TS period in relation to FDI. 
comprehensive liberalisation processes towards IFDI, Korea OFDI in the TS period will be sooner or 
the later fully liberalised. From the medium and long term view, it can also be anticipated that 
Korean state's supports and incentives will be intensified as the Korean economy grow further and 
more regionalised or globalised. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion: 
Learning from the neo-liberal regime or the resilience of the PDS? 
Korea and Japan's foreign economic policy, particularly FDI policy, is best analysed 
using the concept of the post developmental state. This provides a more coherent 
picture of both countries' FDI development. So far, most of the literature devoted to 
explaining Korea and Japan's foreign economic policy depends on either the logic of 
developmentalism or neo-classical economics. These sharply divided views provide 
only partial understandings, considering that the Korean and Japanese PDS periods 
were characterised by zigzag and confused policies, that moved like a pendulum 
between the state-led, managed market and the free, self-regulated market. 
The main argument of this thesis is that we need to understand a country's foreign 
economic policy in terms of transformations and changes. Every human social 
construction is due to change and transformation. Korea and Japan's trajectory of 
economic development reveals the dynamically changing nature of the social 
constructions of the state, civil society and their relations with the external global 
environment. Both countries' short-term, compressed experience of economic and 
social development presents us with the chance to testify why the concept of PDS is 
necessary and why the PDS has a more comprehensive conceptual, descriptive, and 
predictable analytical value in explicating both countries' dynamic features of socio- 
economic and political changes and transformations compared with single-sighted 
developmentalism or neo-classical economics. 
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The PDS was a state where the characteristics of the developmental state and neo- 
liberalism co-existed in a complex manner and conflicts between these two were so 
prevalent that consistent and efficient foreign economic policy could not be 
implemented or pursued. In this period, contradictions among decision-makers' belief 
systems, institutions and policies continuously prevented the effective realisation of 
the planned economic objectives of the state. It is this thesis' main argument that 
smooth, coherent and consistent triangular relations among belief systems, 
institutions, and policies are obviously a firm underlying foundation for rapid and 
effective realisation of economic objectives in both the Korean and Japanese 
developmental state period. However, as both countries' developmental stage was 
upgraded, socio-economic and political transformations and changes occurred and led 
to the period of the PDS. 
In the PDS period, the Korean and Japanese state tried to adjust to the globalising 
world economy by only changing their respective foreign economic policies which 
were not accompanied by simultaneous changes in institutions and belief systems. 
The problem was that these changed policies were just for display in order to evade 
the harsh pressures from the neo-liberalising international political economy. As the 
Korean and Japanese economies grew and the Cold War bipolar system collapsed, the 
notorious features of both countries' DS period such as dirigiste policies, domestic 
market protectionism, export oriented domestic economic structures wholly 
dependent on open foreign markets, and distortion of prices and the market system by 
the strong intrusive state became the major sources of both countries' trade and 
investment conflicts with other countries. This was the period when the cleavages 
among belief systems, institutions, and policies were so pronounced that only 
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innovative reforms in institutions and fundamental changes in beliefs system could 
overcome the deepening socio-economic and political instability or crisis caused by 
conflicts among the three pillars of economic development (policies, institutions, 
belief systems). 
This whole picture is well presented by the case study of both countries' FDI policy. 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, FDI is an index of globalisation and the role 
of FDI in economic development has unprecedentedly increased and cannot be 
overemphasised, both for advanced and developing countries. Korea and Japan's FDI 
policies show the dynamic changes and transformations of both countries' DS, PDS, 
and TS periods. The changes in Korean FDI policies clearly reveal the significance of 
close, organic, and systemic relations among policies, institutions, and belief systems 
in accomplishing a state's economic objectives. Policies matter. Well-planned, 
efficient policies are necessary conditions for economic development. However, 
institutions and belief systems matter much more. Policies can be efficiently 
implemented and produce their best results only when supporting institutions and 
belief systems are closed interlinked with them, and only when these three factors 
have shared norms, values, principles, ideas and economic targets. These three pillars 
are absolutely needed to grasp the whole picture of the state's socio-economic and 
political transformations and detailed changes. A study which only explores any one 
feature of these three pillars is inadequate and is, at best, only partial research. 
This thesis explains Korea and Japan's foreign economic policy using the study of 
FDI as a case study. Three distinctive period (DS, PDS and TS) and their outstanding 
characteristics have been investigated with the same emphasis on the three analytical 
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levels (societal, statist, the international systemic approach). The main argument of 
this thesis is that for a small country like Korea, it is important to have a strong, 
efficient state and a strong, mature society in order to check and balance the 
extremely market-oriented, neo-liberalising international political economy. 
Globalisation is causing changes and transformations whether they are political, 
societal or economic. Sometimes, political, economic, and societal changes or 
transformations occur at the same time by systemic influences from the globalisation 
process as happened in Korea through the impact of the East Asian crisis. 
This means that we need to adopt all three analytical levels in order to comprehend 
these complicated changes and transformations in a country. The statist approach has 
an advantage in explaining the characteristics of the DS period. The institutional 
approach produced the most persuasive explanation of the PDS period while the 
systemic approach provided the most coherent analysis of the TS period. More 
specifically, the Korean and Japanese DS periods are historical spaces in which each 
respective state was a major actor in obtaining its economic objectives. Strategic 
trade policy, government managed financial sectors, industrial policy, and grand 
economic development plans were carefully prepared and implemented by the state 
itself. Civil society was not sufficiently mature and not strong enough to influence 
policy making processes. The international system was favourable to both the Korean 
and Japanese DS, mainly because of the ideologically divided and competitive Cold 
War system. High politics was the primary concern rather than economic interests in 
inter-state interactions and relations. Thus, the statist approach revealed the 
distinguishing characteristics of both the Korean and Japanese DS periods. 
356 
In contrast, the Korean TS period was caused by the spill-over impact of the East 
Asian crisis which was originally ignited by unstable, unregulated international and 
domestic financial flows. Enormously increased financial flows are a conspicuous 
feature of globalisation. This financial globalisation process was obviously a major 
reason for the East Asian crisis and the subsequent structural reforms in the area. So 
the Korean TS period can be efficiently investigated mainly by the systemic approach. 
The Korean and Japanese PDS periods were respectively spaces of high tensions 
where conflicts among society, the state and the international system were at their 
highest. Civil society became mature enough to request from the state its fair share of 
the gains from economic growth and to challenge the strong state which was 
administered by military, authoritarian regimes (Korea) or bureaucratic predominance 
(Japan) over civil society. The international system changed its fundamental nature 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economic interests came first before security 
concerns. The neo-liberalising international political economy is pushing every 
country to adjust to its logic of the free market, privatisation, liberalisation, and 
deregulation. Economic wars and competition replaced security wars and 
competition. Global economic interdependence deepened to the extent that a crisis in 
one state could easily spread to other states or regions. 
With this unprecedented domino-effect style of interdependence, neo-mercantilistic 
economic policies were adopted by major trading and investment states or regions. 
New phenomena such as new protectionism through non-tariffs barriers, unilateral 
retaliations, voluntary export restraints, and structural impediment initiatives (SII) 
emerged in international economic relations. Multilateral institutions and agreements 
such as the WTO came into existence in order to solve conflicts over economic 
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interests among MNCs, states, and regions. In the Korean PDS period, this 
international systemic pressure reached a point that led to the outstanding 
transformation of the Korean PDS into a TS which is far more compatible with free 
market demands from the globalising neo-liberal regime. Thus, in this thesis, a 
synthetic approach which consists of society-centred, state-centred, and system- 
centred approaches was elaborated. And, both the theory of sociological new 
institutionalism and learning theory were also adopted in order to specially deal with 
not only institutional but also ideational resistance, inertia, and reactions towards 
internally or externally driven changes and transformation in both the Korean and 
Japanese PDS period. 
It is the concept of bounded rationality which produces more congruent explications 
of the Korean economic system. Sociological new institutionalism emphasises the 
social and historical embeddedness of institutions, and even culture, customs, and 
national mentality are subjects of its research. The inefficient and zigzag policies and 
irrational bureaucratic behaviours in the Korean and Japanese PDS can be revealed 
and investigated by the theory of sociological new institutionalism. In the Korean and 
Japanese PDS, the historical, social and organisational inertia and shadows of the DS 
period were persistently sustained, despite their dark influences and obstacles 
characterised by corruption between politicians and businessmen (Japan and Korea), 
and moral hazard in the financial and industrial sectors which led to over-investments 
and over-capacity in industrial structure (Korea). This extended developmentalism in 
the PDS period can be clearly explained by sociological new institutionalism. 
Moreover, even the Korean and Japanese people's economic nationalism and 
mercantilistic economic mentality can be dealt with by this theory of sociological new 
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institutionalism. 
It is important to remember that mercantilist economic nationalism, and the 
`community first mentality' are deeply rooted in both Korean and Japanese society 
and people. And this mentality is an undeniable factor which not only facilitated 
economic modernisation and rapid growth but also caused external, systemic 
pressures comprising complaints of stiff trade and investment barriers formulated by 
economic patriotism (such as `buy Korean movements') and economic institutions 
(such as the Keiretsu system and the Chaebol system). Thus, it is these `culturally 
determined institutions' together with the concepts of `bounded rationality' and 
`utility satisfaction' rather than `utility maximisation' that gives the theory of 
sociological new institutionalism its advantage in explaining Korea and Japan's 
domestic institutional resistance, inertia, and reaction to the challenges and pressures 
from the globalising neo-liberal regime. 
Discussions about learning in foreign policy analysis were also adopted in order to 
distinguish the Korean TS period from the DS period in terms of changes in decision- 
makers' belief systems towards the efficacy of the intrusive state into markets. As 
emphasised several times in this thesis, the PDS period was the space where policy- 
makers' beliefs were divided internally and beliefs regarding developmentalism and 
neo-liberalism competed with each other to occupy the dominant ideational position. 
The ideational cleavage, divided belief systems, and competing economic ideologies 
in this period were not only the major background of the disappearance of the DS 
style of effective, rapid realisation of economic objectives but also the most important 
reason for the Korean economic slump in the 1990s and the eventual crisis of 1997. 
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In dealing with belief systems of policy-makers and decision-makers, learning and 
adaptation were distinguished in this thesis. It is important to have a concept of 
adaptation in explaining the Korean PDS period when only FDI policies changed in 
order to evade international criticisms of domestic market protection. Reciprocity 
became a fashionable term in defining a state's economic interactions with other 
states after the collapse of the Cold War order. In the PDS period, Korean policy- 
makers changed Korea's FDI policies which were however not able to ameliorate 
international pressures or were more or less unacceptable to the countries pressing for 
change. In other words, policy changes were not accompanied by institutional and 
ideational changes. Thus, the Korean PDS was a space characterised by inefficient 
and incongruent configuration of liberalised FDI policies, and protection and 
mercantilism oriented institutions and belief systems. This thesis argues that the 
Korean PDS period was an adaptation period that was accompanied by behavioural 
changes in foreign economic policy (superficial policy changes). The Korean state's 
learning could be found in three periods; from Japan's developmentalism in the DS 
period, from Japan's expansionist developmentalism in the PDS period, and finally 
from the globalising neo-liberal regime in the TS period. 
Learning brings changes in belief systems. In the DS period, Korean FDI policy was 
based on the belief of the efficacy of both domestic market protectionism and raising 
indigenous corporations and technologies. Economic nationalism was a key 
underpinning factor in this dirigiste, state-led FDI management. In the PDS period, 
policy towards IFDI was more controversial. IFDI policy was basically based on 
liberalisation, which was in sharp contrast with institutions and belief systems which 
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were fixed to preserve the major characteristics of the DS (state led managed, 
distorted market system). However, in OFDI policy, Korean policy-makers once 
again tried to learn from the Japanese EDS in Southeast Asia. Korea's learning of the 
Japanese EDS was in its nascent stage and was not realised due to the turbulent East 
Asian economic crisis. However, it can be predicted that after experiencing a certain 
period of structural adjustment, the Korean EDS in Southeast Asia will be re- 
implemented with better-prepared plans and grand ideological slogans. China uses 
the ideological term, `Greater China', in order to facilitate and lead the large scale 
integrating processes of East Asian regionalism (Sum 1996: 231). Japan cautiously 
tries to realise the `Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere', pursuing more economic 
and political weight in the region (Hook 1996: 176). Material interests in trade and 
investment are important driving factors in East Asian regionalism. However, 
ideational factors are just as important as material interests in facilitating and 
promoting a common sense of the `we identity' in the development of East Asian 
regionalism. Korea obviously needs ideological preparation in order to participate 
actively in the development of East Asian regionalism. 
In contrast to these two voluntary learnings, coercive learning was observed in the 
Korean TS period. Learning in the TS period was caused by the economic crisis. 
And the structures and contents of learning were neo-liberalism. At this stage, it is 
important to point out that the intensity and extent of coercive learning were much 
deeper and wider than those of voluntary learning. The Korean people's pains were 
enormous and the costs of institutional changes and transformations were expensive. 
Cognitive confusions as well as conflicts between contending belief systems were 
higher in coercive learning compared with voluntary learning. This means that 
361 
coercive learning is abrupt and discontinuous, while voluntary leaning is incremental. 
Voluntary learning could happen only when old and present belief systems and 
institutions are similar to or familiar with new belief systems and institutions in terms 
of their nature and characteristics. In contrast, coercive learning could occur only 
when differences and incompatibility between the old, present and new belief systems 
and institutions are greatly amplified to the extent that the complete replacement of 
old and current belief systems and institutions with new ones is unavoidable. In sum, 
voluntary learning accompanies incremental changes in belief systems and 
institutions, while coercive learning accompanies abrupt, discontinuous, and 
fundamental changes. Simple changes in policy are not learning but just adaptations 
in this thesis. 
Therefore, by dealing with the concept of learning, we can witness ideational or 
ideological conflicts between developmentalism and neo-liberalism. Korea and Japan 
showed contrasting reactions towards neo-liberal challenges. The Korean TS moved 
towards a more liberalised market system which is more or less compatible with and 
acceptable to the globalising neo-liberal regime. Japan is stuck in the PDS period. 
The economic war or conflict is not simply about material interests. It is also caused 
by ideological conflicts between developmentalism and neo-liberalism. As Goldstein 
points out, "often the environment in which an idea is tested, not the quality of the 
idea itself, determines perceptions of the policy's success" (Goldstein 1993: 16). This 
can be interpreted to mean that it is the neo-liberalising international political 
economy itself that mostly matters for Korean and Japanese foreign economic 
policies. Goldstein's argument also implies that the question of `which economic 
ideology -developmentalism or neo-liberalism- is better for economic development is 
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not the important question. The significant task for policy-makers lies in identifying 
determinant or dominant international or domestic environments in which foreign 
policy is tested'. In this sense, Korea and Japan are in the front-line of economic 
conflict over both material interests and ideational dominance. It is from Korea's and 
Japan's historical spaces that we can learn a lot about the relations among belief 
systems, institutions, and policies in accomplishing states' economic objectives. 
One of the main arguments of this thesis is that making a simultaneous, short-term 
changes or transformation of both belief systems and institutions which are 
compatible with changes in civil society, the state, and the international system is 
better than having an extended and long-term period of conflict and contradiction 
among policies, institutions, and belief systems. Put differently, a state's institutions, 
belief systems, and policies have to change and transform at roughly the same time as 
that state's developmental stage is upgraded and as domestic society, the state, and the 
international environment change. Lack of shared norms, values, and principles and 
the widening chasm and deepening discrepancy among these three pillars of economic 
development mean ever-increasing economic inefficiency and transformational costs. 
And, finally, the persistence of this situation can even result in socio-economic and 
political instability caused by long-term economic recession or a sudden crisis. 
The debates on financial liberalisation supports Goldstein's argument. Neo-liberalism recommends 
financial liberalisation in less developed countries. However, as the Korean case revealed, rapid 
financial liberalisation without proper supervisory institutions is very destructive and dangerous. 
Kapur argues for well planned liberalisation: "although LDCs undoubtedly need to open up to the 
world's capital markets, they would be well advised to do so at a pace commensurate with their 
capacity to develop sound regulatory and institutional structures" "(Kapur 1998: 124). The necessity 
of proper supervision and regulations are also supported by Mishkin (1996: 56). However, Wade 
and Veneroso (1998: 21) argue against LDCs financial liberalisation: "the great lesson of the Asian 
crisis is that the desirability of free movements of short-term capital has to be put in question. We 
have tended to lump together trade liberalisation with capital liberalisation". This view is also 
supported by Bhagwati (1998). Because of the lack of empirical research, we cannot answer the 
question of 'which recommendation is better? Rapid liberalisation (IMF) or slow, incremental 
liberalisation (Kapur and Mishkin) or no liberalisation (Wade and Bhagwati)?. This means that it is 
not the quality or superiority of economic ideas but the international environment which is neo- 
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The zigzag and confused policies in the Japanese PDS period simply deepened a 
decade long economic recession. As we have seen in Chapters 4 and 6, Japan tried to 
transplant its developmental system into Southeast Asia by a configuration of ODA 
and OFDI. In other words, in order to avoid domestic structural adjustments, Japan 
exported its economic problems emanating from the legacy of strong 
developmentalism to its neighbouring Southeast Asian countries. This artificially 
delayed and pre-empted domestic structural adjustments in the Japanese PDS period 
increased socio-economic and political dissatisfactions among its people and in other 
countries. Developmentalism played an invaluable role in economic growth and in 
achieving `catch up objectives' in the Japanese DS period. However, as Japan's 
international economic position and performance capacity were upgraded to the 
highest position and as Japan's civil society emerged from its long-term docile 
subjugation to the state apparatus and acknowledged the value of the individual and 
the quality of life instead of the rich country mentality, the core parts of 
developmentalism became important obstacles to further socio-economic 
development and political stability. 
Moreover, dissatisfaction and complaints from the region and the neo-liberalising 
international political economy increased to the point that Japan's ultimate objectives 
of becoming a regional leader, not to mention a potential global economic hegemon is 
being seriously doubted. The core parts of developmentalism such as domestic 
market protection for trade and investment, and export penetration to other open 
economies cannot be sustained for a long time. The international political economy 
liberalising that mostly matters for LDCs' foreign policy making processes and outcomes. 
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has become highly politicised since the end of the Cold War. Reciprocity, fair trade 
and investment, and liberalised, deregulated domestic markets are the prerequisites to 
be a member of the neo-liberalising international political economy. Without opening 
its market and without transforming its institutions and without changing its belief- 
systems which are firmly fixed to developmentalism, Japan's future is not as bright as 
it once was. 
Japan's delayed financial reform and deregulation processes are the symptoms of the 
inefficient Japanese PDS system. The bureaucratically planned transplantation of 
developmentalism into Southeast Asia also revealed its problematic structure. Japan's 
detour exports from Southeast Asian countries to the US market is in a precarious 
position as America's indifference to or acceptance of trade deficits with these 
countries is close to its end. Delayed deregulation increases price differences between 
Japan and other countries. Because of price differences, consumers as well as 
producers pay too much to get goods, services and production factors compared with 
other open economies. Furthermore, the delayed and slow financial reform causes 
economic deflation with contracted consumption and no further investments. In a 
word, Japan is deeply stuck in a prototype PDS period. The more discrepancy and 
inconsistency among policies, institutions, and belief systems, and the more conflicts 
between the developmentalistic domestic system and the neo-liberalising global 
economy, the more serious will socio-economic problems and political 
dissatisfactions become which can lead to a sudden economic or political crisis. 
Of course, Japan has an enormous domestic market and it has the capacity even to set 
an agenda in the international political economy. Moreover, it has the most 
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competitive industrial capability in manufacturing industry and with this strength it 
has accumulated large trade surpluses. However, reciprocity and fair transactions 
matter in the neo-liberalising international political economy. Generating huge trade 
surpluses by penetrating other countries' open markets means exporting 
unemployment. This unequal situation can become a political issue, if a state exports 
unemployment to its trading partners while it has its domestic market closed. 
Moreover, the terrain of global industry is changing towards more knowledge 
intensive, information oriented industry. Japan has no outstanding competitive 
advantage in these areas. 
Having said this, it is obvious that an ultimate structural adjustment producing a new 
economic system which is comfortably compatible with the globalising neo-liberal 
regime is urgently needed for Japan which is deeply stuck in the PDS period. 
However, it is very important to notice that all these assertions do not mean that Japan 
(or Japanese style capitalism) cannot compete with the neo-liberal regime led by 
Anglo-American capitalism. Japan, with its economic strength and national 
competitiveness, can compete with the US and Germany to become a new hegemon in 
the international multi-polar economic system by attaining state of the art 
technological innovations. Japan can compete and even become a winner in the 
economic competition for global economic hegemony. 
What this thesis argues is that slow but painstaking financial reform, slow and 
repetitive deregulation packages, policy inefficiency, socio-economic dissatisfaction, 
and political disorientation which are the externalised phenomena of the enlarged 
chasm among policies, institutions, and belief systems in the Japanese PDS period can 
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dilute or disperse a state's capacity to pursue and realise its economic objectives. The 
extent of a state's diversification and dispersion from its ultimate targets is dependent 
on the length of the PDS period and the depth of discrepancy among policies, 
institutions, and belief systems. If Japan copes with this trap of the PDS period, or in 
other words if Japan successfully completes its structural reforms which will make the 
Japanese economy compatible with and acceptable to the neo-liberalising global 
economy, Japan's potential to be a global economic hegemon could be much higher. 
This potential of Japan coupled with its big domestic market and its strength in 
manufacturing industry are what Korea lacks. Korea is a small country with a small 
domestic market and greatly dependent on exports. Korea also suffers from the lack 
of high technology and the absence of world-famous brand names. Korea is stuck 
between advanced countries' high technology and developing countries' cheap labour 
costs. More importantly, after the economic crisis, Korean people are at a loss as to 
what to believe in terms of economic ideology. Korean people today do not have any 
firm beliefs regarding either developmentalism or neo-liberalism. They are trying to 
demolish the negative legacies of developmentalism such as continuous corruption 
from the close relationships between businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats, and 
the government led financial system which finally resulted in moral hazard in the 
financial sector and policy-finances which eventually caused overcapacity in the car, 
steel, petro-chemical, and semi-conductor industries. They sufficiently understand the 
dangerous features of over-extended developmentalism. On the other hand, the 
Korean people have expressed dissatisfaction and great anxiety watching originally 
indigenous companies being sold to foreign firms at relatively cheap prices as a 
means to overcome the liquidity problems during the economic crisis. In a word, the 
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Korean people are wavering between two belief systems (economic nationalism based 
on developmentalism and a free market system based on neo-liberalism). 
Despite these uncertain and shaken belief systems, the Korean state pursued structural 
adjustment under the auspices of the IMF. The most powerful Korean decision and 
policy makers such as the president, presidential secretaries relevant to economic 
issues, and other relevant bureaucrats have firm beliefs that by being actively 
incorporated into the free market global economy, Korea can be an ultimate winner in 
the economic globalisation process. They believe that Korea can be a member of a 
group of winners in an indefinite process of economic competition among countries. 
However, what they ignore is that active participation in the globalising neo- 
liberalism will produce serious distributional inequality in Korean society. Thus, it 
can be argued that, in the Korean TS period, by actively implementing neo-liberal 
reforms, decision and policy makers manipulated external neo-liberal pressures in 
order to attain the ultimate objective of the `rich state' which was a core feature of the 
DS, sacrificing people's quality of life and social welfare. 
Despite this expected unequal development and social instability caused by neo- 
liberal reforms, Korea moved into the TS period from the PDS period because there 
was no other alternative but to accept IMF conditionalities right after the currency 
crisis. Korea is a small country with many disadvantages. Thus, the currency crisis 
forced Korea to directly request financial help from the IMF. The neo-liberal regime 
is organised into core and peripheral parts. The core part consists of the IMF, the 
World Bank, and leading countries in these institutions such as the US, and Japan 
while the peripheral part is composed of Wall Street, credit-rating companies, and 
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other financial companies playing a leading role in global financial markets2. IMF 
conditionalities have two major policy targets in Korea: stabilisation first and then 
structural adjustment. 
Stabilisation programmes which are faithful to neo-classical economics were so 
inflexibly applied that the Korean industrial base faced total collapse. High interest 
rates and deflationary fiscal policy only led to an unprecedented high rate of 
bankruptcy of big conglomerates, not to mention small and medium sized enterprises 
(SMEs). Subsequent structural adjustment programmes also led to a more serious 
credit squeeze. Every bank was reluctant to lend, because they had to accumulate 
their capital to attain the BIS standard. As economic indices seriously deteriorated, 
the Korean government and the IMF loosened the programmes and the results were a 
reflationary fiscal system and a reduction in interest rate. This situation shows how 
inflexible IMP programmes were and how great the shock from the crisis to the 
Korean government was. 
The sudden and abrupt economic crisis was obviously the main reason for coercive 
learning in Korea, which forced Korea to move into the TS period. In the TS period, 
some Korean institutions such as economic nationalism, governmental organisations 
and their norms, principles, and standard operational procedures will not change 
overnight. It is obvious that institutions last longer than changed belief systems. This 
means that even though Korean decision and policy makers' belief systems have 
changed from developmentalism to neo-liberalism, Korean institutions historically 
2 Bhagwati calls this structural feature of the neo-liberal regime the Wall Street-Treasury complex and 
Wade and Veneroso call this the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex. See Bhagwati (1998) and 
Wade and Veneroso (1998). 
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and culturally adjusted to developmentalism will reveal some signs of resistance and 
reactions towards the neo-liberalising domestic economic system. At this juncture, 
we need more time to predict or decide whether the Korean TS will ultimately move 
into a complete neo-liberal state (NLS) or stay in the TS which is relatively acceptable 
to the globalising neo-liberal regime. 
The TS period is different from the PDS period in terms of changes in belief systems. 
In the DS period, we witnessed the shared ultimate objectives and systemic 
consistency among policies, institutions, and belief systems. In the PDS period, we 
could observe only superficial policy changes which were not accompanied by 
institutional changes. Belief systems in this period were not fixed and decision and 
policy makers' wavering belief systems between developmental ism and neo- 
liberalism were a key factor in understanding Korea's inefficient and ineffective 
economic performance and the onset of economic recession and the eventual 
economic crisis. Inconsistent and conflicting relationships among policies, 
institutions and belief systems in the PDS clearly revealed their negative, destructive 
nature in Korea before the IMF bailout and in Japan until the present. In the TS 
period, policies and belief systems of decision and policy makers' have dramatically 
and fundamentally changed while institutions have not. Thus the focal points to 
observe in the Korean TS period are mainly twofold: first, the extent and intensity of 
institutional reactions and resistance and second, the trend of peoples' uncertain belief 
systems regarding neo-liberalism. Thus, it can be argued that it is according to the 
changing conditions of these two significant variables that Korea's socio-economic 
and political future will be determined. Four scenarios can be provided according to 
the extent of changes in people's belief systems and institutional resistance. 
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(1) First scenario: if the Korean people are not satisfied with state-led free market 
oriented structural reforms and consequent poor welfare system, and if the Korean 
people replace their paradigm of `community oriented growth first' mentality with 
`quality of individual life' and `distributional equality', the Korean TS period cannot 
escape from social instability. And the tensions and confrontation between the state 
and civil society will be pervasive to the extent that in a worst situation, the entire free 
market, neo-liberal economic reform programme will go adrift and economic 
backwardness will remain for a long time. (2) Second scenario: if the Korean people 
keep their `community oriented economic growth first' mentality, Korea will soon 
recover from economic hardship and move forward to be a member of the winners 
group in the global free market competition among countries at the expense of the 
`quality of individual life' and social justice symbolised by `distributional equality'. 
(3) Third scenario: if institutional resistance is sustained for longer, Korea's foreign 
economic policies will be less efficient and effective because of the discrepancy and 
inconsistency among policies, belief systems and institutions. (4) Fourth scenario: if 
institutional resistance is resolved and institutions become consistent with the already 
changed policies and bureaucrats' belief systems, the Korean economic system will 
eventually transform into a neo-liberal economy and Korea will regain its momentum 
of economic growth equivalent to the DS period's economic success. 
Considering the rigid legacies and inertia of developmentalism oriented institutions in 
the Korean TS, the future direction of the Korean TS will lie between the second and 
third scenarios. Even though the Korean TS' government has insisted several times 
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that the Korean people's exclusiveness or mercantilistic economic patriotism towards 
IFDI and import has dramatically changed, the Korean people have revealed their 
deep aversion towards the rush by foreign firms to buy Korean firms which became 
relatively cheap in the aftermath of the economic crisis and the domestic structural 
reform process. Moreover, bureaucrats' reaction and resistance to neo-liberal reform 
have re-emerged as the Korean economy recovered from the crisis. Bureaucrats 
simply do not want to give away their old privileges and interests which were possible 
because of their tight control over and regulation of the whole domestic economy. In 
a free, open, and transparent market system, bureaucrats' leverage towards private 
economic actors will definitely decrease. 
So far we have focused on Korea's domestic and state environments in analysing its 
foreign economic policy. Among the international or regional environment of foreign 
economic policy, the relationships between state and market and East Asian economic 
integration have been the main topic of this thesis. Globalisation and market forces 
challenge state power and its capacity. For some globalists, the state has already lost 
its power against market forces. For them, the roles of MNCs and transnational 
finance and globalising civil social movements have tremendously expanded to the 
extent that state regulation and governance is unable to control or manage them. 
Their argument is undeniable, particularly considering that the Korean economic 
crisis was, to some extent, caused by uncontrollable transnational financial flows. 
However, it was the absence of regulation and governance that directly resulted in the 
currency crisis which subsequently led to a full blown economic crisis. As we have 
seen in Chapters 5 and 6, the Korean government carelessly deregulated the domestic 
financial market in order to become a member of the OECD. This abrupt financial 
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deregulation with no strengthened financial supervisory system was a determining 
factor in the currency crisis. 
In this regard, it can be argued that the existence of state regulation and governance is 
as important as a free open market system. The Korean state must have its domestic 
market opened and deregulated in order to cope with the pressures from the neo- 
liberalising international political economy. An open, free domestic market is also 
needed to make Korea's industrial and financial sectors competitive with world 
leading companies in these areas. The absence of competition in the domestic market 
was another outstanding legacy of developmentalism. Under the developmentalist 
belief system, the Korean government recommended and even artificially arranged 
oligopolistic industrial organisation by the help of policy-finance in the name of 
raising national competitiveness while protecting-the domestic market from foreign 
competitors. This long term government protection of the industrial sector and the 
government led financial sector finally led to weak competitiveness in these 
industries. 
An open and free market is necessary to make Korean industries competitive with 
world standards. Also, an open and free market is necessary to reduce price 
differences between the domestic and international markets. The Korean people have 
paid too dearly, because of the tightly protected, closed domestic market. In sum, not 
only a free, open market but also a strong, efficient state for supervision and 
governance is necessary both to overcome the challenges from economic globalisation 
and to take a lead in global economic competition. This means that states and markets 
are not incompatible and not in a zero sum game but they have to be symbiotic and 
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co-operative in order to attain certain economic objectives. For example, "regulatory 
oversight and market discipline are ... complementary means for achieving a stable 
and robust financial system" (Knight 1998: 1197). 
Also, we witnessed `a paradox of globalisation': a return of the state with much more 
strengthened capacity and power in the Korean TS period. This paradoxical situation 
was brought about by the economic crisis. Once the crisis burst, there was only one 
apparatus which could systematically cope with the pressures from the economic 
globalisation process and that was the state. The Korean state in the PDS period was 
squeezed between globalising neo-liberalism and strengthened civil society, 
particularly trade unions, social movements and the Chaebol. Thus, the Korean PDS 
was a historical space where state capacity was in the weakest position compared with 
the DS and the TS period. Therefore, it can be argued that the state as a supervisory 
mechanism and the state as a last resort in crisis management clearly suggests that a 
strong, efficient state is a necessary condition for economic development and socio- 
political stability. The KIEP (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy), a 
government financed think tank stresses the need to strengthen the role of the state in 
the aftermath of the economic crisis: "the government should be more active in 
restructuring the corporate and financial sectors, reducing corruption and educating 
people" (The Korea Herald 23 November 1999). 
A strong and efficient state apparatus should not exist by itself. There must be a 
balancing counterpart, that is, a strong, mature civil society. A strong, mature civil 
society is needed to check and balance the strong state. State-led economic 
management and subsequent success in terms of per capita GDP and people's 
374 
educational levels led to the growing capacity of civil society. This is `a paradox of 
the strong state'. In the DS period, there was no civil society. The Chaebol were 
highly dependent on government policy-finances. Trade unions were oppressed and 
newspapers and broadcasting companies were continuously censored and regulated. 
Moreover, there was no middle class which could try to pursue its interests in policy 
making processes. However, as Korea's economy grew, civil society gradually and 
steadily grew and in the Korean PDS period, civil society reached a point where it 
became a firm base for Korea's democratisation. 
However, this strengthened civil society became relatively weaker in the TS period. 
Of course, the Chaebol were under intense pressure from the neo-liberalism oriented 
structural reforms. The reform of the Chaebol was the most crucial but difficult part 
of Korean structural adjustment and without Chaebol reform, the entire Korean 
reform process could be in vain. Thus, weakening the Chaebol's bargaining power in 
the realms of civil society and against the state was a desirable situation. However, 
the pacified trade union movements in the TS period compared with their militant 
movements in the PDS period is more difficult to understand. It needs more detailed 
explanation. The core of labour reform was to obtain labour market flexibility and 
this meant unstable job markets and inevitably increased lay-offs. Despite the 
unprecedented high rate of unemployment under the IMF led structural adjustment 
programmes, Korean trade unions were relatively inactive. Of course, the Korean 
government actively integrated trade union representatives into the Tripartite 
Committee which consists of representatives from the government, business, and 
trade unions in order to resolve conflicts among three parties and to develop a united 
and co-ordinated national capacity in dealing with the economic crisis. 
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The outcomes of the Tripartite Committee were disappointing to trade unions. The 
Chaebol attained their ultimate goal of reducing labour costs with the help of the 
legalisation of labour market flexibility in the newly amended labour law. Although 
the unemployment rate was the highest, the social welfare system was terribly poor, 
and there were no great efforts to extend social safety nets because the government 
was faithfully following the prescriptions of the IMF's neo-liberal based programmes. 
However, trade unions did not organise nation-wide strikes because they were afraid 
of strong criticism from the conservative middle-class that had appealed to economic 
nationalism. Conservatives were appealing that nation-wide strikes would make the 
already rock bottom economic situation much more devastated and active trade union 
movements in this crisis would obviously be regarded as anti-nationalistic behaviour. 
Instead of `quality of individual life' and `distributional equality', the `rich state first' 
mentality was a core characteristics of the DS. This mentality is still deeply rooted in 
the Korean TS period. This pervading false and manipulated consciousness of `rich 
state first mentality' is a key factor underpinning Korean civil society's relative 
inactivity in the TS period. 
To be sure, this nationalistic mentality played an invaluable role in Korea's economic 
take-off and modernisation period. However, it cannot be denied that excessive 
economic nationalism causes external pressures from the globalising neo-liberal 
regime. President Dae-Joong Kim, pointed out the problems of excessive `savings on 
consumption' and `buy Korean campaign' in a TV program `Conversation with the 
people'. In that program, he argued for reforms in not only institutions but also in 
people's thinking in relation to IFDI by mentioning that the Toyota factory in the US 
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is the US' not Japan's factory (Joongangilbo 21 January 1998). `Buy Korean 
movements', an excessive nationalistic mentality led to criticisms from America and 
the persistence of such excessive nationalism could finally result in a Structural 
Impediment Initiative from America as happened to Japan. Thus, in the era of 
globalisation, the nationalistic mentality has become an important obstacle in 
formulating balanced relations between a strong, efficient state and a strong, mature 
civil society in order to cope with pressures from the processes of economic 
globalisation. 
A balance in relations between the state and civil society is also necessary for Korea 
in order to actively participate and lead in the economic globalisation process. A 
strong state without a mature civil society is dangerous, because there is always the 
potential for abuse of power by the strong state, such as authoritarianism, human 
rights abuse, and the lack of social welfare and increasing unequal distribution of 
economic growth. A global neo-liberal rearrangement without a strong, efficient state 
is also dangerous, because lack of state supervision and a grand development plan 
could led to socio-economic and political adversity caused by transnational financial 
flows which are difficult to regulate. In a worst case scenario, a state can lose its 
economic sovereignty by the intervention of the neo-liberal regime such as the IMF 
and the World Bank as happened in East Asia after the economic crisis. Moreover, 
without state supervision and strategic planning, an entire national economic system 
could be dominated by foreign MNCs or foreign capital and the lack of indigenous 
capital, companies and technologies as happened in Latin America. 
A globalising neo-liberal order without a mature domestic and global civil society is 
377 
also dangerous. Neo-liberalism which is absolutely dependent on free markets is not 
concerned about environmental protections, social welfare, and unequal development 
among states. These are the shared concerns of domestic and global social 
movements. In sum, in the age of globalisation, both a strong, efficient state and a 
strong, mature civil society are necessary conditions not only for overcoming 
challenges from free marketisation but also in taking a leading position in the 
economic competition among states which are intensified in the neo-liberalising 
international political economy. 
Globalisation is a process which contains several sub-rearrangements such as 
regionalisation, sub-economic zones, and localisation. In this thesis, East Asian 
regionalism has been dealt with by a comparative case study of both Korean and 
Japanese OFDI development in the region. As we have seen in Chapters 4 and 6, 
Japan carefully planned and transplanted its developmental system to Southeast Asia. 
The emergence of East Asia as a world economic locomotive in the 1980s and 1990s 
before the economic crisis was the result of a tremendous combination of Japanese 
OFDI and ODA developments in the region. However, Japan's planned 
transplantation of its developmentalism to Southeast Asia had a problematic feature 
from the start. Japan's core structure of developmental ism (mercantilistic foreign 
market penetration by exports while its domestic market remains tightly closed) 
cannot be sustained longer and cannot escape trade and investment conflicts. 
The core structures of Japanese developmentalism were reproduced in Southeast 
Asian countries: exports to open Western markets while their domestic markets were 
tightly protected or regulated. The only difference between Japan and the Southeast 
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Asian countries was the extent of openness and belief systems towards the role of 
IFDI. While Japan's inward investment environment is not favourable to foreign 
competitors and there has been insignificant amounts of IFDI, Southeast Asian 
countries have enjoyed the benefits of open IFDI policies. However, Japan has not 
opened its domestic market to Southeast Asia countries, it has been reluctant to 
transfer technology to these countries, and it has enjoyed chronic trade surplus with 
these countries. 
The Southeast Asia countries have been simply used by Japan as extended domestic 
industrial production sites or export platforms for Japan's accomplishment of its 
mercantilistic developmental objectives. The long-term transplanted 
developmentalism in East Asia finally brought a backlash from the globalising neo- 
liberal regime. In trade, Western open market economies could not compete with 
East Asian developmental economies which faithfully practised the crucial 
prescriptions of developmentalism, such as subsidies, tax incentives, policy-finances, 
domestic market protections, and a high dependence on exports. The sense of 
unfairness from the view point of Western open market economies led to Trade 
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) and agricultural talks at the Uruguay Round. Agricultural, services and 
knowledge-intensive industries are sectors where Western open market economies, 
particularly the US have both comparative and competitive advantage over East Asian 
countries. With these agreements favourable to both America and Western based 
transnational finance, the neo-liberal regime punished the East Asian countries right 
after the onset of the East Asian economic crisis by trying to demolish core parts of 
the developmentalist structures in these economies. 
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Thus, East Asia after the crisis became an arena where not only material interest but 
also belief systems are fiercely contended: manufacturing industries versus 
agricultural, financial, and knowledge intensive industries as well as 
developmentalism oriented, managed market versus the neo-liberal free market. To 
some extent, it can be regarded that the origins of the neo-liberal backlash towards 
East Asia can be found in the long-term, painful structural adjustment period in 
America in the 1980s. That painful and costly adjustment period was basically caused 
by the East Asia countries' comparative advantage over America in manufacturing 
industry. In that period, America improved its economic system and transformed its 
industrial structure into knowledge-intensive, information and telecommunication 
oriented industry. With strengthened competitiveness in these industries and the 
traditionally strong financial sector, America transferred the adjustment costs of the 
1980s to East Asia which suffered from the impact of the economic crisis and forced 
East Asia to adopt a free and open market system in the name of fair trade and 
investment. In this sense, America's transfer of adjustment costs to East Asia is a 
distinctive feature of globalising neo-liberalism. 
Korea was not so different from Japan in participating and promoting East Asian 
regionalism. Of course, Korean OFDI to Southeast Asia was in a nascent position 
compared with Japan's systematically integrated FDI development. In Korean OFDI 
development, carefully planned government support and co-ordination between the 
government and private firms was not found. However, labour oppression, a 
distinguishing feature of earlier developmentalism was easily found in Korean OFDI 
development in the region. Korean OFDI expansion in the region was centred around 
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labour-intensive industry and Korean managers were notorious for their strictness 
about trade unions in the region. This is not such a different story from Japan's 
earlier period of OFDI development in the region. Korean affiliates in the region 
were also reluctant to transfer technology and also preferred to import valuable parts 
from their parent companies in Korea rather than making contracts with local firms. 
These negative characteristics of Korean OFDI in Southeast Asia has to be improved 
in order to attain sustainable economic integration based on equal and horizontal 
division of labour in the region. 
The period of FDI suspension and contraction after the crisis could be used as a 
period for preparation and reflection. As we have seen so far, while Korean OFDI in 
Southeast Asia was at a nascent stage, it already showed a lack of careful planning 
and displayed the negative aspects of developmental ism (such as labour oppression, 
export penetration into open Western markets, and tightly protected domestic market 
not only to Western competitors but also to reverse imports from Southeast Asia). 
This picture is in sharp contrast with Japan's OFDI development in this region 
considering that Japan's OFDI development has been carefully prepared by co- 
ordinated plans among bureaucrats, businessmen and even academics. Moreover, in 
terms of the extent and scale of OFDI, Korea's OFDI development is trivial compared 
with Japan's massive OFDI presence in the region. However, it is the core parts of 
developmentalism that both Japan and Korea share in their respective regional 
developments of OFDI. Of course, the core parts consist of the export oriented 
organisational structures of OFDI and the intangible mercantilistic mentality behind 
this tangible material evolution. 
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Thus, both Korea and Japan can learn from the East Asia economic crisis. From the 
onset of the crisis to the subsequent structural adjustments in the region, the neo- 
liberal regime exercised its systemic power and brought the hardest period so far to 
developmentalist economies in the region. Sometimes, a crisis can be an invaluable, 
priceless opportunity. In this regard, the East Asian crisis suggested a valuable 
chance to Korea and Japan to reconsider and reflect on their whole system of 
transplanted developmentalism into Southeast Asia. The main argument of this thesis 
is that the main structure and objectives of the exported Japanese and Korean 
developmentalism in the region have to be changed and readjusted to the globalising 
neo-liberal regime. In other words, regionalised developmental ism in Southeast Asia 
has to change its underlying fundamental beliefs and structures in order to cope with 
and actively take part in the globalising neo-liberal regime. Under the realty of the 
neo-liberal order, free markets, free trade, and free investment come first before the 
state, regional and global regulation, supervision, and governance. Reciprocity and 
fairness in trade and investment constitute the nucleus of the neo-liberal international 
political economy. Unchanged developmental belief systems and institutional 
resistance will simply intensify and prolong inefficient conflicts between 
developmentalism and neo-liberalism in the region. These protracted conflicting 
relations will be a major obstacle to realising further regional economic growth and 
integration. 
Thus, East Asian regionalism after the crisis has to be based on open and equal 
processes rather than hierarchical and exploitative processes. Both Korean and 
Japanese transplanted developmentalism in the region has to be transformed to the 
extent that the entire regional economic system is compatible with or acceptable to the 
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neo-liberalising international political economy. This assertion does not mean that 
Anglo-American neo-liberalism will ultimately triumph over East Asian 
developmentalism (Emmerson 1998: 48-49). It is important to remember that 
developmentalism has its positive features composed of an efficient and hard working 
government and diligent and community-oriented people devoted to the realisation of 
national objectives rather than individual self interests. A compatible and acceptable 
economic system to the neo-liberal regime does not necessarily mean the absence of 
strategic planning, supervision and governance by the state. 
The economic crisis in East Asia does not mean the end of the East Asian 
development model. Changes and transformations in East Asia after the economic 
crisis "could represent evolution rather than dissolution" (Whittaker and Kurosawa 
1998: 762). The market is a historically and institutionally determined social 
construction. The market is not fully independent from the shadow of history, culture, 
and institution. There are market failures. Moreover, as we have seen in chapter 3, 
the market is not an absolutely self-sustaining, self-sufficient and self-correcting 
system. The market is not a living and reasoning actor but just a place where 
transactions occur. This is the reason why the market has to be checked and balanced 
by other social constructions, particularly by a strong, efficient state and a strong, 
mature society. 
This thesis has continuously argued that we need not only a strong, efficient state but 
also a strong, mature civil society in order to overcome the negative aspects of 
developmentalism and to cope with systemic pressures from the globalising neo- 
liberal regime. Abolishing the negative features of developmental ism is not to be 
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identified with the complete destruction of state strategic planning, supervision, and 
governance. As we have seen earlier in this Chapter, the less the discrepancy and 
inconsistency among policies, institutions, and belief systems, the great the possibility 
of realising the state's economic objectives. In this regard, it is the extent of the 
compatibility and acceptability between East Asian developmental ism and the neo- 
liberalising international political economy that matter most. 
Thus it can be argued that the future direction of the Japanese and Korean economies 
and of East Asia economic integration depends on how to keep the positive features of 
developmentalism (such as efficient, goal-oriented state bureaucrats and community- 
oriented people) and to ameliorate its negative features while also maintaining an 
open, free market system compatible with and acceptable to the globalising neo- 
liberal regime. Gyohten makes the same argument: "most serious challenge now 
facing the Japanese economy is probably the issue of identifying itself as a model of 
capitalism, or a model of the market economy, which is compatible with other models 
of market economies in the world while maintaining its vitality and dynamism" 
(Gyohten 1994: 31). 
What Korea learned from its DS, PDS and TS periods is investigated throughout this 
thesis and, to be sure, these experiences suggest a valuable case study for other 
countries which are at a lower stage of development. This thesis shows that Japan and 
Korea finally diverged in the configuration of the three pillars of economic 
development (policies, institutions and belief systems). Korea is in the TS period 
while Japan remains in the PDS period. Korea's transformation into the TS is totally 
different from Japan and is an unprecedented case in the historical trajectory of the 
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East Asian economic development process. Now, Korea stands alone and has no state 
which can be a mentor state after moving into the new, unfamiliar TS period. Korea 
has to learn by itself. Korea has to explore the unknown territory of the TS period by 
itself. Thus, in a sense, Korea is a leading state in the region in terms of 
developmental trajectory rather than in terms of economic strength and scale. 
Meanwhile, Japan displays two contrasting verdicts. One verdict is that Japan is 
struggling to make its domestic economic system compatible with and acceptable to 
the neo-liberal regime by slow, incremental reforms in order to minimise adjustment 
costs in its PDS economic system which is under enormous pressures from the neo- 
liberalising global economy. The other verdict is that Japan is competing for global 
economic hegemony with America by trying to conserve its arguably competitive 
developmentalism oriented economic structure. In this judgement, every economy 
has its long-term economic cycle and Japan is at the bottom of the cycle while 
America is at its pinnacle (Krugman 1998: 45). In other words, the utility of the 
domestic developmental economic system and transplanted developmental ism in 
Southeast Asia is still intact and valuable. For the proponents of this evaluation, the 
East Asian crisis and Japan's decade long economic recession is not an expression of 
the limits of developmentalism but they are just usual happenings of the economic 
cycle. So far, nobody can be sure about which interpretation and judgement is correct 
and more persuasive. 
However, the one clear thing is that the Korean case has no contrasting interpretations 
unlike Japan. For example, the decade long recession for Japan can be viewed as a 
soft recession because of Japan's superiority in manufacturing industry and its 
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astronomical trade surplus and big domestic market sufficient to put up with 
economic instability and recessions. Korea is different lacking all Japan's economic 
capabilities3. Thus, Korea was eventually forced to transform into the TS. In this 
stage, the question of which state is on the right track from the long-term view of 
development needs more time to be evaluated and judged. And this is the reason why 
Korea's departure from developmental ism and post-developmentalism in terms of 
changes in belief systems are as equally interesting and carefully observable as 
Japan's current position in the PDS. The whole thesis has focused on the Korean road 
to the TS period and Japan's road to the PDS. It reveals the bifurcation point of the 
two economies' development path and the remarkable differences in the 
characteristics between the Korean TS and the Japanese PDS period only in terms of 
changes in belief systems. The focal point of future research lies in Korean and 
Japan's institutional resistance or reaction to changes in belief systems and the neo- 
liberalising international political economy. The historical lessons and implications 
of this bifurcation of these two countries' development path needs more time to be 
researched, because institutional changes or transformation takes longer than belief 
system changes. 
3 Criticising IMF prescriptions to Korea, Feldstein (1998: 28) argues that "Korea's outstanding 
performance combining persistently high grow, low inflation and low unemployment suggests that 
the current structure of the Korean economy may now be well suited to Korea's stage of economic 
and political development". However, what Feldstein neglects are not only the side-effects of 
developmentalism but also the international position of Korea. Korea needs to remove corruption 
and Chaebol dominance. Moreover, because Korea is highly vulnerable to the international system 
in terms of security and high dependence on exports, Korea has to adjust quickly to changes in the 
international system in order to minimise adverse impacts and take advantage of chances given by 
systemic changes. 
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